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resumo 
 
 
As tecnologias de comunicação sem fios tornaram-se amplamente adoptadas, 
surgindo em aplicações heterógeneas que vão desde a localização de vítimas, 
pessoal médico e equipamentos em cenários de desastre à monitorização da 
condição física de máquinas em ambientes industrials. Muito frequentemente, 
as aplicações exigem uma resposta limitada no tempo que, geralmente, em 
sistemas distribuídos, é substancialmente dependente do desempenho da 
tecnologia de comunicação utilizada. Estes sistemas tendem a possuir 
requisitos de tempo-real uma vez que a comunicação de dados tem de ser 
conduzida dentro de limites temporais pré-definidos que, quando não 
cumpridos, podem comprometer o correcto funcionamento do sistema e 
resultar em perdas económicas ou colocar em risco vidas humanas. 
A potencial adopção de tecnologias sem-fios para um crescente número de 
cenários traduz-se num aumento da complexidade e heterogeneidade dos 
requisitos operacionais relativamente às tecnologias cabladas. A acompanhar 
esta tendência verifica-se uma crescente procura de sistemas distribuídos, 
caracterizados quer por uma boa relação custo-eficácia, quer pela simplicidade 
de instalação, manutenção e adaptação.  Ao mesmo tempo, estes sistemas 
tendem a requerer flexibilidade operacional, que apenas pode ser assegurada 
se a tecnlogia de comunicação empregue supportar transmissões de dados 
dispoletadas quer por eventos (event-triggered), quer por tempo (time-
triggered) e se, ao mesmo tempo, em funcionamento, permitir a alteração dos 
parâmetros de comunicação correspondentes. 
Frequentemente, as aplicações com comunicações sem fios caracterizam-se 
por exigências de instalação que apenas podem ser endereçadas usando 
alimentação através de baterias e/ou mecanismos de recolha de energia do 
ambiente envolvente. Estas aplicações têm tipicamente requisitos exigentes de 
autonomia e de tamanho, impedindo o recurso a baterias de grande dimensão. 
Dado que o suporte de comunicações pode representar uma parte significativa 
dos requisitos de energia da estação, o uso de tecnologias de comunicação de 
elevado consumo não é adequado. Desta forma, nestas aplicações, as 
tecnologias de comunicação de curto-alcance tornaram-se amplamente 
adoptadas uma vez que, apesar de se caracterizarem por taxas de 
transmissão inferiores, consomem apenas uma fracção da energia das 
tecnologias de maior alcance. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
resumo 
 
 
Em geral, os requisitos de pontualidade da comunicação de dados podem ser 
cumpridos através da garantia da disponibilidade do meio no instante em que 
qualquer estação inicie uma transmissão. Em ambientes controlados esta 
disponibilidade pode ser garantida, na medida em que existe um controlo de 
quais as estações que foram instaladas na área e qual a sua função. 
Contrariamente, em ambientes abertos, tal controlo é difícil de garantir uma 
vez que não existe conhecimento a priori de que estações ou tecnologias 
podem competir pelo meio, tornando o suporte de comunicações de tempo-
real um desafio difícil de implementar em cenários com estações de 
comunicação não controladas. 
As comunicações de baixo consumo têm sido o foco de um esforço de 
investigação bastante amplo, por exemplo, no domínio das redes de sensores 
sem fios. Embora possam permitir uma maior autonomia a estações baseadas 
em baterias, estas tecnologias são reconhecidas como sendo negativamente 
influenciadas por tecnologias semelhantes competindo pelo mesmo meio e, 
em particular, por tecnologias que utilizem níveis de potência de transmissão 
mais elevados em bandas de frequências comuns. De forma cada vez mais 
acentuada, a banda industrial, científica e médica (ISM) dos 2.4 GHz tem-se 
tornado mais saturada com tecnologias que competem entre si pelo acesso ao 
meio tais como, por exemplo, Bluetooth e ZigBee, dois padrões de 
comunicação que são a base de vários protocolos de tempo-real. Apesar 
destas tecnologias aplicarem mecanismos para melhorar a sua coexistência, 
são vulneráveis a transmissões de estações não controladas que usem as 
mesmas tecnologias ou que usem tecnologias com níveis de potência de 
transmissão mais elevados, impedindo, desta forma, o suporte de 
comunicações de tempo-real fiáveis em ambientes abertos. 
O protocolo de comunicação sem fios flexível disparado por tempo (WFTT) é 
baseado numa arquitectura mestre/múltiplo escravo alavancado na 
flexibilidade e pontualidade promovidas pelo paradigma FTT e na captura e 
manutenção determinística do meio suportadas pela técnica de bandjacking 
(captura de banda). Esta tese apresenta o protocolo WFTT e argumenta que 
este permite suportar serviços de comunicação de tempo-real com requisitos 
elevados de fiabilidade em ambientes abertos onde várias tecnologias de 
comunicação baseadas em contenção disputam o acesso ao meio.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
resumo 
 
 
Adicionalmente, esta tese reivindica que é possível suportar comunicações 
sem-fios simultaneamente flexíveis e pontuais em ambientes abertos. O 
protocolo WFTT foi inspirado no paradigma FTT, do qual importa os serviços 
de alto nível como, por exemplo, o controlo de admissão. Após a observação 
da eficácia da técnica de bandjacking em assegurar o acesso ao meio e a 
correspondente manutenção, foi reconhecida a possibilidade de utilização 
deste mecanismo para o desenvolvimento de um protocolo de acesso ao meio, 
capaz de oferecer as funcionalidades do paradigma FTT em meios de 
comunicação sem-fios. O desempenho do protocolo WFTT é reportado nesta 
tese com uma descrição dos dispositivos implementados, da bancada de 
ensaios desenvolvida e dos resultados obtidos. 
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abstract 
 
Wireless communication technologies have become widely adopted, appearing 
in heterogeneous applications ranging from tracking victims, responders and 
equipments in disaster scenarios to machine health monitoring in networked 
manufacturing systems. Very often, applications demand a strictly bounded 
timing response, which, in distributed systems, is generally highly dependent 
on the performance of the underlying communication technology. These 
systems are said to have real-time timeliness requirements since data 
communication must be conducted within predefined temporal bounds, whose 
unfulfillment may compromise the correct behavior of the system and cause 
economic losses or endanger human lives.  
The potential adoption of wireless technologies for an increasingly broad range 
of application scenarios has made the operational requirements more complex 
and heterogeneous than before for wired technologies. On par with this trend, 
there is an increasing demand for the provision of cost-effective distributed 
systems with improved deployment, maintenance and adaptation features. 
These systems tend to require operational flexibility, which can only be ensured 
if the underlying communication technology provides both time and event 
triggered data transmission services while supporting on-line, on-the-fly 
parameter modification. 
Generally, wireless enabled applications have deployment requirements that 
can only be addressed through the use of batteries and/or energy harvesting 
mechanisms for power supply. These applications usually have stringent 
autonomy requirements and demand a small form factor, which hinders the use 
of large batteries. As the communication support may represent a significant 
part of the energy requirements of a station, the use of power-hungry 
technologies is not adequate. Hence, in such applications, low-range 
technologies have been widely adopted. In fact, although low range 
technologies provide smaller data rates, they spend just a fraction of the energy 
of their higher-power counterparts. 
The timeliness requirements of data communications, in general, can be met by 
ensuring the availability of the medium for any station initiating a transmission. 
In controlled (close) environments this can be guaranteed, as there is a strict 
regulation of which stations are installed in the area and for which purpose. 
Nevertheless, in open environments,  this is hard to control because no a priori 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
abstract 
 
knowledge is available of which stations and technologies may contend for the 
medium at any given instant. Hence, the support of wireless real-time 
communications in unmanaged scenarios is a highly challenging task. 
Wireless low-power technologies have been the focus of a large research 
effort, for example, in the Wireless Sensor Network domain. Although bringing 
extended autonomy to battery powered stations, such technologies are known 
to be negatively influenced by similar technologies contending for the medium 
and, especially, by technologies using higher power transmissions over the 
same frequency bands. A frequency band that is becoming increasingly 
crowded with competing technologies is the 2.4 GHz Industrial, Scientific and 
Medical band, encompassing, for example, Bluetooth and ZigBee, two low-
power communication standards which are the base of several real-time 
protocols. Although these technologies employ mechanisms to improve their 
coexistence, they are still vulnerable to transmissions from uncoordinated 
stations with similar technologies or to higher power technologies such as Wi-
Fi, which hinders the support of wireless dependable real-time communications 
in open environments. 
The Wireless Flexible Time-Triggered Protocol (WFTT) is a master/multi-slave 
protocol that builds on the flexibility and timeliness provided by the FTT 
paradigm and on the deterministic medium capture and maintenance provided 
by the bandjacking technique. This dissertation presents the WFTT protocol 
and argues that it allows supporting wireless real-time communication services 
with high dependability requirements in open environments where multiple 
contention-based technologies may dispute the medium access. Besides, it 
claims that it is feasible to provide flexible and timely wireless communications 
at the same time in open environments. The WFTT protocol was inspired on 
the FTT paradigm, from which higher layer services such as, for example, 
admission control has been ported. After realizing that bandjacking was an 
effective technique to ensure the medium access and maintenance in open 
environments crowded with contention-based communication technologies, it 
was recognized that the mechanism could be used to devise a wireless 
medium access protocol that could bring the features offered by the FTT 
paradigm to the wireless domain. The performance of the WFTT protocol is 
reported in this dissertation with a description of the implemented devices, the 
test-bed and a discussion of the obtained results. 
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“I believe there is no philosophical high-
road in science, with epistemological
signposts. No, we are in a jungle and
find our way by trial and error, building
our road behind us as we proceed.”
Max Born (1882 - 1970)
1
Introduction
Over the last few years, low-power wireless communication technologies have experi-
enced an increasing popularity in a wide range of applications. Although they provide a
valuable set of benefits such as flexibility and cost-effectiveness, they also present some
limitations when compared to their wired counterparts (interference, security, etc.). Nev-
ertheless, motivated by their ability to perform short-range transmissions with a reduced
amount of power, several applications have appeared. Notably, this set of applications is
highly heterogeneous both in terms of the target domains (military, medical, civil, etc.)
and of their requirements (best-effort, soft real-time, hard real-time, etc.). In the following
section, an overview of the most relevant applications is conducted with focus on iden-
tifying and quantifying their communication requirements. Following, the core problems
addressed by this dissertation and the contributions for a solution are defined. Finally, an
outline of this dissertation is presented.
1.1 Selected Applications
Wireless communications have found an increasing number of applications. In par-
ticular, short-range communications have managed to penetrate into application domains
such as the consumer goods industry, given their flexibility, scalability, mobility support
and low-power operation [1]. Furthermore, besides reducing installation costs, Wireless
Personal Area Networks (WPANs) have been used to mitigate problems related to the
deployment of sensors in dangerous places or having a highly difficult access.
Although applications may share common features such as the networking topology
or the use of a given standard technology, the demands concerning the wireless network
can be highly heterogeneous. On one end, some applications aim at supporting real-time
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communication services in a predictable and reliable fashion so that guarantees can be
provided regarding the delivery of packets within bounded times. On the other, appli-
cations can be supported on best-effort communication services with loose requirements
regarding timeliness and reliability. Three groups of applications were selected for analysis:
localization, monitoring and synchronization. Together with their adoption of short-range
wireless communications, this selection was motivated by the application’s potential oper-
ation in spaces shared with different wireless technologies. The localization of people in
indoor environments is often supported on wireless technologies allowing to track patients
in hospitals, for example. Wireless enabled environmental and health monitoring can be
found in domotics and health-care applications. In the first, temperature and humidity
monitoring may allow a better control of the environment conditions and the provision of
an improved comfort level. In the second, using physiological sensors, health monitoring
may be used to detect the onset of a disease, allowing to trigger a more timely response
by the caregiver. Finally, synchronization dependent applications enable strict timing op-
erations such as distributed sensor sampling, for example. This is important in scenarios
where data is to be acquired in different locations at the same time such as, for example,
in the field of seismic monitoring. In the following subsections an overview of these key
applications is provided, as well as of the associated requirements.
1.1.1 Localization Applications
Localization refers to the position estimation of an asset in a given area and it is a
promising application for wireless communication technologies. Although existing com-
mercial solutions are mainly based on Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) technologies
such as IEEE 802.11 (Ekahau RTLS [2], Exavera eShepherd [3], Aeroscout Real-time Vis-
ibility [4], Ubisense Precise Real-time Location [5]), short-range communications are be-
coming increasingly popular for indoor tracking due to their reduced power consumption,
cost-effectiveness, reliability and coverage.
Short-range based localization based on Receiver Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) can
be found in both public spaces (e.g., hospitals and museums) or private settings (e.g.,
factories or houses). The provision of personalized multimedia contents to the visitors in a
museum [6] is a localization application where the users of interest are given a customized
tour and tracked within the exhibitions. The use of a localization mechanism enables a
more personalized user experience, e.g., via a follow-up email with relevant information
regarding the objects that arose more interest in the exhibition. Furthermore, localization
2
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allows improving the management of the exhibitions. This can be achieved by tracking
which exhibitions and objects are popular and by replacing those who are not, for example.
Similarly, at home, context-aware applications and services can be provided according to
the localization of its inhabitants [7]. For example, if a localization system provides the
identity of the user seeing a movie, such information combined with the knowledge that
the user suffers from myopia can trigger an adaptation of the subtitle’s font size and,
consequently, improve the user’s multimedia experience. Another example where RSSI
based ranging can be used is in underground wireless networks to detect seismic activity
[8]. In this application, wireless sensors are displaced on the subsurface of the area of
interest and, whenever a seismic event changes the relative distance between sensor nodes,
the signal strength “signature” changes, thus allowing to detect the event. This method can
be used to provide an early detection of the onset of geological events such as earthquakes.
Emergency response is another emerging application that builds on short-range wireless
communications to track victims, responders and equipment in disaster scenarios [9]. Two
examples of this application are firefighting [10, 11] and response to chemical explosions
[12]. In these scenarios, the localization of the firefighters is critical not only for the logistic
coordination of large operations in unknown environments, but also to improve the tactical
response in the advent of unforeseen occurrences. Moreover, complemented with real-time
environment and health data, localization can play a crucial role in improving the safety
of the responders and victims in demanding and chaotic environments such as the ground
zero in New York during the terrorist attacks of the 9/11, for example.
Localization can also improve resource management and logistics by allowing a real-time
position monitoring of assets over large areas such as warehouses and production plants
[13]. In this application, all objects (boxes, parts, office equipment, etc.) are tagged with
sensors during their check-in. Besides monitoring storage conditions (e.g. temperature)
to improve the control of the environment conditions, for instance, using a HVAC system,
tags also report their position. This allows tracking mobile equipment and prevent its loss
or theft. Besides, the knowledge of the equipments’ localization substantially reduces the
need for redundancy in scenarios where such equipments need to be quickly found.
The detection (or response) of (to) health and safety violations in working facilities
can also be improved by localization services. In this scenario, the workers’ localization is
monitored in harsh environments (e.g. in a mine) or conducting stressful tasks for limited
periods of time [14]. When the workers’ exposure goes beyond the threshold defined by
the health and safety regulations, an alert is generated, allowing to notify the worker
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and his/her supervisor. Another example where localization plays an important role is
when a task, for security reasons, requires a specific number of workers in a geographical
area. In this case, to avoid violating health and safety regulations, the employed tools
can be programmed to operate if - and only if - the minimum number of workers wearing
localization tags are in that area.
Robot navigation is yet another application where localization plays an important role
allowing robots to perform the irrigation, lawn mowing or fertilizing of large areas [15], for
example. In this case, sensors are commonly deployed in the garden to enable applications
such as plant monitoring, weather forecast and/or surveillance of the area. Hence, the
robot may take advantage of the wireless infrastructure-like network of sensors, installed
in predefined spots, to estimate its own localization based on RSSI, thus improving its
navigation and performing a better lawn mowing or fertilization of the garden.
1.1.2 Monitoring Applications
Monitoring refers to the observation of a given variable set and it has been one of
the most studied areas of application for short-range wireless communications. Applica-
tions span the monitoring of environment variables (e.g., temperature), vital signals (e.g.,
cardiac rhythm) and machine condition (e.g., vibration), among others. Wireless environ-
mental monitoring is found in several scenarios such as HVAC control, sewage treatment,
water quality monitoring and quality assurance in food transportation, for example. In
the first case, sensors are placed in the stored items of interest (or nearby) to provide
information, which helps improving the control of the heating, ventilation, and air con-
ditioning of the warehouse [13]. Water quality monitoring and treatment are two critical
aspects of any densely populated area because they have a huge impact on the health of
the population. The water quality can be monitored in real-time using a wireless sensor
network (WSN), which continuously collects information about the waters’ PH value, pol-
lutant levels, temperature and turbidity [16]. Sewage treatment can be enabled by wireless
monitoring technologies, which allow building automated plants that are more flexible and
safer to maintain [17]. Regarding the transport of food, during the strawberries’ journey
from farm to the store, parameters such as the transport’s environment temperature and
humidity can be closely monitored, providing a higher degree of confidence to the store
and allowing the transport company to act preventively when some unsuspected condition
is detected. Hence, this monitoring process allows tracking and preventing problems in the
supply chain, which promote the freshness and quality of the delivered products [18].
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The wireless monitoring of industrial processes is another application where a given set
of variables are continuously observed and can be used as inputs for controlling a given
process [19]. One of these applications is found in chemical plants, where several flows of
data “must be gathered by sensors distributed all around the plant” and communicated to
the plant controller, which ensures its operation within specific safety bounds [20].
The monitoring of machine health condition can be performed in the context of a net-
worked manufacturing system, for instance. By continuously observing the key physical
parameters of a machine (e.g. motors’ current waveform or the vibration of a pump), it
is possible to detect and prevent a general failure by detecting anomalous motor behav-
ior or the onset of a pump fault due to worn parts [21]. Furthermore, as manufacturing
systems should operate continuously without performance variations, the health status of
each machine must be closely monitored to reduce downtime and improve the life span of
components, devices and equipments. By wirelessly monitoring temperature, oil charac-
teristics and vibration of rolling bearings, it is possible to improve their maintenance and
reduce the downtime of the manufacturing chain [22, 23].
Health monitoring encompasses the observation of physical parameters such as oxygen
saturation and heart rate [24, 25] and it is useful in a large number of scenarios. The
vital signal monitoring of patients in emergency scenarios allows a better tracking of the
patient’s health condition and a faster response to critical events [9]. Another relevant
application is found in ambulatory procedures where the patient’s heart rate is monitored
and assumes a key importance as a diagnostic method for the detection and analysis of
cardiac arrhythmia [26]. Likewise, the on-line physiological status monitoring of elderly
inpatients in nursing centers can largely contribute to improve the service quality and
reduce the workload of the medical staff [25]. Furthermore, health monitoring in out-of-
hospital environments is also a relevant application. For example, it enables assessing the
effects of a treatment at home, with the subjects living their daily life, thus providing an
increased comfort to the patient and an improved medical assessment to the clinical staff
[27, 28].
1.1.3 Synchronization Dependent Applications
Synchronization refers to the process of aligning the operation phase of a given set of
devices so that they share a time scale origin and bounded timing difference [29]. Sev-
eral applications require clock synchronization among stations. However, distributed data
acquisition and network coordination are the most common. The first addresses the chal-
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lenge of performing synchronous sensor sampling or actuator control in distributed nodes
[30]. This is often a critical requirement of the application. For example, the acquisition
of data in a given area through a set of geographically separated vibration sensors must be
performed within a strict interval in order to guarantee the validity of the collected data
[31, 32].
Network coordination was the focus of large research efforts, mainly in what concerns
the synchronization of wireless sensor networks [33]. In this regard, synchronization has
been studied in the scope of improving energy consumption, dependability, network co-
ordination or accuracy for time based applications. Energy consumption can be highly
decreased in applications requiring periodic monitoring services. This can be achieved
by guaranteeing the synchronization of the stations and allowing turning on the radio
transceivers only during the periods in which they are supposed to communicate with each
other [34]. Furthermore, dependability can be improved by ensuring the synchronization
of the stations participating in the network. For example, by adopting the time-triggered
communication paradigm, communication activities are “scheduled according to a prede-
fined, periodic scheme” that “simplifies system verification and diagnosis” [35].
Synchronization is also important for the network coordination of time slotted multi-
ple access communication technologies. It provides the basis for guaranteeing the global
consistency of a network, enabling power management optimization, dynamic frequency
hopping and the implementation of time-slotted medium access control (MAC) protocols
[36]. Moreover, it also improves the communications’ timeliness and bandwidth usage,
since it allows to significantly reduce the amount of time spent in contention for medium
access. For example, in RSSI based localization applications using the IEEE 802.15.4 tech-
nology, synchronization can reduce the round trip delay by one order of magnitude in some
scenarios [6].
Finally, some applications are highly dependent on synchronization to provide their
functionality with the proper quality. One example is the localization based on the Time
Difference of Arrival (TDOA) [37]. In this scenario, a control station polls the tags being
tracked in a round robin fashion and, in response, they sent a packet which is received by
multiple base stations placed in different locations. Provided that each packet travels a
different distance from the tags to the base station and that they are synchronized with
each other, it is possible to determine the relative and absolute position of the tag based
on the instants of arrival. Hence, the better the synchronization the better the position
estimation. Accuracies of up to 10 millimeters can be supported [38].
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1.1.4 Requirements
Despite targeting different goals, the addressed localization, monitoring and synchro-
nization applications share the use of wireless technologies to communicate data among
stations. Hence, a comparative analysis focused on relevant communication parameters
[39] can be drawn to enhance the understanding of their relative importance in each ap-
plication. The parameters of the wireless communications considered for this analysis are:
dependability, scalability, goodput, timeliness, autonomy and range.
The dependability of a communication protocol is its ability to avoid failures affect-
ing the normal operation beyond what it is acceptable. This parameter encompasses four
main dimensions [40]: availability, reliability, safety and security. Availability is the pro-
portion of time in which the network is operating correctly. Reliability is “the duration or
probability of failure-free performance under stated conditions” [41]. Safety is concerned
with “the freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational ill-
ness, or damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment” [42].
Security is related to “the concepts, techniques, technical measures, and administrative
measures used to protect assets from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized acquisition,
damage, disclosure, manipulation, modification, loss, or use” [43]. In other words, security
refers to the “prevention of unauthorized access and/or handling of information” [44]. The
requirements arising from these four dimensions will be holistically represented by the de-
pendability parameter, which will be classified in one of three levels: “Low”, “Medium” or
“High”, according to the stringency of the requirements. For example, an application with
strict requirements concerning the communications’ dependability, in either one or more
dimensions, will be classified with the level “High”.
Scalability is the ability to grow or shrink the size of the network supporting an appli-
cation. In this analysis, scalability will be characterized by the range of stations commonly
used for each application. This characterization will provide a measure of the growth,
which might be required for each given application. Goodput refers to the number of useful
bits per unit of time. This parameter will be described by the range of required bits per
second (bps) in each application. Timeliness encompasses latency and jitter. However, in
this analysis, timeliness will be represented by the communication latency, since the former
is typically one order of magnitude greater than the latter [1]. Autonomy corresponds the
time span, in days, of continuous operation without battery replacement, when applicable,
and range indicates the distance (in meters) between transmitter and receiver that must
be supported for each application. Table 1.1 summarizes the requirements of the above
7
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Table 1.1: Typical wireless communication requirements
Applications
Parameter Quantification Localization Monitoring Synchronization
Dependability Low/Moderate/High Moderate/High Moderate/High High
Scalability # of stations [1, 1k] [1, 10k] [15, 10k]
Goodput Bits per second [10, 100k] [0.1, 600k] < 64
Timeliness Seconds [0.1, 10] ×10−3 [20 ×10−6, 360] [72 ×10−12, 20 ×10−6]
Autonomy D/W/M/Y∗ [1W, 2Y] [3D, 2Y] [10D, 1Y]
Range Meters [1, 100] [5, 300] [1, 100]
∗ Days/Weeks/Months/Years
mentioned applications.
Localization Applications
Localization applications are characterized by a communication level of dependability
ranging from moderate to high. In disaster response scenarios, for example, the employed
communication technology supporting the localization must be highly reliable and ensure
proper security in order to guarantee the availability of communications and the safety of
people. This is required due to the critical nature of the application, i.e., the operations’
command is highly dependent on both the rescuer and victim’s locations to perform an
adequate tactical response [9], for example. In less critical applications such as the tracking
of visitors in museums or patients in medical facilities, the communications’ dependability
is also important, but to a smaller degree. In these scenarios, the localization applica-
tion is usually deployed with a parallel access control mechanism, which allows less strict
requirements regarding the reliability and availability of the localization application and,
consequently, of the communication technology that supports it. Likewise, the safety re-
quirements of such applications are usually less tighter since human lifes are not in danger.
Localization applications are quite heterogeneous in what concerns their scalability.
For example, context aware applications enabled by the localization of people at home [7]
usually require a small number of tags to cover all the usual inhabitants of a dwelling (typ-
ically from 1 to 10). Moreover, firefighting applications [11] have a high variation regarding
the number of tags which are required to be actively being tracked in a given moment.
This is motivated by the fact that different disaster scenarios pose different localization
requirements in terms of responders and equipment. Resource management localization ap-
plications, such as the ones found in warehouses [13], are usually characterized for requiring
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the tracking of a large number of assets (typically some hundreds).
The goodput required for localization applications ranges from a few tens of bits per
second in highly sporadic localization applications (e.g., the tracking of large equipments
in warehouses) to some tens of kilobits per second in more dynamic localization scenarios.
For example, tracking people in a museum room requires a goodput of, approximately, 61
kbps when performing the fine-grained localization of 80 tags with a localization cycle of
1 second in a room encompassing 8 reference nodes [6]. In another example, firefighter
localization requires the transmission of “beacons” with a frequency of 40 Hz [11], leading
to a goodput requirement of 2560 bps, if only a byte is required to be transmitted in each
“beacon”.
In the context of localization applications, timeliness is typically associated with the
cycle period. For instance, localization in disaster response localization scenarios can
operate with cycles of up to 2 seconds [11]. Assuming a typical combat force of 10 teams,
each one encompassing two firefighters, the localization of any tag should take a maximum
of 100 milliseconds. Therefore, assuming that the communication delay should be one order
of magnitude smaller than the localization of a single tag, the maximum delay should be
bounded to 10 milliseconds.
In fine-grained tracking localization scenarios such as tracking visitors in museum ex-
hibitions [6], the localization frequency is similar. However, the number of visitors can be
considerably higher, thus shortening (in proportion) the maximum delay allowed per tag.
Furthermore, in scenarios where other time critical applications are enabled by localiza-
tion - as robot navigation [15], for example - the timeliness requirements become stricter,
provided that localization can have a significant impact on the control algorithm, which
can lead to financial loss or the injury of people. Besides the accuracy of the localization
estimate, the rate at which the estimates are obtained is instrumental in supporting the
avoidance of physical obstacles and a fluid navigation. Hence, considering a control loop
with a period of 100 milliseconds [45], a network of anchor points with 8 nodes and the
requirement of 10 RSSI “signatures” per localization round [6], the delay should be smaller
than 125 microseconds.
Regarding autonomy, localization applications are considerably heterogeneous. Some
applications have minor autonomy requirements concerning the communications which
enable the localization. One example is the localization aided navigation in robots [15]. In
this case, the amount of power employed in the communications that support the position
tracking process is insignificant when compared to the power used to drive the robots’
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motors, for example. In more demanding applications such as tracking workers in harsh
environments [14] or victims, responders and equipments in disaster scenarios [9], the tags’
autonomy should be of, at least, one week. In further demanding autonomy scenarios, such
as resource management and logistics localization applications [13], tags are required to
operate without maintenance for several years.
The communication range required for supporting localization applications is typically
short. This is motivated mainly by the fact that this process takes advantage of the power
attenuation associated to the signal propagation, which is used to estimate the distance
between transmitter and receiver. Therefore, working with a smaller communication range
yields a smaller localization error. Close quarters localization [14] or part localization in
warehouses [13] requires very short communication ranges, typically around 1 meter. For
coarse grained localization such as the tracking of firefighters in disaster scenarios [11] or
localization enabled robot navigation for autonomous lawn mowing or fertilizing of large
areas [15], communications can be supported on technologies with higher ranges. One
popular technology being adopted is the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [46], which has a nominal
range of 100 meters in open spaces.
Monitoring Applications
Monitoring applications are highly heterogeneous concerning dependability. For exam-
ple, health monitoring applications [24, 25], besides requiring a high level of reliability,
have strict constraints regarding the security of the information due to its private nature.
Furthermore, in scenarios where the health monitoring can have a safety impact, e.g., heart
rate monitoring in ambulatory procedures for the detection of cardiac arrhythmia [26], the
required dependability is also high. Albeit less demanding regarding the security dimen-
sion as a consequence of its confined use, the monitoring of industrial processes [19, 20]
and of machine health condition [21, 22, 23] also requires a high level of reliability. These
applications can have significant financial losses when, for example, a given process fails
to operate accordingly or when a part failure is not detected on time, which can result
from the communication’s lack of reliability. Environmental monitoring is characterized
by typically having low security requirements concerning the information and moderate
to high reliability requirements. There are several reasons supporting this fact. First,
the transmitted information is typically not confidential and, second, the dynamics of the
monitored variables are very limited (temperature, humidity and turbidity, for example).
This means that, even if some data packets are lost, the environmental control algorithm
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is not dramatically affected. By way of illustration, the control of an HVAC system in
a warehouse [13] is capable of coping with packet loss as long as it does not affect the
environmental variables being monitored/controlled. On the monitoring of environmental
variables with potential higher dynamics such as the turbidity or the pollutant levels in
water quality monitoring [17], the reliability of the communication technology must be
high to avoid the distribution of contaminated water.
As in localization, monitoring applications have a broad range of scalability require-
ments. On one end, applications such as the environmental monitoring of water [17] are
typically characterized by small networks (usually ranging between 1 and 10 stations). At
the other end, industrial processes [19, 20], machine [21, 22, 23] and health monitoring
applications [24, 25] can encompass tens, hundreds or even thousands of stations in the
same network. Hence, the required scalability is highly dependent on the specific nature
of the monitoring application.
The goodput necessary for supporting monitoring applications ranges from a few hun-
dreds of bits per second in ambient monitoring applications to some hundreds of kilobits
per second, for instance, in electromyography signal monitoring [47]. The goodput required
for a food transport monitoring application is 400 bps, resulting from the requirement of
tracking its acceleration, temperature and humidity [18]. The wireless monitoring of in-
dustrial processes includes variables such as, for example, pressure and flow. In this case,
the required goodput is rather small, typically 8 bps for a refresh period of 2 seconds [19].
The temperature monitoring in plants requires a goodput of 80 bps [20].
Healthcare monitoring applications have different goodput requirements depending on
the signals being acquired. To give an example, the goodput required for monitoring
body temperature, systolic blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure and heart rate is of
32 kbps [25]. Monitoring supported on a three channel electrocardiogram, two channel
skin impedance measurement and three dimensional acceleration information requires a
goodput of 31.744 kbps [26], assuming a data representation length of 16 bits per sample.
Machine condition monitoring requires high speed data acquisition. For example, the
current and vibration sampling frequency of a motor running at a speed of 2850 RPM
should not be smaller than 1 kHz and 5 kHz, respectively. Hence, current and vibration
monitoring requires a communication goodput of 8 kbps and 120 kbps [21], respectively,
assuming 8 bit long samples. In a similar application, the temperature monitoring of rolling
bearings requires a goodput of, approximately, 0.16 bps [23].
Timeliness in the context of monitoring applications is highly coupled with the com-
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munications’ delay (and jitter), which can range from some hundreds of microseconds, in
close control loops [1], to some seconds in highly sporadic monitoring applications. To
illustrate, health monitoring requires sampling periods of 3.9, 1.9 and 15.6 milliseconds for
electrocardiogram, skin impedance and 3-D accelerometer signals [26], respectively. An
estimate of the maximum delay and jitter can be obtained by assuming that the delay is
one order of magnitude smaller than the sampling period and that the jitter is one order of
magnitude smaller than the delay [1]. However, there are other vital signals whose time-
liness requirements are more relaxed. For example, the monitoring of body temperature,
heart rate and blood pressure (systolic and diastolic) require sampling periods of 5 seconds,
10 seconds and 1 hour [25], respectively.
Machine condition monitoring is moderately demanding regarding timeliness. Although
it can be characterized by short sampling cycles of, for example, 200 microseconds for
vibration signals [21], communications are not required to follow the same transmission
period. If the the machine health variable being monitored is temperature, the sampling
cycle becomes significantly more spaced in time, for example, 9 minutes between two
consecutive measurements [23].
In food transport monitoring, the freshness and quality of strawberries can be monitored
by sampling the acceleration, temperature and humidity during their transport with a
period of 100 milliseconds [18]. The monitoring of industrial processes is characterized by
sampling cycles of 2 seconds [19], while the temperature monitoring in the plant may adopt
sampling periods of 200 milliseconds [20]. Likewise, in other scenarios, the monitoring of
very slow environment variables such as PH, temperature and turbidity have even more
relaxed timeliness requirements since the sampling period can be in the range of hours [16].
Monitoring applications also have heterogeneous requirements regarding autonomy. For
example, application domains such as factory automation may encompass sensors and
actuators installed in fixed locations with access to mains power [1] or in moving pieces
[21] where the use of mains power is rather prohibitive. Industrial process monitoring
[19] cannot cope with short maintenance cycles, given that they may affect the plant
productivity. The same occurs in machine health monitoring. Hence, such applications
should cope with maintenance cycles of more than one year. For instance, the replacement
of batteries every 450 days is acceptable in the process industry [23].
Several other monitoring applications require high levels of autonomy. For example,
due to the difficult access and lack of mains power sources, water monitoring has tight
autonomy requirements [16]. Furthermore, food condition monitoring must be able to
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cope with transport journeys of several days [18]. Regarding vital signal monitoring, dif-
ferent applications have different requirements. For example, the support of mobile on-line
physiological status monitoring requires an autonomy of more than one month [25], while
ambulatory electrocardiogram monitoring merely requires an autonomy of more than 3
days [26].
The communication range required in monitoring applications is also highly dependent
of the application. In industrial settings, monitoring typically requires ranges up to 30
meters for one hop communication and around 300 meters for multi-hop communications
such as those of industrial process monitoring [19]. In medical monitoring applications, for
example, the continuous monitoring of fetal heart rate and intrauterine pressure requires a
typical range of up to 20 meters [48]. On-line physiological status monitoring is commonly
characterized by ranges from 50 (indoor) to 150 meters (outdoor) [25]. In a different
monitoring application scenario, such as the transportation of food in large containers or
trucks, the required range is around 5 meters [18], which is the maximum distance between
any sensor in the container and the communications’ gateway.
Synchronization Dependent Applications
Although wireless sensor network synchronization protocols are designed to “cope with
unreliable network transmissions and unbounded message latencies” [33], they are vulner-
able, to some degree, to these effects. Hence, to support a faster convergence [36] and
accuracy, synchronization applications require a high level of dependability.
The scalability requirement of synchronization applications is highly heterogeneous.
In synchronization applications supporting localization services, the size of each network
ranges typically from 15 to 100 stations [38]. In distributed coordination application em-
ploying, for example, the Clock Sampling Mutual Network Synchronization (CS-MNS)
method [36], network sizes are typically between 100 and 500 stations. In seismic activity
surveying the number of geophones deployed can reach several thousands, when the area
to be covered is very wide (several square kilometers) [31], for example.
Clock synchronization algorithms for wireless sensor networks can be classified in sev-
eral categories, for example, internal or external [33]. In the first case, a global time
reference is not available and, therefore, each station tries to “minimize the maximum dif-
ference between the readings of local clocks” [33] of the network. In this case, there is no
specific message transmission for communicating the global clock reference and, hence, no
goodput is required for supporting synchronization. Conversely, in external synchroniza-
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tion algorithms, there is a global time base to which all stations seek to adjust. This is
usually achieved by transmitting messages carrying the global clock reference information
and allowing stations to synchronize their clocks accordingly. The period required for these
messages is such that it guarantees a given synchronization accuracy. Hence, it is depen-
dent on the stations’ clock deviation. For example, the TPSN synchronization protocol [49]
runs on Berkeley motes, whose clock can drift 40 microseconds per second apart [36]. For
a synchronization accuracy of 100 microseconds the period of the TPSN should be of 1.25
seconds. Assuming the transmission of timestamps according to the IEEE 1588 standard,
in which the time value is represented by a 80 bit number, the required goodput would be
of 64 bps.
The synchronization timeliness can be associated to its jitter (and accuracy). For ex-
ample, in fine grained localization applications the (RMS) jitter is of 7.2 picoseconds [50].
Furthermore, the precision of clock synchronization algorithms has been reported to be of
a few tens of microseconds [51, 36]. In synchronous sensor sampling or actuator control
synchronization accuracies are of under 100 microseconds or, under ideal conditions, under
1 microsecond [30]. Wireless seismic data acquisition systems require a (sampling) synchro-
nization accuracy of 2 milliseconds [32]. Other types of synchronous sampling applications
such as, for example, humidity monitoring are characterized by synchronization accuracies
of 1 millisecond [34]. A timeliness estimate can be obtained by assuming, for simplicity,
that the accuracy represents the maximum jitter. Hence, as defined before, the timeliness
is one order of magnitude higher.
One of the key benefits of synchronization is its potential to increase the autonomy
of battery powered devices. For example, in [35], an improvement by a factor of three
is reported in a comparison between two scenarios: duty-cycle of 100 percent and seven
percent. Another example is wireless seismic data acquisition applications [31], where
synchronization allows reducing maintenance costs by increasing the networks’ lifetime,
which is important in long time deployment scenarios. In general, the autonomy required
for synchronization applications is tightly coupled with the specific application being sup-
ported. For example, in medical environments, it should sustain the continuous operation
of devices between 10 and 27 days [38].
The communication range required for synchronization applications is commonly short,
typically from 1 to 100 meters [38], as the stations being synchronized are usually not
too distant from each other. However, higher communication ranges have usually some
impact on the synchronization accuracy, since they result in less hops and, therefore, less
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communication delays [35] or in a faster synchronization convergence [36].
1.2 Motivation
The previous subsection provided an overview of three representative application cat-
egories. These applications were selected due to their adoption of personal area network
technologies and operation in open spaces, where other technologies may contend for the
medium. The key point of this study is the broad heterogeneity of requirements, even
within the same application domain, which poses demanding challenges regarding the flex-
ibility of the communication technologies and protocols supporting them. As the required
dependability is commonly high, the communication technology should not be vulnerable
to (un)intended noise and must be able to ensure, when required, the privacy of the mes-
sages being transmitted. Although the goodput needed for localization, monitoring and
synchronization applications is generally small and the timeliness is highly dependent on
the specific application, many of such applications have highly constrained timeliness re-
quirements. Furthermore, the enabling communication technology should be characterized
by using low power transmissions in order to support high autonomy applications with
communication ranges between 1 and 100 meters.
1.2.1 Problem Statement
The support of real-time communications over license-free bands in open environments,
encompassing multiple real-time stations with an unknown number of unconstrained sta-
tions, is a challenging task. Generally, the support of real-time medium access is achieved
by a strict timing control of all communicating stations (real-time and non real-time). How-
ever, in open communication environments, the traffic generated by uncontrolled “alien”
stations cannot be avoided by existing medium access protocols.
Many applications require the flexibility provided by wireless communications for sen-
sor and actuator networking. Existing protocols that operate in license-free bands are only
able to support reliable and timely communications in environments where bandwidth is
still available to be reused (e.g., a free channel is accessible). In general, communica-
tion protocols assume that the medium has some free bandwidth or that stations make
a fair use of the available bandwidth. Although these assumptions are valid for a wide
set of applications, those with strict dependability and real-time requirements cannot cope
with uncertainties regarding the availability of the medium. Hence, for these applica-
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tions, a mechanism allowing to enforce a deterministic medium access for real-time sta-
tions is required. This mechanism should operate in open environments in scenarios where
other technologies supporting non-critical applications may simultaneously contend for the
medium. For example, the health monitoring of a newborn in an hospital, supported on
a low-power communication technology (e.g., IEEE 802.15.4) should never be affected by
nearby multimedia game streaming over Wi-Fi. Although the game streaming application
requires real-time communication support, it is not critical.
The main hypothesis of this dissertation is that the use of a specific traffic separation
mechanism, at the Medium Access Control (MAC) level, is the underlying foundation of
a real-time communication protocol. In other words, the prioritization of privileged traffic
at the MAC level is the enabling key for implementing a real-time wireless communication
framework able to operate in “open environments”.
The starting point of this work is the characterization of the coexistence between per-
sonal area and local area network technologies. This is motivated by the need to character-
ize the impact that a given technology has on others, which operate in the same frequency
band and in overlapping (or near) channels. Afterwards, a novel traffic separation mecha-
nism is proposed. This mechanism enables the prioritization of privileged traffic, allowing
the coexistence of uncontrolled stations with real-time stations in a shared space. Build-
ing on this mechanism, a complete framework is designed, implemented and validated to
support real-time communications in “open environments”.
1.2.2 Contributions
This dissertation reports the work conducted to validate the defined hypothesis. In
this scope, several studies were performed and multiple system implementations were real-
ized and documented. The main contributions of this dissertation are summarized in the
following list:
• A review of the key wireless communication requirements demanded by localization,
monitoring and synchronization applications operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM band;
• A state-of-the-art and analysis of the low-power real-time communication protocols
operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM band;
• A state-of-the-art and analysis of the coexistence of wireless communication tech-
nologies operating in the popular 2.4 GHz ISM band;
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• The definition, implementation and validation of a novel MAC technique named
bandjacking, allowing a deterministic wireless channel access in open environments;
• The definition, implementation and validation of theWireless Flexible Time-Triggered
(WFTT) protocol, enabling the support of protected real-time and best-effort com-
munications in open environments;
• The design and implementation of an interference auditing tool named Contention-
bAsed nOise Sequencer (CAOS). This tool was used to simulate environments with
different levels of Wi-Fi noise, allowing to assess their impact on the WFTT commu-
nications;
• The design and implementation of a timeliness measurement tool named WIreless
Timeliness Assessment System (WITAS). This tool was used to measure the delay
and jitter associated to the communication of messages (packets) between stations
in a WFTT network.
1.3 Outline of the Dissertation
An introduction to the relevant applications requiring wireless real-time support was
provided in this chapter with focus on their communication requirements. Following, the
main claims of this dissertation were presented together with the key contributions. The
remainder of this section outlines the work conducted to support the stated thesis.
Chapter 2 begins by providing an overview of the main technologies currently being uti-
lized for supporting wireless real-time protocols, with emphasis on open, low-power
standards. The analysis of these technologies is focused on their features, archi-
tecture, operation and, especially, on their supported medium access mechanisms.
Afterwards, a review of selected wireless real-time protocols using low-power com-
munications for the 2.4 GHz ISM band is provided. This review encompasses both
contention-based and contention-free protocols. An overview of the coexistence issues
in the 2.4 GHz Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) band concludes the chapter.
This overview analyzes the impact that wireless technologies can have on each other.
Chapter 3 presents the bandjacking technique, which enforces traffic separation in open
contention-based environments. This chapter begins by introducing the concept of
black-burst and, afterwards, describes the bandjacking technique with emphasis on its
17
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
architecture and operation. Two physical implementations of a programmable inter-
ference synthesizer are documented and preliminarily evaluated. A testbed devised
to assess the performance of the bandjacking technique is also described. The chapter
concludes with a presentation of the collected bandjacking performance results and
their discussion.
Chapter 4 is the “heart” of this dissertation and it is solely devoted to the proposal of the
Wireless Flexible Time Triggered protocol. In this chapter an overview of the FTT
paradigm is provided. Then, the WFTT protocol is presented in detail, with empha-
sis on the adopted design principles, architecture and operation. Furthermore, an
analytical study of its timing constraints is provided focusing on its implementation
feasibility and timeliness.
Chapter 5 describes the framework implementation supporting the WFTT protocol with
emphasis on the architecture and operation of the developed wireless devices. Hence,
the hardware and software architectures of both WFTT types of devices (master and
slave) is presented, providing insights on the adopted options. Given their different
nature, the operation of the master and slave devices is analyzed separately. Because
the developed WFTT slaves can operate in three different modes, each one is analyzed
in respect to its intended purpose.
Chapter 6 deals with the WFTT performance assessment. In this chapter, the method-
ology used to evaluate the WFTT protocol is characterized with focus on the devised
testbed and on the timing parameters of interest. Although tools such as the WITAS
and the CAOS were instrumental in the implementation of the WFTT testbed, they
are characterized in Appendices A and B, respectively, due to their specificity and
length. The performance results obtained using the testbed are documented and
throughly discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 7 presents a summary and discussion of the contributions of this dissertation
and suggests a few lines of future research that seem promising.
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“If I have seen further it is only by stand-
ing on the shoulders of giants”
Sir Isaac Newton (1643 - 1727) 2
Background
The emergence of wireless low-range communication standards such as, for example,
the ones of the IEEE 802.15.x family significantly contributed to the widespread adoption
of low-power technologies. Building on these technologies, new protocols envisaging real-
time applications have been devised. A review of the enabling low-power technologies, the
real-time protocols built upon them and their coexistence with interfering technologies in
the same band is provided in the following sections. The study of low-power technologies
addresses the most popular protocols operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM band, namely the
Bluetooth and the IEEE 802.15.4 technologies. However, due to their emergence, the ANT
and nanoNET technologies are also analyzed in a section named “Emerging Technologies”.
The study of the real-time protocols using these technologies is focused on factory au-
tomation applications, due to their more demanding timeliness and reliability requirements.
The study provides a generic introduction to each protocol followed by a brief analysis of
its operation targeting the adopted MAC mechanisms. A discussion engaged on the per-
formance and limitations of the protocol finishes this analysis. Because these real-time
protocols are built upon vulnerable technologies, an analysis of the IEEE 802.15.4 coex-
istence with key standard protocols operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM band (IEEE 802.15.4,
IEEE 802.11 and Bluetooth) is conducted by reviewing the relevant literature.
2.1 Wireless Low-Power Technologies
During the last few years, wireless low-power communications experienced an increasing
traction as a result of the higher demand posed by power constrained based applications.
Such applications span over many domains ranging from home automation to health-care.
The availability and broad adoption of wireless communication standards such as Bluetooth
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[52] and ZigBee [53] was one of the main driving factors behind their success. Backed by an
array of important companies, these technologies became massified, allowing a steep drop
in their production costs and, as a consequence, an increasingly attractive cost/benefit
relationship. Another key factor contributing for this success is their operation over the
2.4 GHz ISM license-free band, which is supported worldwide. Hence, the integration on
consumer electronics is appealing, since the deployment of such products is facilitated when
compared to wireless technologies operating in bands that are not universally supported.
Nevertheless, alternative technologies such as Z-Wave [54] and EnOcean [55], which operate
in the 868 MHz Band in Europe (908 MHz in the US), are also gaining some traction due
to their potential for applications with low-power requirements. For example, the Z-Wave
protocol focuses on WSNs for lighting, appliance control, access control and HVAC. It
employs a source-routing protocol to communicate messages in a mesh network. Although
it was originally developed with a data rate of just 9.6 kbps, an extension was later added
allowing rates of 40 Kbps. The EnOcean technology was originally designed targeting
ultra low-power communications that could be enabled by energy harvesting mechanisms.
Hence, it is simpler and less rich in features. For example, it is not able to support message
acknowledgement and carrier sense mechanisms.
In the following subsections an overview of the most widespread wireless short-range
technologies operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM Band is provided.
2.1.1 Bluetooth
Bluetooth [52] is an open standard designed for ad hoc short-range wireless networking
that is promoted by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) [56]. The technology was
originally developed envisaging cable replacement. However, it has evolved to be the de
facto standard for short range communication between mobile devices. The first “solid”
specification was released in February 2001 and named Bluetooth 1.1 [57]. Later, in March
2002, this release was adopted by the IEEE 802.15 working group as the IEEE 802.15.1
standard [58]. The Bluetooth 1.2 version [59] was released in November 2003 to enhance
the co-existence with other wireless technologies in the 2.4 GHz ISM band and to improve
audio communication. These changes were reflected in the IEEE 802.15.1 (2002) standard
and resulted in an update to the standard published in June 2005 [60].
To cope with the increasing demand for higher data transfer speeds, the Bluetooth
SIG launched the Bluetooth Core Specification Version 2.0 + Enhanced Data Rate (EDR)
[61] in November 2004. Besides the increased data rate, this specification brought im-
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provements such as a lower power consumption and a simplified multi-link mechanism,
maintaining backward compatibility with the previous versions. In July 2007, the Blue-
tooth Specification Version 2.1 [62] added secure simple pairing to improve security and
usability.
The continuous market demand for higher speed communications resulted in the publi-
cation of the Bluetooth Specification Version 3.0 + High Speed (HS) [63], which increased
the maximum data rate by adopting an hybrid approach based on the MAC and PHY lay-
ers of the IEEE 802.11 standard [64]. More recently, since June 2010, the Bluetooth SIG
adopted the Version 4.0 specification [52], which adds the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
to the set of supported protocols (Bluetooth classical and HS).
Overview
The Bluetooth technology operates in the 2.4 GHz Industrial, Scientific and Medical
(ISM) band and employs a Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) technique through
79 evenly spaced 1 MHz channels, ranging from 2.402 MHz to 2.480 MHz, in order to lower
the signal fading and interference associated to the wireless channel. The hop rate is 1600
hops per second so that each hop is separated from the next by a 625 microseconds time
window. The Bluetooth channel is a specific pseudo-random hopping pattern that is derived
from the network master’s clock and address. Provided that the channel is divided in time
slots, the Time Division Duplex (TDD) scheme is used for transmissions. Packets can
occupy one, three or five slots. Slots can also be reserved for synchronous transmissions,
e.g., voice data.
The Bluetooth technology is classified in one of the three possible power classes: 1, 2 or
3. Class 1 devices are designed for long range (100 meters) communications and transmit
signals with a maximum output power of 100 mW, whereas class 2 and 3 devices aim at
supporting short-range communications between 10 centimeters (class 3, 1 mW ) and 10
meters (class 2, 2.5 mW).
The “classical” Bluetooth Core Specification Versions 1.1 and 1.2 define a radio em-
ploying a Gaussian Frequency-Shift Keying (GFSK) modulation scheme, which allows a
symbol transfer rate of 1 Mbps (effective data rate of 723 kbps over-the-air) designated
“Basic Rate” (BR). Versions 2.0 and 2.1, although maintaining the compatibility with the
Bluetooth BR versions, add two modulation schemes: pi/4-rotated Differential-encoded
Quaternary Phase-Shift Keying (pi/4-DQPSK) and Differential-encoded 8-ary Phase-Shift
Keying (8DPSK). These “Enhanced Data Rate” (EDR) versions support symbol transfer
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rates of 2 Mbps and 3 Mbps, respectively. However, to maintain compatibility, only the
payload section is encoded using the “enhanced” modulation schemes.
Despite of the data rate improvement introduced by the “enhanced” modulation schemes,
Bluetooth was still much slower than, for example, Wi-Fi, deterring its broad adoption for
transferring large files. Hence, in a effort to improve the technology’s throughput, the
Bluetooth SIG adopted the Version 3.0 release, supporting a significantly higher data rate
of up to 25 Mbps. This is achieved by employing an alternate MAC/PHY that allows
Bluetooth to cooperate with a technology supporting an higher data rate (IEEE 802.11).
Therefore, the Bluetooth radio is used (initially) to establish the pairing procedure and set
the security mechanisms. When a higher throughput is required, the Bluetooth module
switches to the alternative IEEE 802.11 radio technology.
Besides the continuous demand for higher throughput, wireless technologies have also
experienced a trend in a different direction, i.e., the demand for extremely low-power
communications that can enable applications with strict autonomy requirements (several
years of continuous operation). The evolution in mobile devices over the past few years
has fueled the appearance of new types of applications requiring a tight integration with
embedded low-power sensors such as fitness devices, watches, clothes, etc. Given the
limitations of the connection-oriented operation of the Bluetooth technology, a new protocol
was devised to coexist with Bluetooth and enable devices to operate in sleep mode for
the most part of their lives. This protocol is named Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) [52].
Its origin can be tracked to the early days of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard development.
Throughout its evolution it took several designations, namely: Blulite, Wibree, Bluetooth
Ultra-low Power, and, finally, Bluetooth Low Energy.
The BLE emerged from the need to develop a protocol that could coexist with stan-
dard Bluetooth and, more importantly, that could share the Bluetooth’s radio structure
to support both protocols in a dual-mode chip architecture. These chips can then be
integrated by manufacturers in consumer devices such as mobile phones and tablets, al-
lowing the support of both protocols. Low-power devices use a single mode chip that only
provides the features associated to the BLE, thus enabling low-cost products supporting
ultra-low power operation. The BLE radio supports a subset of 40 channels in the 2.4
GHz band, adopting a more relaxed Gaussian frequency-shift keying (GFSK) modulation
scheme when compared to the Bluetooth BR/EDR and allowing increasing its operating
range. In addition, the BLE protocol uses very short packets (10 to 47 octets) and allows
the completion of a connection establishment plus data transfer in a period as short as 3
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milliseconds.
Unless an attacker is in possession of the frequency hopping sequence, Bluetooth trans-
missions are relatively difficult to intercept. The Bluetooth standard defines that under
normal operation the frequency-hopping pattern cannot be determined. However, during
the pairing procedure and due to specific implementations of the Bluetooth standard, dis-
coverable devices are vulnerable to attacks. For example, one of the earliest Bluetooth
security threats is known as BlueSnarf and it allows an attacker to steal information (e.g.,
the phonebook) from mobile devices by exploiting a flaw in the firmware of older devices.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology studied the Bluetooth vulnerabili-
ties and threats [65], including Denial of Service (DoS), eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle
(MITM), message modification, and resource misappropriation attacks. This study pro-
vides several countermeasures and guidelines, which allow reducing the risk of their oc-
currence. Nonetheless, the use of the Bluetooth technology in critical applications such as
mobile health-care should be avoided due to the lack of privacy caused by the “informa-
tion leakage of the pairing process, the lack of security and the resistance to interference”
[66]. Nevertheless, the Bluetooth’s Adaptive Frequency Hopping (AFH) mechanism will
still provide a higher probability of transmission success when compared to DSSS-based
technologies, given that it will automatically avoid the use of jammed frequencies.
Architecture
Two or more units sharing the same Bluetooth channel form a piconet (see Figure 2.1).
The piconet is the Bluetooth’s atomic network. Each piconet has one piconet master and
one or more piconet slaves (a maximum of seven active slaves). However, several slaves
might be attached to the network in a so-called parked state. These parked slaves are not
active but are synchronized with the piconet master. Piconets covering common areas form
a scatternet. Bluetooth units belonging to one piconet may participate in other piconets
by using a Time Division Multiplex (TDM) scheme. Moreover, a piconet master may be a
piconet slave in a neighbor piconet. Piconets are not frequency hop synchronized, meaning
that each one has its own hop sequence. This partially avoids piconet interference.
Operation
The Bluetooth protocol supports two types of connections: point-to-point (only two
Bluetooth units communicate with each other) and point-to-multipoint. In the latter form,
the channel is shared with all connected Bluetooth units. In Bluetooth, two types of links
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Figure 2.1: Bluetooth scatternet
are defined: Asynchronous Connectionless (ACL) and Synchronous Connection-Oriented
(SCO). ACL links carry best-effort traffic and are suited for asynchronous transmissions.
SCO links support periodic data transmissions at a 64 kbps rate in each direction. SCO
traffic cannot be retransmitted and thus can only recover from errors by using Forward
Error Correction (FEC) mechanisms. Since specification 1.2, a limited number of retrans-
missions is possible by using the extended SCO (eSCO) link type, which improves the
quality of the link by allowing the retransmission of corrupted packets.
As pointed, the communication channel is divided in time slots, each one occupying
625 microseconds. These slots are numbered according to the piconet’s master clock. The
master transmits on even numbered slots and the slave on odd numbered slots. Each trans-
mission takes place at one new hopping frequency, and a complete data packet is sent in
each slot. This means that there is no frequency shift before the end of the packet transmis-
sion, even if the packet occupies more than one slot. Figure 2.2 depicts the communication
process for a single slave piconet.
Point-to-multipoint communication occurs when a piconet contains more than one slave.
In this scenario, and to prevent piconet members of jamming each other with simultaneous
transmissions, a Time Division Duplex (TDD) scheme is used. This means that the overall
throughput is multiplexed by the slaves. Figure 2.3 shows the procedure. As before, the
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Figure 2.2: Single-slave operation
Figure 2.3: Multi-slave operation
master transmits on even-numbered slots and the slaves on odd-numbered slots. However,
slaves can only transmit when directly addressed by the master in the previous time slot.
In this sense, if the master sends a packet to slave 1, slave 2 will remain with its receiver
turned on only while decoding the packet access code (identifying the piconet) and header
(identifying the destination). Afterwards, it will realize that the packet was not addressed
to him and will turn off its receiver until the next even-numbered slot.
Figure 2.3 also demonstrates that piconet slaves only communicate with the piconet
master, which means that slave-to-slave data transfers are merely possible through the
master or by creating a separate piconet in which they can directly communicate (one
assuming the role of piconet master and the other of piconet slave). The support of multi-
slot packets enables increasing the achievable data throughput. Multi-slot packets can have
a duration of either three or five time slots. However, they all must be sent in a single hop
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frequency.
As mentioned, the co-existence with other wireless technologies was addressed by intro-
ducing the Adaptative Frequency Hopping (AFH) mechanism. This mechanism works by
reducing the number of nominal hopping channels according to their occupation by other
ISM technologies such as Wi-Fi, microwave ovens, cordless telephones, etc. In this sense,
the occupied channels are marked and are avoided in the hopping pattern.
Power Consumption and Availability
Motivated by the focus on low-power technologies operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM band,
this subsection specifically addresses the Bluetooth BLE technology, which is available from
manufacturers such as Nordic Semiconductor [67], Texas Instruments [68], CSR [69] and
EM Microelectronic [70]. Table 2.1 presents a summary containing the main characteristics
of the devices produced by these manufacturers.
Table 2.1: Bluetooth Low Energy commercial solutions
Parameter nRF8001 nRF8002 CC2540 CSR1010 CSR1011 EM9301
Type Transceiver Transceiver SoC SoC SoC Transceiver
Package QFN32 QFN32 QFN40 QFN32 QFN56 QFN24
Size (mm) 5 x 5 5 x 5 6 x 6 5 x 5 8 x 8 5 x 5
Supply (V) 2.3 - 3.6 2.3 - 3.6 2.0 - 3.6 1.8 - 3.6 1.8 - 3.6 0.8 - 1.8
Max. Power (dBm) 4 4 4 7.5 7.5 3
Sensitivity (dBm) -87 -87 -93 -92.5 -92.5 -80
Max. Current (mA) 14.6 14.5 19.6 16 16 12.9
RAM (KB) NA NA 8 64 64 NA
ROM (KB) NA NA 128 or 256 64 64 NA
Sleep Current (µA) 0.5 UA 0.4 5 5 9
Price Estimate (e) 3.76 2.3 3.71 2.21 2.4 UA
NA - Not Applicable
UA - Unavailable
Nordic Semiconductor offers two ICs (µBlue) supporting the BLE protocol: nRF8001
and nRF8002. The first is a BLE transceiver designed to operate in a peripheral role
connected to a host microcontroller. This device requires peak currents of 14.6 and 12.7
milliamperes to support active reception and transmission (@ 3 Volts and 0 dBm), re-
spectively. The second is tailored to the development of low energy peripheral proximity
solutions using a peak current of 14.5 milliamperes in any mode of operation (@ 3 Volts).
Texas Instruments supports the BLE technology with its system-on-chip (SoC) CC2540
IC, which is capable of running simultaneously both the application and the protocol
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stack, thus dispensing the need of a host microcontroller for processing. Furthermore, the
CC2540 includes the memory required for supporting both stack and application in the
same device (128 to 256 KB of Flash memory and 8 KB of RAM). The device operates in
active reception and transmission modes (@ 3 Volts) with current consumptions as low as
19.6 and 24 milliamperes, respectively.
CSR offers the µEnergy platform for BLE enabled applications. The CSR1010 and
CSR1011 single-mode Bluetooth low energy SoCs provide the elements (RF, baseband,
MCU, Bluetooth v4.0 stack) required to create a Bluetooth low energy product encom-
passing a user application running on a single device. The CSR1010 and CSR1011 include
enough memory to support both the Bluetooth stack and the user application (64 KB of
ROM and 64 KB of RAM) on the same device. Their power consumption (@ 3 Volts) is
of 16 milliamperes, in active mode, and less than 5 microamperes, in sleep mode.
Finally, EM Microelectronic has introduced the EM9301 transceiver in 2012. As Nordic
transceivers, this device requires a host microcontroller to run the BLE profiles and the
user application. The EM9301 transceiver is intended for ultra low-power applications.
Hence, it requires just 12.9 milliamperes in active mode (@ 1.2 Volts) and 9 microamperes
in sleep mode. Furthermore, the DCDC version operates with voltages as low as 0.8 Volts,
which makes it highly adequate for single-cell battery (1.5 Volts) operation.
2.1.2 IEEE 802.15.4
The IEEE 802.15.4 [46] is a communication standard that specifies the Media Access
Control (MAC) sub-layer and physical layer for Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks
(LR-WPANs). The first approved version of the protocol was released in 2003 [71] and
has experienced a broad support from the industry, later being adopted as the base for
ZigBee [53], WirelessHART [72] and 6LoWPAN [73] technologies, among others. ZigBee
is a low-power, low-rate popular protocol used in a large number of applications includ-
ing home automation, industrial control and environmental sensing, just to name a few.
WirelessHART is a specialized protocol that became popular in factory and process con-
trol. It allows extending existing wired Highway Addressable Remote Transducer Protocol
(HART) networks with wireless connectivity. The 6LoWPAN is a wireless protocol that
aims at bringing the Internet protocol connectivity to small, low-power wireless devices.
In this sense, it aims at addressing every wireless device of the 6LoWPAN network using
IPv6. 6LoWPAN is an acronym of “IPv6 over low-power wireless personal area networks”.
A revised version of the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol was published in September 2006
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[74]. This version partially addressed the requirements posed by the ZigBee specification.
Besides providing clarifications to the previous version, it focuses on increasing its flexibility
and security while reducing complexity. This updated version encompassed increased data
rates and new modulation schemes for the 868 and 915 MHz physical layers. Furthermore,
a new modulation scheme addressing the 2.4 GHz ISM band was also introduced.
In March 2007, an IEEE 802.15.4 amendment [75] was approved adding two physical
layers to the standard: UWB Pulse Radio and Chirp Spread Spectrum, both aimed at
decreasing power consumption, increasing the communication range and the aggregate
throughput. The included UWB Pulse Radio PHY is based on the Direct Sequence UWB
technology, which can support accurate ranging (up to 1 meter precision) and allow robust
communications to occur even at low power levels. The Chirp Spread Spectrum adds the
ability to support wireless communications to devices moving at high speeds.
The active version of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [46] was approved in June 2011 by the
IEEE Standards Association and, in August 2012, by the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI). The IEEE Standards Association states that this revision addresses the
extension of the market applicability (possibly regarding the 6LoWPAN protocol), the
ambiguities in the previous version and the improvements “learned from implementations
of IEEE Std 802.15.4-2006”.
Overview
The current version of the IEEE 802.15.4 technology [46] supports a broad range of
physical layers, each one defining different frequency bands and data rates. Table 2.2 orga-
nizes these bands and data rates by the associated spreading and modulation technologies,
as defined in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. Because this document specifically addresses
low-power communication technologies that can be supported worldwide, it focuses on the
2.4 GHz ISM band, in particular on the IEEE 802.15.4 implementations using the Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum DSSS technique and the Offset Quadrature Phase-Shift Key-
ing modulation method to perform packet transmissions. In this case, the IEEE 802.15.4
technology supports 16 channels with a data rate of 250 Kbps.
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard defines a minimum output power of -3 dBm in most
bands. Nevertheless, some bands allow the emission of more power, depending on the type
of spreading technology employed. For example, spread spectrum technologies can perform
packet transmissions in the 2.4 GHz ISM band with power levels of up to 100 mW (20 dBm)
of Effective Isotropic Irradiated Power (EIRP). Provided that the communication range
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Table 2.2: IEEE 802.15.4 physical layers
Spreading
Modulation
Bands Data Rate
Technology (MHz) (Kb/s)
CSS DQPSK 2400.0 - 2483.5 1000
DSSS
BPSK
868.0 - 868.6 20
902.0 - 928.0 40
950.0 - 956.0 20
MPSK 779.0 - 787.0 250
O-QPSK
779.0 - 787.0 250
868.0 - 868.6 100
902.0 - 928.0 250
2400.0 - 2483.5 250
None GFSK 950.8 - 955.8 100
PSSS ASK
868.0 - 868.6 250
902.0 - 928.0 250
UWB BPM-BPSK
249.6 - 749.6
110 - 272403100.0 - 4800.0
6000.0 - 10600.0
is usually dependent on the transmission power and on the sensibility of the receiver, the
use of power amplifiers (to increase the transmission power) and low-noise amplifiers (to
increase the reception sensibility) can contribute significantly to improve the transmission
range of the IEEE 802.15.4 technology. The indoor nominal communication range of
standard IEEE 802.15.4 nodes transmitting with power levels of 0 dBm and 20 dBm is of
10 and 100 meters, respectively.
IEEE 802.15.4 communications are enabled with several security mechanisms, which
are supported by the protocol’s MAC sublayer. These mechanisms are provided in the
form of services, namely: confidentiality, authenticity and replay protection. The former is
related to the requirement of making the transmitted data only available to the addressed
node, and no other. This service is implemented using encryption, guaranteeing that ad-
versaries cannot recover the full message nor have access to any partial information that
was encrypted. In order to meet this requirement, two identical data messages must orig-
inate two different cyphertexts. This is achieved by including a nonce in each encryption,
i.e., an ever changing input that adds variability to the information being encrypted, thus
making the encryption of identical data messages result in very different cyphertexts. The
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IEEE 802.15.4 nonce is a 13-octet string including the source address (8 bytes), the frame
counter (4 bytes) and the security level (1 byte) fields.
The authenticity service provides the means to ensure that the received data is the one
that was effectively transmitted, i.e., that it was not modified in transit. The inclusion of
a Message Integrity Code (MIC) in each exchanged packet allows verifying its authenticity
and integrity. This MIC can be simply viewed as an encrypted message checksum, whose
calculation requires a secret cryptographic key shared among the network’s genuine nodes.
In this sense, in addition to the data information itself, secured packets encompass a MIC
that is computed using the packet together with the secret shared key. Secured messages
are only accepted if the locally computed MIC is identical to the one embedded in the
packet. Otherwise, nodes reject the forged message.
The replay protection service ensures the detection of duplicate transmissions, i.e., the
occurrence of attacks involving the transmission of previously sent (legitimate) messages.
Because adversaries can replicate packets with a valid MIC, receiver(s) may acknowledge
them as legitimate and accept the packets. The replay protection service is implemented
by including a frame counter field in the transmitted packet, which is monotonically in-
cremented at each exchanged packet. When the receiver detects a packet with a frame
counter smaller than one already received, it is rejected.
Security services are optional and, depending of the service, can be implemented using
different alternative mechanisms. When enabled, security services are applied to each trans-
mitted/received frame. The replay protection service is enabled whenever one or both of
the confidentiality and authenticity services are activated. Furthermore, all frame types can
be protected using these services, except the acknowledgment frame. The IEEE 802.15.4
standard defines several symmetric-key cryptographic mechanisms to support these secu-
rity services. The keys used by the services are shared among peers or a group of devices
and are provided by the higher layers of the network’s protocol stack.
Architecture
The IEEE 802.15.4 technology supports two types of device: Full Function Device
(FFD) and Reduced Function Device (RFD). The FFD is typically a full featured device
that is able to perform the role of coordinator (or router), besides being able to commu-
nicate with any other devices in its radio range. The FFD can assume the special role
of Personal Area Network (PAN) coordinator. The PAN coordinator is responsible for
establishing and maintaining the network. The FFD, due to its broader application and
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(a) Star (b) Peer-to-Peer
Figure 2.4: IEEE 802.15.4 topologies
more demanding resources (memory and CPU power), tends to be more expensive than
the RFD. The RFD is a simpler device that associates with a coordinator (or router) and
is only able to communicate with FFD devices, since it encompasses no routing capability.
Therefore, it is used as an “end device”, typically a sensor or actuator. These types of
devices also differ regarding the requirements of low-power operation. Because FFDs may
be required to forward messages from other nodes, they must remain actively listening
for those messages. When this occurs, FFDs are commonly mains powered. Conversely,
because RFDs do not require to route messages, they may remain in sleep mode for long
periods of time, only waking up when there is some new information to be sent. This type
of devices is more suited for applications requiring the use of batteries.
The IEEE 802.15.4 supports both star and peer-to-peer topologies, as documented in
Figure 2.4(a) and 2.4(b), respectively. The star topology is developed around a central
PAN coordinator that is connected directly to a set of different nodes. Although these
nodes can communicate with the PAN coordinator, they are not able to perform packet
transmissions among themselves, even if some are FFDs. As introduced, the peer-to-peer
network is also established by the PAN coordinator. However, some FFDs devices are
allowed by the PAN coordinator to act as routers, i.e., to establish direct connections
among FFDs. In this sense, some devices (either FFDs or RFDs) act like “end devices”,
only being able to communicate with the PAN coordinator, while other FFDs (routers)
can talk to each other.
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Figure 2.5: IEEE 802.15.4 superframe example
When the geographical area being covered by the network is beyond the nominal range
of the IEEE 802.15.4 technologies, two topologies can be employed: cluster-tree and mesh.
The former corresponds to a set of star networks interconnected by FFDs, which act as
routers, forwarding packets through the network backbone. The latter topology can be
implemented in a similar fashion. However, it requires higher layers of software on the
nodes to be implemented in order to support the required network formation and routing
services.
Operation
The MAC layer defines two operation modes: beaconed and non-beaconed (also known
as beaconless). In beaconed mode, the access to the physical radio channel is ruled by a
superframe structure enforced by the PAN coordinator. As documented in Figure 2.5, the
superframe is bounded by the transmission of beacon frames and encompasses an active
portion and an optional inactive portion. The former corresponds to the period of time
in which all communications take place. The latter is used to allow entering a low-power
(sleep) mode in which no communications are expected and the radios can be turned off,
thus increasing the autonomy of nodes powered with batteries.
The active portion of the superframe is segmented into 16 slots and the beacon frame
is transmitted at the beginning of the first slot (zero), as depicted in Figure 2.5. The
Contention Access Period (CAP) follows immediately. During this period, the access to the
channel is performed by all nodes using the slotted Carrier Sense Medium Access/Collision
Avoidance (CSMA/CA) access mechanism and all initiated transactions must complete
within the bounds of this time window. The CSMA/CA is a technique that has been
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Figure 2.6: IEEE 802.15.4 slotted CSMA/CA algorithm
popularized by its “non-greedy approach” in distributing bandwidth among contending
stations. The slotted CSMA/CA algorithm is represented in Figure 2.6. As shown, the
first step corresponds to setting the initial values for the variablesNB and CW . The former
refers to the number of retries that the algorithm was required to back off in attempting
to perform the transmission. The latter corresponds to the contention window length,
which defines the number of required backoff periods without channel activity before a
transmission can be initiated.
If the Battery Life Extension (BLE) bit is set, the Backoff Exponent (BE) is set to the
minimum value between 2 and macMinBE. Otherwise, the BE is set simply to macMinBE.
Afterwards, the next backoff period boundary is located and a random delay ranging from
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0 to 2BE − 1 unit backoff periods is enforced. When the delay elapses, the algorithm
checks whether the current CAP can accommodate the remaining operations (CCA checks,
packet transmission and associated acknowledgement), proceeding to perform the Clear
Channel Assessment (CCA) check if the necessary time is available, or halting until the
next active portion of the subsequent superframe, otherwise. As Figure 2.6 illustrates, the
CSMA/CA algorithm only allows a packet transmission to begin after performing a CW0
number of CCA checks finding the channel idle. Alternatively, if a CCA check detects
the channel busy, the algorithm assumes that a transmission is ongoing and restarts the
CSMA/CA algorithm. In this sequence, NB is incremented by one unit, CW is set to
CW0 and the minimum of BE + 1 and macMinBE is assigned to BE. If NB exceeds the
macMaxCSMABackoffs backoff cycle limit, the CSMA/CA algorithm declares a channel
access failure and reports this event to the higher layers of the protocol, which manage the
occurrence.
The CAP is optionally followed by a Contention-Free Period (CFP) where bandwidth
can be reserved for real-time transmissions of individual nodes. Hence, when a node needs
to perform a contention-free access in order to transmit a packet, it requests a Guaranteed
Time Slot (GTS) indicating the duration which ensures a proper packet transmission.
The PAN coordinator is, then, responsible for allowing or denying the request. If the
request is accepted, the node gains exclusive access to a designated GTS. However, the
packet transmission must be concluded one IFS period before the end of the assigned
GTS. As introduced, when present, the inactive portion of the superframe allows the nodes
participating in the network to switch to a low power mode. Besides saving energy, the
inactive period can also be used to establish the interconnection between IEEE 802.15.4
clusters.
Regarding the beaconless mode of operation, the access to the medium is ruled by
a simpler CSMA/CA mechanism, as represented in Figure 2.7. The main difference to
the beaconed CSMA/CA algorithm is the absence of the superframe defined temporal
bounds, which allows several simplifications in the algorithm. First, the random backoff
countdown can begin immediately after the packet transmission has been requested by the
upper layers. Second, when the random backoff expires a single CCA check is enough to
allow the data packet transmission if the medium is found idle. Third, because there is no
superframe, a node can perform a CCA check, transmit a data packet (if the medium is
available) and receive the corresponding acknowledgement (if requested) immediately after
the end of the random backoff interval.
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Figure 2.7: IEEE 802.15.4 unslotted CSMA/CA algorithm
A brief description of the algorithm presented in Figure 2.7 follows. As documented,
BE is initialized to the value of macMinBE. If macMinBE is set to zero, the first iteration
of the algorithm will run without collision avoidance. As introduced, NB is the variable
registering the number of times the CSMA/CA algorithm was required to backoff while
attempting the undergoing transmission. This variable is initialized to zero before each new
transmission attempt. After initializing NB and BE the algorithm waits a random number
of backoff periods in the range of 0 to 2BE − 1, before requesting the PHY to perform a
CCA. If the channel is perceived idle, the transmission of the frame is immediately initiated.
Contrarily, if the channel is found busy (e.g., the detected energy level is above a specific
threshold), both NB and BE parameters are incremented by one unit, ensuring that BE
is bounded by macMaxBE. Afterwards, if NB is smaller than macMaxCSMABackoffs, the
algorithm returns to the state of waiting a random number of backoff periods. Otherwise,
as in the beaconed operation mode, the algorithm reports a channel access failure to the
higher layers of the protocol. For more detailed information about the IEEE 802.15.4
technology, please consult its specification [46].
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Power Consumption and Availability
Given the broad adoption of the IEEE 802.15.4 technology, many manufacturers are
providing hardware capable of supporting this protocol. In this subsection, a short sum-
mary of some products provided by the key manufacturers is provided for reference. Hence,
devices from Freescale [76], Texas Instruments [68], Atmel [77] and Microchip [78] are pre-
sented and discussed in Table 2.3, which shows the most representative parameters of
the selected devices. In this table, two Freescale IEEE 802.15.4 devices are documented:
MC13233 and MC13202. The former is a SoC that can simultaneously integrate an appli-
cation and a communication stack, due to its support of 5 KB of RAM and of 82 KB of
FLASH memory. The latter is a transceiver that requires a host microcontroller to be fully
functional. As documented, although their current consumption in sleep mode is close,
the transceiver requires a higher current consumption (42 milliamperes) than the SoC (35
milliamperes) when performing a packet reception.
Table 2.3: IEEE 802.15.4 commercial solutions
Parameter MC13233 MC13202 CC2538 CC2520 AT86RF231 MRF24J40
Type SoC Transceiver SoC Transceiver Transceiver Transceiver
Package LGA48 QFN32 QFN56 QFN28 QFN32 QFN40
Size (mm) 7 x 7 5 x 5 8 x 8 5 x 5 5 x 5 6 x 6
Supply (V) 1.8 - 3.6 2.0 - 3.4 2.0 - 3.6 1.8 - 3.8 1.8 - 3.6 2.4 - 3.6
Max. Power (dBm) 2.3 3 7 5 3 0
Sensitivity (dBm) -94 -92 -97 -98 -101 -95
Max. Current (mA) 35 42 34 33.6 14 23
RAM (KB) 5 NA 32 NA NA NA
ROM (KB) 82 NA 128, 256, 512 NA NA NA
Sleep Current (µA) 0.45 1 0.4 <1 0.02 2
Price Estimate (e) 5.85 2.78 6.94 3.44 2.34 2.15
NA - Not Applicable
UA - Unavailable
Texas Instruments is also represented in Table 2.3 with one SoC (CC2538) and one
transceiver (CC2520). Although it adds an ARM Cortex M3 processor and memory to the
basic functions of a transceiver such as the CC2520, the CC2538 can operate with a max-
imum current consumption (34 milliamperes @ 7dBm) similar to the CC2520 transceiver
(33.6 milliamperes @ 5dBm), when performing the transmission of a packet. However,
the latter has a broader voltage supply range and it is much less expensive. Two other
transceivers were also considered, the AT86RF231 from Atmel and the MRF24J40 from
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Microchip. The former, is characterized by the best sensitivity and smallest current con-
sumptions of the group. The second, has an intermediate sensitivity and current consump-
tion, but presents the lowest cost per unit of the considered solutions.
2.1.3 Emerging Technologies
The 2.4 GHz ISM band has become the de facto unlicensed band for wireless low-
power communications worldwide. In this sense, Bluetooth, IEEE 802.15.4 and its derivate
protocols have pushed the popularity of this region of the spectrum to levels unknown
before to any short-range technology. Despite their market dominance, these technologies
present some areas of improvement (e.g., the immunity to multipath fading), which can be
explored to create new competing technologies. In the following section, two recent low-
power technologies operating on the 2.4 GHz ISM band are presented and briefly discussed.
ANT
ANT [79] is a proprietary wireless sensor network protocol operating in the 2.4 GHz
ISM band designed for ultra-low power, ease of use, efficiency and scalability. The protocol
was originally developed by Dynastream Innovations Inc. (a Garmin subsidiary) to allow
communications between running shoes and a wristwatch display. However, given its po-
tential for enabling bio sensors, home sensors and industrial sensors with ultra-low-power
communications, chips with built in ANT protocol were made available to third party de-
velopers. Provided the market traction for this protocol, several smartphone manufacturers
are already embedding this technology in their headsets. For example, the recent Galaxy
S4 and Note 3 smartphones from Samsung already have ANT+ support. The same occurs
for the Xperia range of Sony smartphones (Acro S, ion, active, arc, S, etc.).
According to the OSI reference protocol stack model, the ANT protocol implements
the physical, data-link, network and transport layers, including low-level security features.
The application and presentation layers together with the high-level security can be added
by the developers, which implement the networking applications. While the ANT protocol
defines the basic networking functionality, the ANT+ protocol establishes the support
required for interoperability among ANT nodes. In this sense, it is an open application
layer that lays on top of the ANT stack, standardizing communications and enabling
interoperability among different ANT devices (sports, wellness and lifestyle monitoring).
The ANT protocol can operate under several network topologies, namely: star, peer-
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to-peer, tree and mesh, among other variations. The protocol’s support for data commu-
nications is highly flexible, allowing data transfers to be scheduled in both an ad-hoc or
deterministic manner. Besides these transfer modes, the ANT protocol supports a burst
mode, which enables transferring large amounts of data to/from computational devices in
an efficient way. A maximum of 125 channels, each one with a bandwidth of 1 MHz, is
supported by the ANT protocol. Since these channels cover the 2400 to 2524 MHz region
of the spectrum, before using a channel, a check to the compliance with the applicable RF
emission regulations is required. The protocol employs a GFSK modulation scheme and
operates with a data rate of 1 Mbps. The medium access is based on a TDM technique in
which nodes transmit in designated time slots.
Table 2.4: ANT commercial solutions
Parameter nRF24AP1 CC257x ANTAP281M4IB
Type Transceiver Transceiver Transceiver
Package QFN24 QFN40 Proprietary
Size (mm) 5 x 5 6 x 6 20 x 20
Supply (V) 1.9 - 3.6 2.0 - 3.6 1.9 - 3.6
Max. Power (dBm) 0 4 4
Sensitivity (dBm) -80 -86 -85
Max. Current (mA) 22 34.3 17
RAM (KB) NA NA NA
ROM (KB) NA NA NA
Sleep Current (µA) 2 0.5 0.5
Price Estimate (e) 5.06 2.54 11.96
NA - Not Applicable
UA - Unavailable
The ANT chipsets encapsulate the full complexity of the wireless protocol, allowing
resource constrained 4-bit or 8-bit MCUs to manage the formation and maintenance of
large wireless networks using the ANT technology. This encapsulation is only possible
given the compactness of the ANT protocol. When compared to the technologies formerly
presented (Bluetooth and IEEE 802.15.4), the availability of ANT transceivers is rather
limited due to its emerging nature. However, as documented in Table 2.4, three man-
ufacturers are currently offering transceivers that, together with an MCU, can be used
to developed ANT+ wireless networking solutions. Nordic [79] supplies the nRF24AP1
transceiver, whose current consumption varies from 2 microamperes in the sleep mode to
22 milliamperes in the reception mode (peak). Texas Instruments [68] offers the CC257x
line of transceivers, characterized by current consumptions ranging from 500 nanoamperes
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in power down mode to 34.3 milliamperes when performing transmissions with 4 dBm of
power. The ANTAP281M4IB transceiver module is a ready to use solution provided by
Dynastream Innovations Inc. [80]. This module encompasses an ANT transceiver and all
the external components (including antenna) required to establish communications with
other enabled ANT devices. This module operates with currents from 500 nanoamperes
in deep sleep mode to 17 milliamperes when actively listening for transmissions. As Table
2.4 illustrates, the cost of the ANT transceivers is characterized by a wide variation. Also,
only the Texas Instruments CC257x family of transceivers presents a competitive cost when
compared to the former Bluetooth and IEEE 802.15.4 alternatives.
nanoNET
nanoNET [81] is a proprietary low-power wireless communication technology developed
by Nanotron Technologies GmbH [82]. It targets battery-powered mobile communication
and real-time location applications in the fields of factory automation, intelligent access
control and alert systems, among others. This technology operates in the ISM 2.4GHz band
and is advertised as being highly immune to noise due to the employed Multi Dimensional
Multiple Access (MDMA) modulation method together with the Chirp Spread Spectrum
(CSS) technique. The MDMA combines three modulation schemes (frequency, amplitude,
and phase) into a single method that wastes no bandwidth and is able to provide a given
level of Quality of Service (QoS). The CSS spread spectrum technique uses robust chirp
pulses that, in addition to reducing the required transmission power for a given transmis-
sion distance, is highly immune to multipath fading. The CSS technique was originally
developed by Nanotron Technologies GmbH and integrated on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard
in 2007 [75]. The nanoNET MAC sublayer defines access schemes such as ALOHA, Carrier
Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA), Time Division Multiple Access
(TDMA) and CSMA/CA over TDMA, thus potentiating a wide range of applications.
To the best of our knowledge, Nanotron is the only manufacturer developing chips that
make use of the CSS spread spectrum technique. On this account, Table 2.5 presents the
main characteristics of the nanoPAN 5375 transceiver module manufactured by Nanotron.
This device combines the function of location awareness with wireless communication in a
single chip. Additionally, the device encompasses not only the transceiver chip, but also
all the electronic components required to establish wireless communications driven by an
external MCU. It supports three power and transmission modes: HC Ranging, LD Ranging
and R Comm. The first offers high-capacity ranging with communication and provides a
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80 MHz bandwidth together with a 1 Mbps data rate. The second, refers to long-distance
ranging with communication and supports 80 MHz of bandwidth and a data rate of 250
kbps. The third is tailored to allow robust communications only. This mode of operation
is characterized by a bandwidth of 22 MHz and a data rate of 250 kbps.
Table 2.5: nanoNET commercial solutions
Parameter nanoPAN 5375
Type Transceiver
Package Proprietary
Size (mm) 15 x 29
Supply (V) 2.3 - 2.7
Max. Power (dBm) 20
Sensitivity (dBm) -96
Max. Current (mA) 210
RAM (KB) NA
ROM (KB) NA
Sleep Current (µA) UA
Price Estimate (e) 93.9
NA - Not Applicable
UA - Unavailable
As documented in Table 2.5, the nanoPAN 5375 transceiver module has a current con-
sumption of 210 milliamperes when performing transmissions at its maximum power of 20
dBm. Although the transmission range is significantly increased with the support for 20
dBm transmissions, its application in battery powered applications with demanding auton-
omy requirements seems difficult, given that the current consumption can be of one order
of magnitude higher than competing communication technologies. Furthermore, although
the nanoPAN 5375 module adds ranging for supporting RTLS applications together with
wireless communications, it presents a much higher price tag when compared to its com-
munication competitors (e.g., Bluetooth and IEEE 802.15.4). The RTLS specialization
and the lack of massification of this technology are the main reasons contributing to its
increased cost.
Following a description of the key enabling communication technologies operating in
the 2.4 GHz ISM band, a review of the main wireless real-time protocols devised for this
band is provided in the following subsection.
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2.2 A Review on Selected Wireless Real-Time Protocols
The MAC layer has been acknowledged to play a critical role in providing timing and
reliability guarantees in real-time protocols [83]. In this sense, the analysis of such protocols
should focus on their MAC features and operation. Kumar et al. [84] classify protocols
according to their MAC schemes in contention-free and contention-based protocols. In
contention-free MAC schemes, bandwidth is usually reserved for each transmission, thus
avoiding contention among nodes to access the medium. This type of MAC protocols is
typically employed in scenarios with centralized control, where a node (or more) establish
the rules of access to the medium that the remaining must comply with. Contention-based
MAC schemes are characterized by a risk of occurring collisions among data transmissions.
This type of MAC protocols is more geared towards dynamic networks, where the control
to access the medium is distributed among nodes. In the following, a review on selected
wireless protocols is presented. The review encompasses protocols using both types of MAC
schemes, although with a much higher predominance of contention-free protocols. Due to
their demanding timeliness and reliability requirements, the selected protocols focus on
factory automation applications. Also, only communication protocols operating in the 2.4
GHz ISM band were considered, given the requirement of global support. In addition, the
selected protocols target applications with a static nature regarding its deployment and
operation. The following description provides, for each selected protocol, a brief introduc-
tion followed by an analysis of its operation with focus on the adopted MAC scheme. A
discussion of the protocol’s timeliness performance and limitations is also presented.
2.2.1 WISA
The Wireless Interface for Sensors and Actuators (WISA) protocol [85, 86] was proposed
under the assumption that existing off-the-shelf wireless systems could not cope with the
power supply and timeliness requirements of communications at the machine level in factory
automation. In this sense, the WISA technology provides both wireless communication
support and wireless power supply to automation devices. Since batteries are not an
option in industrial applications encompassing hundreds of devices, the power supply is
obtained using a magnetic coupling technique where energy is transmitted using long-wave
radio frequencies. The real-time communication is implemented with a combined scheme of
TDMA and frequency hopping on top of the physical layer of the IEEE 802.15.1 protocol.
The WISA technology encompasses two types of devices: sensor/actuator node and
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base station. The former employs a hardware platform that benefits from the “economies
of scale (low cost), component integration (small size) and low-power consumption” [85]
of using a standard communication technology, in this case a Bluetooth 2.4 GHz radio
transceiver. Thus, it employs a commercial IEEE 802.15.1 transceiver, a receiver coil for
the wireless power supply and a microcontroller. The later adopts a specialized architec-
ture encompassing an RF front-end, microcontroller and an FPGA, which is responsible
for the time critical control of the baseband signal processing. The requirement of using a
dedicated FPGA for signal processing is related to the base station requirement of oper-
ating in full-duplex mode, besides receiving signals from up to four sensor/actuator nodes
simultaneously.
Provided that WISA protocol uses the same physical layer of Bluetooth, it shares its
physical characteristics, as described in Section 2.1.1. For example, the nominal transmis-
sion power is of 0 dBm and the raw data rate is of 1 Mbps.
Operation
The WISA protocol is characterized by a medium access mechanism that combines
techniques such as TDMA, FDD and FH to ensure communications with fast response
times, high reliability and ability to serve a large number of devices deployed in small
areas. As documented in Figure 2.8, time is divided in long intervals called WISA frames,
each one lasting 2048 microseconds. These frames can be of two types: downlink and
uplink. The former, as the name suggests, is used by the base station (BS) to convey
information to sensor/actuator (SA) devices. This frame is segmented into 16 downlink
slots, each one used to perform the transmission of a packet with a length of 128 bits.
The structure of this packet is specified in Figure 2.8. Among other fields, it contains the
data for 8 SAs. Downlink slot transmissions are continuously performed within each WISA
frame in order to keep the synchronization of the SAs with the BS timing.
Uplink slots are used by SA devices to conduct their uplink transmissions. A WISA
time frame is segmented in 32 slots, with a duration of 64 microseconds each. However,
because the packets transmitted by the SAs on these slots only have a length of 56 bits, the
remaining slack of 8 microseconds is used to establish a guard interval for transients. Uplink
slot transmissions are performed by the SAs only when there is (data/control) information
to be transmitted. Furthermore, these transmissions are only performed in the uplink slots
specifically reserved for them, at a maximum rate of one SA transmission per WISA frame.
Two guard slots are reserved at the WISA frame boundary to provide enough slack time
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Figure 2.8: WISA TDMA/FDD/FH pattern
for the frequency hopping switching procedure. Hence, only 30 uplink slots per uplink
group are available. Provided the use of four uplink groups (UL1, UL2, UL3, UL4) in the
WISA protocol, it is possible to support up to 120 sensor/actuator devices per cell.
As depicted in Figure 2.8, the downlink and the uplink groups use a different frequencies
(fDL, fUL1, fUL4), which hop synchronously in each frame boundary. The available ISM
2.4 GHz band is segmented in 7 disjoint sub-bands, each one containing 11 hop frequencies
spaced 1 MHz apart. Thus, an individual hop frequency can be chosen by arbitrating a
7-ary integer that identifies the sub-band and a 11-ary integer that selects the individ-
ual frequency within the chosen sub-band. The frequency hopping is conducted so that
consecutive frames are transmitted in different sub-bands spaced by, at least, 11 MHz;
uplinks belong to the same sub-band, but are spaced 3 MHz apart from each other; and
the minimum separation between downlink and uplink frequencies is of 22 MHz.
An automatic retransmission request (ARQ) scheme is used together with Frequency
Hopping (FH) in order to improve the WISA communication performance. In this sense,
after a transmission in the reserved uplink slot, the SA waits for an acknowledgement
in the corresponding downlink slot. If the acknowledgement is not received, the packet
is retransmitted on the reserved slot of the next frame. Otherwise, the SA receives the
acknowledgement and verifies that the packet was successfully received by the BS.
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Performance and Limitations
The WISA protocol performance was evaluated using a realistic testbed consisting of
60 WISA SA devices placed around a WISA base station, at a distance of around 70 cen-
timeters [85]. The SA devices were configured to generate a data packet at a rate of two
packets per second. Results are provided solely in the form of a normalized number of
transmission attempts. Hence, given that the TDMA framing is bounded by a maximum
of 2048 microseconds and that any lost packet (uplink/downlink) results in an additional
delay of 2048 microseconds (due to its retransmission in the subsequent WISA frame), it
is possible to estimate the maximum delay experienced by any SA transmission. The per-
formance analysis of the WISA protocol focused on three scenarios encompassing different
sources of noise, namely: co-located WISA cells; industrial environment equipments; and
other communication systems.
In the first scenario, a multi-cell operation was simulated by pointing the antennas
of a variable number of interfering BSs (1 to 3) to the WISA system testbed. Results
demonstrated that the maximum number of retransmission attempts is 4 and occurs in
the scenario encompassing 3 interfering BSs. This value is well within the design goal of 6
retransmissions, which can result in a maximum delay of 15 milliseconds.
The performance analysis associated to noise from industrial environment equipments
was evaluated in both spot and arc welding installations, given their ability to generate
very high electromagnetic field strengths, which can interfere with electronic equipment.
The WISA sensors were placed near the welding guns, just a few centimeters away. Pro-
vided that the majority of the noise generated by welding equipment fades out above 1
GHz, results showed no measurable impact of this type of noise on the communication
performance.
Regarding the performance of the WISA protocol when other communication tech-
nologies generate noise in the 2.4 GHz band, two technologies were evaluated: Wi-Fi and
Bluetooth. In the first case, a PC with an IEEE 802.11g card was connected to an Access
Point (AP) on channel 5, employing a 20 dBm transmission power. Measurements were
conducted by placing the AP at three different distances away from the WISA BS (7.5, 4
and 1 meter). Results revealed a general increase in the number of retransmissions, with
a maximum of 5 retransmissions occurring when the AP is placed 1 meter apart from the
WISA BS. On the opposite direction, the WISA testbed had an impact on the WLAN
performance. In the noise-free scenario, the WLAN data rate was measured to be of 3.1
MBps. However, by decreasing the distance between the WISA BS and the AP, the WLAN
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data rates were also reduced to 2.8 MBps (7.5 meters), 2.25 MBps (4 meters), and 0.86
MBps (1 meter).
In the Bluetooth noise scenario, a laptop was configured to continuously transmit pack-
ets to a Bluetooth AP using a transmission power of 0 dBm. The Bluetooth interferer was
placed 1 meter away from the WISA testbed. Results indicate a maximum of 3 retransmis-
sions when the Bluetooth interferer is at a distance of 1 meter. Furthermore, the impact
of the WISA testbed on the Bluetooth link was also measured. Results exhibit a reduction
of the Bluetooth data rate from 29.2 kBps (noise-free scenario) to 25.6 kBps when the link
is exposed to the WISA testbed.
The WISA protocol heavily relies on a specifically developed based station that plays a
central role in the protocol’s operation. This fact poses two relevant issues. The first is the
requirement to develop custom hardware supporting the intended features, thus making
difficult its replacement and significantly increasing the cost of the solution. However,
because a single base station can support up to 120 wireless sensors/actuators, the cost
becomes less significant in large wireless networks. The second issue reports to the existence
of a single point of failure, which hinders a graceful degradation of the network operation
in case of a malfunction.
2.2.2 TDMA-Based MAC Protocol for Industrial WSNs
Phua et al. [87] proposed a TDMA-based MAC protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs) using Link State Dependent Scheduling (LSDS) to cope with the channel fad-
ing phenomena experienced in industrial environments. This protocol works by collecting
samples of the channel quality and generating prediction sets in independent slots. The
prediction sets are then used by stations to wake up and transmit/receive during the clear
predicted slots while keeping in sleep mode during the slots predicted as potentially result-
ing in signal fading. The authors claim that this protocol improves the packet throughput
when compared to both non-link state dependent TDMA and CSMA protocols.
Operation
In order to improve the reliability and efficiency of data transmissions in industrial
WSNs Phua et al. [87] devised a TDMA-based MAC protocol incorporating a LSDS
approach for each independent slot. This protocol was developed under the premises that,
in industrial plants, signal fading occurs in approximately periodic time intervals and that
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Figure 2.9: TDMA frame format
stations placed near each other are unlikely to be affected by it. Thus, signal fading
affecting these stations is mainly caused by the periodic movements of nearby machines.
Figure 2.9 depicts the channel time divided in TDMA frames of fixed length (1...n), each
one encompassing a set of communication slots (S1...Sn) and a control slot. Communication
slots, as the name implies, are used for communication between sensor stations and are
used in a pairwise fashion, i.e., each slot allows only one uplink (transmission) and one
downlink (reception) between a pair of sensor stations. The control slot at the end of each
TDMA frame enables the future development of the protocol to cope with the inclusion of
new stations.
The protocol assumes a set of connected static sensor stations plus a base station.
All sensor stations are connected to exactly one parent and each station can have one or
more children. The base station, however, has no parent as it is the root of the network.
Additional sensor stations can be added to the network after the deployment phase and
stabilization. Initially, in a so called startup phase, stations operate in random access mode
and exchange tokens and TDMA slot assignments. In this phase, the protocol employs a
“bottom-up tree-based token passing approach” in which, because the whole structure of
the network is known, the base station and the relay stations reserve the slots required to
support exclusive communication for their children and descendants. Afterwards, stations
exchange TDMA schedules with their neighbors and initiate the communications in TDMA
mode.
The switching from random access mode to TDMA mode is immediately followed by
an evaluation period called observation phase where a training data set is collected for
a given period of time and later used to compute a prediction set allowing error-free
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transmission/reception of data packets. In the observation phase, sensor stations analyze
the fading signal pattern in order to obtain its length and period. This is achieved by
performing transmissions during the scheduled slots negotiated in the startup phase. As
the sensor stations can detect when a scheduled transmission was not received, they can
register the occurrence of good and bad slots related to the successful or unsuccessful
reception of the scheduled packets in a given slot. Later, this information is used by the
receiving station to build a prediction set which is the subset of the training set with the
shortest repeat pattern. This prediction set is then transmitted at the beginning of the
signal fading aware (SF-Aware) phase in an uplink slot to the source station (for that slot).
In this phase, the transmission and reception of data in a given slot is only conducted if
the prediction set indicates a clear slot. Further information regarding this protocol can
be found in [88].
Performance and Limitations
The protocol relies on the premise that fading occurs in strictly periodic intervals.
However, in practical perspective, this is not likely to happen. A continuous deviation is
expected to occur over time, perhaps with different rates along the day. This deviation
would severely impair the performance of the protocol once the fading period becomes
significantly dephased from the TDMA frames/slots. Although a simple mechanism of
forcing an observation mode systematically could be devised, this would be very costly as
the protocol is complex and could take a non-negligible amount of time to conclude this
task.
Although the authors present supporting simulation results regarding the protocol’s
effectiveness in predicting channel fading, there are several open issues that should be ad-
dressed concerning a physical implementation, namely: the interference impact that other
technologies may have in the devised mechanism’s reliability; the foreseeable timeliness
with and without external interference; the technology selection for its implementation;
and, finally, the protocol’s ability to support operational flexibility.
2.2.3 Real-Time Sensor/Actuator Network for Factory Automa-
tion
In 2007, a real-time Wireless Sensor/Actuator Network (WSAN) protocol targeting
factory automation applications and operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM band was proposed by
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Ko¨rber et al. [89]. This protocol was designed with focus on eight user driven require-
ments, namely: autonomous energy operation; 5 milliseconds end-to-end bounded delay;
multisensor/actuator handling of at least 64 nodes; fieldbus comparable reliability; co-
existence with existing wireless standards; scalability and modularity; low-cost hardware
architecture supported on COTS components and modules; and global market support.
The authors performed an indoor radio channel characterization concluding that the pro-
tocol’s underlying physical layer should support a data rate of 1 Mbps.
The architecture of the proposed network is based on network cells, due to its scalability
and direct application in factory environments where production processes are segmented
into independent subprocesses. The network itself is characterized by a star topology,
having a base station (BS) that bridges the WSAN to the (cabled) upper tier of the
network. The BS encompasses a transceiver for establishing cabled communications in
the upper tier and an array of wireless transceivers, included to support the simultaneous
transmission of packets in multiple frequencies. Sensor/actuator modules (SAMs) typically
employ a single wireless transceiver, but can use two, if full duplex communications between
BS and SAMs are required.
Operation
In this protocol, the access to the medium is managed using a classical TDMA approach,
where the transmission time is divided into slots that are characterized by a bounded
interval and a specific transmission frequency assigned individually to each SAM. This
mechanism avoids collisions among transmissions from nodes belonging to the network.
Provided that the BS encompasses multiple transceivers, it is possible to support varying
levels of throughput, robustness and timeliness in each factory cell.
Figure 2.10 depicts the timing diagram of the protocol. As documented, the superframe
is initiated with the BS transmitting a beacon packet that synchronizes the SAMs and
defines the length of the network’s communication cycle, corresponding to 6 milliseconds.
Among other information, this packet encapsulates configuration data targeting the SAMs
and is provided by the network’s control application. Since each SAM is assigned with
an individual communication slot, it may perform its transmission on the assigned slot
after receiving the beacon packet without risking a collision with another SAM. However,
provided the stringent autonomy requirements, it may remain in sleep mode for long periods
of time (not transmitting in the designated slot), waking up only in predefined intervals to
transmit an “alive” packet.
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Figure 2.10: WSAN protocol time diagram
The interval between the beginning of the beacon and the beginning of the fist SAM
slot is designated “time to slot” (TToSL). It allows the SAM performing the transmission in
the first slot to have enough time to process the beacon packet. The “beacon preparation
time” (TBP ) is enforced to allow the communication with the control application through
the Ethernet connection.
Performance and Limitations
The performance of this real-time WSAN protocol was assessed using a testbed encom-
passing an upper level control unit (ULCU) together with a base station and 18 sensor/ac-
tuator modules. The ULCU was built using a C coded control application running in a
PC. As introduced, the BS is responsible for managing the communications with 18 SAMs
by means of periodically transmitting the beacon packet. The ULCU’s PC is connected to
the BS by means of an Ethernet connection that is used to transport information among
these devices encapsulated in UDP packets compliant to the PROFINET protocol.
Regarding the timeliness performance of the WSAN protocol, results demonstrate that
under (optimal) laboratory conditions the end-to-end delay varies from 6.1 to 11.1 millisec-
onds for remotely accessing the 18 SAMs. The presented testbed is capable of enabling
the occurrence of simultaneous transmissions in two different frequencies, which allows
improving the network’s timeliness and throughput. However, under harsh environmental
and electromagnetic interference conditions, it is foreseeable that these results will signif-
icantly deteriorate. Hence, in order to plan the deployment of this technology in factory
settings, a coexistence assessment with the most widely adopted technologies in 2.4 GHz
ISM band (IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15.4 and Bluetooth) is of paramount importance.
This real-time sensor/actuator network can be analyzed according to three other as-
pects. First, due to its centralized nature, the base station is a single point of failure. This
means that a malfunction in this device causes the whole network to halt, thus impair-
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ing any system based upon it. Second, because the protocol was not designed towards
providing operational flexibility, it lacks the support for on-line adaptation mechanisms,
thus increasing its exploitation and maintenance costs. Finally, being a custom designed
protocol, it lacks the benefits of using standard protocols such as the wide availability of
devices supporting it, for example.
2.2.4 WiDom
The Dominance Protocol for Wireless Medium Access (WiDom) [90] was developed
to adapt the dominance or binary countdown protocol used in technologies such as the
Controlled Area Network to a wireless channel. Dominance protocols assign to each station
of the network (or message) a given unique priority. Before initiating a transmission, a
station waits for a specific amount of time, before the channel is idle, and then starts an
arbitration phase where each station contending for the channel sends its unique priority
in a bit-by-bit fashion, starting with the most significant one. Building on the fact that the
transmission of a dominant bit overwrites the transmission of a recessive bit, a station that
is transmitting a recessive bit but detects an ongoing dominant bit transmission will back
off from the arbitration procedure as it detects the contention of a higher priority station.
This mechanism guarantees that if all stations have different priorities then, at the end of
an arbitration phase, only one will win the contention and proceed with the desired data
transmission.
Although inspired by the dominance or binary countdown mechanism, the WiDom pro-
tocol faced nontrivial problems regarding its wireless nature. First, the implementation of
the dominance protocol in a wired medium is achieved using a wired AND approach, some-
thing that is not possible when using a wireless medium. Second, the physical implemen-
tation of the dominance mechanism relies on the possibility of simultaneously performing
transmissions and listening to the medium state to check whether the transmitted bit is
overwritten by another station, which is usually not possible using wireless technologies.
Provided that when a station is transmitting a dominant bit there is no need to sense the
medium and, given that when a recessive bit is to be sent, no bit is required to be effectively
sent, only the medium is to be sensed, the WiDom protocol uses these characteristics to
transmit the priority in the arbitration phase of the protocol named tournament. During
this phase, the transmission duration of a bit takes a fixed amount of time, which is much
longer than the one of a data bit. Nevertheless, a station winning the contention can
transmit the data packet at the maximum speed.
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Operation
The WiDom protocol operates in three phases: synchronization, tournament and trans-
mit/receive. Figure 2.11 illustrates a WiDom contention cycle between two stations S1 and
S2. The synchronization phase occurs from instants t1 to t4 and t1 to t5 for station S1
and S2, respectively, while the tournament phase elapses between instants t4 and t6 for
S1, and between instants t5 and t7 for S2. The transmit phase of station S1 (contention
winner) occupies the period of time starting at instant t6 and ending at instant t8, while
the reception phase of station S2 (contention looser) occurs between instants t7 and t8.
The synchronization phase aims at establishing a common reference time for all stations
wishing to transmit. During this phase, stations wait for a (long) F period of time to
ensure that no station disrupts an ongoing tournament. Afterwards, two scenarios can
occur: there is a pending message to be transmitted or not. The first scenario occurs for
station S1 having an enqueued message at t2. As such, after a period of time denoted by
E, a carrier pulse signaling the beginning of the tournament phase is transmitted with a
duration given by H + SWX, where H represents the duration of the carrier pulse and
SWX the time required to switch between transmission/reception mode. In the second
scenario, the station will perform a carrier sense for an H period of time. Meanwhile, a
message may have been dequeued for transmission or not. In the later case, given that
no message is waiting to be transmitted, the station will not participate in the following
tournament phase and it will be set to carrier sense mode. In the former case, as occurs
for station S2, a message has been dequeued during the H period at instant t3 and the
contention for the medium must be performed in the following tournament phase.
The tournament phase is characterized by the transmission of the priority, having a
specific number of bits, in this case three (3). As reported, since both stations S1 and S2
have messages to be transmitted, they both content for the medium. However, between
the transmission of carrier signals, stations must wait for a guarding period of time (G)
so that clock inaccuracies can be tolerated. As such, before initiating the transmission
of the priority’s most significant bit, stations S1 and S2 wait for this amount of time.
Following, assuming that station S1 has a priority 5 (0b101) and that station S2 has
a priority 4 (0b100), both stations initiate the transmission of their priorities keeping
a guarding time G between carrier signals. If a station contends with a dominant bit ’1’
(carrier transmission) then it will win the contention for that bit. Conversely, if the station
contends with a recessive bit (carrier sensing) and detects a carrier wave then it looses the
contention and proceeds to listening to the medium to acknowledge which priority has won
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Figure 2.11: WiDom MAC and PHY protocol activity
the tournament.
The end of the tournament phase results in a single winning station, in this case station
S1, given that it has the higher priority (5 > 4). Following, the winning station has to
initiate the transmission of the data message. However, it can only proceed with this task
after waiting for a fixed period of time ETG, allowing all stations to switch to receive
mode, as depicted in Figure 2.11. Further information regarding the WiDom protocol and
the different constants F , E, H , SWX , G and ETG is available in [90].
Performance and Limitations
The WiDom protocol allows a prioritized medium access within bounded time, which
is the basis for supporting wireless real-time communications. The protocol’s authors
developed a test setup that enables assessing its performance, both in terms of robustness
and timeliness. Regarding the former, it was observed that the probability of correct
reception and prioritization of messages is 100 % when using 2 or 10 nodes placed in a
circumference with a 1 meter diameter. However, when the diameter is increased to 4
meters, this probability decreases to 99.998 %. In this sense, it is expected that, with an
increased diameter, e.g., near the typical nominal range of the IEEE 802.15.4 technology
(10 meters), the probability of a correct reception and prioritization of messages is even
more reduced.
The timeliness assessment of the WiDom protocol encompassed two different traffic sce-
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narios: periodic and sporadic. In both scenarios, trials with a different number of messages
transmission requests are performed (ranging from 1 to 10) and the associated response
time is registered. Table 2.6 summarizes the measured WiDom response time bounds pre-
sented in [90]. The “Best Case” corresponds to the trials performed with only one message
stream, while the “Worst Case” occurs in the trials having 10 message streams contend-
ing for medium access. As documented, the delay is always higher than 25 milliseconds
and the jitter is several times larger than the message response delay, even without any
relevant interference from other contending technologies. Hence, the support of real-time
applications with demanding timeliness requirements regarding latency and jitter such as,
for example, industrial process control seems far beyond the capabilities of this protocol.
In fact, because “if a node experiences strong noise (...) then the protocol will simply lose
its tournament and not start any new ones during the duration of noise” [90], there is a
high risk of node starvation due to intentional or unintentional interference from co-located
networks operating in the same region of the spectrum.
Table 2.6: WiDom response time
Sporadic Periodic
Delay Jitter Delay Jitter
(µs) (µs) (µs) (µs)
Best Case 25752 71458 25752 92986
Worst Case 27627 208159 27627 151909
Another aspect that should be considered is the fact that the WiDom protocol relies
on the transmission of specific carrier signal during the tournament phase, which can only
be implemented using very specific hardware. In this sense, provided the specificity of
the signal, it may result in a manufacturer lock-in, thus increasing costs and limiting the
implementation.
2.2.5 RT-Link
The RT-Link protocol [91, 92] aims at providing real-time wireless communications in
industrial control, surveillance and inventory tracking applications. It employs specific out-
of-band synchronization hardware to enable a collision free medium access, which results
in an improved utilization of the medium, timeliness and energy efficiency. The authors
of the protocol identify the support of synchronized and collision-free communications
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as the two fundamental challenges in providing bounded delay services for applications
requiring energy-efficiency. These challenges are met through the design of a TDMA-based
link layer protocol supported on two different synchronization hardware solutions: an
Amplitude Modulation (AM) carrier-current transmitter/receiver for indoor applications
and an atomic clock receiver for outdoor scenarios. In the first case, an AM transmitter
periodically broadcasts a pulse, which is received by stations encompassing an add-on
low-power AM receiver module. This pulse allows to globally synchronize the clock of
the receiving stations. In the second case, each station includes a WWVB atomic clock
receiver module allowing global synchronization in outdoor environments. The authors
claim that, besides providing predictable network lifetime together with bounded end-to-
end delay, the RT-Link protocol offers an increased flexibility when compared to random
access protocols, namely in what concerns the control of the topology, the independence
of the delay regarding the sampling rate and the on-demand multi-rate support.
Operation
The RT-Link protocol was designed to support two types of stations: fixed and mobile.
The fixed type relates to the infrastructure support and, as such, encompasses out-of-band
synchronization hardware to ensure the medium access timing coherence. The mobile
type, on the other hand, relates to devices whose localization varies over time and, thus,
will synchronize by listening transmissions from the fixed stations and does not include
specific synchronization hardware. Although behaving differently regarding time synchro-
nization, both fixed and mobile stations share a common base of hardware encompassing
microcontroller, IEEE 802.15.4 transceiver and sensors.
In indoor scenarios the RT-Link protocol synchronization is conducted using a carrier-
current AM transmitter, which takes advantage of the power wiring of the building to
radiate a time synchronization pulse to all stations in the neighborhood. This transmitter
is fed with an atomic clock pulse in order to maintain synchronization with any stations
placed outdoor. The AM module attached to the fixed stations receives the periodic pulse
and drives an input pin of the microcontroller, which triggers a time update.
Figure 2.12 represents the synchronization pulse (from t1 to t2) initiating a fixed length
communication period denoted by Time-Sync Cycle ranging from t1 to t5. This pulse
is followed by two frames, one containing Scheduled Slots (t2 to t3) and the other one
containing Contention Slots (t3 to t4). The length of each slot corresponds to the time
required to transmit a maximum sized packet. Scheduled slots, as the name suggests, are
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Figure 2.12: RT-Link time slot allocation
reserved for scheduled transmissions from given stations while contention slots are targeted
for stations contending for the channel using a slotted-Aloha mechanism. On a timeliness
perspective, nodes performing transmissions in the scheduled slots have a collision free
medium access and, therefore, enjoy a guaranteed access to the medium. Conversely, the
nodes that contend for the medium are prone to interference from other nodes wishing to
transmit in the same slot, which makes it difficult to provide timeliness guarantees.
As illustrated in Figure 2.12, after the last contention slot, between instants t4 and
t5, the station schedules itself to wake up just before the following synchronization pulse
and switches to a low-power consumption mode. Afterwards, this cycle repeats. Further
information regarding the RT-Link protocol and, specifically, about the network formation
and packet transmission scheduling can be found in [91].
Performance and Limitations
The key result reported by the authors and supported by the presented measurements
is the ability of the RT-Link protocol to offer a predictable network lifetime on par with
a bounded (multi-hop) end-to-end delay. This is possible due to the use of a global time
synchronization mechanism that is described to be both “economical and convenient for
indoor and outdoor deployments” [91]. However, the adoption of a global synchronization
approach using out-of-band synchronization hardware implies additional hardware, which
in turn, increases the cost of the solution as well as the required power. Besides, the
adoption of a WWVB atomic clock signal for outdoor synchronization limits its deployment
to the United States of America, given the general lack of support for this synchronization
signal worldwide.
Provided that the RT-Link protocol is based on the IEEE 802.15.4 technology for data
communications, it can be exposed to intentional or unintentional interference in the 2.4
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GHz ISM band. In this sense, in order to evaluate the feasibility of deploying networking
solutions for factory automation settings based on this protocol, an experimental evaluation
of its coexistence is critical. Such coexistence analysis should assess the RT-Link proto-
col performance under packet transmissions (interference) generated by co-located IEEE
802.11, IEEE 802.15.1 and IEEE 802.15.4 technologies on overlapping channels, given their
broad market penetration.
2.2.6 Wireless Fieldbus for Plastic Machineries
A wireless proprietary protocol for plastic machineries was proposed by Flammini et
al. in [93]. At the core this protocol is the requirement of supporting up to 16 wireless
devices with a maximum cycle time of 128 milliseconds. The protocol’s design goals were
focused on minimizing the overhead; reducing the amount of information exchanged; low-
ering the amount of energy spent; increasing the protocol’s efficiency; and decreasing the
computational effort. Hence, the authors based their solution on an IEEE802.15.4 compli-
ant transceiver for implementing the physical layer of the protocol together with an hybrid
Medium Access Control (MAC) layer supported on both Time Division Multiple Access
(TDMA) and Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA). The
former, in addition to providing a smaller communication overhead, allows to guarantee
the required cycle time deadline of data transmissions. The latter is suited for exchanging
network management packets, given its aperiodic nature.
Regarding the topology, the protocol adopts a star topology, provided that the factory
setting addressed by the authors is characterized by a set of nodes deployed relatively close
to each other. Hence, there is no need for complex routing, which permits a simplifica-
tion of the network layer implementation. In this star topology, nodes are only allowed to
communicate with a special device named network coordinator. Provided that nodes only
employ one transceiver, they can only perform packet transmissions in a channel at a time.
Therefore, multiple subnets can be deployed together and exploit frequency diversity. The
instantiation of the proposed protocol was conducted for a plastic machining application,
encompassing a set of wireless thermocouples, which include a simple IEEE 802.15.4 com-
pliant transceiver paired to a 8-bit microcontroller that is capable of performing the analog
data acquisition.
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Figure 2.13: CSMA/CA and TDMA hybrid medium access
Operation
The network coordinator lies at the center of the proposed network because it is re-
sponsible for periodically transmitting the BEACON packet, which triggers the beginning
of a new communication cycle. Due to the need of remaining active for long periods of
time, it is mains powered. As depicted in Figure 2.13, the interval of time following the
BEACON packet is reserved for network formation (JOIN PERIOD), allowing nodes to
join by transmitting JOIN messages.
The network coordinator assigns communication slots in the real-time period (RT PE-
RIOD) by means of JOINACK messages. The duration of the network formation window
(32 milliseconds) was chosen to accommodate a sufficient number of packets for this purpose
in each communication cycle. Furthermore, the window enabling real-time communications
by using a TDMA medium access approach has a duration of 96 milliseconds. This win-
dow defines 16 slots with 6 milliseconds of length each. A wireless device participating in
the network with a slot attributed must remain active during the duration of that slot.
However, only a fraction of this time is effectively used to perform the actual transmission
(≈ 1 millisecond), after the settlement of the analog circuits pertaining to the thermocou-
ple interface (1 millisecond). The remaining time provides a slack timing period named
interslot time interval that lasts approximately 4 milliseconds.
The protocol employs a delayed acknowledgement strategy envisaging both the energy
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consumption and the medium occupancy reduction. In this scope, the BEACON packet
encompasses a bit array field containing the individual acknowledgements of the packets
sent in the preceding communication cycle. Moreover, the authors exclude retransmissions
based on the knowledge that the “physical quantity of interest is oversampled due to a
small minimum cycle time” [93]. This approach allows some samples to be lost without
affecting the performance of the system. Also, because the noise in wireless channels is
bursty by nature, the approach of dropping retransmissions is more suitable, since closer
retransmissions would have a higher probability of failing.
Regarding channel diversity, building on the coordinator ability to measure the radio
frequency activity on different channels, the protocol adopts a strategy of classifying the
channels into two groups according to their floor noise and selecting the best channel of
each group to become the communication channel and the backup channel, respectively. In
both cases, the BEACON packet defines, which channel shall be used in the communication
cycle. When a device fails to listen the BEACON packet for a period longer that 8 cycles,
it starts listening the communication and the backup channels alternatively for an interval
of 8 communication cycles. If this period elapses without receiving a BEACON packet,
the nodes initiates a BINDING procedure, looking for an active coordinator.
Furthermore, the authors describe a comparable solution based on the IEEE 802.15.4
standard and employing the Guaranteed Time Slots (GTSs) provided in the beacon en-
abled mode. These slots can be reserved by the network coordinator for devices requiring
a specific bandwidth, in this case, wireless thermocouple nodes. Without going into much
detail, the necessary modifications are addressed. First, since the IEEE 802.15.4 standard
allows a maximum of seven GTS per superframe, an alternating (round-robin) GTS assig-
nation policy is required to interleave two node groups, each one encompassing up to seven
sensors. Using this approach, it is possible to provide a similar throughput to the proposed
solution. Second, the Beacon Payload field of the Beacon frame is used to convey the ac-
knowledgement bitmap required to implement the proposed delayed acknowledgement.
Performance and Limitations
Regarding the assessment of the protocol implementation timeliness, two approaches
were addressed. In the first, the timing correctness of the protocol was successfully eval-
uated using a custom sniffer, capable of generating a digital signal marking the packet
transmissions on a given IEEE 802.15.4 channel. In the second, the protocol timeliness
and reliability were analyzed. A testbed encompassing four wireless thermocouples was
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installed on a plastic injection moulding machine for this purpose. Provided that in each
cycle (128 milliseconds) a new temperature value was generated by the wireless thermo-
couple, the protocol supported approximately 8 samples per second for each of the four
nodes. The authors claim that the packet’s associated latency is “virtually null”.
The network reliability was assessed using the progressive sequence numbers embedded
in the transmitted packets to check for gaps. Five trials with a duration of 1 hour each
were conducted in different days, with the plastic injection molding machine operating
normally. Results demonstrated no sensor rebinding procedure nor switching from the
communication channel to the backup channel. However, some packets were lost during the
trials, namely: a maximum of four consecutive BEACON packets at a sensor; a maximum
of seven consecutive DATA packets (from the same sensor) at the coordinator; and a
maximum of there consecutive DATA packets (from the same sensor) at the sniffer.
Given the centralized nature of this protocol, upon a failure of the network coordinator,
the global wireless fieldbus halts its operation due to lack of beacon packets. Hence, if
the system being controlled has no redundancy, this failure may result in a significant
production loss. Furthermore, provided that the protocol operates in the popular 2.4
GHz ISM band, it is susceptible to being exposed to interference from contending wireless
technologies. In this sense, it is likely that its reliability and timeliness performance will
be affected by high levels of noise in the communication channel.
2.2.7 ISA SP100.11a
The ISA SP100.11a standard [94] was originally designed to provide reliable and secure
wireless communications supporting non-critical monitoring and control applications in
industrial process settings [95]. It was approved in 2009 by the International Society
of Automation (ISA) and became the IEC 62734 standard [96] in January 2014 after
being voted and approved by the Technical Committees 17, 22 and 57 of the International
Electrotechnical Commission.
The ISA SP100.11a defines several types of devices, namely: field devices, routers,
backbone routers, and gateways. Field devices are input/output (I/O) devices, which have
the minimum characteristics that allow them to participate in an ISA SP100.11a network.
These devices typically operate so as to maximize energy conservation. Routers, as the
name implies, must have routing capability, be able to act as proxy and support clock
propagation. These devices are responsible for increasing the communication’s robustness,
allowing the extension of the network, and supporting differentiated QoS for multiple traffic
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flows. The backbone router is a special type of router, whose operation is focused on the
network’s backbone and on the support for the encapsulation of external network protocols.
The gateway typically placed at the edge of the ISA SP100.11a network and provides the
necessary interface between this and other networks. As in the WIA-PA protocol (see
Section 2.2.9), the ISA SP100.11a protocol defines two logical devices: system manager
and security manager. The system manager is responsible for the network’s configuration,
performance and operational status, while the security manager handles all the aspects of
the network pertaining to security.
The ISA SP100.11a standard defines a five layer OSI compliant protocol stack. At
the top of the stack is an optional object-oriented application layer, which can be used
to enable object to object communications. This layer defines the interoperability and
interaction mechanisms that support object communication and provides the means for
establishing protocol tunneling, thus enabling the access of legacy protocols to the devices
of a ISA SP100.11a network. The key features provided by the transport layer pertains to
the support of end-to-end communications based on connectionless services. The network
layer is mainly responsible for the routing mechanism at the backbone level and for the
fragmentation/reassembly of packets going to/coming from the data link layer. The ISA
SP100.11a medium access control and the subnet level routing are defined in the data link
layer. It encompasses three sublayers supporting a) a subset of the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC
features; b) an extension of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard with new CSMA/CA, TDMA and
frequency hopping mechanisms; and c) routing at the subnet level. The ISA SP100.11a
physical layer is based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, thus operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM
band.
Several network topologies are supported by the ISA SP100.11a, namely: star, hub-and-
spoke, mesh or a combination of them. The star topology is characterized by presenting
the lowest possible latency across the physical layer due to to its single hop architecture.
The hub-and-spoke topology is built with field devices around backbone routers, which are
then connected to the gateway. Finally, the mesh topology is supported on routing devices,
which extend the network coverage by supporting connectivity with multiple hops. In this
topology, path diversity can be employed to improve the network’s reliability.
Operation
The ISA SP100.11a protocol defines that devices are organized in subnets and that
transmissions are performed in specific time intervals (slots) according to a specific sched-
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ule provided by the system manager. The time slots are synchronized among devices be-
longing to the same subnet, i.e., devices in a given subnet have their slots aligned. At the
application level, devices wishing to perform transmissions must request network resources
to the system manager, supplying information about their communication requirements.
Using the provided requirements (data and timeliness) information together with the infor-
mation about the performance and connectivity between node pairs, the system manager
calculates graphs and specific time slots to sender/receiver pairs of devices, thus enabling
their communication.
The access to the medium is based on a TDMA scheme in which time is segmented
in slots of configurable duration (typically 10/12 milliseconds). The use of 12-millisecond
timeslots is related to the support of the duocast mechanism, which requires an additional
interval of 1-2 millisecond for an additional acknowledgment. The duocast mechanism is
intended to improve the network’s reliability. This slot duration also provides a time ex-
tension that allows the prioritization of messages and the communication between devices
whose slot synchronization is delayed by a maximum of 2 milliseconds. Timeslots can
be either dedicated or shared. The former are reserved for contention-free communication,
while the later are qualified for contention-based communications using a backoff algorithm
similar to the one employed in CSMA/CA. Transactions in each timeslot are ruled by tem-
plates, which define the timing for the operations pertaining to the transmission/reception
of packets (e.g., reception wait time, turnaround time, etc.).
In order to improve the coexistence of the ISA SP100.11a protocol with other tech-
nologies operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM band, channel-hopping is employed in the ISA
SP100.11a protocol (see Figure 2.14). This technique is coupled with mechanisms of chan-
nel blacklisting and whitelisting, which prevent the channel-hopping sequence from visiting
frequencies being used by other technologies and enables the reuse of previously blacklisted
frequencies that have become available.
Besides presenting the delimitations of superframes (cyclic collections of equal length
timeslots), Figure 2.14 depicts the three types of channel hopping defined by the ISA
SP100.11a protocol: slotted, slow and hybrid. In the first, transactions per slot are per-
formed on a different channel according to five pre-programmed default hopping patterns.
Each slot uses a different channel and encompasses the transmission of a packet and its
acknowledgement. The slow hopping groups a set of contiguous timeslots on a single radio
channel. Hence, the mode still allows channel hopping, but with a longer switching period,
ranging from 100 to 400 milliseconds per hop. The hybrid channel hopping adopts both
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Figure 2.14: ISA100.11a frequency hopping
slotted and slow-hopping periods in a configurable combination.
Performance and Limitations
In [97], Wagner and Barton presented a comparative study between the MAC level per-
formance of the ZigBee (CSMA-CA, single channel) and ISA100.11a (scheduled, channel-
hopping) technologies under Wi-Fi traffic on a highly reflective, enclosed environment.
The study focused on application-level message delivery rates as the primary indicator
of performance. In the following, provided that the focus of this subsection is simply on
the ISA100.11a protocol, only the relevant information pertaining to this technology is
presented.
The setup used to assess the ISA100.11a performance under Wi-Fi noise was character-
ized by encompassing five wireless nodes, one gateway, one laptop computer (Wi-Fi traffic
generator) and one Wi-Fi router configured to operate exclusively according to the IEEE
802.11g standard. The setup was installed within a steel cylinder experimental environment
having approximately 3 meters of diameter and 6 meters of length. The ISA100.11a hops
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through all the available 16 channels and the IEEE 802.11g interference was generated on
channel 6 with several throughputs, namely: no interference, 5 Mbps, 10 Mbps, 20 Mbps.
The wireless nodes were configured to perform transmissions at every 1, 5, and 10 seconds
during an interval of one hour. The trials were performed three times and the percentage
of successful packet deliveries was presented. The results of this study showed a consistent
delivery rate above 99 % in all interference and data period scenarios, which, in the au-
thors’ opinion, demonstrates the frequency-hopping ability of the ISA100.11a technology
to find free channels.
Shin and Rezha performed a simulation analysis of a hybrid network encompassing both
CAN and ISA100.11a nodes in [95]. The study was realized using the OPNET modeler
to simulate a network encompassing 6 CAN nodes and 10 ISA100.11a nodes connected to
a gateway in a star topology. The gateway, as the name suggests bridges both networks.
Nodes from both networks were configured to operate with a data rate of 250 kbps and the
ISA100.11a superframe length aggregated 25 slots of 10 milliseconds each. The ISA100.11a
nodes can be configured with dedicated slots from 1 to 24. The slots not reserved for
deterministic traffic were allocated as contention slots. The detailed configuration of the
CAN traffic is omitted as it is outside the scope of this analysis. The performance of the
CAN-ISA100.11a hybrid network was evaluated with emphasis on its delay characteristics
upon being subject to different network loads ranging from 1 to 9 packets per second
from each node, following a poisson distribution. The results provided by the authors
indicate that the path between the ISA100.11a node to the gateway contributes in excess
of 95 % to the total experienced end-to-end delay. This fact was justified by the use of
shared ISA100.11a slots, which employ the timeslot duration as a backoff period to resolve
collisions.
The results mentioned above indicate that the ISA SP100.11a frequency-hopping algo-
rithm is capable of successfully finding free channels, thus enabling a high level of reliability.
However, at the time of this writing, no information about the performance of the the ISA
SP100.11a technology in highly polluted scenarios is available.
2.2.8 WirelessHART
WirelessHART [98] was the first open wireless communication standard designed specif-
ically to target process measurement and control applications [99]. The initial release of the
HART protocol occurred in the 80s with a physical layer supported on a 4-20 milliamperes
analog signal loop, which allowed reliable bidirectional communication with field instru-
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ments. The evolution since then has been dramatic, not only due to the added features
(security, diagnostics, etc.), but also because of the wireless capability added in the HART
field communications protocol version 7. This protocol was named WirelessHART and it
is compatible with existing HART devices and applications.
In general terms, WirelessHART is a secure and robust mesh networking technology
built upon the IEEE 802.15.4 2.4 GHz ISM physical layer. It employs a channel hopping
mechanism applied on a packet by packet basis. This channel hopping mechanism allows
establishing a higher frequency diversity, thus contributing to increase the WirelessHART
reliability. Furthermore, a blacklisting mechanism is also adopted to avoid channels being
used by contending technologies. The WirelessHART protocol adopts a Time Division
Multiple Access (TDMA) scheme to arbitrate and coordinate communications among the
devices of the network. Hence, it follows a time synchronized approach where devices only
establish communications in pre-scheduled timeslots, enabling granting QoS to transmis-
sions, a critical aspect in process measurement and control applications.
The WirelessHART protocol encompasses a centralized network manager that is re-
sponsible for scheduling the transmissions of the network. This procedure is accomplished
by considering the global network routing information together with the communication
requirements provided by the devices and the application. The schedule defines which
devices communicate in which timeslots. When the schedule is computed, the devices par-
ticipating in the network receive only the information pertaining to them, i.e., they are
only provided with the slots for which they have transmit or receive requirements. The net-
work manager continuously monitors the network topology and communication demands,
accordingly adapting the network graph and schedule.
Operation
The WirelessHART protocol employs a MAC compliant with the IEEE 802.15.4 (2006)
standard [74], which enables its implementation with readily available Commercial Off-
The-Shelf (COTS) IEEE 802.15.4 transceivers. As introduced, the original IEEE 802.15.4
MAC functionality is extended with TDMA and frequency hopping schemes, enabling the
provision of collision-free and deterministic communications. At the base of such schemes is
the concept of time slot, which is an interval of time with a duration of 10 milliseconds. The
WirelessHART protocol also defines the concept of superframe as a sequence of contiguous
time slots. Each superframe is characterized by the number of slots that it includes, which
also defines its period. Figure 2.15 depicts three superframe cycles including 4 slots (TS0 to
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Figure 2.15: WirelessHART superframe example
.
TS3) each. The duration of each slot only allows one transmission and the corresponding
acknowledgement to occur. As documented, the first two slots (TS0 and TS1) are used to
perform communications between Device A and Device B in both directions. The third and
fourth slots (TS2 and TS3) are used in the same way but by devices B and C. As shown,
the superframe schedule is repeated in every cycle. Additionally, since a superframe is
defined by a given set of channels and time slots, multiple superframes of different sizes
may coexist in a given WirelessHART network. In this sense, different schedules with
varying duty cycles can be assigned to different groups/types of devices. For example, it
is possible to allocate superframes encompassing multiple QoS requirements to different
device groups.
The operation of a mesh network employing a TDMA scheme relies heavily on a pre-
cise time synchronization, since all communications must occur within the designated time
slots. In this sense, all devices participating in the network must share a common notion
of time, i.e., they must perceive the beginning and ending of slots with minimum varia-
tions throughout the network. As introduced, the duration of a timeslot (10 milliseconds)
was selected to allow sending/receiving one packet in a given channel and the associated
acknowledgement. Furthermore, as documented in Figure 2.16, the timeslot also includes
periods of time to allow the synchronization of the WirelessHART network.
Figure 2.16 shows that the receiver must start listening the medium after TsRxOffset
time units after the beginning of a time slot [100]. Furthermore, the receiver must acknowl-
edge a received packet within TsMaxPacket + TsTxAckDelay time units after the beginning
of the packet. In order to maintain the time synchronization among the WirelessHART
network devices, time is propagated periodically outward from the gateway. The underly-
ing synchronization mechanism is as follows. Individual devices are constantly adjusting
their network time using the Time Adjustment field carried by the acknowledgement pack-
ets received from its time source neighbors. However, if packets are not exchanged for long
periods of time with these neighbors, the synchronization fails. As a consequence, each
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Figure 2.16: WirelessHART slot timing
device encompasses a keep-alive timer programmed with the maximum inactive interval
that still guarantees the synchronization with the network’s time. When this timer expires
for a given neighbor, a keep-alive packet to this neighbor is automatically generated, thus
forcing a time resynchronization.
Performance and Limitations
In [101], besides studying the time synchronization of a WirelessHART network, Ferrari
et al. evaluated the end-to-end latency of the HART command 1 “Read Primary variable”
using a setup with commercial devices. The time synchronization was assessed using a
testbed that allows either one or two hops between the gateway and the WirelessHART
device under test. In both scenarios, the period deviation was observed for an interval of
50 time slots. Results demonstrated an increased jitter in the two-hop scenario together
with 50 % of the slots having a synchronization error centered around 0.1 milliseconds,
which is the maximum allowed offset between clocks. The end-to-end latency was assessed
using a setup that allows measuring both the time elapsing between the “Read Primary
variable” HART request and the corresponding response (using Wireshark); and the inter-
val between the over-the-air WirelessHART request and the acknowledgement reception
of the WirelessHART response packet (using a WirelessHART probe). The corresponding
values were, on average, 3 seconds and 1 second, respectively.
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Petersen and Carlsen studied the performance of a WirelessHART network in an in-
dustrial environment in [102]. The performance was evaluated, among other parameters,
in terms of latency. The setup used to perform the assessment consisted on a network of
9 sensors and 1 gateway. The WirelessHART network testbed was configured to operate
with a superframe encompassing 150 timeslots, resulting in a superframe with a duration of
1500 milliseconds. Three scenarios were evaluated: interference “clear”; interference from
IEEE 802.11g networks; and interference from a chirp jammer. The interference “clear”
scenario was evaluated over a period of 120 hours. Network latency results showed an
average value of 2037 milliseconds during the entire test period with a standard deviation
of 92 milliseconds. This value arises from the length of the superframe and the latency
introduced by the retransmissions of lost packets in the multi-hop mesh network.
The scenario considering interference from IEEE 802.11g networks was assessed over a
period of 24 hours. This scenario was further segmented in two sub-scenarios with different
WLAN beacon intervals: 100 milliseconds or 20 milliseconds. In the first case, the average
latency observed was of 1885 milliseconds with a standard deviation of 99 milliseconds. In
the second case, the average latency observed was of 2760 milliseconds with a standard
deviation of 315 milliseconds. These results indicate that “deploying one or more WLAN
access points in the same area as a WirelessHART network will lead to a degradation of
the WirelessHART network” [102].
Finally, the scenario where the WirelessHART network is exposed to interference from a
chirp jammer was tested over a period of one hour. The jammer sequence consisted on the
transmission of a time-varying noise signal with a sweep period of 10 microseconds. The
signal was activated after 15 minutes of the beginning of the test period and was active for
45 minutes. Results showed that in the initial phase of the jamming sequence the network is
completely halted with no packets being received and, thus, with no valid latency. These
results corroborated the notion that DSSS based networks are generally “vulnerable to
time-varying spectral noise, as both the spread signal and the jammer interference have
large bandwidths” [102].
From the results presented above, it is possible to conclude that the timeliness of the
WirelessHART protocol is highly dependent on the superframe duration and slot config-
uration, which enables a limited tailoring of its operation to different QoS requirements.
Hence, it is constrained regarding its operational flexibility, which difficults the adaptation
of its behavior to different application requirements. Furthermore, although it employs a
blacklisting mechanism allowing a higher level of reliability, it displays a significant per-
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formance degradation in the presence of interference. Hence, a dramatic reduction of its
performance is foreseeable in open environments characterized by a strong level of con-
tention in all available channels.
2.2.9 WIA-PA
The Wireless Networks for Industrial Automation - Process Automation (WIA-PA)
[103] is the Chinese standard for industrial wireless communications for process automa-
tion. After WirelessHART (see Section 2.2.8), WIA-PA was the second industrial wireless
communication standard in the world (IEC 62601) specifically addressing industrial wire-
less communications. As the name implies, this standard addresses production processes,
particularly, its activity monitoring and control support.
The WIA-PA standard adopts a hybrid star-mesh network topology. The bottom level
of the network encompasses the so-called field and handheld devices. Field devices, as the
name implies, are installed in the factory floor in order to monitor/control sensors/actua-
tors while handheld devices are used in the management of the network. The bottom level
is built around a star topology (cluster), where some nodes (routers) act as cluster heads.
The routers are responsible for forwarding packets between WIA-PA network devices. The
upper level is realized by means of a mesh topology that integrates both routers and gate-
ways, which are devices that bridge the WIA-PA network and other plant networks with
the purpose of translating the protocols and mapping data. In addition, the WIA-PA stan-
dard defines two logical devices: network manager and security manager. While the first is
usually implemented at the gateway and is responsible for the configuration, communica-
tion scheduling and performance monitoring of the network, the second is responsible for
establishing and maintaining the WIA-PA security mechanisms.
The WIA-PA communication protocol defines a full stack of layers, including Appli-
cation Layer (APL), network layer (NWK), Data Link Layer (DLL) and Physical Layer
(PHY). The APL includes objects for aiding the implementation of industrial monitoring
and control applications, besides providing a mechanism to manage the system and the
available network resources. The NWK layer supports the network formation, route dis-
covery and the static packet routing in multi-hop networks, among other features. The
DLL handles the channel access and aspects such as the topology, point-to-point commu-
nications, etc. In this regard, although the channel access is compatible with the IEEE
802.15.4 standard, it was extended to cope with the requirements of industrial applica-
tions, as it will be seen further ahead. The WIA-PA PHY is defined by the IEEE 802.15.4
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Figure 2.17: WIA-PA superframe
standard.
Operation
A superframe structure of the WIA-PA protocol is documented in Figure 2.17. As
presented, it is based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard beaconed mode frame structure
presented in Figure 2.5. It encompasses an active and an inactive part. The former,
includes a Contention Access Period (CAP), used to allow devices to join the network,
perform intra-cluster management, among other activities. Furthermore, it also embeds a
Contention Free Period (CFP) where deterministic communications between field devices
and cluster heads can be scheduled. The inactive part of the WIA-PA superframe is used
to extend the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol, allowing intra and inter-cluster communications.
The inactive period can also be used to reduce power consumption by switching to sleep
mode.
In order to support real-time communications in industrial applications, two key IEEE
802.15.4 MAC additions are proposed by the WIA-PA protocol: extra deterministic slots
and different priorities for non-periodic communications [104]. The former addresses the
limitation of the number of GTSs in the CFP. Provided that the key concern in this appli-
cation scenario is not power conservation, part of the superframe’s inactive period can be
used to provide additional guaranteed slots, i.e., an additional period of time encompassing
time slots similar to those of the CFP. These slots can be scheduled by the network man-
ager when there is no available GTSs in the CFP to be attributed. In this case, the field
device assigned with the slot outside the CFP must remain active during the inactive part
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of the superframe, going to sleep mode only after its designated time slot. The remaining
field devices will go into sleep mode during the inactive portion of the superframe.
The priority-based contention for non-periodic real-time communications is adopted
from the IEEE 802.11 standard. In this sense, different Inter Frame Space IFS time
intervals are respected before initiating a packet transmission: urgent IFS (UIFS), RIFS for
real-time IFS (RIFS) and nor-real-time IFS (NIFS). When a device listens to the medium
before initiating a non-periodic transmission, it first waits for the channel to become idle.
When that occurs, it waits a specific amount of time (IFS) that depends on the time of data
being transmitted (urgent, real-time or nor-real-time) before sampling the medium again.
After the expiration of the IFS interval, the medium is checked again. The CSMA/CA
mechanism is then conducted using a modified exponential random backoff algorithm,
where the backoff interval of the different types of non-periodic transmissions has different
exponential increments and ranges, thus enabling higher priority communications to access
the wireless channel first.
The WIA-PA protocol avoids interference by means of frequency hopping. In this
sense, it defines three hopping mechanisms: Adaptive Frequency Switch (AFS), Adaptive
Frequency Hopping (AFH) and Timeslot Hopping (TH). The first defines that, in a given
superframe cycle, the channel is kept unchanged for the Beacon packet, CAP and CFP.
Then, depending of the channel conditions, the channel can be switched on a subsequent
superframe cycle by the network manager. The AFH scheme defines that the time slots in
the intra-cluster period change irregularly the communication channel depending on the
actual channel condition. Finally, the TH hopping scheme states that, to avoid interference
and fading, the channel used per timeslot in the inter-cluster period is changed regularly.
Performance and Limitations
The performance of the WIA-PA protocol was theoretically analyzed by Zhong et al. in
[104]. Two types of traffic were considered in this analysis: predefined periodic communi-
cation and non-periodic communication. In predefined periodic communications the end-
to-end delay was found to be deterministic, bounded and minimized in both scenarios of
intra and inter-subnet communication. Provided that deterministic time slots are assigned
to periodic communications in either the CFP or in the inactive window’s intra-cluster
communication period, the queuing delays at the NWK and MAC layers are small, thus
justifying these results. The performance of non-periodic communications was concluded
to depend heavily of its priority, which defines the length of the IFS being used. Urgent
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communications are those with the higher probability of being served. However, because
the delay affecting these communications depends of the number of messages contending
for the medium, they are not bounded as periodic communications. Non-periodic real-time
and nor-real-time messages also contend for the medium with the urgent messages. How-
ever, because they have lower priorities, they wait for the end of the transmission of all
urgent messages before contending among themselves for the medium. In this sense, their
end-to-end delays are larger and remain unbounded.
The WIA-PA protocol employs a flexible channel hopping mechanism, which renders
possible avoiding channels under heavy use. Nevertheless, it can still be negatively affected
when exposed to environments with a reduced number of available “free” channels. Due
to its novelty, there are no studies addressing the performance of the WIA-PA protocol
under interference on the 2.4 GHz ISM band.
2.3 The 2.4 GHz ISM Band Hubbub
The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary [105] defines a hubbub as a “loud sound
made by a lot of people talking at the same time” or “a situation in which there is a
lot of noise, excitement and activity”. Given the current heterogeneity of communication
technologies operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM band and their trend of broad adoption fueled
by its unlicensed nature, a continuously increasing hubbub is to be expected in this region
of the spectrum. Since different technologies sharing a frequency band may have an impact
on each other, a review of the related work on the coexistence between local and personal
area networks operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM band is provided.
2.3.1 IEEE 802.15.4/IEEE 802.15.4 Coexistence
The coexistence among IEEE 802.15.4 based networks has not been widely studied as
IEEE 802.15.4/ WiFi and IEEE 802.15.4/ Bluetooth technologies. This mainly occurs
because the underlying technology (physical layer) is common and it should be simple to
configure the networks in order to make them uncoupled from each other. However, given
both the existence of uncontrolled IEEE 802.15.4 stations and the adoption of frequency-
hopping techniques built on top of the IEEE 802.15.4 physical layer, interference is likely to
occur. The literature addressing the performance of the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol is typically
focused on characterizing specific aspects such as, for example, packet delivery ratio, hop
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delay and ratio of collisions between hidden terminals [106], or even end-to-end capacity
[107].
This subsection focuses on some selected works addressing the impact of uncontrolled
IEEE 802.15.4 stations transmitting in overlapping or adjacent channels of an IEEE 802.15.4
network. In [108], Bertocco et al. present an evaluation of the impact of ZigBee interference
on beaconless IEEE 802.15.4 communications. The authors experimentally demonstrate
that the interference caused by ZigBee transmissions has a higher impact than the trans-
missions performed by Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11g interferers. Results show a PER of 55
% when using IEEE 802.15.4 data stations configured to operate with CCA modes 1 and 2.
This indicates that the transmissions performed by the IEEE 802.15.4 interferer reach the
data stations with a power level above their threshold. The disabling of the CCA reduces
the PER to 16.5 %, which is still a non-negligible value.
Lo Bello and Toscano analyzed the cross-channel interference occurring in co-located
IEEE 802.15.4 industrial networks in [109]. The experimental evaluation was conducted
using a beaconless ZigBee network and the corresponding analysis was focused on param-
eters such as PER, packet loss and delay. As expected, results from a single interferer
employing a similar transmission power show that the effect of cross-channel interference
is highly dependent of the interfering node channel. The spurious emissions of the interfer-
ing signal are mainly “felt” in near channels (with a minimum offset), where a maximum
PER of 4.5 % may occur due to the IEEE 802.15.4 interference. However, if the power
of the interfering IEEE 802.15.4 station significantly exceeds the one employed for valid
transmissions, the PER escalates rapidly with an increase on the Signal-to-Interference Ra-
tio (SIR), going above 60 % when the interferer is placed at 20 centimeters from the IEEE
802.15.4 network. When a valid IEEE 802.15.4 network is exposed to an increasing number
of interferers on the same channel, the interference impact on that network decreases. This
occurs due to the CSMA mechanism running on the interferers that increments the beacon
exponent (reduces the generated traffic) upon the detection of a busy medium (by other
interfering stations). The work presented in [109] also studies the effect of the minimum
backoff exponent on delay under cross-channel interference. The authors conclude that it
is “advisable to set the macMinBe for high priority real-time traffic to zero” because it
leads to shorter transmission delays with less jitter.
Nordin and Dressler investigated the effects and implications of beacon collisions in co-
located IEEE 802.15.4 networks in [110]. The authors provide several simulations of two
co-located IEEE 802.15.4 beacon-enabled networks, which are either in communication
72
2.3. THE 2.4 GHZ ISM BAND HUBBUB
range or in interference range (out-of-range) of each other. The performance analysis of
these scenarios is focused on goodput, received beacons and number of collisions. Results
indicate that the interference of beacons is a significant cause of performance degradation,
although “the number of lost beacons is independent of the amount of superframe overlap”
[110].
2.3.2 IEEE 802.15.4/Bluetooth Coexistence
As reviewed in Section 2.1.1, the Bluetooth technology follows a master-slave medium
access scheme, employing a slow frequency hopping mechanism that ensures a permanence
of a minimum of 625 microseconds in each channel of the hopping pattern. An adaptive
frequency hopping (AFH) scheme is supported from the Bluetooth specification version 1.2
onwards. This mechanism allows improving the coexistence of the Bluetooth technology
by excluding from the hopping sequence channels being used by other technologies. Nev-
ertheless, until the AFH mechanism detects such channel activity and effectively blacklists
those channels, Bluetooth may continue to use the full set of hopping channels and cause
interference in co-located networks.
The impact of the Bluetooth technology on beaconless IEEE 802.15.4 based networks
has been extensively studied in [111, 112, 113, 108, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118]. Conversely,
the impact of Bluetooth transmissions on IEEE 802.15.4 based networks operating on the
beacon-enabled mode has received much less attention in the literature. The most relevant
work addressing this issue was published by Herrera et al. in [113]. Different versions of the
Bluetooth technology were employed in the construction of the interferers. For instance,
interfering devices compliant with the Bluetooth specification version 1.1 were only used in
[113], while version 2.0 + EDR and version 2.1 + EDR Bluetooth devices where employed
in [114, 115, 117] and [116], respectively.
In [112], Shin et al. model and simulate the Bluetooth interference impact on the IEEE
802.15.4 (ZigBee) PER. As expected, the authors conclude that “as the distance between
ZigBee and Bluetooth increases, the PER of ZigBee decreases”. Also, if the the distance
between the ZigBee coordinator and the Bluetooth source is smaller than 80 centimeters,
the PER ranges from 12 to 16 %. The PER together with the packet loss ratio have also
been the performance parameters of choice for experimentally evaluating the IEEE 802.15.4
resilience to Bluetooth interference in several other research works [111, 108, 114, 115, 116,
117, 118]. Sikora and Groza [111] analyze the packet loss rate resulting from interference
generated by co-located Bluetooth stations operating in the same spectrum region. Results
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indicate a maximum packet loss rate of 10 % when an IEEE 802.15.4 link is exposed
to Bluetooth interference. A study of the coexistence of IEEE 802.15.4 and Bluetooth
for vehicle networks was performed by Zacharias et al. in [116]. Results demonstrate a
maximum packet drop rate of 3.1 % and 7.45 % for Bluetooth traffic generated in SCO
and ACL links, respectively.
Bertocco et al. [108] conclude that, provided its frequency hopping nature, Bluetooth
interference does not disturb an IEEE 802.15.4 network, regardless of the CCA mode being
employed. Francisco et al. [114] evaluate the coexistence of ZigBee networks and Bluetooth
inside vehicles. Their investigation seems to corroborate the conclusions of Bertocco et al.
[108], since the obtained PER is below 1 % for all nodes embedded in the vehicle. Also, the
authors measure the average packet latency, which is always smaller than 3 milliseconds.
A similar result is presented in [115], where the authors conclude the that ZigBee and
Bluetooth networks “are able to work simultaneously with almost no impairment”. Lavric
et al. [117] and Guo et al. [118] present additional results reinforcing the conclusion that,
for distances above 1 meter between a Bluetooth interferer and the IEEE 802.15.4 network,
the interference impact is residual.
As introduced, the performance of the IEEE 802.15.4 beaconed and non-beaconed
modes under Bluetooth interference is investigated by Herrera et al. in [113]. Several
conclusions are drawn. First, the distance between Coordinator and End Device has a
dominant impact on the PER over the existence/absence of Bluetooth interference, con-
sidering distances from 1 to 2 meters. Second, although the mean PER increases under
Bluetooth noise, the beacon-enabled mode shows a higher susceptibility to this interfer-
ence, since its mean PER value increases 130 % while, comparatively, the corresponding
nonbeacon-enabled value only increases 66 %. Third, an increase of the distance between
Coordinator and End Device above 3 meters has a negligible impact on the communica-
tion’s PER under Bluetooth interference.
2.3.3 IEEE 802.15.4/Wi-Fi Coexistence
The interference caused by Wi-Fi transmissions on IEEE 802.15.4 networks has been
one of the most investigated topics on coexistence among wireless technologies. The main
motivation is the pervasiveness of the IEEE 802.11 technology among application domains
where IEEE 802.15.4 based communication solutions can be deployed. Hence, provided
that their coexistence characterization is of paramount importance, two main approaches
were adopted. The first relies on effective implementations and experimental evaluations,
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allowing a more realistic investigation of the coexistence issue. This approach, however,
becomes onerous in terms of cost and labor when setting up a testbed for a complex
evaluation scenario. Examples of this approach can be found in [111, 119, 120, 121, 122, 108,
123, 124, 125, 115, 116, 117, 118]. The second approach is established upon the development
of models, which provide a representation of the real components in a communication
system. Although generally providing less accurate estimates when compared to field
tests, this approach is typically more flexible and easy to scale in terms of testbed setup.
Several research works addressing the coexistence between the IEEE 802.15.4 and Wi-Fi
technologies adopted this approach [126, 127, 120, 112].
Currently, commercially available Wi-Fi stations conform to one of the following spec-
ifications: IEEE 802.11b [128], IEEE 802.11g [129] and IEEE 802.11n [130], each one
with specific characteristics. In the remaining of this section, a characterization of the
key results and conclusions regarding the impact of these technologies on IEEE 802.15.4
communications is presented.
IEEE 802.11b interference
The interference caused by IEEE 802.11b stations on an IEEE 802.15.4 network has
been analyzed by means of its impact on several parameters, namely throughput [126, 127],
packet loss rate [111, 119], PER [127, 108, 112], PDF [108] and average delay [127].
In [111], Sikora and Groza address the coexistence between a beaconless IEEE802.15.4
network and a IEEE 802.11b network. Three key observations are described. First, as
expected, the interference level caused by the IEEE 802.11b transmissions reduces with an
increasing distance of the channels employed in both technologies. Second, the packet loss
of the IEEE 802.15.4 technology exceeds 90 % when the transmissions of IEEE 802.11b
stations are performed on overlapping channels. Third, the packet loss is not linear with
the distance between Wi-Fi interferer and IEEE802.15.4 network.
On a similar line of work, Angrisani et al. [119] performed cross-layer measurements to
characterize the coexistence between the IEEE 802.11b and IEEE 802.15.4 technologies.
Their results show a degradation of the IEEE 802.15.4 packet loss ratio in excess of 50 %
for Wi-Fi duty cycles above 40 %. Furthermore, this works also documents an increasingly
higher packet loss ratio as a result of an increase in the power employed by the Wi-
Fi transmissions. Finally, a key observation is presented by this study. It occurs when
the Wi-Fi access point (AP) is distanced from the IEEE 802.15.4 network so that its
transmissions are below the Wi-Fi’s energy threshold. In this case, the “AP erroneously
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assumes the channel free and transmits even when WSN is occupying the channel”, thus
causing collisions with the IEEE 802.15.4 packets.
Bertocco et al. [108] also addressed the coexistence between IEEE 802.15.4 and IEEE
802.11b networks, but with focus on the effect caused by the employed CCA modes. In
this sense, the authors conclude that the use of the CCA1 mode is the most problematic
concerning Wi-Fi noise. The justification is that the power perceived by the IEEE 802.15.4
nodes is frequently above the CCA threshold, thus hindering IEEE 802.15.4 transmissions
from initiating, even if the SNR is far above the value required for a correct communication.
This conclusion is supported by the presented PER and PDF results.
Chong et al. [126] provide an analytical study and a simulation assessment of the
impact of IEEE 802.11b transmissions on the throughput of a ZigBee network. Several
conclusions are drawn based on the obtained results. First, IEEE 802.11b transmissions
can make the ZigBee communications practically impossible due to the severe throughput
decrease for high loads of IEEE 802.11b interfering traffic. Second, for a given input load of
IEEE 802.11b interference, the normalized throughput of a ZigBee network decreases as the
length of the packets employed by the interferer increases. Third, the use of larger ZigBee
packets makes the throughput more sensible to the IEEE 802.11b interference. Regarding
the interference effect of IEEE 802.11b transmissions on the PER experienced by a ZigBee
link, Shin et al. [112] present a simulation analysis whose results demonstrate that a PER
increase is expected when there is an increment in the number of Wi-Fi stations or the
distance between them and the ZigBee network is reduced.
In [127], Shin et al. provide an exhaustive analytical and simulation study addressing
the interference occurring between IEEE 802.15.4 and IEEE 802.11b co-located technolo-
gies. A IEEE 802.15.4 network was configured to operate in the beacon-enabled mode
using a slotted CSMA/CA medium access. This study corroborates the importance of the
frequency separation between IEEE 802.11b and IEEE 802.15.4 technologies expressed in
the obtained PER, latency and throughput. For example, it is demonstrated that for fre-
quency separations smaller than 5 MHz, the PER is larger that 20 %, escalating above the
80 % threshold for frequency separations smaller than 3 MHz. Regarding latency, a 6.5 to
17.5 milliseconds increase is observed when the frequency separation between technologies
is modified from 5 MHz to 2 MHz. In terms of throughput, a similar trend is documented.
Shin et al. [127] also address scenarios where multiple IEEE 802.11b interfering stations
perform transmissions. The results reported in these scenarios sustain two key ideas. First,
the performance of the IEEE 802.15.4 network improves with an increasing distance to the
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interfering IEEE 802.11b stations. Second, the performance of the IEEE 802.15.4 network
worsens with an increasing number of interfering IEEE 802.11b stations. The author cor-
roborates these conclusions with results for the PER, latency and throughput performance
parameters.
IEEE 802.11g interference
The IEEE 802.11g [129] is, arguably, the most deployed WLAN technology today. In
this sense, because it adds a new modulation scheme (OFDM) to the IEEE 802.11b version,
it may interact differently with IEEE 802.15.4 based networks. Hence, its coexistence
impact is important to be characterized. The evaluation of this technology was conducted
under parameters such as PLR [122, 124, 125]; PDR [121]; RSSI [122, 118]; throughput
and BER [120]; PER [117, 118]; LQI [118]; and FER [115]. The main conclusions regarding
the impact of IEEE 802.11g transmissions on IEEE 802.15.4 networks are presented in the
following paragraphs.
The performance assessment of IEEE 802.15.4 based networks under the influence
of noise from IEEE 802.11g stations was widely studied using experimental approaches.
Petrova et al. [121] conclude that the IEEE 802.15.4 channels overlapping the 20 MHz
bandwidth of IEEE 802.11g channels experience a lower PDR as a consequence of a mod-
erate/high traffic load of interference. For instance, an IEEE 802.11g interference traffic of
15 Mbps results in a PDR of around 60 %. Shuaib et al. [120] provide experimental results
indicating a throughput drop of, a least, 10 % in an IEEE 802.15.4 link when exposed
to IEEE 802.11g interference. These results also indicate that a smaller SIR results in a
smaller throughput. For example, a 22 % drop in the throughput is to be expected when
IEEE 802.15.4 stations are exposed to IEEE 802.11g interference while being separated by
a distance of 12 meters (indoor).
Yang and Yu [124] also put forward results supporting the conclusion that the frequency
offset and physical distance between networks is determinant in the PLR. As an illustra-
tion, the PLR drops from approximately 35 % to less than 5 % for frequency offsets of 2
and 8 MHz, respectively. In yet another example, the PLR drops from approximately 50
% to less than 12 % for distances of 1 and 8 meters between IEEE 802.11g AP and ZigBee
coordinator. In [117] a similar trend is reported, but using the PER as the performance
indicator. Bartolomeu and Fonseca [125] also experimentally demonstrated that, by per-
forming IEEE 802.11g transmissions on a channel overlapping the frequency used by an
IEEE 802.15.4 network, it is possible to severely compromise its reliability and, therefore,
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impair all IEEE 802.15.4 communications. Musaloiu et al. [122] also analyze the impact of
IEEE 802.11g interference on IEEE 802.15.4 sensor networks in both indoor and outdoor
environments. The main conclusion is that an increase in the IEEE 802.11g data rate
consistently results in both higher perceived RSSI values and higher IEEE 802.15.4 PLRs.
Guo et al. [118] present an extensive analysis of the impact of IEEE 802.11g transmissions
in the reliability of IEEE 802.15.4 WSNs deployed inside buildings. This work indicates
that a maximum PER of 8 % can be reached depending upon the relative distances be-
tween transmitter, receiver and interferer station. Furthermore, the authors conclude that
the computed LQI and RSSI values are not always coupled with the PER. These results
are consistent with the conclusions presented by other authors.
IEEE 802.11n interference
The IEEE 802.11n [130] was the last wireless protocol to be widely adopted for WLANs.
It builds on the existing family of IEEE 802.11 standards and adds two physical layer fea-
tures, namely: support for Multiple-input Multiple-Output (MIMO) and 40 MHz channels.
Provided the emergence and continuous adoption of this standard together with the in-
clusion of new physical layer features, the study of the IEEE 802.11n and IEEE 802.15.4
coexistence becomes highly relevant. The remaining of this section is dedicated to the
analysis of relevant works covering this topic.
In [121], Petrova et al. perform an experimental analysis of the performance degra-
dation between colocated IEEE 802.11n and IEEE 802.15.4 networks mainly focusing on
PDR. The authors conclude that a moderate/high traffic load of IEEE 802.11n interfer-
ence transmissions results in an IEEE 802.15.4 lower PDR when its channel overlaps an
IEEE 802.11n channel, i.e., when the IEEE 802.15.4 channel central frequency lies within
the bounds of the 40 MHz IEEE 802.11n channel’s bandwidth. The results provided by
the authors also support the conclusion that the residual side-band emissions negatively
impact the PDR of co-located IEEE 802.15.4 networks. For example, considering an IEEE
802.15.4 CCA level of −77 dBm, a packet length of 26 bytes and a channel with a separa-
tion of −27 MHz to the IEEE 802.11n central frequency, the measured PDR is around 70
%.
A work featuring similar objectives and focusing on performance parameters such as
the increase in the average loss rate and average latency was published later by Polepalli
et al. [123]. In this study the coexistence between the IEEE 802.15.4 and IEEE 802.11n
technologies was evaluated by configuring IEEE 802.15.4 transmissions in two different
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IEEE 802.11n channels: extension and control. In the first scenario, results indicate a
significant IEEE 802.15.4 performance loss for higher IEEE 802.11n traffic loads. For
example, in the presence of a moderate IEEE 802.11n traffic load of 60 Mbps, the IEEE
802.15.4 average loss rate increases by approximately 30 % and the corresponding packet
average latency increases by around 140 milliseconds. In the second scenario, a more
dramatic effect is observed. The IEEE 802.15.4 average loss rate increases by around 80
% and the average packet latency increases by approximately 180 milliseconds.
A different coexistence perspective is presented by Zacharias et al. in [116], where an
analysis is conducted considering vehicle networks. One key difference between this and
other works on technology coexistence presented above is the use of a radio frequency
anechoic chamber, which allows obtaining results without the influence of external inter-
ference or multipath propagation effects. The performance parameter used to evaluate the
impact of IEEE 802.11n interference in IEEE 802.15.4 communications is the packet drop
rate. The authors put forward results corroborating a maximum packet drop rate of 2.75
% when an IEEE 802.15.4 link is exposed to beacon traffic generated by an IEEE 802.11n
station with a 102.4 milliseconds period.
2.4 Summary
This chapter presents the necessary background information for studying the feasibil-
ity of performing wireless real-time communications in open environments, where other
technologies may contend for the medium. In this scope, several aspects are of particular
relevance, namely: the existence of wireless technologies capable of enabling the support of
real-time communications; the existence of protocols that are already capable of perform-
ing wireless communications and meet real-time requirements; and, finally, the potential
limitations concerning their use in open environments.
In Section 2.1, the most widespread wireless low-power technologies operating in the 2.4
GHz ISM band are presented and discussed in detail, providing hints about their strengths
and weaknesses. The Bluetooth and the IEEE 802.15.4 technologies have been selected as
the primary candidates to support a wireless real-time communication solution capable of
coping with the limitations of open environment deployment. Given the emergence of the
ANT and nanoNET technologies, these have also been analyzed, but with less detail.
From a technical standpoint, when compared to Bluetooth, the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol
provides a much higher degree of flexibility, both in terms of its network architecture and
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timeliness support. The IEEE 802.15.4 protocol also provides a higher scalability, which
significantly contributes to its use in a broader range of networking scenarios. The use of a
DSSS spread spectrum technique together with the ability of employing frequency agility
mechanisms to avoid interference makes the IEEE 802.15.4 standard an ideal solution to
support reliable wireless communications in the 2.4 GHz ISM band. In an implementation
perspective, the Microchip’s MRF24J40 transceiver was selected mainly due to its low-cost
(2.15 e), high sensitivity (-95 dBm) and relatively low current consumption (maximum
current of 23 mA in active mode and 2 microamperes in sleep mode), when compared to
other IEEE 802.15.4 transceiver/SoC solutions.
In Section 2.2, a study of a subset of wireless communication protocols is presented.
The study focuses on communication protocols operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM band that
mainly target factory automation applications, due to its more demanding timeliness and
reliability nature. The presented review provides a generic introduction to each protocol
followed by a brief analysis of its operation, emphasizing the adopted MAC mechanisms
and discussing their performance and limitations.
The first observation is the existence of standard wireless protocols such as ISA SP100.11a
[94], WirelessHART [98] and WIA-PA [103] that were specifically developed for factory
automation applications and rely on the physical layer of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard for
enabling communications. These protocols employ an OSI-like layer structure supporting
a diagonal set of features that ranges from channel-hopping, for avoiding noise from co-
located networks operating in the same band, to multi-hop communications, which allow
extending the network coverage of the technologies. As noticed, these protocols employ
a bandwidth reservation mechanism in the form of slot assignment scheme that allows
ensuring deterministic timeliness to their transmissions. Nevertheless, given their higher
complexity, multi-hop operation and particular configuration, the end-to-end delay expe-
rienced by these technologies can be high. For instance, in a simple star WirelessHART
network with a 1500 milliseconds superframe duration, the average latency if of approxi-
mately 2 seconds with 92 milliseconds of jitter.
Another observation corresponds to the existence of wireless protocols designated specif-
ically for a particular purpose, such as the “Wireless Fieldbus for Plastic Machineries” by
Flammini et al. [93] or the WISA protocol by Dzung et al. [85], for example. Although less
flexible and encompassing a single point of failure, these protocols are capable of meeting
more stringent timeliness requirements due to their simplicity and adopted communication
techniques. For instance, the worst case latency of the WISA protocol is bounded by a 15
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milliseconds threshold.
The coexistence support and evaluation amongst protocols is highly heterogeneous, rep-
resenting yet another observation from this study. Protocols such asWISA andWirelessHART
provide both channel hopping mechanisms that allow to avoid noise from co-located net-
works operating in the same region of the spectrum, for example. Conversely, although
protocols like the “Real-Time Sensor/Actuator Network for Factory Automation” provide
mechanisms for channel redundancy and channel hopping, there is little or no informa-
tion in the literature about their effective performance. Because the presented protocols
operate in the 2.4 GHz ISM band they may become exposed to different types of noise
from contending technologies. Since, for the most part, these protocols are based on the
IEEE 802.15.4 physical layer and MAC, their resilience performance against noise from
co-located network technologies is very important.
In general, the studied protocols assume a certain amount of free band in order to oper-
ate correctly. Although some of the studied protocols employ frequency agility mechanisms,
these are only effective if there is enough bandwidth available to meet the application’s
requirements. When that is not the case, a significant performance degradation is to be
expected, possibly rendering the network unusable. In many scenarios, this will result in
considerable financial losses.
The analysis of relevant literature regarding the coexistence of the IEEE 802.15.4 tech-
nology in the 2.4 GHz ISM band is presented in Section 2.3. Provided the widespread
adoption of technologies such as IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15.4 and Bluetooth, there is a
non negligible probability that a deployed wireless real-time protocol may become exposed
to them during its lifetime. This may occur due to either unintentional or intentional
actions. The first occurs when an ad-hoc Bluetooth network is established in a factory
setting to support some temporary file transmission or a Wi-Fi network is deployed with-
out proper radio frequency planning, for example. Intentional actions occur when a third
party controls the interfering networks to have some gain from his action. For example, a
denial of service attack could make a wireless based production process to halt, benefiting
the company’s competitors. Hence, a study of the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol resilience to
Wi-Fi, IEEE 802.15.4 and Bluetooth noise transmissions was performed.
Concerning the coexistence of co-located IEEE 802.15.4 networks, results indicate a
significant degradation of the PER (above 60 %) when the SIR is small, as a consequence of
high power interference transmissions from neighbor stations. Furthermore, it was noticed
that, even transmissions on near channels (minimum offset) can have a visible effect (4.5 %)
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on the PER of a IEEE 802.15.4 network, due to the spurious emissions that are generated in
the sidelobes. The Bluetooth technology was found to have a smaller impact on the IEEE
802.15.4 PER (a maximum of 16 %). This is justified by both its frequency-hopping scheme,
which oftentimes “jumps” between frequencies, and by its blacklisting mechanisms that,
upon detecting channels with high PERs, marks and avoids them in the channel hopping
pattern.
The coexistence of IEEE 802.15.4 with IEEE 802.11 networks was separately ana-
lyzed for scenarios encompassing IEEE 802.11b, 802.11g and 802.11n stations, due to their
specificity. When compared to the IEEE 802.15.4 and Bluetooth technologies, a dramatic
increase in the PER is observed for the three Wi-Fi versions of interference. As aforemen-
tioned, the SIR is tightly coupled with the PER. Results are reported with PER values
above 50 % and, in some cases, going beyond the 90 % threshold. A PER increase re-
sulting from Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11g) sidelobe spurious emissions was also observed in this
coexistence review. Furthermore, it was also found that, due to its wider bandwidth,
transmissions conforming to the IEEE 802.11n standard have a higher impact on the per-
formance parameters of the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol.
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“A man gazing at the stars is proverbially
at the mercy of the puddles in the road.”
Alexander Smith (1830 - 1867) 3
Enforcing Traffic Separation in Open
Environments
The previous chapter concluded that contention-based interference from moderate/high-
power communication technologies can severely impair other on-going low-power commu-
nications in their range. This result challenges the support of real-time communications
using low-power technologies in open environments, where such technologies are abun-
dant and can be used without proper control. In the following sections, an overview
of the black-burst contention method is provided and a novel medium access mechanism
named bandjacking is proposed. This mechanism exploits the specific characteristics of
contention-based communications to provide a deterministic channel access. Afterwards,
the bandjacking reference architecture and operation are defined. Following, two different
implementations of its key hardware element (the programmable interference synthesizer)
are described and evaluated. Finally, the bandjacking effectiveness is assessed using a
commercial off-the-shelf based programmable interference synthesizer.
3.1 Black-Burst Contention: An Overview
The idea of contending for channel access using jamming signals is not new. It was
proposed more than ten years ago by Sobrinho and Krishnakumar [131], who defined
a mechanism entitled “Ethernet Quality of Service Using Black Bursts” (EQuB). This
mechanism adopted a Medium Access Control (MAC) overlay scheme, where real-time
stations use jamming signals - called black-bursts - to gain prioritized channel access. EQuB
was proposed under the assumption that real-time stations access the channel in (more-or-
less) regular intervals and that network cards can detect packet collisions and send jamming
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signals of pre-specified durations. The EQuB mechanism operates as follows. Real-time
stations are expected to generate a continuous data stream over long periods of time, i.e.,
sessions. At the beginning of each session, a real-time station transmits the first packet
following standard Ethernet rules. Down to the end of the session, subsequent packets
are transmitted employing the scheme described in the next paragraph. When a real-time
station successfully transmits a packet, it schedules a subsequent transmission for a given
instant in the future.
Considering a scheduled access for the current time, if the real-time station finds the
channel idle for an amount of time equal to the Inter-Frame Space (IFS), it starts the
transmission immediately. Otherwise, it waits until this condition is met and initiates the
packet transmission afterwards. Subsequently, if the real-time station detects a collision,
it holds back the packet being sent and transmits a jamming signal (black-burst) in the
channel. The black-burst length is proportional to the time that the station has been
waiting for channel access, i.e., the time elapsing from the scheduled access attempt and
the instant when the channel was perceived idle for an IFS. If, during the black-burst
transmission, the real-time station senses that no collisions are occurring, it resumes the
previous packet transmission that becomes successful. Hence, provided that only one
station wins the contention in each black-burst window, the EQuB mechanism enables a
round-robin service discipline among real-time stations.
The approach adopted for EQuB cannot be directly applied in standard wireless net-
works due to the lack of collision detection support. Consequently, Sobrinho and Krish-
nakumar proposed an extension of the EQuB mechanism for Wireless Local Area Networks
(WLAN) [132]. This protocol differs from the latter in the sense that real-time nodes con-
tend for channel access after the WLAN medium IFS instead of the long IFS, thus having
a higher access priority than standard data stations. Besides, because real-time stations
are not able to sense collisions, the black-burst cannot be shortened as in the EQuB when
the channel is sensed idle, i.e., real-time stations transmit the black-burst for a period
proportional to the time that the station has been waiting for channel access. Afterwards,
real-time stations observe the channel for a given interval to determine, without ambi-
guity, if the station has the longest black-burst window, which enables the transmission
of its data. In this case, the packet is transmitted and a new transmission is scheduled.
Otherwise, as in EQuB, the real-time station will wait for the channel to become idle for a
medium IFS interval. As before, this mechanism enables distributed prioritized access of
real-time stations in contention-based networks.
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Lindgren et al. [133] evaluated the provision of Quality of Service (QoS) in IEEE 802.11
wireless LANs with a study focused in four mechanisms: IEEE 802.11 Point Coordination
Function (PCF), IEEE 802.11e Enhanced Distributed Coordination Function (EDCF),
Distributed Fair Scheduling (DFS) and black-burst. The conclusion was that the black-
burst mechanism exhibits the best performance for QoS support.
An enhanced version of the black-burst protocol was proposed by Jacob et al. in [134].
This protocol (enhanced black-burst) aims at improving the QoS assurance for Variable Bit
Rate (VBR) traffic by allowing two contention mechanisms: one based on black-bursts and
the other on EDCF. The authors propose a scheme where black-burst contention is used
during the “bursty” periods of a VBR session and EDCF contention during the beginning of
the bursts after the silence periods. This approach harnesses the benefits of both contention
mechanisms, i.e., smaller access delays during VBR data bursts and after “long periods of
silence”. As a result, the performance in terms of packet delay, throughput and channel
utilization is significantly improved.
Despite being capable of providing multiple Quality of Service (QoS) levels for real-time
communications, the aforementioned MAC mechanisms cannot guarantee bounded access
delays in open scenarios where different contention-based communication technologies may
(co)exist. The following section addresses the operation of the bandjacking MAC scheme
aimed at coping with this requirement.
3.2 Bandjacking: A Forceful MAC Technique
The requirement of a MAC mechanism allowing establishing a privileged access to the
medium for wireless communications, even in environments affected by contention from
different technologies, motivated the development of the bandjacking technique [135], which
was inspired by two key observations. The first is how contention is handled in wild nature
environments, where a resource can be disputed by several parties. For example, there is
evidence that competition can increase resource use diversity within a natural population
of three-spine sticklebacks (Gasterosteus aculeatus) [136]. This means that competition
in nature can incite similar individuals to seek alternative resources for coping with their
living requirements. Those who ensure the access to the available resources are more likely
to prosper. Another example is the accepted theory that natural mammal competition
for females was the evolutionary mechanism driving males to develop a larger body size
and the development conspicuous weaponry such as horns [137]. In this perspective, larger
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mammals with the best weaponry are more likely to reproduce and ensure their lineage.
These are only two examples indicating that, when there is contention for a shared resource,
nature favors those who evolve to use alternative resources or those who specialize to have
better chances of accessing to the shared resource. In a sense, bandjacking is both an
evolution of a technology to use an alternative resource that allows increasing its chances
of getting the medium freed and a technological specialization to improve its probability
of accessing the shared medium.
The second observation that inspired bandjacking was the acknowledgement that real-
time events should always have a higher priority than any others. This implies that in a
communication scenario where real-time and best-effort services are being provided, the
former should always be serviced, even if it means to starve the latter. In this sense,
it is acceptable that a real-time transmission may interrupt an ongoing best-effort trans-
mission, since a failure in the services supported by the latter will not have a significant
impact overall. The bandjacking technique was devised as a way of enabling guaranteed
real-time transmissions in open (uncontrolled) environments. This technique allows a sta-
tion to forcefully gain access to the communication channel, even if other contention-based
technologies are simultaneously contending for the access to the medium. Therefore, band-
jacking allows one station, herein designated as critical station, to conduct transmissions
to one (or more) standard station(s) with deterministic medium access delay.
An intuitive explanation of how the bandjacking works is presented before providing
its formal definition. The bandjacking technique defines that a critical data transmission,
i.e., a transmission performed by a critical station, is preceded by a fixed length black-
burst transmission [131] that ultimately jams all ongoing communications. If the jamming
signal is long enough, all stations will eventually find the medium busy and postpone
(backoff) their transmissions to a later time. Provided that the critical station is able
to transmit a data packet immediately after the black-burst sequence, without having to
enforce any Inter-Frame Space (IFS), it will gain prioritized medium access when compared
to stations respecting the IFS or performing Clear Channel Assessments (CCA) before
initiating a transmission. The approach of transmitting the critical packet immediately
after the black-burst sequence resembles the mechanism proposed by Moraes and Vasques
[138] in the h-BEB collision resolution algorithm for shared Ethernet networks.
The bandjacking is the sequence of transmissions encompassing the black-burst and
the critical data packet. The prioritization of critical data transmissions will occur even
if multiple technologies operate within the same geographical area, as long as the time
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elapsing between the black-burst sequence and the critical data packet is shorter than the
minimum IFS or CCA for those technologies. Additionally, it must be guaranteed that
the critical data transmission is perceived as occupying the medium for the time of its
duration.
3.2.1 Bandjacking Formal Definition
In this subsection the bandjacking MAC technique is formally defined and proved correct
under a specific set of conditions.
Definition The amount of time elapsing from the end of a black-burst and the beginning
of a critical contention-free data transmission is defined as the capture interval τ .
Lemma 3.2.1 A contending communication station performing a clear channel assess-
ment perceives the medium as busy if it detects a known signal pattern; a signal having
one or more parameters above a given threshold; or a combination of both. Otherwise, the
medium is declared idle.
Proof Assume that technologies employing a contention mechanism use some derivation
of the CSMA technique. Hence, the channel sampling activity which precedes any new
transmission attempt is common to all contention based communication technologies. This
procedure aims at evaluating the medium for inactivity. From this evaluation one of two
results may occur: the medium is perceived as not being used or an ongoing transmission is
detected. The detection of a busy medium is performed by identifying if the energy present
in the medium is above a given threshold, if a signal with a given encoding is present in
the medium or by a combination of both. These detection mechanisms are applied during
the CSMA’s clear channel assessment phase of both IEEE 802.15.4 [46] and IEEE 802.11
[64] technologies, for example.
Lemma 3.2.2 Communication stations employing contention mechanisms to access the
medium are hindered from performing transmissions if the medium is always perceived as
occupied.
Proof From Lemma 3.2.1, a contending communication station can only find the medium
as either busy or idle after performing a clear channel assessment using a specific method.
Therefore, before attempting a new transmission, contending stations must scan the medium
for ongoing packets. If the medium scanning detects an ongoing transmission, the station
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will postpone its transmission. Because the mechanism is only repeated for a limited num-
ber of attempts, the station attempting the new transmission will eventually drop it if the
medium is always found busy with ongoing transmissions. Therefore, the station will be
hindered from performing any transmissions as long as the medium is found occupied.
Definition A critical station is defined as a communication station that has the ability
to synthesize black-burst interference, making co-located contending stations perceive the
medium as busy, and also perform contention-free transmissions.
Lemma 3.2.3 A critical station synthesizing black-burst interference for a period of time
long enough will force all of the co-located contending stations to backoff from the medium.
Proof Assume that Θ = {θIEEE802.15.4, θIEEE802.11, ...} represents the set of maximum
transmission durations of a group of different technologies, where θIEEE802.15.4 represents
the maximum duration of an IEEE 802.15.4 packet and θIEEE802.11 is the IEEE 802.11
packet maximum duration. Assume also that θMAX = max(Θ) corresponds to the maxi-
mum packet duration of all contending stations. From Lemma 3.2.2, a contention station
will not be able to access the medium if it is perceived occupied. Therefore, if a station has
the ability to make the medium be perceived as occupied for a period of time larger than
θMAX , all co-located contending stations will become idle before the end of this period.
This is supported by two facts. First, any contending station that might have initiated a
transmission before the beginning of the synthesized interference will finish its transmission
before the latter ends. Second, during the transmission of the synthesized interference any
co-located contending station will find the medium busy.
Lemma 3.2.4 A critical station that is capable of performing a data transmission masked
as one from a neighbor “alien” contending station ensures that an ongoing critical trans-
mission will not be corrupted by that station.
Proof Assume that the critical station can generate a signal, herein designated as pro-
tective interference, which does not affect its data packets but makes co-located “alien”
stations to perceive the medium as occupied. If the critical station has the ability to
perform a data transmission and, simultaneously, synthesize protective interference, then
according to Lemma 3.2.2, during these periods, “alien” stations perceive the medium as
busy and will hold back from transmitting. In this sense, the protective interference masks
the data transmission as one from an “alien” station.
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Theorem 3.2.5 A critical station synthesizing black-burst interference for a period of
time t : t ≥ θMAX can, subsequently, perform a contention-free data transmission, shielded
by protective interference, without risking obstruction from co-located “alien” contending
stations, as long as the capture interval is shorter than the minimum IFS or CCA durations
of any contending technology.
Proof Assume that Ξ = {ξIEEE802.15.4, ξIEEE802.11, ...} represents the set of minimum IFS
delays of a group co-located contending stations, where ξIEEE802.15.4 and ξIEEE802.11 are
the minimum IFSs of the stations using the IEEE 802.15.4 and IEEE 802.11 technologies,
respectively. Also assume that Λ = {λIEEE802.15.4, λIEEE802.11, ...} expresses the set of min-
imum CCA durations for all of the co-located contending stations in which λIEEE802.15.4 and
λIEEE802.11 designate the IEEE 802.15.4 and IEEE 802.11 minimum CCAs, respectively.
From Lemma 3.2.3, if the black-burst transmission has a duration higher than θMAX , no
contending station is transmitting at the end of the black-burst, i.e., the medium is clear
from contending station transmissions. Consider that ξmin = min(Ξ) and λmin = min(Λ)
define the minimum values of the IFS and CCA durations. If a critical station performs
a contention-free data transmission immediately after the end of the black-burst, with a
capture interval τ : τ < min{ξmin, λmin}, it will not experience any obstruction from co-
located contention stations, since they must respect their MAC technology requirements
(minimum IFS or CCA durations) and will not initiate any transmissions during the cap-
ture interval. From Lemma 3.2.4, if the contention-free data transmission is accompanied
by protective interference, then the co-located “alien” stations will be hindered from trans-
mitting for the length of its duration, which ensures that the critical data transmission is
not corrupted by them.
Building on the definition of the bandjacking MAC technique, the following subsections
describe the reference architecture supporting its implementation and provide a detailed
analysis of its operation.
3.2.2 Reference Architecture
The reference architecture describes the preferred method for implementing the band-
jacking hardware and provides a network example which allows explaining the technique in
a practical perspective. Figure 3.1 presents the architecture of a wireless network encom-
passing stations that employ different communication technologies and share the wireless
2.4 GHz ISM medium. For the purpose of better explaining the bandjacking technique,
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Figure 3.1: Architecture of a wireless network
without loss of generality, it is assumed that data communications are carried on with
IEEE 802.15.4 transceivers and that transmissions from co-located IEEE 802.11 stations
are perceived as interference. Since the latter stations are not part of the (IEEE 802.15.4)
data network they are, herein, designated as “alien” stations.
The following considerations are valid for scenarios where multiple “alien” stations
compete for the medium, despite the provided example encompasses a single “alien” sta-
tion. In addition to the “alien” station (AST1), the network comprises one critical station
(CST1) and two standard stations (SST2 and SST3). The critical station integrates a
programmable interference synthesizer (PNS1) and a standard sub-station (SST1).
Standard stations encompass both a Commercial Transceiver (CT) and a Communica-
tions Controller (CC). The first one is responsible for transmitting/receiving data packets
to/from the network while the second manages all the communications of the station. In
the following discussion, without loss of generality, the CT is assumed to be an IEEE
802.15.4 compatible radio operating in channel 17. This channel covers a range of fre-
quencies denoted as “data band” (21) in Figure 3.2. The notation (21) identifies a specific
element in a figure unambiguously, in this case the element marked with the number 21.
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Figure 3.2: Spectrum occupation of the shared medium
This notation is adopted in the remainder of this section to reference the details in the
figures more easily.
The CT can use one of the following methods to access the shared medium: (slotted
or unslotted) Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) con-
tention; contentionless Guaranteed Time Slots (GTSs); and contentionless direct access, a
special access mode provided by some manufacturers such as Microchip. This mode allows
a transceiver to initiate a transmission without waiting for any number of backoff slots or
performing a Clear Channel Assessment (CCA).
The “alien” station (AST1) operates on the IEEE 802.11 channel 6, corresponding to
the interference band (23) represented in Figure 3.2, and accesses the medium using the Dis-
tributed Coordination Function (DCF), which employs the CSMA/CA algorithm defined
in the IEEE 802.11 specification [64]. This station is included in the example to represent
the interference generated by an “alien” contention-based communication technology.
The programmable interference synthesizer (PNS1) produces interference profiles ac-
cording to Figure 3.2, generating radio signals with a spectral content similar to the “alien”
interference (23) or interference in both low (20) and high (22) sub-bands. This interference
must not be perceived by standard stations as incoming packets, as they will attempt their
decoding, which may affect their response time in case a transmission is required (e.g.,
immediately after the interference sequence). As it will be detailed further ahead, the
requirement of performing simultaneous transmissions in both sub-bands aims at avoiding
“alien” stations from finding the medium idle when a low-power critical data packet trans-
mission is ongoing. All transmissions from the programmable interference synthesizer are
conducted without contention.
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Along with two front-ends (8) and two digital-analog converters (7), the PNS1 (3) also
integrates a Digital Signal Generator (DSG) (6), which allows to simultaneously synthe-
size, for example, two different Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) encoded digital
signals. Although we consider the generation of DSSS signals in this example, the DSG
can be used to synthesize other signal types, as long as their characteristics are within
the bounds of the applicable radio emission regulations. Furthermore, the DSG (6) also
controls the local oscillator frequency used in the upconversion to the 2.4GHz ISM band as
well as the gain of the RFF amplifier stage. In a critical station (1), all parameters related
to the generation of interference (frequency band, power, duration) are managed by the
communications controller (5) embodied on the standard sub-station (2).
Assuming that an IEEE 802.11b-like interference signal is to be synthesized by the
PNS1 (3) according to the parameters passed on by the CC1 (5), the DSG produces a 11
Mbit DSSS encoded random signal, which is fed to one of the DACs, converted into analog,
and passed to the following RFF (8). Here, the analog signal is up-converted, for example,
to the central frequency corresponding to channel 6, and amplified with a gain that results
in a transmission with 20 dBm of power (EIRP). Both RFFs shall be connected to omni-
directional antennas. To synthesize interference simultaneously in the two sub-bands (20)
and (22) a similar approach is followed by using two DSSS encoded random signals with
appropriate bandwidths, but guaranteeing that the cross-interference in the data band is
bellow its noise floor level. The synthesis of this interference profile must be carefully
implemented, as non-negligible problems to the integrated low-cost transceivers operating
in the data band (21) may occur, for example, due to saturation phenomena.
The legal limit for the transmission of signals in the 2.4 GHz ISM band is of 100 mW
(20 dBm) of Effective Isotropic Irradiated Power (EIRP) in Europe (ETSI EN 300 328)
and 1 W (30 dBm) of Peak Conducted Output Power in the US (FCC part 15.247 and
15.249), assuming the transmission of Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) signals.
Therefore, the synthesized interference in the (20), (22) and (23) bands must comply with
these limits.
3.2.3 Operation
Figure 3.3 represents a set of signals associated with the communication scenario rep-
resented in Figure 3.1. Assume that a standard station SST2 has been previously attached
to a neighbor Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) coordinator (not shown) operating
in the beaconed mode and that it was granted a GTS to transmit a data packet in a given
92
3.2. BANDJACKING: A FORCEFUL MAC TECHNIQUE
Figure 3.3: Timeline of two bandjacking accesses
Contention Free Period (CFP). Suppose that a GTS data transmission (30) is initiated at
instant t1 and finished in t4 by the SST2 station. An “alien” station (AST1) becomes ready
for initiating a data transmission at instant t2. However, it must observe the medium for
a period of time known as DCF Inter Frame Space (DIFS) before declaring it inactive at
instant t3 and proceeding with an “alien” packet transmission (31) until the t5 instant.
As it is shown, a collision takes place in the medium from t3 to t4. This may occur
since the transmissions performed by short-range wireless communication technologies (e.g.
IEEE 802.15.4) may not be detected by co-located technologies employing higher levels of
power in their transmissions (e.g IEEE 802.11). In other words, the energy levels produced
by low-range transmissions may not be strong enough to make “alien” stations declare
the medium occupied. As such, all standard low-range communications, regardless of the
medium access method, are prone to interference from other contention-based networks,
especially those employing higher power transmissions.
Assume that the “alien” station (AST1) becomes ready for an “alien” transmission
(31) at instant t6 and starts it at instant t7, after the medium has been observed for the
DIFS period. This transmission is concluded at instant t9. If the critical station (CST1)
has a data packet scheduled for instant t12, it starts the transmission of a black-burst
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interference sequence (32) at instant t8 with a spectral content (23) similar to that of the
“alien” technology, jamming the “alien” packet transmission. The interference sequence
is completed at instant t11. Immediately after, at instant t12, the scheduled critical data
packet (34) is sent in the data band (21) by the standard sub-station SST1, finding the
medium free and ending at instant t13. During this period, two “protective” interference
signals are also simultaneously produced by the synthesizer in the lower (20) and upper
(22) sub-bands, as depicted in Figure 3.2 and 3.3.
The need to perform the data transmission immediately after the interference sequence
is a consequence of the Theorem 3.2.5, which implies that the time window elapsing between
the events t11 and t12 must be smaller than the IFS and CCA of any neighbor “alien”
technology. This guarantees that, even if an “alien” station initiates the CCA during this
period, it will acknowledge the channel as being occupied because it will find significant
energy levels. This occurs due to either the subsequent data transmission (34) or the
simultaneous transmission of interference (33) in the lower (20) and upper (22) sub-bands.
The same is valid for an “alien” station waiting the IFS before initiating a transmission.
The black-burst interference sequence (32) ensures the medium availability at instant
t12 by inhibiting “alien” stations from starting transmissions during this period. The pro-
tective interference sequence (33) ensures that “alien” stations will not mark the medium
as free when, for example, low-power narrow-band data transmissions are on-going. Pro-
vided that the critical data is transmitted simultaneously to the protective interference
(33) immediately after the end of the black-burst interference sequence (32), “alien” DoS
attacks using (contention-based) packet flooding will not be effective in blocking the critical
transmissions.
According to Figure 3.3, after failing the transmission initiated at instant t7, the “alien”
station AST1 tries to access the medium at instant t10, but finds it occupied and performs a
backoff procedure until instant t14, where it acknowledges the medium as free and proceeds
with a successful transmission lasting until instant t15.
A similar cycle is initiated at instant t18 corresponding to the dispatch of a critical data
packet. Another interference sequence (32) is initiated even with the medium occupied
by a contention-based data transmission (35) triggered by the standard station SST3 at
instant t17. In this scenario, the black-burst interference sequence (32) between instants
t18 and t21, the critical data packet (34) between instants t22 and t23, and the simultaneous
protective interference (33) repeat. As illustrated, the ongoing data transmission (35) is
corrupted by the interference sequence (32) between instants t18 and t19. Therefore, station
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SST3 evaluates the medium at instant t20 to attempt a packet retransmission, finding it
occupied. After conducting the backoff procedure, station SST3 evaluates the medium at
instant t24 and, observing it free, initiates a packet retransmission lasting until instant t25.
3.3 SDR-based PNS Implementation
The first hardware solution for the Programmable Interference Sequencer (PNS) is de-
scribed in this section. This version of the PNS was devised in collaboration with the
Wireless Sensor Networks LABoratory Group of the Electronics for Automation Depart-
ment of the University of Brescia, which was responsible for implementing the software
running in the PNS. Although the initial approach was aimed at implementing a hardware
platform similar to the one defined for the PNS in Figure 3.1, soon it was realized the avail-
ability of Software Defined Radio (SDR) development KITs with a similar architecture. In
this sense, an option was made for evaluating the feasibility of using one SDR KIT as the
PNS. The remaining of this section describes the SDR-based PNS architecture and oper-
ation with an emphasis on the solution’s hardware and software. In addition to providing
an in-depth review of the PNS implementation, this section also documents the testbed
used to assess its performance and discusses the obtained results with the perspective of
building a SDR-based commercial solution for the PNS.
3.3.1 Architecture
The use of a SDR-based solution for the PNS was initially motivated by the similarity
between the hardware architectures of both the envisaged PNS and of a typical SDR. This
option was also supported by two other advantages. First, the flexibility and reconfigura-
bility offered by this approach allows a rapid modification of the signals’ characteristics
without depending on hardware redesign. Second, the openness provided by the joint use
of the GNU Radio open-source software development toolkit and of the Universal Software
Radio Peripheral (USRP) platform makes the development of radio solutions more agile
due to software component reuse.
Hardware
Figure 3.4 shows the typical block diagram of a SDR platform. This diagram empha-
sizes the abstract blocks of the SDR and the representative physical components contained
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in each one. As documented, there are three main blocks: Data Processing, Wideband
Conversion and the Radio Frequency Front-end. The data processing block, as the name
suggests, is responsible for the SDR’s data processing abilities. It can be implemented by
means of a generic processing unit that encodes/decodes digital samples. The implemen-
tation of this block usually relies on a DSP; a microcontroller; a FPGA; a general purpose
PC; or a combination of these. An effective approach is to have the data processing block
implemented using an hybrid structure, where high speed repetitive tasks are ensured by
programmable logic (e.g., CPLD or FPGA) and tasks with a higher level of abstraction
are handled by a dedicated processor.
The wideband conversion block separates the analog and digital sections of the SDR.
This block typically defines the analog bandwidth of the system and is commonly the SDR’s
bandwidth bottleneck. As shown in Figure 3.4, it holds both the ADC and the DAC, which
are responsible for digitizing the analog signal coming from the Radio Frequency Front-end
(RFF) and converting to analog the digital signal synthesized at the data processing block,
respectively.
Finally, the RFF is responsible for tuning the analog baseband signal coming from the
wideband conversion block to be wirelessly transmitted and to transform the radio signals
coming from the antenna to be digitized by the DAC. The transmission path of the RFF
is generally composed by an Intermediate Frequency to Radio Frequency (IF→ RF) stage
and a Power Amplifier (PA) just before the antenna. The former stage performs the up-
conversion that translates the software-configurable IF into the RF of interest. The later
increases the amplitude of the signal fed to the antenna for an increased communication
range. The receiving path includes stages with complementary functions: a Low Noise
Amplifier (LNA) and a (RF→ IF) stage. The first, while maintaining the levels of noise to
a minimum, produces an amplified version of the signal received at the SDR’s antenna. The
second performs a down-conversion that translates the center frequency of the RF signal
to an intermediate frequency suited to be handled by the wideband conversion block.
The SDR concept can be developed in the 2.4 GHz ISM band using several commercially
available tools, as presented in Table 3.1. For example, National Instruments provides
the USRP-2921 [139] for 2380 e. This software radio bundle allows synthesizing signals
covering the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz ISM bands, thus supporting Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and ZigBee
communications. This KIT allows interfacing with LabVIEW for streaming baseband IQ
signals with up to 25 MS/s. LabVIEW is an application that enables the development
of algorithms for physical layer communications using an intuitive graphical programming
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Figure 3.4: Block diagram (top) and physical component mapping (bottom) of an SDR
Table 3.1: Commercial SDR KITs
Vendor Designation
Frequency range Cost
Software support
(MHz) (e)
National Instruments USRP-2921 2400-2500, 5725-5875 2380 LabVIEW
Avnet ZYNQ SDR-II 70 -6000 ≈ 1100 Xilinx Vivado
Great Scott Gadgets HackRF Jawbreaker 902-928, 2400-2500 ≈ 222 GNU Radio
Ettus Research USRP1 + RFX2400 2300 - 2900 ≈ 860 GNU Radio
approach that increases productivity.
Avnet is another SDR provider. This manufacturer commercializes the ZedBoard
ZYNQ SDR-II [140] KIT for approximately 1100 e. This software defined radio KIT
combines a ZedBoard with a Analog Devices AD-FMCOMMS2-EBZ FMC module, featur-
ing the AD9361 integrated RF agile transceiver. Although the transceiver can be tuned
for RF center-frequencies ranging from 70 MHz to 6 GHz, it is optimized for synthesizing
signals in the 2400 - 2500 MHz region of the spectrum with a channel bandwidth ranging
from 200 kHz to 56 MHz. The development of communication solutions using the Zed-
Board is conducted with the Xilinx Vivado Design Suite, which enables key productivity
elements such as IP integration and implementation; verification and debug; and design
exploration and IP generation.
The HackRF open source project [141] is a SDR platform that is gaining a considerable
attention in both the academy and the industry. This project aims at producing a SDR
device that can operate over a wide range of frequencies, including both the 2.4 GHz and
900 MHz ISM bands. This project was funded for more than 444000 e in Kickstarter. The
first release of the HackRF board was named Jawbreaker and became available in January
2014, with a cost of around 222 e per board.
The most popular platform for developing the SDR concept is the Universal Software
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Figure 3.5: USRP-based PNS implementation and µMRF mezzanine interface board
Radio Peripheral (USRP) created by Ettus Research, LLC [142]. The first SDR system was
the USRP1 that, when paired to the RFX2400 daughterboard, is capable of synthesizing
signals occupying the spectrum region between 2300 MHz and 2900 MHz with host signals
with a maximum bandwidth of 16 MS/s. This device is a low-cost and high-speed equip-
ment designed to “allow general purpose computers to function as high bandwidth software
radios” [143]. The USRP1 board is available together with the RFX2400 daughterboard
for approximately 615 e and 245 e, respectively. Over the last years, Ettus Research
has broadened its SDR offer in three product categories: USRP Networked Series, USRP
Embedded Series and USRP Bus Series. The Networked Series targets high-bandwidth
and high-dynamic range applications that require Gigabit Ethernet connectivity. The Em-
bedded Series, as the name suggests, addresses embedded applications where the use of a
computer together with the USRP is not desired. This platform combines the flexibility
of the USRP product family with an embedded processor running a custom Linux image.
Finally, the Bus Series extends the USRP1 line by including both fully integrated, single-
board USRP solutions as well as USRP Kits that mount daughterboards like the USRP1.
The USRP platform is commonly paired with the GNU Radio software suite to rapidly
create complex SDR systems without the burden of developing commonly used software
defined building blocks from scratch.
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The adopted SDR platform for developing a 2.4 GHz ISM band programmable inter-
ference synthesizer (PNS) was the USRP1 Kit together with RFX2400 daughterboard by
Ettus Research LLC. This option was motivated by its flexibility, low cost and broad open
source support, namely by the GNU Radio suite and its UCLA Zigbee block. The USRP1
motherboard hosts two 12-bit ADCs (up to 64 MS/s sampling rate), two 14-bit DACs (up
to 128 MS/s) and an Altera Cyclone EP1C12 FPGA for simple high speed operations such
as up-conversion, down-conversion, interpolation and decimation. The ADCs and DACs
allow both the reception of baseband signals of up to 32 MHz of bandwidth and the gen-
eration of baseband signals of up to 50 MHz of bandwidth. To ensure the ability to tune
two different frequency ranges, a set of two RFX2400 daughterboards were mounted on the
USRP1 board. As depicted in Figure 3.5, a µMRF mezzanine board was added to allow
the critical station’s communications controller to manage the transmission of black-burst
and protective interference. This board was designed to individually control each of the
RFX2400 daughterboards by applying a control pulse to the ENOP pin of the Analog De-
vices’ AD8349 quadrature modulator chip on each board, thus allowing to switch it on and
off within 50 nanoseconds and, therefore, start/stop the transmission of any signal being
conveyed by the USRP1 board.
Software
The GNU Radio [144] open source project was elected for the implementation of the
PNS software architecture due to its support for developing “real-time, high-throughput
radio systems in a simple-to-use, rapid-application-development environment” [144]. The
GNU Radio framework is composed by a modular, expandable and block-organized soft-
ware library, which can be further enriched with signal processing blocks contributed by
the GNU Radio community. The GNU Radio platform is being used in both research
and commercial domains for developing wireless communication solutions by hobbyists,
academics and enterprises.
The software structure of a GNU Radio application is mainly written with the Python
programming language, a dynamic object-oriented scripting (interpreted) language. How-
ever, the performance-critical elements of the signal processing path are usually imple-
mented in C++, taking advantage of any available specific processor floating point ex-
tensions. The integration between C++ and Python occurs by means of the Simplified
Wrapper and Interface Generator (SWIG), an interface compiler, allowing data to flow at
maximum speed.
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Figure 3.6: Block diagram of the PNS prototype using the GNU Radio framework
Figure 3.6 shows the software block diagram of the implemented PNS. As it can be
seen, two different paths are represented: one for the black-burst interference and the other
for the protective interference. In both paths there is a data source, an amplifier and a
throttle. The two signal flows are then interleaved and sent to the USRP using a USB 2.0
connection. These two interference signals are then demultiplexed at the USRP and fed to
an individual RFX2400 daughterboard, allowing them to be switched on and off separately.
The source block works as the baseband sample generator and can be replaced by a generic
modulator or a file source, for example. Since the original aim of this implementation was
to create a PNS prototype, the signal source block was left undefined. Provided that it is
a software block, it can be easily replaced (via software reprogramming) with what best
suits the needs of testing, such as a particular modulator, a signal generator function or a
(pre)recorded file.
Following the signal path, after the sample generator block (source), a digital gain am-
plifier is placed in order to amplify the source signal amplitude, which is of ±1 (floating
point value). After passing the gain block, the signal increases to an amplitude of ±8000
points (integer value). The selected gain was chosen because it represents a good compro-
mise for a low Spurious-Free Dynamic Range (SFDR) with the USRP [145]. The amplified
signal then enters the throttle block, which moderates the rate of the streaming data to
avoid overloading the CPU. The block output is a flow of samples in which the average
rate does not exceed a given defined value of samples per second. In this case the selected
value is 4 MS/s. The two data flows encoding interference signals are then merged by the
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interleave block and then sent to the USRP via USB 2.0 connection.
One of the main advantages of developing a SDR-based PNS is the ability to change
the characteristics of the interference signals simply by modifying the data source and the
configurations of the front-ends.This possibility prompted the endeavor of trying different
approaches for finding a suitable interference pattern, hindering IEEE 802.11 stations from
transmitting when other IEEE 802.15.4 transmissions are both beginning or ongoing.
Boano et al. [146] found that a signal synthesized by a USRP board with enough power
can completely block IEEE 802.15.4 communications. Furthermore, in a different approach,
several studies indicate that IEEE 802.15.4 transmissions have significant impact on IEEE
802.11 communications. For example, in [147], the PER of the IEEE 802.11b technology
is analyzed under the interference of IEEE 802.15.4 transmissions. The authors conclude
that if the distance between both transceivers is less than 2 meters the interference caused
by the IEEE 802.15.4 transmissions on IEEE 802.11b communications causes a PER of
around 0.8 (80% of all packets transmitted by the IEEE 802.11b stations are lost). In
a more recent work by Mao et al. [148], the coexistence of the IEEE 802.15.4 and IEEE
802.11b/g technologies is studied by means of analyzing the throughput of IEEE 802.11b/g
communications under the influence of IEEE 802.15.4 transmissions. One conclusion is that
the throughput drops to about 59% when the IEEE 802.15.4 station is at one meter from
the IEEE 802.11b/g station. Despite increasing the distance between these stations has,
generally, a positive effect on the throughput, that does not always occur due to signal
multi-path phenomena. In both cases, results indicate that IEEE 802.15.4 signals have
enough bandwidth to be detected by IEEE 802.11 stations. Nevertheless, in our approach
to implement the PNS, two different scenarios were considered: protective interference
generated across multiple IEEE 802.15.4 channels or (black-burst) interference on a single
channel. In both cases an IEEE 802.15.4 modulator was used as the source signal for the
PNS. Besides the potential capability of blocking IEEE 802.11 transmissions, the use of an
IEEE 802.15.4 modulator was also motivated by its low implementation complexity, which
comes from using the GNU Radio project [149].
The first scenario assumes that the interference signal must occupy more than one
IEEE 802.15.4 channel to be effectively detected by neighboring IEEE 802.11b/g stations.
Hence, a frequency hopping procedure was implemented, allowing the interference signal
to hop over a configurable number of IEEE 802.15.4 channels. In the second scenario, it
is assumed that the interference on a single IEEE 802.15.4 is sufficient for making IEEE
802.11b/g stations perceive the medium as busy.
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Figure 3.7: PNS block diagram: frequency hopping protective interference
In both scenarios, a stream of samples was generated and recorded into a file using the
IEEE 802.15.4 modulator. The stored samples were processed to avoid being perceived
as IEEE 802.15.4 valid data. This was conducted by changing the packet synchronization
header, which allows standard IEEE 802.15.4 stations to ignore this signal, while keeping
the original IEEE 802.15.4 band occupation. Changing the synchronization header is
critical in scenarios when it is required that an IEEE 802.15.4 station responds immediately
after the end of an interference sequence, such as the case of a critical transmission. If
an IEEE 802.15.4 packet is perceived as valid, the transceiver will attempt its decoding,
blocking the possibility of an immediate response.
As illustrated in both Figures 3.7 and 3.8, the block that reads the samples from the file
and sends them continuously in a loop is represented as the pseudo 802.15.4 source block.
Two pseudo 802.15.4 signals are generated: one to be used as black-burst interference and
the other to be employed as protective interference. As described, these signals are then
interleaved and sent to the USRP, which proceeds to its demultiplexing and feeding to the
designated DACs. The interleaving is required to allow transmitting simultaneously both
data flows over the single USB connection.
In the first implementation scenario, as depicted in Figure 3.7, a Frequency Hopping
Control block is added to the transmission path of the protective interference side to allow
occupying more than one IEEE 802.15.4 channel by means of frequency hopping. This
block has the ability of sending update commands to the digital up conversion section of
the USRP, changing the tuning frequency of the analog front-end after a given period of
time. This block is not required in the fixed frequency scenario because the protective
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Figure 3.8: PNS block diagram: fixed channel protective interference
interference is transmitted on a single pre-defined channel, as shown in 3.8.
In both block diagrams, the FPGA demultiplexer splits the received signal stream in
two flows; each one fed to a different radio frequency font-end and tuned to a specific center
frequency (or set of frequencies) to match the required band occupation for each type of
interference. Provided that the 2.4 GHz ISM band has been chosen to implement the PNS
prototype, two RFX2400 daughterboards have been mounted on the USRP board, allowing
tuning two different individual signals in this band of frequencies. These daughterboards
host two radio frequency analog mixers that allow adjusting their operation in the 2400 to
2900 MHz range of frequencies. As documented in both Figures 3.7 and 3.8, the RF front-
end of the daughterboard A is tuned for the channel (or set of channels) corresponding to
the protective interference, while the front-end of the daughterboard B was configured to
transmit in the black-burst interference channel, i.e., the same that is used for valid IEEE
802.15.4 data transmissions. The daughterboards permit that both types of interference
can be individually turned on and off using external signals.
3.3.2 Evaluation
After implementing the PNS using a SDR-based approach follows the assessment of its
effectiveness in blocking IEEE 802.11 transmissions. Of particular interest is experimen-
tally finding the optimal gain/transmission power and the channel separation that enables
the support of “protective” interference without affecting the critical data being simulta-
neously transmitted. In the coming section, besides presenting the methodology used to
perform the PNS evaluation, the associated results and the key findings are provided.
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Methodology
Figure 3.9 shows the test setup created to assess the effectiveness of the (USRP-based)
PNS in hindering Wi-Fi communications. The testbed is composed by several elements,
including:
• An IEEE 802.11b network between a laptop and a personal computer using an ad-hoc
connection to emulate a noisy Wi-Fi environment. The laptop generates UDP traffic
using the Distributed Internet Traffic Generator (D-ITG) application [150];
• A python script driving the PNS USRP board and running in the PC. The script
generates a pseudo IEEE 802.15.4 data stream using packets with a payload of 9
bytes that, after being fed to the radio frequency front-end and tuned to a given IEEE
802.15.4 channel, will be interpreted as “interference” by neighbor Wi-Fi stations;
• A Wireshark application [151] is used in the PC to monitor the packets received by
the attached Wi-Fi adapter in order to evaluate the Wi-Fi packet error impact of the
pseudo IEEE 802.15.4 “interference”;
• Two IEEE 802.15.4 stations (transmitter and receiver) are setup to transmit and
receive packets to evaluate the ability of the pseudo IEEE 802.15.4 “interference”
to protect standard IEEE 802.15.4 transmissions. The IEEE 802.15.4 stations run a
specific firmware that allows to start/stop a trial and register the number of packets
transmitted and received during that trial.
The two computers and the two IEEE 802.15.4 stations were placed over a table in the
vertexes of a virtual square, as represented in Figure 3.9. The table has a height of 75
centimeters and the virtual square has a side length of approximately 1 meter. The USRP
board of the PNS was placed on the same table, one meter apart from the wireless interface
card of the PC and at approximately two meters from the laptop. The room where the
trials were performed has an area of approximately 40 m2 and was clear from interference
beyond the one produced by the PNS.
Two evaluations were conducted. The first is related to the assessment of the frequency
hoping version of the PNS, where several channels are used to transmit a pseudo IEEE
802.15.4 interference signal in a round-robin fashion. The setup shown in Figure 3.9 is
used without the standard IEEE 802.15.4 stations in this evaluation. Hence, in order to
evaluate how Wi-Fi transmissions are affected by the interference generated by the PNS,
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Figure 3.9: Testbed used to evaluate the SDR-based PNS
a Wi-Fi connection is established between the laptop and the PC. Using this setup, two
sets of trials are conducted, including the transmission of UDP packets over the Wi-Fi link
with:
• A payload of 1 byte and a period of 50 µs;
• A payload of 1458 bytes and a period of 1250 µs.
The motivation for using these packet lengths was to observe if their size has any
influence on the ability of the PNS to block their transmissions. Furthermore, a set of trials
encompasses four trials, each one having the PNS configured to perform successive pseudo
IEEE 802.15.4 “interference” transmissions over a different set of channels. Because theWi-
Fi connection was established in channel 1 and the assessment aims at evaluating the Wi-Fi
resilience to the PNS synthesized interference, the trials were performed using interference
transmission on the overlapping 802.15.4 channels 11, 12, 13 and 14. In each trial, a
different set of channels is employed in the round-robin channel hopping sequence. The
first trial is conducted with pseudo IEEE 802.15.4 interference transmissions on channel
12; the second trial on channels 12 and 13; the third trial on channels 11, 12 and 13;
and the fourth trial with interference transmissions on channels 11, 12, 13 and 14. In this
evaluation, the PNS was setup in all trials with the following default configuration options:
tune delay= 0.001 s, dwell = 0.001 s and gain = 8000. The tune delay corresponds to the
time interval enforced between the tuning of a channel and the instant where the channel
becomes available for use, i.e, it defines the period of time used to allow the radio frequency
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circuitry to stabilize on the tuned channel. The dwell delay is the time interval that must
elapse in each tuned channel before switching to a new one. Finally, the gain defines the
amplitude of the output signal.
The second evaluation addresses the task of finding the required channel separation,
which guarantees that the pseudo IEEE 802.15.4 interference produced by the PNS can be
used as “protective” interference, i.e., as interference that can be sent simultaneously to
the critical data, but on a IEEE 802.15.4 lateral channel. This evaluation is related to the
fixed channel version of the PNS. The complete setup illustrated in Figure 3.9 is employed
in this evaluation. As in the fist evaluation, the UDP traffic sent over the Wi-Fi connection
was configured with payloads of either 1 or 1458 bytes in channel 1. The standard IEEE
802.15.4 stations were placed 1 meter apart and setup to communicate in channel 14 with
both a power of -10 dBm and a period of 100 milliseconds. The PNS protection interference
was synthesized in one of the channels 11, 12, or 13 with a configurable gain of 8000, 16000,
24000 or 32000. Each trial encompasses the transmission of 1000 IEEE 802.15.4 broadcast
packets by a standard IEEE 802.15.4 device (transmitter) simultaneously to both the Wi-
Fi traffic and the protective interference. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard receiver device
registers which transmitted packets have been received and provides the number of packet
errors in each case.
The following subsection provides the results collected in both evaluations and a dis-
cusses their implications.
Results
The frequency hoping PNS evaluation results are presented in Table 3.2. This table
shows the number of Wi-Fi packets received by the Wireshark application when the Wi-Fi
link is subject to four different channel interference sequences synthesized by the PNS.
As depicted, no packets were received by the Wireshark application in any of the trials,
which indicates that using the USRP to transmit pseudo 802.15.4 packet is a feasible way
of synthesizing interference to inhibit Wi-Fi communications. Furthermore, it is observed
that the use of a single IEEE 802.15.4 channel (12) is sufficient to entirely block the Wi-Fi
communications. The use of different payloads for the UDP traffic sent over Wi-Fi links
seems to have no effect on the pseudo 802.15.4 interference blocking capability.
Table 3.3 documents the results of the second evaluation, where a set of trials was
conducted to find the best channel separation allowing the PNS to synthesize protective
interference without risking corrupting the critical data communications. As demonstrated,
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Table 3.2: Received Wi-Fi packets in the presence of synthesized interference
“Interference” channel(s) 12 12,13 11,12,13 11,12,13,14
UDP Length
1 0 0 0 0
1458 0 0 0 0
Table 3.3: Packet errors in the presence of “protective” interference
Gain 8000 16000 24000 32000
UDP Length 1458 1 1458 1 1458 1 1458 1
11 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Channel 12 0 0 45 0 5 258 16 113
13 923 909 999 998 1000 997 1000 1000
the transmission of protective interference in channel 13 severely impairs the standard
IEEE 802.15.4 data communications performed on channel 14. However, this effect is
not observed when channels with a higher frequency separation (for a gain of 8000) are
used. In addition, results show that the adoption of higher power protective transmissions,
such as in channel 12 with gains of 16000, 24000 and 32000, causes an increase in packet
errors in channel 14. The use of different payloads in the Wi-Fi traffic seems to have no
clear tendency in affecting the protective interference effectiveness. Therefore, in order
to guarantee that data transmissions are not affected by interference, regardless of its
transmission power, a separation of two channels between critical data and protective
interference is required.
As aforementioned, the use of a SDR-based PNS has the key advantage of allowing to
experiment different signals and processing algorithms without changing the supporting
hardware. However, this advantage comes with some costs. First, due to their specific
purpose, SDR-based solutions are still not yet broadly adopted, as they are more expensive
than equivalent commercial systems. Second, due to the flexibility requirement, they tend
to be rather larger than custom made communication boards. Third, they usually require
a PC or a high performance processor that handles the upper layer programs, which not
only increases the overall cost, but also the power consumption. Finally, although the
development process is usually simpler, it carries an increased debugging complexity due
to the amount of code layers that must be analyzed. For these reasons, a low-cost PNS
version was devised using a commercial transceiver, employing the knowledge gathered
from evaluating the SDR-based PNS. In the following section, this low-cost PNS version
is described and evaluated.
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3.4 COTS-based PNS Implementation
As presented, the first attempt at developing a fully functional PNS adopted a SDR
approach. In this endeavor, several general conclusions were drawn from the ability of
blocking Wi-Fi transmissions using modified IEEE 802.15.4 transmissions, mainly con-
cerning the channel selection. This information was crucial for the development of a low
cost alternative to the SDR-based PNS.
In [146], Boano et al. propose and assess an IEEE 802.15.4 based low-cost interfer-
ence generator allowing to audit WSNs operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM band. This tool
generates interference using a Chipcon CC2420 transceiver [152] operating in two specific
test modes, which allow synthesizing a unmodulated signal characterized by a highly con-
centrated power spectrum peaking at the center frequency of the selected channel and a
randomly-modulated signal, which has its spectrum power spread evenly across the band-
width of the selected channel. In the first case, the unmodulated carrier does not trigger
packet handling interrupts in neighboring IEEE 802.15.4 stations. Conversely, because
the modulated version employs a synchronization header that makes all IEEE 802.15.4
stations in range to actively receive the generated packets, these events are signaled by
interrupts. The first mode of operation cannot be used in the development of commercial
applications, since it only envisages testing procedures and does not comply with the radio
emission regulations of the 2.4 GHz ISM band.
As defined in the previous section, in order to guarantee that an IEEE 802.15.4 station
is able to respond immediately after the end of an interference sequence, the generated in-
terference cannot be perceived as including valid IEEE 802.15.4 packets, since that would
lead to an attempt of decoding them at the transceiver, which would impair the possibility
of an immediate response from the IEEE 802.15.4 station. Provided that only the Chip-
con’s CC2420 second mode of operation can be adopted for developing a commercially
viable solution and since its transmissions are perceived as valid IEEE 802.15.4 packets, an
alternative transceiver is required. The Microchip MRF24J40 [153] is a commercial IEEE
802.15.4 transceiver that supports a special operation mode named turbo mode, which is
compliant to the regulations for radio emissions in the 2.4 GHz ISM band. In this mode,
the transceiver operates with a data rate of 625 kbps, i.e., 2.5 times the standard IEEE
802.15.4 rate. This enables the use of these transceivers to synthesize interference using low-
cost commercial chips, provided that packets sent in the turbo mode will not be decoded
(identified as valid IEEE 802.15.4 packets) by any standard IEEE 802.15.4 stations. In the
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next subsections, a description of the PNS built upon IEEE 802.15.4 COTS transceivers
is presented, focusing on its architecture, performance and limitations. Furthermore, an
evaluation of the bandjacking effectiveness using a COTS-based PNS is provided together
with a discussion of the obtained results.
3.4.1 Architecture
Low-cost was the main driver for developing a COTS-based PNS. By using a special
operation mode of a standard IEEE 802.15.4 transceiver, it was possible to build a PNS that
is substantially simpler and cheaper than its SDR-based counterpart, while maintaining the
blocking abilities shown by the later. The devised architecture is compact both in terms
of hardware and software. This arises from the reduced number of active components and
states of the PNS design, as it will be demonstrated in the following subsections.
Hardware
The hardware architecture of the COTS-based PNS was devised around two key compo-
nents: MCU and 802.15.4 transceiver. As depicted in Figure 3.10, the MCU is the central
element of the hardware architecture, bridging the external control and the IEEE 802.15.4
transceivers. The external control block provides input ports tied to MCU internal inter-
rupts, allowing to drive the PNS’s state machine by means of external digital signals. The
MCU is a Microchip PIC32MX795F512L [154] holding 512 and 128 KB of program memory
and RAM, respectively. Besides encompassing large memories, allowing the development
of complex applications, this device features a processing core that supports fast context
switching and interrupt response, both desirable characteristics for a device that will be
employed in a time sensitive application. These features are enabled by its capability of
operating with frequencies of up to 80 MHz/105 DMIPS.
The PIC32MX795F512L MCU encompasses several communication interfaces, namely:
USB 2.0-compliant full-speed; 10/100 Mbps Ethernet MAC; CAN module 2.0B with De-
viceNet addressing support; six UART modules (rate up to 20 Mbps); five I2C modules
(rate up to 1 Mbaud) with SMBus support and up to four 4-wire SPI modules (rate up to
25 Mbps). These SPI features allow the MCU to be easily interfaced to the three IEEE
802.15.4 transceivers required by the PNS. The use of independent SPI ports not only
allows a more straightforward control of the IEEE 802.15.4 transceivers, but also enables
driving the transceivers simultaneously, e.g., to load the transmission buffers with data to
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Figure 3.10: COTS-based PNS hardware architecture
transmit. Furthermore, provided that the PIC32MX795F512L MCU integrates five 16-bit
digital timers, it is a suitable option for applications requiring a fine timing control such
as the development of a PNS.
As indicated in Figure 3.10, three IEEE 802.15.4 transceivers were used in the design of
the PNS. The use of the MRF24J40MC transceiver modules [155] is justified by their ability
to support the turbo mode, where data packets are transmitted at a rate of 625 Kbps, thus
preventing them from being perceived as valid by neighboring IEEE 802.15.4 stations. The
MRF24J40MC module builds on the features provided by the MRFJ40 transceiver [153]
and adds a −108 dBm typical sensitivity (−23 dBm maximum input level) together with a
+19 dBm typical output power (45 dB transmission power control range). The MRFJ40 is
a small sized, low-power, low-cost IEEE 802.15.4 compliant RF transceiver that operates in
the 2.4 GHz ISM band and supports the development of applications based on ZigBee [156],
MiWi [157] or proprietary protocols. It can be driven by a simple four-wire SPI interface
and has hardware support for the CSMA/CA, automatic acknowledgement and packet
retransmission mechanisms, along with integrating a hardware security engine (AES-128).
The duration of the longest IEEE 802.15.4 packet (133 bytes) transmitted in the turbo
mode is 1702 µs, which is represented in Figure 3.11 as tPKTMaxLen. Furthermore, this Fig-
ure documents a scheme that can keep the medium occupied with packets in two different
channels (black-burst and protective) simultaneously, using only three transceivers. In this
sense, two MRF24J40MC transceivers are used exclusively to perform long packet trans-
missions (PL and BL) on either the black-burst interference channel (MRF1) or protective
interference channel (MRF3), while the remaining transceiver (MRF2) transmits shorter
packets (PS and BS) alternately in the black-burst and protective interference channels to
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Figure 3.11: COTS-based PNS transceiver operation
cover the idle periods between long packet transmissions, in a round-robin fashion. These
shorter packets have a duration of 396.8 µs and are represented by tPKTMinLen in Figure
3.11.
The transceiver operation encompasses an initial dephase of 900 µs that is represented in
Figure 3.11 as tPKTDephase. This delay allows to synchronize the long packet transmissions
on both black-burst (BL) and protective (PL) channels to occur approximately in the middle
of each other. Short packet transmissions are performed by the transceiver MRF2 between
consecutive long transmissions to keep the medium busy with interference in both channels.
The length of these transmissions was selected so that it permitted a jitter protection
interval (tJitterProtection) at the beginning and end of the long packets, as documented in
Figure 3.11.
The design of this PNS, encompassing three IEEE transceivers operating in the turbo
mode, was conducted under some assumptions, namely:
• A MRF24J40MC transceiver operating in the turbo mode shows negligible latency
to initiate a transmission after the trigger command is issued for a packet already
loaded to the transceiver’s transmission buffer;
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• The duration of a turbo mode transmission is bounded not only by the trigger com-
mand event that initiates it but also by the transceiver’s interrupt that signals the
end of the transmission;
• The jitter of executing a SPI command at the MRF24J40MC transceiver is negligible
when compared to the latency of its transmission.
The MRF24J40MC module allows a broad configuration range using SPI commands.
One element that can be controlled via a SPI command is the permanent setting of the
MRF24J40 transceiver to transmit mode. With this setting it is possible to shorten the time
elapsing from a packet transmission trigger command and the instant when the packet is ef-
fectively broadcasted in the medium, because there is no delay associated to the transceiver
switching from the receive (default) to the transmit mode. The state of the MRF24J40MC
module’s power amplifier is another key element that can be controlled via a SPI com-
mand. It renders possible to enable/disable the medium broadcast of any packet being
transmitted by the MRF24J40 transceiver. Hence, in the context of the developed PNS,
this feature is used to start/stop the transmission of interference in both black-burst and
protective channels. In other words, the PNS application is capable of managing the on/off
state of the three MRF24J40MC module power amplifiers, allowing to forward the packet
transmissions to the medium or not. In the following subsection, the software architecture
of the devised PNS is presented.
Software
The software architecture of the PNS is very straightforward. The application is directly
built on top of the hardware interface layer, which encompasses the drivers used to control
the layer below, the hardware. The PNS embedded application was developed in the C
language, with the libraries provided by Microchip, and compiled using the Microchip’s
MPLAB C32 compiler. The application begins by configuring the MCU digital ports
(direction and interrupts) and peripherals (timers and SPI ports), before initializing the
three MRF24J40MC transceivers to operate in the turbo mode.
A brief explanation of the general operation of the PNS is presented before discussing
the associated state machine in detail. As documented in Figure 3.11, the turbo mode trans-
missions in both black-burst and protective channels are performed in a almost continuous
fashion. However, they are only broadcasted to the medium when the MRF24J40MC
power amplifiers are enabled. Otherwise, these packet transmissions do not reach the
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Figure 3.12: COTS-based PNS state machine
antenna and, therefore, are not propagated into the medium. Provided that the power
amplifier integrated in the MRF24J40MC modules has a short response time, the PNS
directly controls the power amplifier’s enabled state in order to start/stop the broadcast
of interference in a timely manner. In other words, the PNS schedules quasi continuous
packet transmissions in the two predefined channels, with its propagation to the medium
being conditioned by the state of the MRF24J40MC power amplifiers’, driven directly by
the PNS.
The operation of the PNS is characterized by the state machine shown in Figure 3.12.
The transitions between states are driven by external signals, which are tied to the MCU’s
interrupt pins. Both transitions low-to-high (L2H) and high-to-low (H2L) on these pins
trigger the occurrence of interrupts and, consequently, of changes in the state of the PNS.
As documented in Figure 3.12, the PNS can operate in six states, namely:
INIT: Initialization state. In this state, the MCU hardware and peripherals are
initialized along with the transceivers;
HOLD: Hold state. The PNS is idle in this state. Hence, no packets are generated
by the transceivers or propagated by the associated power amplifiers;
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ARMD: Armed state. The PNS synthesizes a continuous flow of transmissions in
both black-burst and protective channels. However, such packets are not broadcasted
into the medium because all the transceivers’ power amplifiers are disabled;
TXBN: Transmit black-burst interference state. In this state, the PNS generates a
continuous stream of packets aimed at both the black-burst and protective channels,
but only the power amplifiers associated to the transmissions of black-burst inter-
ference are enabled. Hence, only this type of interference is propagated into the
medium;
TXPN: Transmit protective interference state. A continuous stream of packets
aimed at both the black-burst and protective channels is generated in this state.
However, only the power amplifier of the transceivers that transmit in the protective
channel is enabled, thus allowing the propagation of this type of interference;
TXAL: Transmit both black-burst and protective interference state. In this state,
a continuous packet flow in both black-burst and protective channels is broadcasted,
provided that all the transceivers’ power amplifiers are enabled.
As depicted in Figure 3.12, three signals drive the PNS state machine: PNS ARM ITF,
PNS BEGIN BN and PNS BEGIN PN. The first enables (low-to-high transition) or dis-
ables (high-to-low transition) the generation of turbo mode packets in the three transceiver
modules. The two latter signals control the propagation of these packets to the correspond-
ing antennas in the black-burst and protective channels, respectively. The state machine
progresses in response to the stimuli of the external signals. Hence, after the initialization
is concluded, it switches to the HOLD state, where it remains until a low-to-high transi-
tion occurs in the PNS ARM ITF signal. Thereupon, the state machine progresses to the
ARMD state. In this state, it can go back to the HOLD state if a high-to-low transition
occurs in the PNS ARM ITF signal; to the TXBN or to the TXPN state if a low-to-
high transition is forced in the PNS BEGIN BN or PNS BEGIN PN signals, respectively.
Figure 3.12 documents that high-to-low transitions in these signals lead the progress of
the state machine in the opposite direction. The state machine progresses to the TXAL
state when both types of interference are activated with low-to-high transitions in both
PNS BEGIN BN and PNS BEGIN PN signals.
After implementing this state machine on the PNS’s MCU, a few informal tests were
conducted to assess its effectiveness. These tests were performed with a PNS attached to
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a host standard station, which was responsible for controlling the state machine’s driving
signals. The test simply consisted on transmitting a black-burst interference sequence (by
the PNS) immediately followed by an IEEE 802.15.4 data packet transmission (by the
standard station) and checking if the data packet was correctly received by a neighboring
IEEE 802.15.4 station. The results of these tests revealed that a significant amount of
packets were lost. In order to isolate the problem, the PNS was turned off and the tests
were repeated. The conclusion was that all the transmitted packets were received and,
therefore, the cause of the errors in the former trials were the PNS transmissions, which
seemed to overlap the data transmissions. In consequence, we performed an experimental
evaluation of the assumptions used for the design of the PNS hardware. In the following
subsection, a characterization of the response limitations of the Microchip’s MRF24J40
transceiver and of the PNS is presented.
3.4.2 Evaluation
The analysis of both the MRF24J40 transceiver and PNS response limitations was
performed using a MRF24J40 based device customized to monitor the medium energy in
one or more IEEE 802.15.4 channels of the 2.4 GHz ISM band. This device was named
BeeMon due to its ability to monitor ZigBee transmission channels. The details of its
architecture and operation can be consulted in Appendix D.
Transceiver Response Limitations
This subsection presents the methodology used to assess the MRF24J40 transceiver
timeliness together with the collected experimental results. The results are analyzed and
justified accordingly.
Methodology
The characterization of the transceiver response in the turbo mode was performed using
signals showing the duration of a long packet transmitted by the PNS in two different
perspectives. The first signal represents the perspective of the MRF24J40 host controller
MCU and it is obtained using a PNS MCU digital output that is set to the logic state “1”
when the turbo mode packet transmission is triggered (after the packet being loaded into
the transceiver’s transmission buffer) and reset to the logic state “0” when the associated
interrupt is detected, marking the end of the transmission. This signal is connected to
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the channel 1 of an HP 54602B 150 MHz digital storage oscilloscope. The second signal
is obtained from the output of the BeeMon’s low-pass filter and it is connected to the
oscilloscope’s channel 2.
The oscilloscope was used to register several delay parameters of the transceiver and
also to have an informal measure of their jitter by visual inspection. The adopted approach
to register the parameters and their jitter follows. The PNS was programmed to perform a
long packet transmission (133 bytes overall) in the turbo mode every ten seconds. During
a period of 100 seconds, for each packet transmission, the oscilloscope synchronizes to the
digital output of the PNS and also shows the output of the BeeMon monitor. During
this period, the oscilloscope is adjusted to show the intended delay and a photography
is taken in each synchronization. At the end of the test procedure, all photographies
are discarded, except for the one registering the shortest delay. The value of the longest
delay is also annotated, providing an estimate of the maximum delay variation (jitter).
An individual testing procedure encompassing the measurement of the delay associated
to the transmission of 10 packets was conducted for each of the four parameters under
evaluation: transmission trigger and effective propagation delay; transmission interrupt and
effective end delay; effective transmission duration and MCU perception of the transmission
duration.
Results
Figure 3.13 presents four captures with overlays identifying signals and instants of in-
terest of the four considered timing parameters. The first timing parameter to be evaluated
was the time that elapses between the SPI command instructing the transceiver to perform
the transmission of a preloaded packet and the beginning of the effective transmission. As
documented in Figure 3.13(a), this delay has a value of 620 microseconds. The observed
worst-case jitter was of 52 microseconds (not depicted). The second parameter to be evalu-
ated was the delay between the transmission interrupt and the effective end of the ongoing
transmission. As shown in Figure 3.13(b), the effective transmission ends 30 microseconds
after the interrupt. The observed worst-case jitter was of 70 microseconds (not depicted).
The effective duration of the long packet transmission was the third timing parameter
being evaluated. Figure 3.13(c) reports an effective duration of 1730 microseconds with a
jitter of 28 microseconds (not depicted). Finally, the last MRF24J40 transceiver param-
eter to be evaluated was the duration of a long packet transmission, as perceived by the
transceiver’s host controller, in this case the PNS MCU. This duration has been measured
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Table 3.4: MRFJ40 transceiver response timings in the turbo mode (corrected)
Parameter
Delay Jitter Worst-case delay
(µs) (µs) (µs)
Trigger and effective transmission 555 36 591
Transmission interrupt and its effective end −35 54 19
Effective transmission duration 1730 28 1758
MCU perception of the transmission duration 2300 83 2383
to be of 2300 microseconds (shown in Figure 3.13(d)) with a jitter of 83 microseconds (not
depicted). The first two parameters (Figures 3.13(a) and 3.13(a)) were measured using two
different signals. However, one of them (BeeMon device) introduces a constant latency of
65 microseconds and a maximum jitter of 16 microseconds, as discussed in Appendix D.
With this information and assuming that both the BeeMon delay and jitter are additive,
the timing parameters can be corrected accordingly, resulting in the values represented in
Table 3.4.
The maximum value of the delay occurring between the packet transmission trigger and
the effective beginning of the transmission is very significant (591 microseconds). It renders
the PNS implementation unfeasible to synthesize simultaneous interference in two channels
using only three transceivers. Provided that this “start transmission” delay is similar for
both long and short packets, the MRF2 transceiver, responsible for alternately filling the
gaps in the two interference channels, as represented in Figure 3.11, will not be able to
generate packet transmissions faster enough to cover the idle periods simultaneously in both
channels. Since the “start transmission” delay can reach a maximum of 591 microseconds,
the length of the MRF2 transmission must have, at least, the same value. From Figure 3.11
it is possible to conclude that, during an interval of 2940 microseconds comprehending a
“start transmission” delay on the MRF1 transceiver (591 microseconds), the corresponding
effective transmission (1758 microseconds) and another “start transmission” delay, the
MRF2 transceiver must be able to perform three effective packet transmissions (two in
the same channel of the MRF1 and one in the MRF3’s channel). Considering a “start
transmission” delay of 591 microseconds and a (best-case) effective duration of the same
value, this procedure will last for 2955 microseconds (5 × 591 microseconds). Hence, using
the proposed approach, it is not possible to guarantee a continuous occupation of two
different channels simultaneously. To achieve this ability, the PNS would have to employ
four transceivers and use them in pairs to alternately perform transmissions on the selected
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(a) Trigger and effective transmission delay (b) Transmission interrupt and effective end delay
(c) Effective transmission duration (d) MCU perception of the transmission duration
Figure 3.13: Transmission timeliness of the MRF24J40MC transceiver in turbo mode
channel.
The delay between the transmission interrupt and the effective end of the ongoing
transmission should be negative, meaning that the interrupt occurs after the transmission
effective end, or zero. However, a worst-case value of 19 microseconds was observed dur-
ing the trials as a consequence of the significant jitter affecting this parameter. This is
problematic because it means that a transmission may extend over its designated timing
window, affecting other transmissions that may have been initiated.
The effective duration of the long packet transmission can be as high as 1758 mi-
croseconds. Although slightly larger than the theoretical duration of 1702 microseconds,
provided the measurement scale of 500 microseconds, the deviation seems acceptable, as
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Figure 3.14: Noise sequence transmitted by the COTS-based PNS
it can be a consequence of an oscilloscope adjustment error. The duration of the packet
transmission, as perceived by the transceiver’s host controller, of 2383 microseconds, in
the worst-case, also seems to be in line with its theoretical value, which corresponds to the
sum of the delay occurring between the trigger of the packet transmission and its effective
energy propagation in the medium (591 microseconds), and the worst-case duration of the
effective transmission (1758 microseconds).
PNS Response Limitations
In this subsection, the methodology used to assess the PNS timeliness is presented as
well as the experimental results obtained using the devised testbed. As before, these results
are discussed and justified accordingly.
Methodology
The PNS response characterization was conducted similarly to the MRF24J40 transceiver.
Figure 3.14 illustrates an interference signal generated by the PNS and measured using the
BeeMon monitor. The goal of this evaluation is the characterization of the PNS turn on
and turn off delays. For this purpose, the PNS was programmed to perform a periodic
black-burst interference transmission with a fixed duration of 330 milliseconds (see Figure
3.14) and a period of 10 seconds. The external signal driving the PNS on/off state was
connected to the channel 1 of a HP 54602B oscilloscope, while the signal coming from the
BeeMon filter output was tied to the oscilloscope’s channel 2. The testing procedure was
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conducted over an interval of 100 seconds and, for each interference period, the oscillo-
scope is synchronized to the driving input of the PNS. During the testing procedure, a
photography is taken in each synchronization showing a given delay. After the conclusion
of the test procedure, the photographies having the shortest and longest delays are kept.
Using this methodology, two PNS delay parameters were evaluated: the interference start
and stop latencies.
Results
Figure 3.15 depicts the minimum and maximum PNS interference start delay. As
shown, the minimum and maximum delays are of 124 and 199 microseconds, respectively.
Although the measurement of these delays can be affected by the BeeMon’s maximum
latency of 81 microseconds, the start delay range is nonetheless high, with a significant
delay variation. This can be justified by the actual implementation of the PNS. Currently,
to begin generating interference, the PNS must be at the ARMD state and either one of
the PNS BEGIN PN or PNS BEGIN BN, must be driven high. This occurrence triggers
an interrupt on the PNS MCU, whose ISR is programmed to send a command to the
associated transceiver(s) (via SPI) to make it (them) turn the embedded power amplifier on,
thus propagating the interference signal being generated into the medium. This approach
was taken mainly because it renders possible building the PNS using standard unmodified
IEEE 802.15.4 modules, thus avoiding a demanding RF certification procedure that, apart
from having a high cost, comprehends the risk of being denied. The compliance with
the RF regulations is a critical aspect of any commercial application employing wireless
communications. Hence, by using pre-certified modules without any tampering, a specific
certification procedure could be avoided while maintaining the PNS RF compliance by
inheriting the module’s characteristics already certified.
This approach was also adopted due to the assumption that the state machine of the
MRF24J40MC transceiver would be fast (and predictable) to respond to commands sent
via SPI, in particular the command to enable/disable the power amplifier. However, as
these measurements seem to indicate, this assumption is not completely sustained by the
results. First, considering that the PNS exhibits a negligible interrupt latency for the
external driving signals and a latency of 1.6 microseconds for the transmission of the the
“enable power amplifier” via SPI, the minimum delay of 43 microseconds, taking off the
BeeMon maximum response time of 81 microseconds, suggests that the transceiver’s state
machine takes a significant amount of time to process and execute the received command.
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(a) Minimum (b) Maximum
Figure 3.15: COTS-based PNS timeliness: interference start latency
Second, the broad variation of the start delay seems to indicate that the internal state in
which the transceiver receives the command has a significant impact on the time it takes
to start its processing.
The minimum and maximum PNS interference stop latency is documented in Figure
3.16. As shown, the minimum and maximum delays taken by the PNS to stop interference
are 74 and 106 microseconds, respectively. These values are far smaller than those of turn-
ing the interference on. Provided that both actions (start or stop) are handled in the same
way by the PNS, i.e., a SPI command is sent to the transceiver after the PNS BEGIN PN
or PNS BEGIN BN signal has been driven low, the different response time is caused by
the transceiver responsiveness to the “disable power amplifier” command.
Although Figures 3.16(a) and 3.16(b) show the interference signal stopping after the
interrupt that marks the end of the transmission, this actually only occurs when the stop
delay is larger than the worst-case response time of the BeeMon monitor. This occurs
because the BeeMon monitor signal is affected by a delay that can reach the maximum
value of 81 microseconds, thus delaying it by this amount of time regarding the external
signal driving the PNS. As occurred in the MRF24J40 timing response subsection, the
interference generated by the PNS can extend enough to overlap a subsequent transmission,
thus causing its corruption. This seems to justify the packet errors encountered in the
informal evaluation described in Subsection 3.4.1.
The above mentioned timing limitations of the PNS can be overcome by driving the
power amplifier of the transceiver module directly, i.e., by changing the PNS implemen-
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(a) Minimum (b) Maximum
Figure 3.16: COTS-based PNS timeliness: interference stop latency
tation so that, instead of sending a SPI command to turn on/off the power amplifier, a
digital signal connected to its enable input is used alternately. The time response of the
PNS implementation and of the power amplifier become similar in this approach, which
has the disadvantage of requiring the PNS to be submitted to a certification process to
consent its commercialization. In the following section, besides the COTS-based PNS im-
plementation evaluation, an assessment of the bandjacking technique is presented using
a time slack between the end of the interference transmission and the beginning of the
critical data packet to avoid its corruption.
3.5 An Evaluation of the Bandjacking Effectiveness
This section aims at assessing the bandjacking technique timeliness and effectiveness
in supporting critical data communications by using a COTS-based PNS implementation.
In this sense, a testbed was devised so as to evaluate the bandjacking ability to support
real-time communications in uncontrolled environments, where different communication
stations may contend for the medium. Provided that the critical data communications are
IEEE 802.15.4 based, the technologies chosen to contend for the medium are the IEEE
802.15.4 and the IEEE 802.11.
As defined in Section 3.4.2 (Transceiver Response Limitations), the implementation of
the PNS using three transceivers poses the limitation of being only capable of synthesiz-
ing one type of interference at a time: black-burst or protective. In this sense, a PNS
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implementation was devised to allow selecting one of the two types of interference to be
synthesized. No significant modifications were made to the state machine presented in
Figure 3.12, except for the fact that, when a given type of interference is configured, only
the associated triggering signal (PNS BEGIN PN or PNS BEGIN BN) will be sensible to
a level change and allow the control of the synthesized interference.
An individual evaluation of the bandjacking effectiveness using either black-burst or
protective interference is presented in this section. Despite the separate use of these types
of interference, the conditions in which they are used are similar. This allows to grasp the
level of bandjacking effectiveness achievable using a PNS that can synthesize simultaneously
both types of interference. In the following subsections, a description of the methodology
used in the bandjacking assessment is presented together with the associated results and
their discussion.
3.5.1 Methodology
The methodology employed to assess the bandjacking technique was conceived to pro-
vide a solid evaluation of its effectiveness. Figure 3.17 depicts the elements that compose
the devised testbed. Figure 3.17(a) documents the positions of the devices on the test
environment, while Figure 3.17(b) depicts the logical arrangement of the WITAS tool used
to evaluate the bandjacking effectiveness. As documented, the testbed includes one critical
station, one standard station; and one contender station. The standard station is placed at
a distance of 9 meters away from the critical station. This is a value close to the standard
nominal range (10 meters) of the IEEE 802.15.4 technology. The contender is placed in
three different positions: 0.5 meters from the standard station, 0.5 and 3 meters from the
critical station. Positioning the contender on these locations renders possible an evaluation
of the impact of having the interference source very close to the standard station and to
the critical station, or at a reasonable distance from the latter.
The trials were conducted on a sub-basement with an area of approximately 116 m2
(13.5 m × 8.6 m). Several photos of the physical space are shown in Figure 3.18. This space
benefits from its seclusion due to the thick concrete walls that block interference from the
outside of the building. The WITAS tool allows the measurement of several parameters
including the packet error rate, which is the focus of this evaluation. It encompasses three
types of devices: Event Loggers, Event Processor and an application running on a PC.
The Event Loggers are attached to the communication stations of interest and register the
packet transmission/reception events that have occurred. The Event Processor is directly
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(a) Physical arrangement (b) WITAS setup
Figure 3.17: Bandjacking evaluation testbed
driven by the PC application to individually collect the information saved at the Event
Loggers and forwards it to the application for backup. The WITAS application running in
the PC, besides saving the data into a file for later analysis, allows processing the collected
data to obtain meaningful statistical information about the communication reliability and
timeliness. Appendix A provides detailed information regarding the WITAS architecture,
operation and application.
A trial using the WITAS tool encompasses three phases: configuration, execution and
data processing. The first represents the interval in which all the elements participating in
the trial (communication stations and WITAS devices) are set up to operate during that
trial. In this phase, the WITAS application running in the PC assigns to each element a
new configuration that, on the PC application side, can be stored on a XML data file for
later editing and backup. The automation of the trials allows performing the configuration
process in a timely fashion. The execution of the trial is driven by WITAS PC application
using specific commands to the elements of the testbed. In this case, the critical station can
be configured to start/stop sending critical data packets and to use different transmission
periods. The standard station only supports commands for starting/stopping its operation.
During a trial, both communication stations log all the transmission and reception packet
events into the associated Event Loggers, which forward this information to the Event
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Figure 3.18: COTS-based trials
Processor and then to the application running in the PC. At the end of the trial, the data
temporarily stored in the WITAS application (memory) can be permanently saved into a
file for later analysis. In the last phase, the WITAS PC application uses the collected data
to calculate the packet error rate experienced in the trial.
Figure 3.17(b) shows the connection of the bandjacking communication elements to the
WITAS evaluation tool. As documented, the standard station S1 and the critical station
are connected to the Event Logger EL 1 and EL 65, respectively. These Event Loggers are
then linked to the Event Processor (EP), which, in turn, is tied to the PC using a serial
port. This connection supports a bi-directional interface between the WITAS application
running in the PC and the Event Processor. In this sense, the Event Loggers record locally
the events (packet transmission or reception) reported by the associated communication
stations and send them periodically to the Event Processor. The transmission of these
events is triggered by specific command messages sent from the Event Processor to the
Event Loggers in a round robin fashion.
The bandjacking implementation was configured to provide a maximum slack interval
of 200 microseconds between the end of the interference sequence produced by the PNS and
the beginning of the critical transmission performed by commercial transceiver in order to
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avoid the overlapping of these transmissions. This value was experimentally verified to be
a good compromise between providing enough room to cope with the PNS and MRF24J40
transceiver limitations; and the requirement of shortening the capture interval to a mini-
mum. Furthermore, the testbed was configured to conduct trials encompassing 1000 packet
transmissions with a 1 second period between them. The bandjacking effectiveness assess-
ment was carried out using the general parameters shown in Table 3.5 and the testbed
elements positioned according to Figure 3.17(a). The contender was placed on a mobile
MDF stand with a height of 64 centimeters, the critical station on a MDF table with a
height of 82 centimeters and the standard station on a mobile plastic stand with a height
of 112 centimeters.
Provided that this evaluation aims at assessing the effectiveness of the bandjacking
technique to support real-time communications in uncontrolled environments, two types
of interference were selected to contend for the medium: IEEE 802.15.4 and Wi-Fi (IEEE
802.11). The contenders were configured to perform transmissions in the Wi-Fi channel 1
(CAOS) and in the IEEE 802.15.4 channel 14 (ZigFlooder). The critical transmissions are
also performed in channel 14, thus overlapping both types of contender transmissions. The
CAOS contender used in these trials employs a Wi-Fi dongle configured to perform trans-
missions in channel 1 with a power of 20 dBm and a period of 1 millisecond. The ZigFlooder
uses a uMRFs board programmed to perform contention transmissions in channel 14 with
a power of 0 dBm and a period of 10 milliseconds. These contention transmissions employ
the “Energy Above Threshold” CCA mechanism with limit of -69 dBm. For an in-depth
analysis of the CAOS, please consult Appendix B. Both critical and standard stations
were configured to perform their data transmissions in channel 14 with two different power
levels: 0 dBm, −10 dBm. The use of these power levels was motivated by the need to
assess the impact of the transmission power, which is coupled with the distance between
transmitter and receiver, in the effectiveness of the bandjacking technique.
Table 3.5: Bandjacking evaluation: general parameters
Parameter Unit/Type
Contender Critical Station Standard
CAOS ZigFlooder Data PNS Station
Height cm 64 82 112
Channel
IEEE 802.15.4 — 14 14 11, 14 14
IEEE 802.11 1 — — — —
Power dBm 20 0 0, -10 18 0, -10
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As introduced, the PNS is only able to produce one of the two types of interference at
a time: black-burst or protective. In this sense, part of the trials were conducted with the
PNS configured to synthesize interference on channel 14 (black-burst) while the other part
were realized with interference on channel 11 (protective). In both cases, the PNS was
configured to send packets with a transmission power of 18 dBm. Performing critical data
communications supported on a PNS that can only transmit one type of interference at a
time is a limitation in the analysis of the bandjacking effectiveness. However, since the same
set of trials are performed under similar conditions employing both types of interference,
it is possible to estimate the effectiveness of the bandjacking technique if a PNS producing
simultaneously the two types of interference was used instead.
3.5.2 Results
Table 3.6 shows the Packet Error Rate (PER) of the critical data communications using
the setup presented in the previous subsection. As documented, three main scenarios were
evaluated concerning the PNS usage: PNS off, PNS generating black-burst interference and
PNS generating protective interference. In the black-burst interference scenario, two types
of contender have been evaluated: Wi-Fi and IEEE 802.15.4. The first allows to assess
the robustness of the critical data transmissions in an uncontrolled environment affected
by Wi-Fi noise on an overlapping band. The second allows evaluating if the bandjacking
technique is capable of protecting the critical data transmissions from contending stations
also employing the IEEE 802.15.4 technology. In the protective interference scenario only
the immunity to Wi-Fi noise was evaluated. This occurs because, typically, only wireless
contending technologies whose bandwidth covers the protective interference channel will
be blocked by its transmissions.
The scenario encompassing both PNS and contender turned off was evaluated to provide
a reference measure of how the critical data transmissions perform in an environment free
from interference. It also allowed to confirm if the slack interval between the interference
sequence and the subsequent data packet was long enough to avoid its corruption due to
the PNS jitter. As demonstrated, the PER is of 0.1 % for both power levels (0 and −10
dBm), which indicates that one packet was lost in the trial’s 1000 transmitted packets.
As introduced, considering the case where the PNS synthesizes black-burst interference,
critical data communications are evaluated under either Wi-Fi or IEEE 802.15.4 noise. In
the first case, as depicted in Table 3.6, a small PER (≤ 0.3%) occurs for a transmission
power of 0 dBm when the CAOS is placed close to the critical station (at 0.5 meters) or at
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Table 3.6: Critical station packet error rate (percentage)
PNS Contender
Power Contender active at Contender
(dBm) @-3m @CS @SS Inactive
Off Off
0 NA NA NA 0.1
-10 NA NA NA 0.1
BB
Wi-Fi 0 0.2 0.3 95.3 NA
-10 97.1 86.3 72.8 NA
802.15.4 0 0.1 0.0 0.7 NA
-10 0.0 0.0 2.5 NA
PI
Wi-Fi 0 0.5 0.2 0.4 NA
-10 0.3 0.3 1.0 NA
CS Critical Station SS Standard Station
BB Black-burst Interference PI Protective Interference
−3 meters from it. However, when the contender is set near the standard station, the PER
becomes much higher, around 95.3 %. A similar PER increase occurs when the critical
data transmission power is −10 dBm. In this case, the PER is of 97.1 %, 86.3 % and 72.8
%, corresponding to the placement of the CAOS at −3 meters from the critical station,
near the critical station or near the standard station, respectively.
The interpretation of these results follows. The small PERs observed when the con-
tender is placed at −3 meters or close to the critical station can be justified by the sporadic
occurrence of Wi-Fi transmissions during the capture interval, which is a consequence of
the slack interval introduced to avoid having an overlap between the black-burst and the
subsequent data packet transmission. When the capture interval lasts more than 10 mi-
croseconds, there is a chance for the medium to be used by a Wi-Fi station to perform a
packet transmission. This bound corresponds to the maximum amount of time that the
medium can be in the idle state before risking a Wi-Fi station transmission [158]. However,
because the slack interval is relatively small, the observed packet error probability is also
small. Regarding the higher PER, it seems to be a consequence of the decrease in the
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) observed at the receiver, which occurs when the contender
is placed nearby the standard station, or as an outcome of reducing the critical station
transmission power. This result seems to be aligned with the trend observed in BER, as a
consequence of the decrease of the SNR in [120].
The results documented in Table 3.6 show that the PER is negligible (0.1 % or less)
in the scenarios where the ZigFlooder is placed far from receiver when the critical data
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communications are protected with black-burst interference. The PER suffers a small
increase (to 0.7 %) when the contender is placed close to the receiver and further increased
when the critical station’s transmission power is reduced to −10 dBm (2.5 % in this case).
Provided that an IEEE 802.15.4 transmission can only be initiated if the medium is idle
for a period of, at least, 128 microseconds [158], even with a slack of 200 microseconds in
the capture interval, the standard IEEE 802.15.4 station (ZigFlooder) will not be able to
find the medium idle and initiate any transmissions frequently, possibly due to a hardware
response time limitation of the “alien” station. This justifies the negligible PER values
found when the contender is far from the receiver station. Regarding the higher PER of
0.7 % and 2.5 %, as before, the PER becomes higher with a decrease in the SNR at the
receiver. Since the contender uses a communication technology with a similar transmission
power to the critical station, it is expected that it will have a higher impact when placed
near the receiver.
Finally, as documented in Table 3.6, when the critical data communications are eval-
uated under Wi-Fi noise, having the PNS synthesizing the protective interference, results
show that the PER is equal or smaller than 1.0 %. In this scenario, the PNS continu-
ously produces interference in a channel different from the one used in the critical data
communications. The PNS interference covers a spectrum region common to the selected
Wi-Fi channel, thus making the CAOS find the medium always occupied and inhibiting
its transmissions. This justifies the small PER observed in the results. Nevertheless, the
PER is not negligible. This can be explained by the sensitivity pattern of the Wi-Fi con-
tender, which may have different gains in different reception directions. Hence, due to a
gain minimum in the direction of the CAOS, the contender may sporadically evaluate the
medium idle, even if a protective interference sequence is being transmitted.
The results presented in Table 3.6 demonstrate that the bandjacking technique can be
effectively implemented using commercially available low-cost components. These results
indicate that the use of black-burst interference can significantly contribute to the im-
munity of IEEE 802.15.4 critical data transmissions in environments susceptible of IEEE
802.15.4 contention. Moreover, it is possible to ensure that Wi-Fi stations have a negligible
impact on IEEE 802.15.4-based critical data transmissions by employing protective inter-
ference in an adjacent channel. Overall, this section indicates that the support of low-power
deterministic communications is possible using the IEEE 802.15.4 technology in open envi-
ronments, where other technologies may dispute the medium. This can be ensured by using
the bandjacking technique implemented with a responsive PNS (turn on/off delays smaller
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than 10 microseconds) capable of synthesizing (and controlling) simultaneously black-burst
and protective interference.
3.6 Summary
This chapter presented a review of the literature regarding black-burst contention and
identified the key proposals with focus on their advantages and limitations. Furthermore,
it described the bandjacking MAC technique using both formal and informal approaches.
The explanation of the bandjacking technique encompassed the analysis of a reference ar-
chitecture as well as of its intended operation. Besides a theoretical reference architecture,
this chapter proposed two physical implementations for the key element of the critical sta-
tion: the PNS. In this sense, one of the described implementations was based on a SDR
approach, while the other was based on a COTS approach. The first was used to evaluate
to which extent was it possible to devise a pseudo IEEE 802.15.4 based PNS that would
effectively be able to hinder Wi-Fi communications. The first conclusion obtained in this
approach was that the interference produced by a SDR-based PNS can effectively block
Wi-Fi transmissions being performed in the overlapping channel. The second conclusion is
that the protective interference generated using pseudo IEEE 802.15.4 transmissions must
be separated from the critical data channel by, at least, two channels in order to avoid
cross channel interference.
The PNS COTS implementation was built upon the conclusions of the SDR-based
development, but was focused on a commercial realization using COTS. In this sense, in
order to study their adoption for the critical station, both the response time limitations of
the MRFJ40 transceiver and of the PNS were characterized. In the first case, the conclusion
was that the transceiver encompasses a significant latency to initiate transmissions in the
turbo mode, which renders unfeasible the development of a PNS capable of producing
two types of interference simultaneously using only three transceivers. Besides this, the
transceiver also exhibits a relatively high delay between the interrupt, which indicates the
end of the transmission and its effective end, thus making the transmissions extend over
the designated window by a period of time that can corrupt the transmissions occurring
in this interval (19 microseconds). In the second case, regarding the PNS time response
limitations, it was concluded that the start delay of the interference generated by the PNS
ranges from 43 to 118 microseconds while the interference stop latency can reach up to 25
microseconds.
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The last part of this chapter is concerned with the evaluation of the bandjacking effec-
tiveness using the COTS-based PNS. Although the presented PNS implementation lacks
the ability to simultaneously synthesize black-burst and protective interference, the results
collected individually indicate that the original goals can be met using a PNS capable of
simultaneously synthesizing and controlling both types of interference. An aspect currently
contributing to lower the bandjacking technique determinism is the PNS turn on/off jitter.
One way to avoid this problem is by directly driving the PNS transceivers’ power ampli-
fiers, which have a shorter response time when compared to the use of SPI commands for
this purpose. The results presented in this chapter endorse the conclusion that the support
of dependable low-power communications is possible in open environments.
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“There’s no system foolproof enough to
defeat a sufficiently great fool.”
Edward Teller (1908 - 2003) 4
The Wireless Flexible Time-Triggered
Protocol
In the ever evolving technology domain, distributed architectures have found appli-
cations in many areas, ranging from home automation to avionics. The dependability,
composability, scalability and maintainability provided by these architectures make them
particularly interesting to support complex applications, where significant efficiency gains
can be obtained through modularization. In the previous chapter it was demonstrated
that the use of the bandjacking technique allows enforcing dependable critical transmis-
sions in environments affected by contention-based interference. However, the application
of this technique in distributed environments encompassing multiple uncoordinated critical
stations would be unfeasible, since the critical data transmissions would be impaired by
interference from each other. The bandjacking forceful nature is geared to an adoption
where a critical station is entitled to the exclusive use of the medium for a predefined pe-
riod of time. This cannot be guaranteed in scenarios encompassing multiple uncoordinated
critical stations.
In order to benefit from the dependability provided by the bandjacking technique in
a communication protocol, a coordination mechanism between stations must be estab-
lished to allow their interaction without transmission overlapping. Furthermore, because
the interference sequence of a bandjacking access takes a significant amount of time, thus
reducing the communication’s efficiency, the time spent in performing interference trans-
missions should be reduced to a minimum. In the following sections, a wireless commu-
nication protocol inspired on the Flexible Time-Triggered (FTT) paradigm is presented.
This protocol builds on the medium capture and maintenance conveyed by the bandjack-
ing technique to support dependable, flexible, low-power and real-time communications in
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open environments.
4.1 The FTT Paradigm: A Short Introduction
The FTT communication paradigm [159, 160] was devised to address the requirements
of distributed architectures and to support a high level of operational flexibility using
a time-triggered approach guaranteeing its timeliness and safety. This communication
paradigm can be instantiated into several protocols, depending on the adopted network-
ing technology. Three protocols are currently supported: FTT-CAN [159], FTT-Ethernet
[161] and FTT-SE [162], which are based on the CAN, Ethernet, and micro-segmented
switched Ethernet technologies, respectively. Although these protocols have different im-
plementations and differ in several technology-related aspects, they share a common set of
properties emerging from the FTT communication paradigm.
Figure 4.1 documents the FTT system architecture. It comprises one master and several
slave nodes in an asymmetric, synchronous architecture where the master manages and
coordinates the network communication activities. The system requirements database
(SRDB) represents the information repository where all meaningful data pertaining to the
protocol is stored. The master holds both the communication requirements and message
scheduling information, which enables on-line admission control with support for update
of requirements and message scheduling on-the-fly.
The FTT protocols are characterized by encompassing two temporally isolated types of
traffic: time-triggered and event-triggered. The former is called synchronous traffic and is
explicitly scheduled by the master. The later, despite being restricted to the specific win-
dow defined by the master, is autonomously driven by the slaves and is called asynchronous
traffic. The temporal isolation between the two types of traffic is enforced in any proto-
col implementation. The Asynchronous Messaging System (AMS) and the Synchronous
Messaging System (SMS) provide the application services required to manage these traffic
types. The first offers basic send and receive services, while the latter supports services
based on the producer-consumer model.
The FTT paradigm defines that the bus time is divided in consecutive fixed duration
slots, called Elementary Cycles (ECs), which start with the master’s broadcast of a periodic
trigger message (TM) that synchronizes all nodes. Figure 4.2 depicts an elementary cycle
example including the trigger message, four asynchronous messages (AM1, AM3, AM5
and AM6) and five synchronous messages (SM1, SM3, SM4, SM10 and SM14). As depicted,
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Figure 4.1: Master-slave FTT system architecture
Figure 4.2: FTT elementary cycle
these messages are transmitted in two traffic windows: asynchronous and synchronous. The
former is used to convey event-triggered traffic handled according to a best-effort policy.
The latter conveys the time-triggered traffic specified in the TM, which is previously subject
to admission control. The window order depends on the FTT protocol being employed.
For instance, the FTT-CAN protocol sequence is represented in Figure 4.2. Here, the
asynchronous window appears before the synchronous, while the other way around occurs
in the FTT-Ethernet and FTT-SE protocols, i.e., the asynchronous window appears after
the synchronous.
The elementary cycle begins with the broadcast of the trigger message holding the
scheduling decisions for the elementary cycle, i.e., the identification of the synchronous
messages which must be transmitted in the synchronous window. After decoding the TM,
all stations participating in the network verify if they are the producers of any of the
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scheduled messages identified in the TM and, if so, they perform the corresponding trans-
mission on the synchronous window of the EC. One key aspect of the paradigm is that the
traffic scheduler cannot schedule more messages than those that can fit in the synchronous
window. This allows guaranteeing the temporal isolation between elementary cycles. The
asynchronous traffic is freely generated by the slave stations in the asynchronous windows
using the specific medium access technique adopted for the underlying communication
technology. In any case, the transmissions requests that have not been served during the
asynchronous window are queued and resubmitted in the asynchronous window of the
subsequent EC. More information regarding the FTT paradigm is available in [160].
4.2 Protocol Specification
According to You et al [163], the development of a MAC protocol for wireless networks
must address a specific set of design objectives, namely: high network throughput; low
collision probability (or collision-free) communication; energy preservation; high quality
of service; prevention from starvation and fairness within the same priority level; effi-
cient broadcast; and simple hardware requirements. A high network throughput typically
contributes to obtain reduced packet delays and, therefore, to a better communication re-
sponse. Likewise, reducing or avoiding collisions leads to an improved network usage and
responsiveness, besides avoiding spending energy with corrupted data transmissions. The
energy preservation is particularly stringent in the context of mobile wireless communica-
tions, where devices have a limited access to energy supply sources. Because the liveness
of such networks is highly dependent on the autonomy of their nodes, the optimization
of power consumption allows sustaining their operation for larger periods of time. The
quality of service allows differentiating traffic flows according to specific communication
parameters such as latency and throughput. In this sense, the support of multiple priority
levels enables packets to meet the application’s service requirements by allowing those with
higher priorities to be transmitted with a shorter delay. The prevention of starvation and
fair use of the medium ensures that all stations have the opportunity to perform their
transmissions. This is an important design goal because it fosters a balanced use of the
shared resource (communication medium) among stations. The efficient broadcast objec-
tive is only meaningful in multi-hop wireless networks, as otherwise, it merely depends
of the communication range. In such networks, broadcasts are typically used to convey
information about the network itself (synchronization and routing) and to propagate data
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messages from the neighbors. Hence, effective broadcast mechanisms are required to guar-
antee that all nodes of the network get the transmitted information. Finally, the simple
hardware requirement is of paramount importance when a commercial implementation and
deployment is needed. Since the complexity of the hardware is tightly coupled with its
cost, the development of a MAC protocol using widely available technologies is fundamental
when targeting commercial applications.
Regarding the aforementioned objectives, when demanding requirements are established
for a subset of features, a compromise is usually required. In such cases, some features are
favored over others, which are adjusted according to the resulting limitations or, in many
cases, dropped. The design of the WFTT protocol has taken all the above mentioned
objectives into account but has particularly emphasized the group that includes collision
avoidance, quality of service, fair use of the medium, energy preservation and low-cost
hardware. The following sections identify the key design options.
4.2.1 Architecture
The architecture of a typical WFTT network is represented in Figure 4.3. This example
will be used to explain the WFTT protocol in the following subsections. As documented,
the network is composed of one critical station (CST1), three standard stations (SST2,
SST3 and SST4), and one “alien” station (AST1). “Alien” stations, as previously ad-
dressed, are contention-base communication devices that do not belong to the WFTT
network. These stations can employ the same technology of the WFTT stations or a dif-
ferent technology. However, they are configured to perform transmissions on a channel
overlapping the region of the spectrum being used by the WFTT network. Furthermore,
“alien” stations can attempt to initiate a transmission in any random instant of time.
Provided the use of a contention scheme to access the medium, the transmission will be
conveyed if the medium is perceived idle for a period of time long enough.
The critical station (CST1) encompasses a standard station (SST1) and a programmable
interference synthesizer (PNS1). The first is responsible for communicating the critical data
and includes a communications controller (CC1) and a commercial transceiver (CT1). The
second is engaged in synthesizing two types of interference (black-burst and protective) ac-
cording to pre-defined profiles, as depicted in Figure 3.2. The standard stations (SST1,
SST2, SST3, and SST4) are assumed to be capable of performing transmissions in a TDMA
fashion by disabling any existing CSMA/CA mechanism. This allows improving the la-
tency and the jitter associated to the standard station transmissions, besides enabling their
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Figure 4.3: Architecture of a WFTT network
use in the WFTT protocol.
As introduced, the WFTT was inspired by the FTT paradigm [159]. In this sense, it
employs a FTT-like master-multislave communication model in which a master station syn-
chronizes the transmissions from slave stations using a trigger packet. The trigger packet
defines which stations (and when) are allowed to transmit in a time interval named Ele-
mentary Cycle (EC). The critical station (CST1) assumes the role of the WFTT master,
since it is the only station with potential to perform data transmissions with bounded com-
munication delay, a key operational flexibility requirement of the FTT paradigm. Provided
that the bandjacking MAC technique was demonstrated to support dependable communi-
cations, it is foreseeable that its transmission scheme will result in critical transmissions
characterized by a highly deterministic delay. Hence, the trigger packet was mapped to the
bandjacking ’s critical packet. In this sense, it is preceded by a black-burst sequence that
clears the medium from “alien” station transmissions. The standard stations SST2, SST3
and SST4 play the role of the WFTT slaves, i.e., they only act upon receiving a trigger
packet, decoding it and checking if they are producers of some message in the corresponding
elementary cycle.
The preference for the FTT paradigm in the development of a real-time wireless com-
munication protocol was mainly motivated by its architecture and temporal organization.
This option allowed inheriting the paradigm’s properties and their validation, besides bene-
fiting from the existing operation and implementation know-how. Provided the centralized
nature of the FTT paradigm, the use of a single critical station as the master seems the
natural option considering the overall cost and functionality. The design of a commercially
viable network hardware architecture must endeavor for making the most pervasive de-
vices cost less so that the network cost is mostly dependent on these devices. On account
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that the critical station incorporates the PNS, which makes it much more expensive than
standard stations, its use for the role of the central station (master) seems reasonable. In
consideration that the trigger packet corresponds to a critical communication, only the
critical station has the functionality required to support the role of the master. Therefore,
in an architectural perspective, the use of the critical station as the WFTT master directly
emerges from the requirements of the FTT paradigm.
Regarding the temporal organization, the FTT protocol is particularly suited for sup-
porting different types of traffic, namely, event and time triggered. Since the WFTT
protocol aims at supporting a wide variety of applications, possibly encompassing different
communication requirements, the flexibility and timing guarantees conveyed by the FTT
protocol seem a good base for building an efficient wireless communication protocol. In
this sense, the protocol can be designed to inherit the ability of adjusting to different op-
erational conditions, maximizing the use of the available resources in any instant (to grant
the required levels of quality of service) and allowing reconfiguring the communication
parameters on-line.
The described WFTT protocol deals only with the low level communications’ implemen-
tation that guarantees the first operational flexibility requirement defined in [164]: bounded
communication delays. In other words, WFTT protocol herein presented exclusively ad-
dresses the requirement of providing low-latency deterministic wireless communications.
The support for the remaining requirements of the FTT paradigm is outside the scope of
this work. Nevertheless, provided the similar characteristics, the mechanisms developed
for the FTT paradigm should be easily extended to the WFTT protocol.
Elementary Cycle
The WFTT elementary cycle (EC) is a period of time characterized by a predefined
duration that encompasses several communication phases (windows), as depicted in Figure
4.4. Provided that the TP is considered a critical transmission in the WFTT protocol
implementation, it is preceded by a black-burst interference sequence that guarantees the
medium availability at its end, as demonstrated in the last chapter. Afterwards, the TP
is transmitted immediately, synchronizing the communication stations participating in the
network. Besides providing the means to synchronize the WFTT network, the TP also
conveys detailed information about the synchronous messages that must be transmitted
by the slave stations in the current ECs and, at the same time, provides information
about the window timing bounds of the EC. This master-multislave scheme, employing
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Figure 4.4: Elementary Cycle diagram
a single message to control the behavior of multiple slave stations, presents a significant
overhead improvement when compared to common master-slave protocols, leading to an
overall higher network throughput.
A temporal sequence of communication phases (windows) follows the TP transmission:
protected window (PW), contention window (CW) and inactive window (IW). The WFTT
protocol defines specific access rules for each timing window. The PW envisages the trans-
mission of the real-time packets explicitly scheduled in the preceding TP, in this case,
P1, P2, P3 . . . PN . These transmissions are made almost “back together” to maintain the
medium occupied and to prevent neighbor “alien” contention-based technologies from hav-
ing the chance of finding the medium idle and initiating a transmission. This continuous
occupation of the medium is achieved both by injecting black-burst interference between
slave transmissions and protective interference simultaneously to the slave transmissions
in the low and high “narrowbands” (represented in Figure 3.2).
The protected window is the EC interval where collisions must not occur, neither be-
tween WFTT transmissions nor with contention-based “alien” technologies. This con-
tributes to a higher network throughput, energy preservation and quality of service. Since
the transmission medium is maximally used, no transmissions are wasted due to collisions
and the medium access latency is minimum because of the enforced TDMA scheme. The
WFTT protocol energy preservation focus is on the slave stations, which can be mobile
and operate on batteries, thus having an autonomy highly coupled with their power con-
sumption. Although the master station broadcasts interference patterns that require a
significant amount of energy, because it is designed to be mains powered, it has loose
operational requirements regarding energy preservation.
The CW establishes a period of time for asynchronous traffic where WFTT standard
stations may compete for the medium using native contention-based mechanisms, for exam-
ple, the IEEE 802.15.4 CSMA/CA scheme. Besides the WFTT standard stations, “alien”
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stations using the same communication technology can dispute the usage of the medium
during this period, as long as they operate on the same channel. However, since protective
interference is issued by the master’s PNS during this window, “alien” stations using a dif-
ferent (contention-based) technology will be hindered from disputing the medium. Figure
4.4 documents an example of two contention-based transmissions: CI and CK . During the
CW all stations of WFTT network can freely request the transmission of packets. However,
only those which can be concluded within the window are allowed to proceed. Otherwise,
the requests that could not be served within the window are queued and submitted again
in the CW of the subsequent EC. The contention window provides a moderate network
throughput and a best-effort quality of service as result of the periods of inactivity intro-
duced by the contention scheme and the uncertainty of the request load offered during this
interval. The energy preservation during this interval is also high, as the contention mech-
anism avoids wasting energy on collisions. This further enforced by the use of protective
interference, which prevents “alien” stations from initiating transmissions as a result of
perceiving the medium idle when WFTT low-power transmissions are ongoing.
The IW completes the EC, establishing an interval of time where standard stations with
demanding autonomy requirements can switch to a mode of reduced power consumption
by turning off their radio-frequency transceivers until the next TP, for example. During
this period, “alien” stations may access the medium and perform transmissions. The
transmission of an “alien” packet in the inactive window is represented as CJ in Figure
4.4. In addition to establishing a mechanism to enhance the autonomy of standard stations
with stringent low-power requirements, this timing window contributes to enforcing a fair
use of the medium by allowing transmissions from other technologies without interference
from the WFTT network.
Packet Structure
The structure of a WFTT packet is presented in Figure 4.5. The trigger, real-time and
contention packets are built using standard communication MAC packets, encapsulating
the specific information in the frame’s payload. The fields type of packet and flags are
common to all packet types. The flags field includes the sequence number. Each packet
has a distinct payload according to its type. The trigger packet specifies the number of
real-time packets that will be conveyed during the PW, the specific information of each
one (identification and offset), the contention window duration and the elementary cycle
duration.
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Figure 4.5: Structure of WFTT packets
In the following analysis, for simplification/compactness purposes, it is assumed that
the PW real-time transmissions have a constant length. However, variable sized real-time
transmissions can be supported by including in the TP an additional field defining each
transmission’s duration. Since the trigger packet specifies the offsets of all the transmissions
in this window, the contention window duration and the elementary cycle duration, slave
stations can easily determine the time bounds where they must be active (protected and
contention windows) or switch off their communication transceivers (inactive window).
Although real-time and contention data packets have a similar structure, the former has
an additional field specifying the time to deadline, which will be used to determine the
temporal validity of the data. Besides documenting the field organization of valid WFTT
packets, Figure 4.5 also presents the size of each field, which is important to determine the
duration of each packet type.
Temporal isolation
The temporal isolation of the time windows within each WFTT EC is ensured by
different mechanisms, depending on the interval being considered. The temporal isolation
of the PW with regards to the CW is secured both by the intrinsic characteristics of
the WFTT protocol and the discipline enforced on the slave stations. As to the first,
the medium will never be perceived as idle during the PW due to the scheduled real-
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time transmissions and to the interference sequences that protect them. Hence, even if
contention-based WFTT slaves would attempt to perform transmissions during this period,
they would be forced to postpone them to a later time due to finding the medium busy.
With reference to the discipline enforced on the slave stations, the traffic transmitted
during the PW must be explicitly authorized by the master station in the preceding TP
and cannot be carried out beyond the specified temporal limits. Therefore, only the slave
stations that were authorized to produce information in the EC’s protected window can
perform transmissions on the designated slots. In the future, fault-tolerance mechanisms
similar to the ones developed for FTT-CAN and denoted as bus guardians [165] (in this
case media guardians) can possibly be introduced in the slaves to guarantee that they will
respect the time bounds imposed by the master.
The isolation between the CW and the IW is established by ensuring that the slave
stations respect the temporal bounds of the CW, as defined by the preceding TP. In this
sense, WFTT slaves are only enabled to dispute the medium when the contention window
begins and can only request new transmissions if they are guaranteed to be concluded
within the bounds of the CW. Otherwise, if a transmission is submitted but it extends
beyond the limits of the CW, it is queued and resubmitted in the CW of the subsequent
EC, where the process repeats. The instant in which the transmission is allowed can be used
to establish priorities among contention based transmissions. For instance, transmission
requests originating in resubmission of packets are performed at the beginning of the CW,
thus increasing their chances of success.
The separation between the IW and the following PW is ensured by the WFTT protocol
operation itself. First, no WFTT transmissions are allowed to be performed during this
period, as WFTT slave stations with stringent energy consumption requirements will be
held in a low-power state, which hinders them from receiving any packets during this
interval. Second, slave stations that are being kept on a low power state are triggered
to wake up just before the end of the black-burst noise sequence, on time to receive the
TP that schedules the following EC. Third, in order to comply with the WFTT protocol
timings, all slave stations must actively listen to the trigger packet transmission performed
by the master. Holistically, these requirements guarantee that slave stations are not able
to perform any transmissions from the end o the CW to the beginning of the PW.
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4.2.2 Operation
Figure 4.6 presents an example of a WFTT EC that will be used to describe the
protocol’s operation and derive the expressions ruling its timing behavior. As documented,
the EC encompasses a sequence of protected, contention and inactive windows, which are
preceded by a critical data transmission composed by a black-burst sequence and a trigger
packet. As shown, different visual patterns are used to differentiate the intervals of time
pertaining to the packet and interference transmissions. The identified parameters are
detailed in Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 according to its fixed or variable nature1. Five parallel
individual timelines are used to better represent the transmissions from both the PNS
(PNS1) and the slave stations (SST1, SST2, SST3 and SST4) over time. In the supplied
example, the TP schedules three data transmissions that are carried on during the PW. In
addition, the represented timelines do not show the transmission’s propagation delays, as
these can be considered negligible for personal area network communication ranges.
Table 4.1: Fixed parameters
Name Description
DIS Delay of starting an Interference Sequence (IS ), measured from the instant of the
request (by SST1) to the instant of its effectiveness (at PNS1)
DPD Delay of starting a Protected Data (PD) transmission
DTP Delay of initiating a Trigger Packet (TP) transmission, measured from the instant of
its request to the instant of its effectiveness
LBIS Length of a Bandjacking Interference Sequence (BIS )
LIFS Length of the Inter Frame Space (IFS ) between two consecutive data transmissions
LISI Length of the Inter Frame Space Interference (ISI ) sequence
LOI Length of the Overhead Interference (OI ) sequence
In the following, a description of the annotated elements of Figure 4.6 is presented.
Explicatively, at instant t1, the master reconfigures the interference profiles that will be
used in the following EC(s). This reconfiguration is conducted during the inactive window
and allows the master to change the parameters of the PNS’s interference profiles according
to different requests (e.g., change channel or power), thus supporting the on-line adjustment
of the WFTT network to different working conditions. The reconfiguration is only accepted
if it can be concluded within the timespan of the IW. Otherwise, it is queued and postponed
to the IW of the following EC.
At instant t2 the CTS1 initiates a critical transmission by triggering the propagation of
1In this dissertation the jitter is defined as the variable component of a delay, independently of the
event nature (periodic or aperiodic) being measured.
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Figure 4.6: WFTT EC timeline
a black-burst (LBIS) by the PNS1. This transmission is affected by a DIS delay and a JBISi
jitter. The first parameter represents the constant part of the activation delay (minimum).
The second represents its variable range. The approach of segmenting the delay parameters
in two separate contributions (constant and variable) for the events depicted in Figure 4.6
is adopted in the remaining of this dissertation.
In order to guarantee that all alien stations are in a backoff state immediately after
the end of the black-burst sequence, its duration is selected according to the maximum
transmission duration foreseeable for any “alien” packet m (see Theorem 3.2.5). In this
sense, Equation 4.1 defines the required black-burst length as a function of the “alien” data
packet duration (LADm).
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Table 4.2: Variable parameters: delays, lengths and quantities
Name Description
DdTP Delay of the transceiver to signalize the reception of a packet with an interrupt after
the energy broadcast in the medium has ended
DpPDi,j Delay of processing the j
th Protected Data transmission in the ith EC and request
an interference commutation
DpTP i Delay of processing the TP associated to the i
th EC
DrTP i,k Delay of the k slave station to respond to the TP in the i
th EC. Includes the worst
case latency that any slave station takes to process the TP, load a real-time data
packet and switch the transceiver to the transmit state
LADm Length of a given “alien” packet m
LCW i Length of the Contention Window (CW ) in the i
th EC
LECi Length of the i
th elementary cycle (EC )
LIW i Length of the Inactive Window (IW ) in the i
th EC
LPDi,j Length of the j
th Protected Data (PD) transmission (in the protected window) of the
ith EC
LPIi,j Length of the Protective Interference (PI ) sequence for the j
th data transmission (in
the protected window) of the ith EC
LPICW i Length of the Protective Interference sequence in the Contention Window (PICW )
of the ith EC
LPITP i Length of the Protective Interference sequence for the TP (PITP) transmission of the
ith EC
LPW i Length of the Protected Window (PW ) in the i
th EC
LPWSSi,j Length of the j
th Slave Slot in the Protective Window (PWSS ) of the ith EC
LTP i Length of the TP transmission in the i
th EC
NPPW i Number of Packets in the Protected Window (PPW ) of the the i
th EC
LBIS = max (LADm) , ∀m ∈ N1
✞
✝
☎
✆4.1
Provided that the TP transmission has a duration of LTP i and experiences a DTP
constant delay, in order to guarantee that it begins with the shortest possible delay after
the end of the black-burst, its transmission is initiated at instant t3 − DTP , becoming
effective within the JTP i timing window (TP jitter). The duration of the TP transmission
can be modified between consecutive ECs, since the number of scheduled packets in the
PW can be updated on-line. However, if the EC period is to be kept constant, the duration
of the CW or IW has to be updated to compensate for both the TP and PW modifications.
As shown, the TP is protected by an interference sequence in the low and high “narrow-
bands“ (LPITP i), herein named Protective Interference (PI), which is synthesized simulta-
neously to the TP transmission just after the black-burst interference sequence. When the
TP transmission ends (at instant t4), the SST1 signals the PNS1 to stop the protective in-
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Table 4.3: Variable parameters: jitter (delay variation)
Name Description
JBISi Jitter of initiating Bandjacking Interference Sequence (BIS ) in the i
th EC
JISIi,j Jitter of initiating an Inter Frame Space Interference (ISI ) sequence after the the j
th
data transmission in the protected window of the ith EC
JISIMAX Maximum jitter of initiating an Inter Frame Space Interference
JOIi Jitter of initiating an Overhead Interference (OI ) sequence in the i
th EC
JPDi,j,k Jitter of the k slave station to start the j
th Protected Data (PD) transmission (in the
protected window) of the ith EC
JPDMAX Maximum jitter (considering all slaves) of initiating a Protected Data (PD) transmis-
sion
JPIi,j Jitter of initiating the Protective Interference (PI ) sequence associated to the j
th
data transmission in the protected window of the ith EC
JPICW i Jitter of initiating a Protective Interference sequence in the Contention Window
(PICW ) of the ith EC
JPITP i Jitter of initiating a Protective Interference sequence for the TP (PITP) of the i
th
EC
JpPDi,j Jitter of processing the j
th Protected Data transmission in the ith EC and request an
interference commutation
JpPDMAX Maximum jitter of processing a Protected Data transmission by the master station
JpTP i,k Jitter of the k slave station to process the Trigger Packet of the i
th EC
JTP i Jitter of initiating a TP transmission in the i
th EC
terference associated to the TP transmission. As any other transmissions, it encompasses
a given activation delay (DIS) and an associated jitter (JPITP i). The WFTT protocol
design supporting Figure 4.6 assumes that all types of interference produced by the PNS
are characterized by a constant activation delay expressed by DIS and are switched off
instantly, i.e., can be disabled with a negligible latency.
In the following subsections, a detailed description of the operation of the WFTT
protocol in the protected, contention and inactive windows is provided.
Protected Window (PW)
The ith protected window is characterized by a LPW i length. This window begins at
instant t4 with an overhead delay that aims at providing enough room for the slaves to
receive the TP, process it and become ready to respond with a real-time transmission,
when required. The overhead delay, thus, has three contributions: TP detection delay,
the TP response delay and the real-time packet trigger delay. The first corresponds to the
latency of the transceiver to signalize the reception of a packet with an interrupt after the
energy broadcast ended in the medium. This latency (DdTP ) is assumed to be constant
and, thus, not coupled with the TP length. The TP response delay includes the worst case
147
CHAPTER 4. THE WIRELESS FLEXIBLE TIME-TRIGGERED PROTOCOL
latency that any slave station takes to process the TP, load a real-time data packet in the
transmission buffer and switch the transceiver from the receive to the transmit state. The
overall TP response delay required by a generic slave station k to conduct these tasks in
the elementary cycle i is given by Equation 4.2.
DrTP i,k = DpTP i + JpTP i,k , ∀i, k ∈ N1
✞
✝
☎
✆4.2
The TP may have different lengths on different elementary cycles. Therefore, the delay
experienced by slave stations to process the TP can also change between ECs. Moreover,
the delay of loading the real-time packet to the transceiver and switching it to the trans-
mit state is assumed to be constant, because the packet length was also assumed to be
constant regardless of the PW slot where it is transmitted. The jitter associated to the
aforementioned tasks is variable, i.e., it will change depending on the EC and slave sta-
tion performing them. Henceforth, the constant part of the TP response delay is modeled
by the DpTP i parameter while its variation is expressed by JpTP i,k , where k represents a
specific slave station receiving the TP.
The real-time packet trigger delay also comprises two components: one fixed and one
variable. The first models the constant latency that any real-time packet transmission
encompasses and it is denoted by DPD. The second, is the associated transmission jitter
expressed by JPDi,j,k , where i refers to the i
th EC, j to the jth PW time interval and k to
the station k.
The overhead delay length (LOH) enforced after the TP transmission is described by
Equation 4.3 and comprises the TP detection delay, the worst case TP response delay and
the constant contribution to the real-time packet trigger delay. In order to keep the medium
occupied during this period and hinder “alien” contention-based stations from initiating
transmissions, the master (CST1) uses the PNS1 to synthesize “wideband” interference
during a LOI interval, as defined by Equation 4.4. This interference sequence is named
Overhead Interference (OI) and experiences an activation delay and jitter given by DIS
and JOIi, respectively.
LOH = DdTP +max(DrTP i,k) +DPD, ∀i, k ∈ N1
✞
✝
☎
✆4.3
LOI = LOH − (DIS +max(JOIi))−max(JpTP i,k), ∀i, k ∈ N1
✞
✝
☎
✆4.4
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As shown, the LOI interval corresponds to the overhead delay LOH reduced by two safety
margins: one of (DIS+max(JOIi)) and the other ofmax(JpTP i,k). The first compensates the
overhead interference activation latency and jitter. The second counteracts the maximum
trigger packet processing jitter. By enforcing both time margins, it is possible to avoid the
overhead interference from extending beyond its designated bounds and compromise the
real-time transmission occurring in the subsequent PW slot.
Provided that the transceiver takes a given amount of time between the protected packet
trigger event and its effective transmission on the medium, the constant (predictable)
portion of this delay can be anticipated. Hence, when the master station computes the
offsets that are used by the slave stations to trigger the scheduled transmissions, it subtracts
aDPD amount of time in order anticipate the trigger event so that the resulting gap between
the end of the overhead interval and the beginning of the first transmission is minimized.
As scheduled by the TP, slave stations initiate transmissions in specific instants and
over disjoint periods of time, called slots (e.g., LPWSSi,j ). The master employs Equation 4.5
to compute the activation offsets of the slave stations (aoPDi,j,k), which prevent collisions
among protected transmissions. Because the slave stations only detect the TP at instant
t4′ = t4 + DdTP , the first transmission must be scheduled to be triggered at the relative
instant max(DrTP i,k), in order to guarantee that the effective transmission suffers the least
possible delay to become effective in the beginning of the first slot.
aoPDi,j,k =


max(DrTP i,k) j = 1
max(DrTP i,k) +
∑j−1
m=1
(
JPDMAX + LPDi,m + LIFS
)
j ≥ 2
∀i, k ∈ N1 ∧ j ∈ [1...NPPW i ]
✞
✝
☎
✆4.5
where:
jPDMAX = max
(
JPDi,j,k
)
, ∀i, k ∈ N1 ∧ j ∈ [1...NPPW i ]
✞
✝
☎
✆4.6
This implementation approach is different from the one described in [158] due to the
fact that, instead of locally computing the offset of their transmissions on the PW, slaves
simply obtain that information directly from the TP, in order to shorten their response
time. Hence, upon receiving the TP and if they are producers of a packet in the PW, slave
stations immediately load a timer with the offset value read from the TP. This timer will
expire at the instant where the packet transmission will be triggered, as calculated by the
master station.
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At instant t
4
′′ = t
′
4
+max(DrTP i,k), SST2 begins the process of transmitting a real-time
data packet whose duration is represented by LPDi,j . When this packet transmission ends
(at instant t6), the master station (CST1) processes it with a DpPDi,j delay and JpPDi,j
jitter. At instant t5 the master begins the PI transmission with a DIS delay and a JPIi,j
jitter. This transmission extends up until the t7 instant, corresponding to the worst case
delay for the real-time packet transmission completion (JpPDMAX + LPDi,j).
In order to ensure that all slave stations are able to successfully receive the real-time
transmissions, it is necessary to establish an interval between real-time packet transmissions
equal to the Inter Frame Space (IFS) of the data technology being employed. During this
period, the master synthesizes “wideband” IFS Interference (ISI) to maintain the medium
occupied. This interference sequence is influenced by a given delay and jitter denoted by
DIS and JISIi,j , respectively. Hence, at instant t7, the master requests a ISI interference
sequence with a length is determined according to Equation 4.7.
LISI = LIFS − (DIS + JISIMAX )
✞
✝
☎
✆4.7
where
JISIMAX = max
(
jISIi,j
)
, ∀i ∈ N1 ∧ j ∈ [1...NPPW i ]
At instant t8, immediately after the end of the ISI, the CST1 automatically switches
the interference profile back to the PI again, in order to protect the incoming real-time
data transmission from SST4, which is triggered at instant t
8
′ = t8−DPD. As documented,
the real-time data transmission jitter (JPDi,j,k) affects its activation offset within the PW
scheduled slot. Two scenarios arise when considering the delay (DIS) and jitter (JPIi,j ) of
initiating a PI transmission:
1. The overall protection interference activation delay is smaller than the jitter of initi-
ating the protected data transmission (DIS+JPIi,j ) < JPDi,j,k . This seems to be the
most common scenario since the PNS can exhibit a time response that only depends
of the activation delay of a power amplifier. Hence, it is assumed that the sum of DIS
and JPIi,j are negligible. In this case, the PI begins before the real-time transmission
and the channel used by the real-time transmissions will be idle during the JPDi,j,k
jitter. This scenario may be further analyzed and segmented according to the type
of “alien” stations that contend for the medium.
150
4.2. PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
(a) Stations employing the same real-time data technology on the same channel. In
this case, if the JPDi,j,k jitter is larger than the minimum IFS or CCA intervals
employed by “alien” stations, they can initiate a transmission during this period
and, consequently, compromise the real-time transmissions of the WFTT’s PW.
(b) Stations employing a different data technology with a higher bandwidth over-
lapping the channel used for real-time transmissions. The PI keeps the data’s
lateral channels occupied, generating enough energy to prevent these stations
from performing transmissions during the PI sequence (LPIi,j ).
(c) Stations employing a different data technology with a smaller bandwidth over-
lapping the channel used for real-time transmissions. This case is similar to the
first, where the PI is not capable of making the “alien” stations perceive the
medium as busy. Hence, “alien” stations characterized by IFS or CCA intervals
shorter than the JPDi,j,k jitter may compromise the real-time transmissions of
the PW.
2. The overall protection interference activation delay is greater or equal to the jitter of
initiating the protected data transmission (DIS+JPIi,j ) ≥ JPDi,j,k . This case will be
rare due to the responsiveness provided by the PNS hardware architecture. However,
because the real-time transmission jitter is variable, it can (sporadically) assume
small values and become shorter or equal to the overall PI activation delay. In this
case, assuming that the protective interference activation delay is negligible (as in
point 1), the period of time in which the medium is idle will be smaller than the IFS
or CCA of any “alien” station contending for the medium. Therefore, the WFTT
schedule in the PW will not be compromised by unauthorized transmissions.
In both scenarios, if the real-time packet jitter (JPDi,j,k) is small, the transmission will
occur at the beginning of the PW slot, leaving a time interval near the end of the slot that
will be secured by protective interference. The remaining events in the PW (concluded at
instant t14) follow the approach described for the first protected data transmission.
Contention Window (CW)
As introduced, the contention window aims at providing an interval of time for asyn-
chronous traffic. As discussed in Section 2.3, technologies using higher bandwidths and
higher power levels have a significant impact on the timeliness and reliability of co-located
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low-power communications operating on the same region of the spectrum. In this sense,
the WFTT CW was designed to enforce an interval of time where such “alien” technolo-
gies are hindered from compromising asynchronous traffic performed by low-power WFTT
slave stations.
Figure 4.6 depicts a CW that is initiated at instant t14 and has a length of LCW i. In this
window, in order to protect the WFTT contention-based transmissions against interference
from “alien” stations employing technologies with larger bandwidths, the master station
occupies the medium in the low and high interference “narrowbands”, as documented in
Figure 3.2. This CW protective interference (PICW) is affected by a given activation delay
(DIS) and jitter (JPICW i). During the CW, slave stations may perform transmissions using
standard contention-based methods as long as their duration does not extend beyond the
CW bounds defined by the master station. If this occurs, the transmission is queued and
a retransmission attempt is performed at the beginning of the CW of the subsequent EC.
Inactive Window (IW)
The inactive window follows the CW. It begins at instant t15 and has a duration of
LIW i, which extends until the next bandjacking access. This interval was included in
the WFTT EC to establish a period of time reserved for low-power slaves to sleep and
for “alien” stations to conduct transmissions and avoid starvation, while operating over
the same region of the spectrum. The support for a period of inactivity in the WFTT
protocol specifically addresses applications with stringent low-power requirements, i.e.,
applications with low duty cycle requirements, but demanding a high level of dependability
and timeliness. Also, the existence of a “silent” WFTT interval promotes a fairer sharing
of the communication channel with “alien” contending stations.
In a basic WFTT star network such as discussed so far, no slave WFTT transmissions
are allowed to take place during the IW. This occurs because slave stations with strict
autonomy requirements switch to a low-power operation mode during this period to ex-
tend their autonomy. Among other actions, these stations can slow down the frequency
of the MCU, turn off unnecessary MCU peripherals and shut down the communications
transceiver, thus hindering them from receiving packets. In the course of this period, the
master station may reconfigure its interference patterns and perform calculations (e.g.,
packet scheduling) regarding the following EC.
Although beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is possible to use the inactive period
to enable communications among WFTT star networks such as, for example, in the WIA-
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PA protocol addressed in Section 2.2.9. In this case, the inactive window would encompass
protected transmissions among WFTT star networks. Since the master is permanently
active, it can participate in data exchanges during the inactive window.
4.2.3 The Hidden Node Problem
The hidden node problem is a well-known phenomenon affecting wireless networks.
This problem occurs when a sink station is within the range of a set of source stations,
which are not fully “visible” to each other. Therefore, two source stations hidden from each
other may attempt to transmit simultaneously to the sink, thus causing a packet jamming
at the sink and the loss of both transmitted packets.
As presented, the WFTT protocol was based on the bandjacking technique for guaran-
teeing the deterministic access of the master’s trigger packet to the medium. Furthermore,
the protocol also relies on the use of black-burst and protective interference to prevent
“alien” stations from accessing the medium and impairing real-time transmissions per-
formed by slave stations. The existence of hidden master, slave or “alien” stations repre-
sents a challenge to the determinism conveyed by the WFTT protocol. In this sense, several
possible scenarios of interaction between wireless stations were identified and characterized.
1. The “alien” station is out of range of the interference synthesized by the master
station as well as of the real-time transmissions performed by the slave stations. The
“alien” station transmissions are out of range of all the WFTT stations.
2. The “alien” station is out of range of the interference synthesized by the master
station as well as of the real-time transmissions performed by the slave stations. The
“alien” station transmissions are in range of some/all slave stations.
3. The “alien” station is in range of the interference synthesized by the master station
but not of all real-time transmissions performed by the slave stations. The “alien”
station transmissions are in range of some/all WFTT stations. In this scenario, two
occurrences are possible:
(a) The bandwidth employed in real-time transmissions is similar to the bandwidth
used by the “alien” technology.
(b) The bandwidth employed in real-time transmissions is much smaller than the
bandwidth used by the “alien” technology.
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4. The “alien” station is in range of the interference synthesized by the master station
as well as of all real-time transmissions performed by the slave stations. The “alien”
station transmissions are in range of all WFTT stations.
Scenarios 1 and 4 are not likely to pose any issues regarding the hidden node prob-
lem, provided that “alien” stations are distant enough from the WFTT network (master
and all slave stations) to cause any interference or are able to both sense the real-time
communications and the synthesized black-burst and protective interference, thus limiting
their access to the medium. Following the same trend, scenario 3(b) should also be free
from hidden node impairments since the protective interference will prevent higher band-
width “alien” stations from initiating transmissions. Conversely, the lack of impact of the
protective interference in avoiding “alien” transmissions in scenario 3(a) can result in the
corruption of real-time packets sent by hidden slave stations. This scenario should not
occur frequently since it is typically characterized by the use of the same technology by
the WFTT network and by the “alien” stations. Hence, the communication range should
be similar in both directions (slave → “alien” station and vice versa). Nevertheless, one
possible solution for this problem combines the configuration of the WFTT slave stations
to employ a higher transmission power and the adoption of a physical region surrounding
the WFTT network where no “alien” stations can be deployed. The first proposal extends
the slave’s physical reach, thus contributing to their sensing by the “alien” stations. The
second reduces the impact of the “alien” transmissions on the WFTT network, i.e., it
increases the Signal-to-Interference Ratio (SIR) of the WFTT transmissions.
Scenario 2 is also prone to the hidden node problem, as an “alien” station may interfere
with a real-time transmission from a given slave station. Although there are many solutions
to mitigate the hidden node problem in wireless networks [166], none of them seems directly
applicable to the specific operation of the WFTT protocol, since the main vulnerable
scenario occurs when the master station is hidden from the “alien” stations. Provided that
WFTT and “alien” stations do not communicate in the same network, control packets
cannot be exchanged to setup a collision free environment. A possible way of avoiding
interference from “alien” stations is the adoption of a special WFTT station that simply
produces black-burst and protective interference synchronized with the master station.
This special station would be placed in the physical boundaries of the WFTT network,
where the master’s interference transmissions are hidden from local “alien” stations. The
hidden node problem is still an open issue in wireless networks and a complete solution is
beyond the scope of this work.
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4.3 Analytical Study
The WFTT protocol is studied under two perspectives: implementation feasibility and
timeliness. The objective of the former is to identify the key intervals of time in which
the protocol operation can be compromised. Furthermore, this section also establishes
the allowed operation bounds for the parameters that represent such intervals, allowing to
determine the feasibility of implementing and deploying the WFTT protocol in real nodes.
The timeliness study of the WFTT protocol is focused on analyzing two types of traffic:
synchronous and asynchronous. This timeliness characterization provides the necessary
background information to allow estimating the delay and jitter experienced by WFTT
packets in both traffic scenarios.
4.3.1 Feasibility
This section presents a WFTT timing analysis focused on the challenges of implement-
ing the protocol with low resource slave stations. This analysis is derived from the WFTT
EC represented in Figure 4.6 and encompasses a coexistence study between the WFTT
protocol and “alien” stations employing different communication technologies. Within this
scope, two complementary interference scenarios are addressed:
1. “Alien” technologies interfering over a bandwidth much wider than the data band
(i.e., BWdata ≪ BWalien). In this case, without loss of generality, it is assumed that
WFTT stations employ the IEEE 802.15.4 technology to perform data transmissions
and that “alien” stations are compliant with the IEEE 802.11 standard technology.
The study of this scenario is motivated by the fact that the IEEE 802.11 protocol is,
currently, one of the most widely deployed (and potentially harmful) wireless local
area network technology, as described in Section 2.3.3;
2. The data technology has a bandwidth similar to (BWdata ≈ BWalien) or higher than
(BWdata > BWalien) the “alien” technology. As before, the WFTT was assumed to
employ the IEEE 802.15.4 technology for its data transmissions. Regarding “alien”
transmissions, due to its adoption for supporting wireless personal area networks (e.g.
ZigBee), the IEEE 802.15.4 was selected as the contender technology. This option
was motivated by the coexistence conclusions presented in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
The timing analysis in both scenarios is supported in several assumptions regarding
the operation of both the WFTT and “alien” stations. As described, besides using the
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Figure 4.7: WFTT spectrum occupation illustration
IEEE 802.15.4 protocol for the WFTT data transmissions, the existence of two different
contending technologies (IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.15.4) is considered. In both cases, the
medium access is conducted according to the corresponding specification. Hence, trans-
missions can only begin when the medium is perceived idle for a period of time longer than
the CCA or IFS defined by the contending technology. Furthermore, it is assumed that
the interfering technologies employ their nominal power levels and perform transmissions
on a channel overlapping the WFTT data transmission channel.
Regarding the hardware of the WFTT stations, the master’s communication controller
(CC1) is assumed to have enough processing power to run the WFTT services in a timely
fashion. Hence, it is accepted that the PNS complies with the following assumptions:
i) The interference signals synthesized by the master are compliant with the bandwidth
profiles represented in Figure 4.7;
This is a reasonable assumption since the PNS presented in Section 3.4 can be con-
figured to synthesize interference in different channels with a bandwidth similar to
the one employed by standard IEEE 802.15.4 stations (BWdata ≈ BWinterference). De-
spite the fact that the presented COTS-based implementation is not able to conduct
simultaneous transmissions in two different channels, the hardware architecture can
be modified to include more transceivers and, therefore, to enable the transmission
of interference in two simultaneous channels. The protective interference is transmit-
ted simultaneously in both the low and high channels, which are two channels apart
(IEEE 802.15.4) from the WFTT data channel. The black-burst interference occupies
an overlapping spectrum region, i.e., it is centered on the channel used to perform the
WFTT data transmissions.
ii) Interference signals are compliant with the EU and USA regulations for transmitting
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in the 2.4 GHz ISM band ;
The legal limit to perform transmissions employing Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
(DSSS) signals in the 2.4 GHz ISM band is 100 mW (20 dBm) of Equivalent Isotrop-
ically Radiated Power (EIRP) in European countries (standard ETSI EN 300 328)
and 1W (30 dBm) of Peak Conducted Output Power in the United States of America
(regulation FCC part 15.247 and 15.249). Therefore, it is fair to assume that because
the hardware architecture of the COTS-based PNS employs certified modules, it can
be used to generate DSSS signals complying to these limits.
iii) The synthesized interference signals are effective in hindering “alien” stations from
accessing the medium.
As reported in Section 3.3.2, the use of pseudo IEEE 802.15.4 signals by the PNS to
synthesize interference is effective in blocking standard IEEE 802.11 transmissions.
Provided that these signals have enough bandwidth and power to hinder IEEE 802.11
communications, it is plausible to assume that they are effective in hindering “alien”
stations based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, operating in an overlapping channel.
This assumption was experimentally validated in Section 3.5.2.
Finally, it is assumed that the propagation delays can be negligible when compared to
the length of the CCA or IFS, considering low power communication technologies such as
IEEE 802.15.4. Provided that the nominal indoor range of this technology is typically 10
meters, the associated propagation delay is approximately 33 nanoseconds, which is much
smaller than the corresponding CCA (10 microseconds) or IFS (192 microseconds).
IEEE 802.11 Interference
The first addressed interference scenario corresponds to the IEEE 802.11 protocol. The
motivation for evaluating the WFTT protocol timing in open environments encompassing
stations employing this technology spans from its wide adoption to support wireless local
area networks. Because the IEEE 802.11 technology can be found in a broad range of
domains (domestic, industrial, medical, etc.), it is a strong candidate to pose limitations
to other co-located technologies operating in the same region of the spectrum, as discussed
in Section 2.3.3. In this scenario, as documented in Figure 4.8, the medium will become
unprotected during the intervals where no interference (protective or black-burst) is being
propagated in the medium. This figure is a simplification of Figure 4.6, illustrating explic-
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Figure 4.8: WFTT vulnerable intervals to IEEE 802.11 interference
itly the idle medium intervals of time. The medium will become vulnerable (V) after the
bandjacking sequence in the following periods of time:
• VBIS→PITP i between the end of a bandjacking interference sequence (LBIS) and the begin-
ning of a Protective Interference sequence for the TP (LPITP i), in a given EC i.
• VPITP i→OI between the end of the protective interference sequence for the TP (LPITP i)
and the beginning of the overhead interference sequence (LOI), in a given EC i.
• VOI→PIi,1 between the end of the overhead interference sequence (LOI) and the beginning
of the first protective data interference sequence (LPIi,1), in a given EC i.
• VPIi,j→ISI between the end of a protective data interference sequence (e.g., LPIi,j ) and
the beginning of the subsequent Inter Frame Space Interference sequence (LISI) in a given
Slave Slot (e.g., LPWSSi,j ).
• VISI→PIi,j+1 between the end of an inter-frame space interference sequence (LISI), in a given
slave slot (e.g., LPWSSi,j ), and the beginning of the subsequent protective data interference
sequence (e.g., LPIi,j+1) in the following slave slot (e.g., LPWSSi,j+1).
• VISI→PICW i between the end of an inter-frame space interference sequence (LISI) of the last
slave slot and the beginning of the protective interference in the following CW (LPICW i),
in a given EC i.
The integrity of the PW can only be ensured if “alien” stations are not able to initiate
a transmission after the end of the BIS and the conclusion of the PW. As such, based
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on the presented assumptions and considering that the bandwidth employed in the data
transmissions is much smaller than the bandwidth of the “alien” interference (BWdata ≪
BWalien), the maximum period of time in which the medium becomes idle during the
aforementioned interval is represented by Equation 4.8.
VPWBWdata≪BWalien =
✞
✝
☎
✆4.8
max{VBIS→PITP i , VPITP i→OI , VOI→PIi,1 ,
VPIi,j→ISI , VISI→PIi,j+1} =
max{DIS + JPITP i , DIS + JOIi , DIS + JPIi,j +max(JpTP i,k),
DIS + JISIi,j}, ∀i, k ∈ N1 ∧ j ∈ [1...NPPW i ]
The PI generated by the PNS is assumed to make the medium be perceived as busy by
IEEE 802.11 “alien” stations. Hence, in order to keep the medium free from these stations’
transmissions during the CW, the maximum period of time in which it can be idle is given
by Equation 4.9.
VCWBWdata≪BWalien = max{VISI→PICW i} =
✞
✝
☎
✆4.9
max{DIS + JPICW i}, ∀i ∈ N1
Provided that the IEEE 802.11 “alien” interferers’ MAC dictates that a transmission
can only start after an idle minimum period of LSIFSIEEE802.11 = 10 microseconds (see Table
4.4), the integrity of the PW and of the CW is kept if the results derived from Equations
4.8 and 4.9 are bellow this bound. As Equation 4.8 indicates, the maximum vulnerable
period of time in the PW window depends of both the PNS response time and of the
processing capabilities of the slaves. Conversely, Equation 4.9 suggests that the medium
vulnerability in the CW is only dependent of the PNS implementation.
Table 4.4: IEEE 802.11 CSMA parameters (2.4 GHz band)
PHY Layer LSIFSMIN LCCAMIN
FHSS 28 µs 27 µs
DSSS 10 µs ≤ 15 µs
HR/DSSS 10 µs ≤ 15 µs
Long Slot ERP-OFDM 10 µs ≤ 15 µs
Short Slot ERP-OFDM 10 µs ≤ 15 µs
MIMO 10 µs < 15 µs
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As evaluated in Section 3.4.2, the current PNS implementation presents limitations
concerning its response time. It was observed that the minimum and maximum latency to
turn on interference on a given channel ranges from 124 to 199 microseconds. The turnoff
latency ranges from 74 to 108 microseconds. These values are affected by a measurement
offset introduced by the BeeMon monitor that varies from 65 microseconds to 81 microsec-
onds. The BeeMon monitor implementation and evaluation are detailed in Appendix D.
Assuming that the minimum turn on/off latencies were affected by the minimum BeeMon
offset and, conversely, that the maximum BeeMon offset affected the maximum interfer-
ence turn on/off latencies, it is possible to obtain an indicative range of latencies for the
current PNS implementation timeliness. These values can be expressed by a constant part,
which corresponds to the minimum latency, and by an associated jitter, corresponding to
the difference between the minimum and the maximum latencies. Therefore, the interfer-
ence turn on can be represented by a delay of 59 microseconds and a maximum jitter of
59 microseconds while the turnoff can be achieved with a delay of 9 microseconds and a
maximum jitter of 18 microseconds. WFTT
The PNS implementation presented and evaluated in Section 3.4 exhibits values of
latency and jitter significantly higher than 10 microseconds. The aforementioned results
indicate that the interference turn on delays are characterized by a constant delay of DIS =
59 microseconds and a maximum jitter of JPITPMAX = JOIMAX = JPIMAX = JISIMAX =
59 microseconds. Although substantially lower than the interference turn on delay, the
turnoff delay is not negligible, as it was assumed. This PNS responsiveness impairment
is motivated by the use of SPI commands to control the state of the transceivers’ power
amplifiers. Hence, since it is possible to drive directly the enable/disable signal of these
amplifiers, it is reasonable to assume that DIS, JPITP i , JOIi , JPIi,j , JISIi,j and JPICW i ,
represented in Equations 4.8 and 4.9 can significantly reduced to become negligible when
compared to the 10 microseconds bound.
Regarding the processing power of the slaves, the max(JpTP i,k) parameter value will be
negligible if the adopted stations employ a common hardware architecture encompassing
a fast processor and execute the same firmware instructions to process the trigger packet.
Therefore, this analysis suggests that a WFTT network can be implemented and deployed
in an open environment populated by IEEE 802.11 standard stations without risking an
impact on its performance due to uncontrolled IEEE 802.11 “alien” transmissions, as long
as a PNS with a fast time response is employed to synthesize interference and the adopted
slave stations are supported on an adequate shared hardware architecture.
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IEEE 802.15.4 Interference
The second interference scenario being addressed corresponds to the IEEE 802.15.4
protocol, which is also one of the most widespread wireless technologies in the market for
personal area networks. Provided that it lies at the base of several popular communica-
tion protocols such as ZigBee and WirelessHART, this technology can be found in many
applications, ranging from domotics to industrial processes, for example. Therefore, it is
a potential candidate to contend for the 2.4 GHz band where the WFTT operates. In a
scenario where data and “alien” transmissions occupy overlapping spectrum regions and
BWdata ≈ BWalien or BWdata > BWalien, the medium will be protected only when WFTT
transmissions or black-burst interference sequences are ongoing, as represented in Figure
4.9. Otherwise, “alien” stations may find the medium idle, even if the master’s PNS is
synthesizing protective interference. Figure 4.9 is a simplification of Figure 4.6, illustrating
explicitly the intervals of time where the medium becomes idle and can be compromised
by “alien” transmissions. The following list summarizes these intervals:
• VBIS→TP i between the end of a bandjacking interference sequence (LBIS) and the beginning
of a TP (LTP i), in a given EC i.
• VTP i→OI between the end of the protective interference sequence for the TP (LTP i) and
the beginning of the overhead interference sequence (LOI), in a given EC i.
• VOI→PDi,1,k between the end of the overhead interference sequence (LOI) and the beginning
of the first protected data transmission (LPDi,1,k) performed by the k
th slave station in a
given EC i.
• VPDi,j,k→ISI between the end of a protected data transmission (e.g., LPDi,j,k), performed
by the kth slave station in a given jth slave slot, and the beginning of the subsequent Inter
Frame Space Interference sequence (LISI).
• VISI→PDi,j,k between the end of an inter-frame space interference sequence (LISI) and the
beginning of the subsequent protective data transmission (e.g., LPDi,j,k) by the k
th slave
station in the jth slave slot (e.g., LPWSSi,j ).
As in the IEEE 802.11 case, the integrity of the PW can only be ensured if “alien”
transmissions are not possible to occur between the end of the BIS and the end of the
PW. Equation 4.10 provides an expression that allows to determine the maximum period
of time during which the medium is idle between the end of the BIS and of the PW.
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Figure 4.9: WFTT vulnerable intervals to IEEE 802.15.4 interference
VPWBWdata≥BWalien
=
max{VBIS→TP i , VTP i→OI , VOI→PDi,1,k , VPDi,j,k→ISI , VISI→PDi,j,k} =
max{JTP i , DIS + JOIi ,max(JpTP i,k) + JPDi,j,k , JPDMAX − JPDi,j,k +DIS + JISIi,j , JPDi,j,k},
∀i, k ∈ N1 ∧ j ∈ [1...NPPW i ]
✞
✝
☎
✆4.10
where:
JPDMAX = max(JPDi,j,k)
Regarding the CW, because the protective interference has no impact on hindering
“alien” stations that have a bandwidth similar to or narrower than the one of the WFTT
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network, it is not possible to avoid contention among both types of stations. In other
words, the WFTT CW transmissions will not be protected against contention from “alien”
stations employing a similar technology.
Provided an environment populated with IEEE 802.15.4 interferers, “alien” trans-
missions can only be initiated after a period of time corresponding to the clear chan-
nel assessment (CCA) of this technology, which is given by LCCAIEEE802.15.4 = 128 mi-
croseconds (Table 4.5). Hence, the PW integrity in this environment is kept only if
VPWBWdata≥BWalien < 128 microseconds. As in the IEEE 802.11 interference scenario, DIS,
JOIi and JISIi,j are dependent of the response time of the PNS and, according to the
premises laid for that scenario, they will be much smaller than the 128 microseconds
bound.
Table 4.5: IEEE 802.15.4 CSMA parameters (2.4 GHz band)
PHY Layer LSIFSMIN LCCAMIN
DSSS 192 µs 128 µs
On the other hand, JTP i , JpTP i,k , JPDi,j,k and JPDMAX depend on the response time of
standard stations. To simplify the analysis, assume, as before, that the slave stations share
an hardware architecture encompassing a fast processor, which executes a common set of
instructions to process the trigger packet, resulting in a negligible JpTP i,k . If the jitter of
initiating a TP (JTP i) is smaller than the maximum jitter of initiating a protected trans-
mission (JPDMAX ), Equation 4.10 can be further simplified to Equation 4.11. Otherwise,
the vulnerability to “alien” transmissions is only dependent of JTP i .
VPWBWdata≥BWalien = JPDMAX +DIS + JISIi,j , ∀i ∈ N1 ∧ j ∈ [1...NPPW i ]
✞
✝
☎
✆4.11
Provided the 128 microseconds bound for an idle interval and recalling the previously
obtained DIS and JISIMAX values (59 microseconds each), only a slack of 10 microseconds
is left to cope with the jitter of transmitting a protected packet, which will be challenging
to meet in practice. Therefore, an improvement of the PNS response time is required to
lower the delay and jitter associated to the transmission of interference (DIS and JISIi,j ,
respectively). This will provide a larger margin for the protect data transmission jitter
(JPDi,j,k). As described in the IEEE 802.11 interference scenario, the solution corresponds
to enabling the direct driving of the PNS power amplifiers, thus significantly reducing
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the latency of switching the interference state. With this in mind, the presented analy-
sis points towards a WFTT network that can be implemented and deployed in an open
environment populated by IEEE 802.15.4 standard stations. Although the network is vul-
nerable to contention from “alien” stations during the CW, the consistency of the real-time
communications performed in the PW is ensured by the protocol’s operation.
4.3.2 Timeliness
The timeliness of the WFTT protocol is determinant for its adoption in real-time appli-
cations. Besides the reliability of the transmissions, the transmission latency and jitter can
impair its usage in demanding real-time applications. Along these lines, this subsection
presents a study of the WFTT protocol timeliness focused on the transmission latency
and jitter for both types of traffic: synchronous and asynchronous. The transmission de-
lay definition corresponds to the interval of time elapsing between the instant where a
transmission is ordered to the transceiver, after the packet was successfully loaded into the
transceiver’s transmission buffer, and the instant of the packet detection at the receiver,
marked by an interrupt event at the transceiver. The transmission jitter is defined as the
difference between the minimum and maximum transmission latencies.
Synchronous Traffic
The synchronous traffic communicated in a WFTT EC can be divided in two types:
control and data. The first corresponds to the data carried by the trigger packet to inform
the slaves about the structure of the EC and of the scheduled protected transmissions.
This traffic is generated with a period given by the EC length and has a variable duration,
according to the number of protected scheduled transmissions. The transmitter delay and
jitter of this type of traffic in a given EC i is represented by TDTP i and TJTP i , respectively.
As shown in Equation 4.12, TDTP i encompasses the delay to initiate a TP transmission
(DTP ), the actual length of the transmission (LTP i) and the delay to detect its transmission
at the slaves (DdTP ). The latter, for simplification purposes and compared to the length
of the TP (LTP i), is assumed to be negligible. Equation 4.13 defines that the transmission
jitter is the same of initiating the TP transmission.
TDTP i = DTP + LTP i +DdTP , ∀i ∈ N1
✞
✝
☎
✆4.12
TJTP i = JTP i∀i ∈ N1
✞
✝
☎
✆4.13
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An estimate for both delay and jitter can be derived by considering a typified scenario
and making some basic assumptions. Consider a WFTT network encompassing three real-
time stations performing one protected transmission each per PW, for example. Provided
that the TP must contain the scheduling information of these three transmissions, the
overall length of the TP is 48 bytes, including the IEEE 802.15.4 synchronization, PHY
and MAC headers with the lengths of 5, 1 and 11 bytes, respectively, besides the MAC
footer with a length of 2 bytes. Therefore, the theoretical length of the TP transmission
(LTP i) is of 1536 microseconds.
In Section 3.4.2, it was observed that the Microchip IEEE 802.15.4 MRF24J40 transceiver
is affected by a delay of 555 microseconds and a jitter of 36 microseconds to initiate a trans-
mission, i.e., between the instant when the SPI packet transmission order is issued (of a
packet previously loaded into the transmission buffer) and the instant when the associ-
ated transmission is effectively initiated. Although these values were measured placing the
MRF24J40 transceiver in a special mode of operation called turbo mode, it is reasonable
to assume that this transceiver will exhibit a similar latency when instructed to perform
standard IEEE 802.15.4 data transmissions. Thus, it is acceptable to consider that the
delay (DTP ) and jitter (JTP i) to initiate the TP can be represented by the values of 555
and 36 microseconds, respectively.
Regarding the delay to detect the trigger packet at the WFTT slave stations (DdTP ), the
latency to trigger the external interrupt line at the transceiver and to attend the interrupt
service routine at the standard station can be assumed negligible when compared to the
length of the packet. In this sense, substituting the presented values in Equations 4.12 and
4.13, it is possible to estimate a TP transmission delay of 2091 microseconds and a jitter
of 36 microseconds.
The synchronous data traffic mentioned before corresponds to the real-time information
exchanged between slave stations in the PW of the WFTT’s EC. The transmission period
of this type of traffic depends of the schedule contained in the TP, i.e., it is defined in a per
EC basis. Equations 4.14 and 4.15 represent the transmission delay and jitter associated
to this type of traffic, considering a real-time transmission performed by the slave station
k in the slave slot j of the ith EC.
TDPDi,j = DPD + LPDi,j +DdPD, ∀i ∈ N1 ∧ j ∈ [1...NPPW i ]
✞
✝
☎
✆4.14
TJPDi,j,k = JPDi,j,k∀i, k ∈ N1 ∧ j ∈ [1...NPPW i ]
✞
✝
☎
✆4.15
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As in the TP timeliness characterization, it is possible to estimate the transmission delay
and jitter by establishing some basic assumptions regarding the parameters of Equations
4.14 and 4.15. Considering that a WFTT real-time data packet has a length of 29 bytes,
its transmission length (LTP i,j) occupies a time window of 928 microseconds. Assuming,
as before, that DdPD is negligible and the values of delay (555 microseconds) and jitter
(36 microseconds) presented in Section 3.4.2 for initiating a packet transmission, it is
possible to obtain a real-time packet transmission delay and jitter estimate of 1483 and 36
microseconds, respectively.
Both types of synchronous traffic estimates could be improved by effectively measuring
the activation delay and jitter associated to the transmission of standard IEEE 802.15.4
packets and the latency of detecting a packet reception.
Asynchronous Traffic
The asynchronous traffic can be triggered at any instant of the contention window as
long as it can be guaranteed that its completion is concluded within the timing bounds of
this window. The overall transmission delay associated to WFTT contention transmissions
is defined by Equation 4.16. As documented, it encompasses the delay elapsing between
the transmission trigger and the instant in which the transceiver can begin the effective
propagation of the transmission (DCD); the length of the effective contention transmission
(LCD); and, finally, the delay to detect the contention data packet at the receiver (DdCD).
TDCD = DCD + LCD +DdCD
✞
✝
☎
✆4.16
Equation 4.17 presents the transmission jitter of the mth contention data packet trans-
mission. This jitter comprises two components, one related to the time window elapsing
between the transmission order and its effectiveness in the medium (JCDm), and the other
to the backoff algorithm of the CSMA-CA mechanism employed in standard IEEE 802.15.4
communications (JBKm).
TJCDm = JCDm + JBKm∀m ∈ N1
✞
✝
☎
✆4.17
As before, assuming that the delay and jitter of initiating a transmission can be approx-
imately represented by the values observed in Section 3.4.2, the DCD and JCDm parameters
can take the values of 555 and 36 microseconds. The overall length of a data contention
packet is 25 bytes. Therefore, its transmission has an effective duration of 800 microseconds.
By assuming that DdCD is negligible, it is possible to obtain a representative estimate of
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the contention packet transmission delay using Equation 4.16. Thus, its value corresponds
to 1355 microseconds.
Regarding the jitter expressed in Equation 4.17, the missing parameter is the jitter in-
troduced by the IEEE 802.15.4 backoff algorithm. Recalling Section 2.1.2, in the unslotted
version of the CSMA/CA, before initiating the CCA, a random number of backoff periods
ranging from 0 to 2BE − 1 must be enforced. Provided that each backoff period has a
length of 20 symbols, the symbol rate is 62500 symbols per second and the typical back-
off exponent used in broadcast packets is 3, the maximum delay experienced during the
backoff phase is bounded by a value of 2240 microseconds (JBKMAX = 2240). Therefore,
an estimate of 2276 microseconds can be obtained for the maximum jitter of a contention
data transmission.
As in the synchronous traffic case, this estimate of the delay and jitter can be improved
by measuring the effective activation delay and jitter associated to the transmission of
standard IEEE 802.15.4 packets. Moreover, the latency of detecting a packet reception
could be evaluated in order to provided a more accurate timeliness estimate.
4.4 Summary
This chapter presented the foundations, operation and characterization of the Wireless
Flexible Time-Triggered (WFTT) protocol. It provided a short review of the protocol
upon which it was inspired (FTT), describing its architecture, operation and distinctive
features. Afterwards, the specification of the WFTT protocol was presented focusing on
its architecture and operation. The key elements that characterize the protocol’s behavior
(elementary cycle, packet structure, temporal isolation, etc.) were introduced and ana-
lyzed. Finally, in order to obtain an improved characterization of the WFTT protocol, a
study focused on its implementation constraints and timeliness was presented. This study
was conducted on an explicative scenario encompassing WFTT stations using the IEEE
802.15.4 protocol and “alien” stations attempting to perform transmissions on a common
region of the spectrum using one of two communication technologies: IEEE 802.15.4 and
IEEE 802.11.
Regarding the implementation feasibility, it was found that in a scenario employing the
IEEE 802.15.4 technology to perform data communications in an environment affected by
“alien” IEEE 802.11 noise (BWdata ≪ BWalien), the maximum period of time during which
the medium can be idle without risking being compromised is 10 microseconds. Likewise,
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the maximum idle time interval between the end of the black-burst interference sequence
initiating an EC and the end of its PW is expressed by VPWBWdata≪BWalien . Therefore, in
order not to compromise the PW, this parameter must be kept smaller than 10 microsec-
onds. Using the current WFTT PNS implementation this is not possible due to the latency
and jitter introduced by the use of SPI commands to turn on/off the transmission of inter-
ference. This limitation can be overcome by driving directly the PNS transceivers’ power
amplifiers.
More on the implementation feasibility. In a scenario where both WFTT and “alien”
stations employ the IEEE 802.15.4 technology (BWdata ≥ BWalien), the maximum interval
of time during which the medium becomes unprotected in the interval elapsing from the
black-burst interference sequence to the end of the PW is given by the VPWBWdata≥BWalien pa-
rameter. As demonstrated, in order to maintain the consistency of the PW, this parameter
must be bounded by a value of 128 microseconds, which corresponds to the duration of the
IEEE 802.15.4 CCA operation. Although the current PNS implementation provides some
margin for the slave stations to theoretically meet this bound, its implementation using
resource limited embedded devices seems challenging. Hence, as in the former scenario, an
improvement of the PNS implementation to provide a larger slack in the timeliness of the
slave stations is required.
The timeliness of the WFTT protocol was analyzed focusing on both the synchronous
and asynchronous traffic. In the first case, the delay and jitter associated to both trigger
and real-time packet transmissions was studied. Besides presenting the expressions ruling
the delay and jitter experienced by these two packet types, an estimate based on reasonable
assumptions is provided. The delay and maximum jitter of the trigger packet transmission
is given by the TDTP i = 2091 microseconds and TJTP i = 36 microseconds estimates,
respectively. The components that mostly contribute to the TP transmission delay are the
activation delay and the duration of the effective transmission. Concerning the timeliness
estimates for the real-time packets, TDPDi,j = 1483 microseconds and TJPDi,j,k = 36
microseconds correspond to the transmission delay and maximum jitter that these packets
may suffer. As in the former case, the transmission activation delay and its length are the
most representative latency components.
The asynchronous traffic timeliness was also studied in this chapter. Provided that
all data transmissions in the WFTT protocol are performed using broadcasts, this study
focused on the broadcast of packets according to the IEEE 802.15.4 CSMA/CA unslotted
scheme. The result of this study was the identification of two expressions that represent the
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Table 4.6: WFTT transmission timeliness estimates
Type
Delay Jitter
(µs) (µs)
Trigger Packet 2091 36
Real-time Packet 1483 36
Contention Packet 1355 2276
delay and jitter of a contention based transmission using the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol. Be-
sides performing a timing analysis and identifying the key delay components contributing
to the timeliness parameters, this chapter also provides the corresponding estimate using
plausible assumptions. In this sense, it was concluded that the transmission delay and
jitter of broadcast contention data packets is of 1355 and 2276 microseconds, respectively.
In this case, besides the activation delay and length of the transmission, the most repre-
sentative delay component of the packet’s timeliness is the jitter associated to the IEEE
802.15.4 CSMA/CA backoff procedure. The timeliness estimates of the trigger, real-time
and contention packets are summarized in Table 4.6 for easier reference.
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“No amount of experimentation can ever
prove me right; a single experiment can
prove me wrong.”
Albert Einstein (1879 - 1955) 5
Framework Implementation
The previous chapter presented and analytically validated the WFTT protocol. In this
chapter, an instantiation of the protocol is provided using practical devices. A description
of the envisaged operation and of the implementation of master and slave devices is also
discussed. This description is focused on the device’s individual architecture and operation.
5.1 Envisaged WFTT Operation
The instantiation of the WFTT protocol using real devices must account for the lim-
itations associated to an experimental implementation, namely the processing delays of
handling events. It is important that these delays are acknowledged and well characterized
in an early stage of the implementation since they pose timing restrictions that, poten-
tially, may cause an incorrect behavior of the stations participating in the WFTT network
and are only realized in the later states of development (e.g., during the tests). It is also
important to have a global perspective of the WFTT network operation, including all the
expected events that may occur in a single elementary cycle as well as the different types
of devices participating in the network. Besides allowing a better understanding of the
overall operation, it makes it possible to identify the interactions and dependencies among
different stations and elements.
Figure 5.1 depicts the WFTT operation of the envisaged implementation during the
length of one elementary cycle. As illustrated, three stations are represented: one master
and two slaves. While the slave stations are only able to transmit data packets, the
master station is also capable of performing protective 1© and black-burst 2© interference
transmissions using the PNS. The 1© notation refers to the 1© element marked in Figure
5.1 and it will be used in the remaining of this chapter to unequivocally mention other
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Figure 5.1: WFTT elementary cycle implementation
relevant elements of this figure.
As represented, the black-burst noise is transmitted in the same IEEE 802.15.4 channel
as the data packets. The protective noise is issued on a lateral channel, which does not
overlap the data channel. Figure 5.1 documents these three types of transmissions in two
timelines: one associated to the black-burst noise (B) and data packets; and the other to the
protective interference (P). In order to facilitate the association between the station which
performs a given transmission and the corresponding medium occupancy, all transmissions
are represented simultaneously on the timeline of the issuing station and on the timeline
of the medium.
As defined in the previous chapter, the elementary cycle encompasses the protected,
contention and inactive windows. The protected window consists of time slots, which are
previously reserved for priority communications between real-time stations. The transmis-
sions performed in the contention window use the CSMA/CA mechanism to contend for
the medium. When appropriate, the PNS synthesizes protective noise, black-burst noise or
both, depending of the phase of the WFTT elementary cycle.
The envisaged WFTT operation relies on a tight elementary cycle control by the master
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station and a configurable operation by the slave stations. As to the former, using the PNS,
the master synthesizes noise in both black-burst and protective channels during a period of
time corresponding to the maximum length of any packet being transmitted by an “alien”
station. In this case, on account of the conclusions of Section 2.3, Wi-Fi was considered
the “alien” technology with the highest potential impact on the IEEE 802.15.4 network
operation. After the initial noise sequence, “alien” stations are (eventually) prevented from
transmitting on the medium and the master station transmits immediately after the trigger
packet 3©, which encodes the schedule of the current elementary cycle. This trigger packet
(TP) includes the information described in Figure 4.5, which, among other parameters,
defines both the number of real-time slots (and offsets) in the protected window and the
durations of the contention window and of the elementary cycle. The TP is accompanied by
protective noise, which hinders Wi-Fi stations from finding the medium idle and initiating
the transmission of packets.
As documented in Figure 5.1, in the envisaged implementation, besides the TP, two
additional types of data transmissions will occur during the length of an elementary cycle:
real-time 9© and contention 13© transmissions. The support of real-time and contention
transmissions aims at meeting the requirements of the WFTT protocol for issuing packets
in the protective and contention windows, respectively. The occurrence of these two types
of transmissions by the same slave in a elementary cycle is not common in real world
deployments. Usually a slave has communication requirements fitting on either the WFTT
protected or contention windows. However, to provide a more complete vision of the
WFTT operation, two types of transmissions are explained in a single elementary cycle.
Furthermore, the firmware implementation of the slave stations was conducted in order
to enable switching their transmission pattern in runtime, i.e., modifying the station type
and, hence, change the type of packets sent by that station (real-time or contention).
By allowing changing the type of packets being transmitted using external commands
in runtime, it is possible to easily devise an automated control system to monitor and
evaluate the WFTT protocol operation. This is of paramount importance, given that
it can significantly reduce the amount of time spent preparing the WFTT testbed and
performing the associated trials. In the remaining of this section, a detailed explanation
of the envisaged WFTT protocol operation is presented with an emphasis on the delays
introduced by the limitations of a practical implementation.
The WFTT example presented in Figure 5.1 shows a protected window including an
overhead delay and two real-time transmission slots. After the reception of the trigger
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packet 3©, all real-time stations take some time to read it from their transceivers 5©,
process it 6©, log it 7© and, finally, load a real-time packet 8© to the transceiver for
transmission. The logging action enables an external characterization of the WFTT time-
liness. In this sense, a guard interval is reserved to enable an (external) assessment system
saving and time-stamping the received packet. The WITAS is the adopted tool for this
purpose. Details about its architecture and operation are available in Appendix A.
The timeliness valuation of the protocol requires the support of specific features on the
WFTT stations. Hence, an early assessment of the impact of this features in the WFTT
implementation is required since, otherwise, a later inclusion may result in modifications
whose complexity can disrupt the timeliness of the WFTT protocol already implemented.
In this sense, the implementation of the WFTT defines that whenever an event occurs
(transmission/reception of a packet), it is logged according to a predefined process whose
delay is foreseeable and can be considered in the implementation. The accounting of these
delays occurs for the trigger packet 4©, real-time packet 10© and the packets transmitted
in the contention 14© window, as documented in Figure 5.1. The propagation delay is
considered negligible when compared to the delays mentioned above for a wireless local
area network. The scheduled real-time offsets encoded in the TP account for the sum of
these delays, guaranteeing that the slaves are ready to transmit their packets when the
master is expecting them to be transmitted.
During the period in which the slave stations are processing the TP, the master station
occupies the medium to guarantee its inactivity when the first real-time station starts its
transmission in the assigned slot. Hence, it drives the PNS to synthesize both protective 1©
and black-burst 2© interference during this interval. Then, at the offset instant encoded in
the TP, the slave station scheduled for transmitting in the first slot triggers the correspond-
ing real-time packet. The master station protects this transmission by ensuring that the
PNS generates protective interference 1© during the length of the packet. Afterwards, the
slave station logs 10© the transmitted real-time packet while the receiving stations (master
and slaves) read it 11© from their transceivers and proceed to its logging 12©. During this
interval, the medium is protected from Wi-Fi transmissions by both protective 1© and
black-burst 2© interference. The cycle described for the first real-time packet transmitted
in the protected window is replicated for the second real-time transmission, as shown in
Figure 5.1.
The WFTT protocol defines that there must be an IFS period between consecutive data
transmissions to ensure that, for example, slave stations have enough time to perform their
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transmissions and also to receive the transmissions from neighbor slave stations. However,
it is important to notice that a more agile mechanism could be devised in the protected
window, if slave transmissions targeted exclusively the master. In this case, the IFS could
be significantly reduced, since the master remains in the receive state during the whole
duration of the protected window.
As introduced, the firmware implemented for the slave stations was designed to allow an
on-line switching of the type of packets being transmitted. In the description of the protocol
presented above it was assumed that the slave stations were configured to transmit real-
time packets according to the schedule defined by the TP. In order to explain the master
and slave operation on the contention window, it is assumed that slaves are specifically
configured to transmit packets in this window. In this sense, they listen to the medium
for the TP and, upon its reception, they determine the offset of the contention window
beginning using the information carried in the TP. Only one transmission is scheduled per
elementary cycle. Its offset follows a uniform random distribution, which is chosen to occur
within the window temporal bounds. This offset is added to the window offset defined by
the TP. At the scheduled instant, the CT packet is transmitted 13© and logged accordingly
14© by the slave. As before, all stations receiving the packet must read it 15© from their
transceivers and log it 16© as well.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the inclusion of the inactive window in the WFTT
elementary cycle was motivated by the requirement of allowing other technologies (in this
case Wi-Fi or IEEE 802.15.4) to contend for the medium and to be serviced in a periodic
fashion. Otherwise, such “alien” technologies would suffer from “starvation” before being
able to access the medium.
5.2 Master Station
As aforementioned, the master station is responsible for coordinating the real-time
network operation and bridging information from/to the outside world. In this section,
the base architecture of the master station is scrutinized both in terms of the employed
hardware and of the devised software.
5.2.1 Architecture
A key element of the WFTT hardware design is its centralized nature, in which a
single master station should be able to manage a large number of slave stations (several
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tens). Therefore, the pressure for cost reduction is shifted towards slave stations, i.e.,
the implementation of the master station does not have a tight limitation concerning the
low-cost requirement. Furthermore, although in some scenarios it could be of interest
to support battery powered master stations, in general, it is assumed that they can get
energy from the mains supply through a voltage converter. Also, since the master station
will operate as a gateway between the low-power wireless network and the outside world,
different communication technologies can be selected for this task. Thus, it seems beneficial
that these technologies can be enabled in the master station in a flexible way. For example,
using a modular approach where each technology is implemented in a module that can be
easily attached/detached from the master station board. Further requirements regarding
the master station architecture are the possibility of connecting it directly to a computer
platform (embedded or not) and the availability of a simple human interface to monitor
and change the master station’s operation.
Hardware
Figure 5.2 shows a block diagram of the master station. As documented, it encompasses
several components: Micro-Controller Unit (MCU), IEEE 802.15.4 communication mod-
ule, Expansion Port, Power Control, and Human Interface. Optionally, a USB interface,
Temperature Sensor and a battery (Li-ion) can also be integrated. The MCU will hold the
application responsible for coordinating the real-time wireless network as well as to bridge
any communications to the “world outside”. Therefore, the MCU not only has to be fast
enough to run these applications in a timely fashion, but must also have enough memory to
store and run the application and any communication stacks being employed. The adopted
MCU is the Microchip’s dsPIC33FJ256MC710, a high-Performance 16-Bit Digital Signal
Controller (DSC) capable of running at 40 MIPS and providing a flash memory of 256 kB
plus a Random-Access Memory (RAM) memory of 30 kB. Besides speed and memory ca-
pacity, this DSC presents other features that make it especially adequate for implementing
the master station, namely:
• The support of up to nine 16-bit timers, which can paired up to form four 32-bit
timers, thus enabling the development of time sensitive applications;
• An interrupt controller with a 5-cycle latency capable of handling up to 67 distinct
interrupt events, allowing a low delay/jitter exception handling support;
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Figure 5.2: Block diagram of the master prototype
• The integration of a Direct Memory Access (DMA) module with eight hardware chan-
nels and a 2 Kbytes dual ported DMA buffer area, enabling data transfers between
the RAM and the peripherals while the Central Processing Unit (CPU) is executing
code, i.e., there is no cycle stealing from the CPU when data transfers occur between
DMA-enabled peripherals and the RAM;
• Multiple management features such as, for example, Power-up Timer, Watchdog
Timer and Fail-Safe Clock Monitor, which provide an increased assurance of the
MCU’s correct behavior;
• Several communications interfaces. The dsPIC33FJ256MC710 DSC integrates two
Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) modules, two Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) mod-
ules, two Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) modules and two
Controller Area Network (CAN) modules, allowing the support of a wide variety of
peripherals (e.g., memories, communication modules, etc.).
In addition to these features, this DSC encompasses an eight channel Pulse Width
Modulation (PWM) module and a quadrature encoder interface module targeting motor
control applications as well as a 12-bit, 500 kbps Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) with
32 channels capable of sampling two, four or eight inputs simultaneously, targeting sensing
applications.
The IEEE 802.15.4 module enables short-range low-power wireless communications in
the 2.4 GHz Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) band according to the IEEE 802.15.4
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standard [74]. The MRF24J40 transceiver was selected in Section 2.4 as the best solution
for supporting IEEE 802.15.4 compliant communications. Hence, the master station can
mount two IEEE 802.15.4 modules based on this transceiver, which are characterized by
different communication ranges: Microchip’s MRF24J40MA and MRF24J40MB modules.
The first has a typical output power of +0 dBm (36 dB transmit power control range)
and a −94 dBm typical sensitivity. The second supports an output power of +20 dBm
(56 dB transmit power control range) and a −102 dBm typical sensitivity. Figure 5.3
presents a prototype of the master station with either the MRF24J40MA (Low-Power)
or the MRF24J40MB (High-Power) module assembled. Both modules were enabled in
the master station, although mutually exclusively, because of the heterogeneous range
requirement posed by different applications. Several reasons accounted for this option,
namely the familiarity with the Microchip tool-chain; the easy integration with the adopted
MCU; the base transceiver low-cost and low-power operation; the IEEE 802.15.4 standard
compliance; and the features provided by the transceiver, highlighted by the hardware
support for the CSMA-CA mechanism; the automatic ACK response; the support of the
full range of CCA modes and RSSI/LQI; the hardware security engine (AES-128) with
support for the CTR, CCM and CBC-MAC modes; and the encryption and decryption
support for the MAC and higher layers. The other technical aspects that drove this option
were the low-power consumption, as documented in Table 5.1; the simple 4-Wire SPI
interface; the integrated oscillator circuitry; the small form factor; and the support for the
ZigBee, MiWi, MiWi P2P stacks and proprietary wireless networking protocols, especially
those requiring the disabling of the CSMA-CA medium access mechanism. Besides these
features, this module encompasses specific hardware allowing both the standard IEEE
802.15.4 transmission scheme, which is capable of data rates of 250 kbps, as well as a
special operating mode capable of data rates of 625 kbps known as turbo mode. For further
information about the uMRF board and its peripherals, please refer to Appendix C, Section
C.2.
As depicted in Figure 5.2, the expansion port allows extending the functionality of
the master station using a mezzanine board. Currently, three mezzanine boards have
been devised: Wi-Fi, Ethernet and PNS. Prototypes of the Wi-Fi and Ethernet boards
are shown in Figure 5.4. The main objective of these boards is to enable the master
station with an alternative communication technology that can operate as a second tier for
bridging the communication between the low-power network and the Web, for example.
The Wi-Fi board is based on the ZeroG ZG2100M module, which is a single-chip IEEE
178
5.2. MASTER STATION
(a) Low-Power (b) High-Power
Figure 5.3: Master prototypes
Table 5.1: MRF24J40MA, MRF24J40MB and MRF24J40MC power consumption
Mode MRF24J40MA MRF24J40MB MRF24J40MC
Transmit 23 mA 130 mA 120 mA
Receive 19 mA 25 mA 25 mA
Sleep 2 µA 5 µA 12 µA
802.11b including MAC, baseband, RF and power amplifier, featuring hardware support
for the AES and RC4 based ciphers (WEP, WPA, WPA2 security), SPI slave interface
with interrupt and a serial trace interface (UART). The Ethernet board is built around
the Microchip’s ENC28J60 stand-alone controller, which is an IEEE 802.3 compatible
Ethernet controller integrating a MAC and a 10Base-T PHY. Figure 5.2 also specifies
CAN as a potential technology to include in the board. This could be important, for
instance, to extend a FTT-CAN network with wireless communications.
As aforestated, the PNS aims at synthesizing interference and it is a key sub-block of
the master station. The implementation adopted for the WFTT is the one based on the
COTS components described in Section 3.4. Therefore, the PNS consists of a mezzanine
board mounting several elements, the more important being the 32-bit MCU and the three
MRF24J40MC transceivers. These encompass a Power Amplifier/Low Noise Amplifier and
a Ultra Miniature Coaxial (U.FL) connector allowing to mount an external dipole antenna.
Despite sharing the MAC/Baseband features of its MRF24J40MA and MRF24J40MB
counterparts, the MRF24J40MC transceiver is characterized by a typical output power of
+19 dBm with a 45 dB transmit power control range.
Software
The software architecture of the master station was designed on top of its hardware,
i.e, the MCU for processing; the IEEE 802.15.4 transceiver for supporting wireless com-
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(a) Wi-Fi (b) Ethernet
Figure 5.4: WFTT master mezzanine boards
munications; the PNS for synthesizing interference according to the WFTT protocol; the
WITAS Event Logger for allowing the protocol’s timeliness evaluation; and, finally, the
human interface (HMI) for following the master’s operation. Hence, on the bottom of the
layered software architecture lies the hardware, as portrayed in Figure 5.5. The second
layer corresponds to the hardware interface, including libraries to drive directly the MCU’s
UART and SPI ports, timers, and digital inputs and outputs. Additional libraries for con-
trolling the PNS and the IEEE 802.15.4 MRF24J40MA/MRF24J40MB transceivers are
also employed in this layer. These libraries are built upon the features provided by the
hardware driver libraries mentioned before. Above the hardware interface is the WFTT
layer, which makes use of the functions provided by the WFTT library to instantiate the
WFTT protocol and facilitate the application development on top of it. The WFTT layer
implementation is built around a timer with a 200-nanosecond resolution, enabling schedul-
ing WFTT events with high temporal accuracy. This timer is used to control the lengths
of the protected, contention and inactive windows, as well as the durations of the real-time
slots in the protected window. Besides timer events, the WFTT layer implementation is
driven by two other events: transmission and reception of a packet. In this sense, if any
of these events occur, the flow of execution is passed to this layer, which proceeds to its
analysis, checking if an action is required in response. This layer implementation relies
heavily on the execution of ISRs to acknowledge, in a timely manner, timer expirations,
packet receptions and packet transmissions. The current version of the WFTT layer does
not provide a service to support the dynamic offset calculation of the real-time slave trans-
missions. These are statically defined at the application layer, where the requirements are
set.
The WFTT layer includes an optional times-tamping library that was devised during
the WFTT’s early stages of development with the purpose of closely monitoring the time-
liness of the events occurring during the execution of the WFTT protocol. Hence, when
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Figure 5.5: Software architecture of the master station
employed, it configures a 32-bit hardware timer to operate as a counter with a time reso-
lution of 2 microseconds. It operates by time-stamping every event of the WFTT master
state machine (beginning of the protected window; beginning of a real-time slot; and be-
ginning of the contention and inactive windows) and, during the following WFTT inactive
window, print the timing log to a terminal application running in PC via a serial port. The
use of this library allowed to confirm the duration of the real-time slots and of the timing
windows as they are perceived by the master station. Hence, it provided the necessary
means to pre-evaluate the WFTT implementation, confirming the timely execution of the
WFTT protocol in the master station.
The user application resides at the application layer. For the purpose of this work,
the user application is very simple, since it mainly aims at providing a proof of concept of
the WFTT protocol. As it will be detailed in Chapter 6, the user application considers a
WFTT network with three real-time stations, each one performing a single transmission
in every elementary cycle.
The logging cross layer represented in Figure 5.5 provides support for monitoring the
performance of the WFTT protocol. This task is conducted using an external tool named
WITAS, which collects information about the transmission and reception events occurring
in a WFTT network. Using this information the WITAS tool is capable of computing the
delays elapsing between the instants of packet transmissions and receptions. In order to
cope with the WITAS operation requirements, it is necessary to embed the WFTT stations
(master included) with an automatic mechanism that signals packet events and provides
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access to its content. This is achieved at the logging cross layer. As documented in Fig-
ure 5.5, it employs the WITAS library, which encompasses the definitions and functions
required to help the WFTT station interface the external WITAS tool. Additional infor-
mation regarding the use of the WITAS tool to assess the WFTT protocol performance
can be found in Chapter 6. A description of the WITAS tool architecture and operation
is available in Appendix A.
The configuration cross layer was developed so as to render possible both changing the
master’s parameters in runtime, as well as controlling its operation. The parameters whose
modification is supported, besides the contention window and inactive window durations,
are the sequence number transmitted in the packets and used in the WITAS logging process;
the communication channel ; and the transmission power of the IEEE 802.15.4 transceiver.
The control commands supported by this module are the start/stop/reset of the master
station and the start/stop of the black-burst or protective interference transmitted by
the PNS. The later commands were devised targeting the stand alone evaluation of the
PNS. The master station configuration process is conducted by means of serial messages
complying with a specific pre-defined format. These messages can be sent, for example,
from a terminal emulator such as the HyperTerminal to the serial port connected to the
master station. This software architecture description provides the necessary background
for the study of the master’s operation, which is presented in the following subsection.
5.2.2 Operation
Before detailing the operation of the firmware running in the master’s station microcon-
troller, it is important to review the operation of the PNS, which supports the synthesis of
both protective and black-burst interference. The PNS considered in the implementation
of the master was detailed in Section 3.4 and operates in one of six states, namely:
Init: The three MCU SPI ports are configured to interact with the attached IEEE
802.15.4 transceivers in this state. Furthermore, the MRF24J40MC transceivers are
configured to operate in the turbo mode and disable the CSMA/CA mechanism.
Hold: All the transceivers are idle, i.e., are ready to start transmissions but wait for
the corresponding trigger signal. Also, their power amplifiers are turned off.
Armed: Paired transceivers perform transmissions in turns, on a selected channel
and with a fixed period, which ensures that a given IEEE 802.15.4 channels can be
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fully occupied. However, such transmissions are not propagated to the medium since
all power amplifiers are turned off.
Black-burst noise: Packets are transmitted on the configured black-burst channel
by two transceivers, in turns, provided that the associated power amplifiers are turned
on.
Protective noise: Packets are transmitted in the configured protective channel by
two transceivers, in turns, provided that the associated power amplifiers are turned
on.
All: Packets are transmitted to the medium in both the configured black-burst and
protective channels. This mode, however, is not available in the master implementa-
tion due to the hardware limitations identified in Section 3.4.
Although the PNS is not currently capable of simultaneously synthesizing both protec-
tive and black-burst interference, the master firmware implementation is not changed to
cope with this limitation. This option is motivated by the fact that it will allow improving
the PNS without requiring any modifications on the master’s firmware. Furthermore, the
PNS described in Section 3.4 is configurable and allows to define the synthesized interfer-
ence type. Hence, for evaluation purposes, it will be possible to configure trials where the
PNS transmits effectively one of the two types of interference. However, in the remain-
ing of this section, it will be assumed that the PNS holds no limitations regarding the
simultaneous support of both types of interference.
The operation of the master station can be modeled by a state machine encompassing
eight states, as documented in Figure 5.6. When the master is turned on, it is set to the
INIT state. The master remains in this state until all initializations are concluded, namely
the initialization of the internal timer and inputs/outputs, of the PNS to the HOLD state
and of the MRF24J40MA/B transceiver, among others. Regarding the transceiver initial-
ization, there is a design option that is worth mentioning. Although the MRF24J40MA/B
transceiver supports different security features, these were disabled in order to improve the
time response determinism of transmitting and receiving packets. The future development
of the WFTT protocol should account for the inclusion of security mechanisms to avoid
unauthorized access to sensible information exchanged in the network.
Afterwards, the master switches to the inactive window (IW ) state and programs the
internal timer to expire at the end of its duration (IW DUR). This allows the master to
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Figure 5.6: Master station’s state diagram
enforce an inactive window with a (IW DUR) duration. This state was devised to allow the
medium access of “alien” technologies during the elementary cycle. In this state the master
drives the PNS to the ARMD state where it becomes ready to transmit, i.e., although noise
is locally synthesized by the PNS, it is not sent to the medium because the power amplifier
is turned off.
When the timer expires, the master switches to the black-burst transmission state
(BBTX ), where it will eventually force the existing alien stations to backoff from the
use of the medium. When this transition occurs, the timer is scheduled to expire after the
duration of the ongoing black-burst (BB DUR). The duration of this period is such that it
guarantees an idle medium after its completion. In this state, the master drives the PNS
to the TXAL state, ensuring that any “alien” stations contending for the medium will
find it occupied in both black-burst and protective channels. Furthermore, to guarantee
the shortest possible TP latency, the master loads the TP to the transceiver during this
period, making it ready to transmit in the next state.
After elapsing the BB DUR period, the master immediately initiates the transmission
of the TP ruling the following elementary cycle. In addition, the master drives the PNS
to the TXKbytesPN state for the duration of trigger packet. This interference pattern is
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transmitted simultaneously to the TP, on a side channel, to ensure that alien stations will
not find the medium idle and attempt transmissions, even with ongoing IEEE 802.15.4
transmissions employing a small amount of power. This is the TPTX state.
When the transmission ends, the master switches to the OHEAD state, which provides
a time window where slaves can process the TP and become ready for transmitting without
risking having the medium available for “alien” stations. This is implemented by occupying
the medium with both black-burst and protective interference. During this period, the
master sets the timer to expire after a period of time given by OHEAD DUR and drives
the PNS to the TXAL state. The OHEAD DUR period corresponds to the sum of the
slave’s time to read the TP from its transceivers 5©, process it 6©, log it 7© and load a
real-time packet to the transceiver for transmission 8©, as presented in Figure 5.1.
After the overhead period elapsed, the master proceeds to ensure that the upcoming
real-time transmissions are not affected by any “alien” stations. Hence, provided that their
duration is known beforehand, the master switches to the PDATA state, configures its timer
to expire after their duration (PDATA DUR) plus a margin for slave jitter (SLACK) and
drives the PNS to the TXPN state, ensuring that the ongoing real-time transmission by a
slave will be secured against “alien” transmissions. In this state two scenarios can occur,
both leading to the IFS state. In the first, the real-time transmission is received before
the timer expires. In this case, the master increases the variable holding the number of
real-time slots processed (numRTS), configures the timer to expire after the duration of
the IFS (IFS DUR) and drives the PNS to the TXAL state. In the second case, the timer
expires before any real-time transmission has been received. This means that no real-time
packet was detected during the protected window slot. Nevertheless, the master increases
the number of real-time slots processed, drives the PNS to the TXAL state and configures
the timer to expire earlier then the full length of the IFS DUR, since it has waited an
additional (SLACK) interval for the reception of the packet and it needs to be aligned
with the elementary cycle phase.
The current version of the master’s WFTT protocol implementation does not include a
mechanism to enforce a medium busy state when a given scheduled real-time transmission
is not issued as planned. The occurrence of an unoccupied real-time slot in the protected
window creates a vulnerability, which can be exploited by “alien” stations initiating trans-
missions during this period, thus possibly compromising the remaining WFTT protected
and contention window transmissions. However, given the early development of the pro-
tocol and the proof-of-concept nature of this work, this issue was not addressed in this
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WFTT protocol implementation. The occurrence of an idle slot in the protected window
can be be avoided by establishing a timeout for the corresponding slave transmission and,
when not detected within this interval, by enforcing a busy state in the medium using the
PNS to synthesize a black-burst interference sequence for the remaining of the real-time
slot. The length of the timeout must be shorter than the minimum IFS or CCA durations
of any contending technology.
The IFS state was devised to allow all stations participating in the WFTT protocol
to be able to receive and process the real-time packets sent in the protected window. The
duration of this state (IFS DUR) was chosen to allow the slaves to read the received real-
time packets from the transceiver 11© and log them accordingly 12©, as documented in
Figure 5.1. This state was also designed to hinder “alien” stations from capturing the
medium during this interval by means of keeping the medium busy with protective and
black-burst interference.
Following the IFS state, two paths of execution may succeed. In the first scenario,
the total number of real-time slots (numRTS TOT ) was not reached and, therefore, more
real-time transmissions should follow. In this case, the master switches to the PDATA
state. Hence, as before, it configures the timer to expire after the length of the real-time
transmission (plus a margin to accommodate the slave jitter) and drives the PNS to the
TXPN state. In the second case, the number of slots defined by the trigger packet was
reached and, therefore, the master progresses to the CW state. Consequently, it configures
the timer to expire after the length of the contention window (CW DUR) and drives the
PNS to the TXPN state.
After the timer expires at the CW state, the master returns to its first operational
state, the inactive window (IW ) state. As occurred when switching from the INIT state,
the timer is configured to expire after its duration (IW DUR). Furthermore, the master
drives the PNS to the ARMD state again to ensure a high degree of interference readiness.
5.3 Slave Station
The slave station is the WFTT device that holds the application functionality, i.e., it
is the element that actually communicates information pertaining to the application being
developed. The WFTT master station is only responsible for coordinating the operation
of the slave stations and, when required, bridging the WPAN with a second tier of com-
munications. The slave, on the other hand, is bound to interface the application elements
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(sensors, actuators, etc.) and to support the exchange of information in the network.
The following subsections present the architecture and operation envisaged for the slave
stations.
5.3.1 Architecture
Given the broad range of applications where a WFTT slave station may be employed,
it is important to highlight its possible operation in different communication scenarios,
ranging from applications with best-effort requirements to real-time applications. Hence,
the slave’s architecture and operation must enable a high degree of flexibility concerning
its communication abilities.
Hardware
The hardware architecture is tightly coupled with the application being developed.
Hence, it is common that the hardware choices made for the communication nodes in a
network are dependent on the specific purpose they address. In the case of the WFTT
protocol, the goal was the development of slave nodes that could be used for communication
demonstration purposes and/or radio-frequency based localization. One of the key aspects
driving the design of the slave station was the overall low power operation. It was originally
intended that these nodes could operate with a battery for a period of, at least, two years
in environmental monitoring applications. Hence, the choice of hardware accounted for
this requirement. Figure 5.7 depicts the block diagram characterizing the slave station. As
shown, a slave is built around a MCU, which is connected to the Human Interface (HMI),
IEEE 802.15.4 module, Power Control, digital input/output pins (DIO) and analog input
pins (AI ). As an option, other elements can be integrated in the slave station board,
namely: a USB interface, a 3-axis Accelerometer, a Temperature Sensor and a Li-ion
Battery.
The adopted MCU is the Microchip’s PIC18F26K20 low power microcontroller. Al-
though it employs the nanoWatt XLP Technology for reduced power consumption, it com-
prises a high-performance RISC CPU capable of 16 MIPS operation; a data EEPROM
of 1024 bytes; a flash memory of 64 kB and 3936 bytes of RAM memory. Besides these
key characteristics, the PIC18F26K20 can provide up to 35 input/output pins; two Cap-
ture/Compare/PWM (CCP) modules (one enhanced); one Master Synchronous Serial Port
(MSSP) module; an Enhanced Universal Synchronous Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter
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Figure 5.7: Block diagram of the slave prototype
(EUSART) module; and three 8-bit timers. The CCP module can be used in motor control
applications, for example. The MSSP module has support for both 3-wire SPI and I2C
master and slave modes of operation. This module is configured as a SPI port to commu-
nicate with the IEEE 802.15.4 transceiver. The EUSART module is used to debug and
configure the slave station, as will be presented further ahead. The timers can be used to
count time or generate delays in an accurate fashion. This MCU allows the use of two of
them together, forming a 16-bit timer. The firmware devised for the slave stations makes
an extended use of this 16-bit timer to schedule events by enforcing pre-determined delays.
Additional features of this microcontroller include an analog-to-digital converter (ADC)
module with 10-bit resolution and 13 external channels, the support for brown-out reset
with configurable voltages and a watchdog timer with programmable duration.
The HMI includes two LEDs (orange and green) and one push button. These elements
are used to provide visual feedback about the slave’s operation health and to control
its run/stop state. The IEEE 802.15.4 module is the Microchip’s MRF24J40MA device
presented in Section 5.2.1. The ability to disable the CSMA/CA medium access mechanism
is instrumental in the implementation of the WFTT protocol and one of the key features
that motivated its adoption. The power control module allows the slave station to be
powered by an external Li-ion battery, by the USB interface or both. In the last case, if
the battery is not totally charged, the power control module charges the battery according
to a predefined charging profile. The optional elements are only mounted on the board,
when they are required by the specific application being developed. In this sense, the 3-axis
accelerometer is used, for example, in applications requiring the monitoring of movements
such as the survey of elderly activity patterns, for example. The temperature sensor may
be used, for instance, in environmental monitoring. Figure 5.8 presents a photography of
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Figure 5.8: The slave prototype
the uMRFs board, which is used to implement the WFTT slave stations. For detailed
information about the uMRFs board and its peripherals, please refer to Appendix C,
Section C.1.
Software
The software architecture of the slave stations was designed following the same approach
of the master station, except for the PNS, which is not required in slave stations. Hence,
it is supported on a hardware layer encompassing the MCU, WITAS Event Logger, human
interface (HMI) and MRF24J40MA transceiver external devices, as documented in Figure
5.9. The layer above (hardware interface) embodies the functionality of configuring and
driving the slave’s internal and external hardware. The hardware interface layer includes
libraries to manage the operation of the MCU’s UART and SPI ports, timers, and digital
inputs and outputs. This layer also comprises a higher level library that builds on SPI
communications to interface the slave’s IEEE 802.15.4 MRF24J40MA transceiver.
Above the hardware interface lies the WFTT layer. As in the master station, this layer
provides the necessary support for instantiating the WFTT protocol on the slave stations,
making an extensive use of the WFTT library to facilitate the application development
on top of it. However, this layer’s implementation is significantly different from its coun-
terpart in the master station, since the envisaged operation is also very distinct. In this
sense, instead of providing support for scheduling real-time transmissions or protecting
WFTT transmissions, for example, this layer implements mechanisms to control packet
transmissions according to the WFTT protocol in both the protected and contention win-
dows. Three types of events drive the WFTT layer: timer, packet reception and packet
transmission. Timer events are programmed on a 16-bit MCU timer with a 250-nanosecond
resolution and are used to accurately follow the elementary cycle timings defined by the
trigger packet. An example of this timer usage is the scheduling of a real-time transmis-
sion in the protected window. Thus, upon the reception of a trigger packet, a slave station
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Figure 5.9: Software architecture of the slave station
scheduled to perform a transmission in the protected window loads its timer with the offset
carried in the trigger packet. When the timer expires, the slave initiates its real-time trans-
mission. Packet reception and transmission events caused by the MRF24J40 transceiver
also affect the slave operation, as previously discussed. The WFTT layer relies on ISRs to
manage the interrupts generated by the MCU timer and by the IEEE 802.15.4 transceiver.
As documented in Figure 5.9, the application layer is at the top of the slave’s software
architecture. The major difference regarding the master is the existence of application
profiles, which allow a simple switching between slave modes of operation. The firmware
of the slave station was designed to support an on-line modification of the type of traffic
generated in each elementary cycle. Slave stations are usually programmed to exhibit an
unchanged (real-time or contention) behavior during their lifetime operation. However,
it was found to be of great great interest having an automated testing procedure that
could change, in runtime, the type of traffic generated by the WFTT slaves. Following this
requirement, two easily switchable application profiles were developed, each one generating
traffic on one specific WFTT window: protected (PW) and contention (CW). Only one
application profile can be active in any elementary cycle. If no application profile is enabled,
then no traffic will be generated by the associated slave station. The switching between
application profiles is supported by the configuration cross layer. The profile switching is
always enforced in the subsequent elementary cycle following the switching request.
The WFTT PW profile should be enabled when the slave station is required to behave
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as a real-time station, i.e., to perform transmissions in the protected window. Accordingly,
the slave station will conduct a single transmission in its reserved slot as defined by the
trigger packet. The timeliness assessment of slaves employing this type of traffic allows
characterizing the WFTT protocol’s support for real-time communications. If the WFTT
CW profile is enabled in a slave station, it will become a standard-like IEEE 802.15.4
station, using the CSMA/CA mechanism to contend for the medium during the length
of the WFTT contention window. The timeliness evaluation of the traffic generated in
this profile renders possible the assessment of WFTT communications based on medium
contention access with limited interference protection. Finally, the WFTT IW profile
should be enabled whenever it is necessary to evaluate the performance of IEEE 802.15.4
transmissions without any protection from the WFTT protocol. This is useful to directly
compare different WFTT types of traffic with regards to their timeliness and resilience in
environments affected by “alien” interference.
Similarly to the master’s software architecture (see Section 5.2.1), slave stations also
encompasses both logging and configuration cross layers. The former enables the external
WFTT protocol performance monitoring using the WITAS tool by providing information
about the occurrence of packet transmission and reception events. The latter renders
possible the runtime modification of parameters and control of the slave operation. The
slave station supports the configuration of the IEEE 802.15.4 transceiver channel and
transmission power parameters. The operation set up is managed using the start, stop and
reset control commands. The configuration and control of a slave is conducted by means
of serial messages complying to a specific pre-defined format. As before, these messages
can be sent from any terminal emulator connected to the slave station’s serial port.
Provided the background description of the slave’s software architecture, the following
subsection presents and analyzes its operation in detail.
5.3.2 Operation
As reported in the software architecture section above, the operation of a slave can be of
two different natures, each one fulfilling a specific purpose. Real-time stations address the
support of real-time traffic. Stations transmitting in the contention window enable best-
effort traffic with some degree of protection against “alien” noise. Both types of stations
have their transceiver’s security features disabled in order to comply with the master’s
mode of operation. In the following paragraphs, each one of these slave operation types
will be described in detail.
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Figure 5.10: State diagram of the (real-time) slave stations transmitting on the PW
Real-Time Stations
As shown in Figure 5.10, the operation of slave stations as real-time nodes can be mod-
eled by a state machine encompassing seven states. When the real-time slave is turned on,
it is set to the INIT state, where it remains until the initialization process is over. During
this period, among others, the internal timer and inputs/outputs, and the MRF24J40MA
transceiver are configured. Then, the state machine progresses to the TPRX state in which
it listens to the transmission of a trigger packet by the master station. When the TP is
received, it is processed and one of two scenarios can occur. In the first scenario, the
TP schedule does not refer the station. Therefore, the slave will configure the timer to
expire in the beginning of the contention window and switch to the W4CW state. The
delay programmed in the timer is obtained using the delay2CW function. In the second
scenario, the TP schedule identifies the station and grants a real-time slot for its upcoming
transmission. In this case, the station triggers the internal timer to expire at the scheduled
offset, loads the real-time packet to the transceiver (to speed up its future transmission),
obtains the length of the contention and inactive windows and proceeds to the W4PW
state. The delay configured in the timer is obtained using the delay2RTTX function. In
the W4PW state, the slave station waits for the real-time packet transmission instant to
occur and, when it does, it triggers the transmission of the preloaded packet, proceeding
to the PWTX state, which models the transmission of the real-time packet.
After transmitting the real-time packet, slave stations follow the elementary cycle tim-
ing without performing any additional transmissions. Hence, when the packet transmission
is finished, the slave configures and triggers its timer to expire at the beginning of the con-
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tention window (using the delay2CW function) and progresses to theW4CW state. When
the timer expires at this state, the slave configures it again to delay for a cwDur interval,
corresponding to the duration of the contention window, and progresses to the the CW
state. Afterwards, the timer expires and the state machine progresses to the next state,
the IW state, where it remains for the full length of its duration (iwDur). When the
inactive window elapses, the state machine goes back to its initial operational state, the
TPRX state, and repeats the steps described above.
Stations Transmitting in the Contention Window
Slave stations operating with contention transmissions can be modeled by a state ma-
chine encompassing six states, as documented in Figure 5.11. This state machine is similar
to the one presented for the real-time stations in Figure 5.10, except for the packet trans-
mission part. Hence, in the first operational state (TPRX ), the station listens to the
medium for a trigger packet. When this packet is received and decoded, the station con-
figures its timer to expire at a random instant within the contention window. Therefore,
the timer is programed with a delay value obtained from adding the contention window
time offset obtained with the delay2CW function to a random delay value, generated with
a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to the length of the contention window (obtained
with the getCWDur function) minus the maximum duration of a contention packet trans-
mission (MCTX DUR). This duration is measured from the packet triggering instant to
the instant where the associated transmission is concluded. Therefore, by using this upper
bound for the transmission offset, it is possible to guarantee that the packet transmission
will not violate its temporal limits.
After configuring the timer, enabling the CSMA/CA medium access mechanism with
the setCSMA function (disabled by default in the WFTT protocol) and initiating the
loading of the contention packet to the transceiver, the slave station progresses to the
W4CW state. In this state, the station waits for the scheduled instant to perform the
contention transmission. When this instant arrives, it triggers the transmission of the pre-
loaded packet and progresses to the CWTX state, where it remains until the contention
transmission is concluded. Afterwards, the slave station configures the timer (using the
delay2IW function) to expire at the beginning of the inactive window and switches to the
W4IW state. From here, as in the real-time station, the state machine goes to the IW
state and, after, to the TPRX state, where its behavior repeats. When the station switches
from the W4IW to the IW state, it configures the slave to operate back in the WFTT
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Figure 5.11: State diagram of the (contention) slave stations transmitting on the CW
default medium access mode (no contention) using the the setCSMA function.
5.4 Summary
This chapter presented the envisaged instantiation of the WFTT protocol. Hence,
it explained the expected operation of the devices participating in a WFTT network,
focusing on their interaction and timing behavior. In this regard, it was noticed that
the IFS between consecutive data transmissions, required by the WFTT protocol, could
be significantly reduced (or even eliminated) in specific scenarios. For example, when the
packets transmitted by slave stations are not meant to be received by other neighbor slaves
(only by the master) the IFS can be withdrawn from the WFTT operation. This occurs
because the master can be continuously receiving these packets. In this case, the overall
goodput of the network can be increased significantly.
This chapter also described both the architecture and inner operation of the two types
of devised stations: master and slave. In this endeavor, the focus was on their hard-
ware/software architecture and on the state machines that rule their operation. Regarding
the state machine of the master, it was noticed that the WFTT protocol implementation
described in this chapter does not yet support mechanisms to avoid idle periods in the
protected window when a slave station fails to transmit its schedule packet. Given the
proof-of-concept nature of the presented work, this issue was left to be addressed in a
future version of the WFTT protocol implementation. Nevertheless, a simple mechanism
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that seems adequate to mitigate this issue was described.
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“The strongest arguments prove nothing
so long as the conclusions are not verified
by experience. Experimental science is
the queen of sciences and the goal of all
speculation.”
Roger Bacon (1220 - 1292)
6
Protocol Assessment
In the previous chapter, the architecture and implementation of the WFTT prototype
stations was presented and analyzed in detail. The following step is the timeliness eval-
uation of the WFTT protocol using the developed stations. Hence, in this chapter, the
evaluation methodology is described with an emphasis on the devised testbeds and on the
timing parameters of interest. The associated results are also presented and throughly
discussed.
The approach employed to validate the WFTT protocol provides a solid evaluation of
its timeliness and behavior. As it will be demonstrated, the evaluation was performed in
two distinct scenarios. One in which the WFTT implementation was accomplished using
conservative timing margins for coping with the jitter1 of both the data transmissions and
PNS synthesized interference, herein named unoptimized WFTT implementation, and the
other where an effort was made to shorten the timing margins to the possible minimum,
named optimized WFTT implementation. Both scenarios provide valuable information
concerning the behavior and timeliness of the WFTT protocol.
In the first scenario, the trials were conducted on a residential building sub-basement
(see Section 3.5) to characterize the WFTT protocol under varying conditions regarding
the data and PNS transmission power. Besides identifying the protocol’s timeliness is-
sues regarding the timing margins, these trials allowed finding the best testing conditions,
namely the distance between elements of the WFTT network and the optimal transmis-
sion power by those elements. As such, these results allowed focusing the analysis of the
optimized WFTT version on the timeliness, emphasizing its noise immunity. In the second
scenario the trials were designed to evaluate the WFTT timing behavior both regarding the
1In this dissertation the jitter is defined as the variable component of a delay, independently of the
event nature (periodic or aperiodic) being measured.
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master’s trigger packet and the slaves’ data transmissions. The slaves’ related trials were
focused on assessing the performance of their data transmissions on the WFTT protected
and contention windows.
In order to assess the WFTT implementation, a measurement tool named WITAS
was developed and employed in both unoptimized and optimized WFTT scenarios. The
WITAS tool was designed to measure the key communication parameters of a wireless
network comprehending several nodes. This tool supports the collection of parameters,
namely the number of successful transmissions, latency, energy and can compute some re-
lated statistical variables such as the minimum, maximum, average and standard deviation
delays, among others. Although this tool was developed to target wireless communication
systems, it can also be used to assess wired setups. The WITAS tool supports time mea-
surements with a 1 microsecond resolution and the assessment of small/moderate wireless
networks.
A PC runs an application that holistically configures and controls the testbed, allowing a
fast setup for each trial. This application can also be used to store and statistically process
the (event) data collected at the Event Loggers. This information is sent by the Event
Loggers to the Event Processor, which proceeds to its forwarding to the PC application.
Detailed information regarding the WITAS architecture, operation and application can be
consulted in Appendix A.
The following sections characterize the testbeds and the collected results for the unop-
timized and optimized WFTT protocol implementations. In the latter case, the timeliness
of the trigger packet transmissions and of the transmissions performed by the slave stations
in the protected and contention windows are separately analyzed.
6.1 Unoptimized WFTT
The methodology employed in the evaluation of the WFTT protocol unoptimized im-
plementation is presented in this section. Furthermore, the results obtained with the
developed testbed are described and throughly discussed.
6.1.1 Methodology
Figure 6.1 depicts the main elements of the testbed used to assess the WFTT protocol
timeliness in its unoptimized version. On the left (Figure 6.1(a)), the physical arrangement
of the devices participating in the communications is illustrated. As documented, the test
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(a) Physical arrangement (b) WITAS setup
Figure 6.1: Unoptimized WFTT setup
setup encompasses one master station (M); two slave stations (S1 and S2); and one Con-
tender (C). The contender is placed in the vicinity of the master, separated by a distance of
0.5 meters. Studies [124] and [127] conclude that the placement of an Wi-Fi interferer near
a IEEE 802.15.4 network generally yields a network with a significant PLR/PER. Hence,
in order to evaluate such a challenging scenario, the contender’s geographical location was
selected so as to enable the assessment of the impact of having the interference source near
to the key element of the WFTT network, the master. The slaves are placed at a distance
of 9 meters away from the master, which is a value close to the standard nominal range
of the IEEE 802.15.4 technology (10 meters). As documented in Table 6.1, the slaves
are placed at different heights, namely 10 and 160 centimeters from the ground. This
physical arrangement was adopted to determine if the slave height influences the WFTT
performance.
Figure 6.1(b) depicts the connection of the WFTT elements to the WITAS evaluation
tool. As it can be seen, the two slaves S1 and S2 are connected to the Event Loggers
EL 1 and EL 2, which, in turn, are linked to the Event Processor (EP). The connection
of the EP to the PC is made using a virtual serial port, which provides a bi-directional
link between the control/process application running in the PC and the EP. The Event
Loggers (ELs) timestamp the transmission and reception events occurring in the attached
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wireless stations. After being timestamped, the events are collected by the EP in a round
robin fashion. This procedure is conducted by means of command messages sent from
the EP to the ELs. In response, data messages including event timestamp information
are transmitted by the ELs to the EP. As introduced, the PC application obtains the
timestamp information from the EP, allowing its storage and (later) analysis.
As detailed in Appendix A, a trial using the WITAS encompasses three phases: con-
figuration, execution and data processing. The configuration phase represents the period
of time in which all the elements participating in the trial are set up to operate during
that trial. This includes not only the WFTT wireless stations, but also the elements of the
WITAS. During this phase, each element is automatically assigned with new configuration
that is sent by the WITAS application running on the PC. The configurations can be saved
in text files, which can later be loaded and modified again, thus providing a high degree of
flexibility. The approach of automating the trial setup allows saving a considerable amount
of time in the configuration process.
The execution phase, where the trials are actually conducted, is started/stopped by the
WITAS PC application. As before, this operation is conducted by sending serial commands
to the EP for starting the round robin query process and to the master station to initiate
the transmission of trigger packets, which begin the generation of communication events on
the WFTT network. During the execution phase, the slave stations respond to the trigger
packet and all events are logged by the attached EL devices and communicated upstream
to the PC application. At the end of a trial, the collected data is temporarily stored on
the WITAS application (memory), but can be permanently saved as a text file in a hard
drive. This renders possible the loading of data to the WITAS application and performing
its statistical analysis.
The data processing phase occurs when the user performs the statistical analysis of the
event data currently on the applications’ memory (be it after the end of a trial or after
loading a text file with the trial’s event data). In this phase, the collected events and their
timestamps are used to calculate the communication’s statistical parameters mentioned
above. Besides these parameters, the WITAS PC application allows to automatically
obtain the transmission latency histogram and to modify its bounds, thus changing its
appearance. The results of the processing phase can be stored in text files for later reference.
The timeliness assessment of the unoptimized WFTT version was carried out using
the general parameters shown in Table 6.1. Respecting the orientation defined in Figure
6.1(a), the contender was placed on a mobile MDF stand with a height of 64 centimeters,
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Table 6.1: Unoptimized WFTT: general parameters
Parameter Unit/Type
Contender Master
Slaves
CAOS ZigFlooder Data PNS
Height cm 64 82 10 , 160
Channel
IEEE 802.15.4 — 14 14 11, 14 14
IEEE 802.11 1 — — — —
Power dBm 20 0 0, -10, -20 -2, 18 0, -10, -20
the master on a MDF table with a height of 82 centimeters and the slaves of a custom made
MDF stand, vertically aligned, at the heights of 10 and 160 centimeters, respectively. In
order to assess the ability of the WFTT protocol to cope with Wi-Fi noise in an overlapping
channel, both master (M) and slaves (S1 and S2) were configured to perform their data
transmissions in channel 14, which shares a common region of the spectrum with the Wi-Fi
channel 1. These transmissions were performed with three different power levels: 0 dBm,
−10 dBm and −20 dBm. The motivation for supporting the use of multiple power levels is
the evaluation of the WFTT protocol timeliness under different SIRs, allowing identifying
possible bounds for degradation.
The master’s PNS was configured to synthesize interference in either one of the 11 or
14 (IEEE 802.15.4) channels with a power of −2 dBm or +18 dBm. The signal synthesized
by the PNS is transmitted on channel 11 if the master requires the broadcast of protective
interference. Likewise, if black-burst interference is required, the signal is propagated on
channel 14. As addressed before, both types of interference aim at populating the medium
with energy that will, eventually, hinder co-located “alien” stations from either perceive
the medium as idle or forcefully make them to backoff from the medium. As presented in
Section 3.4, the implemented PNS can only synthesize one type of interference in a given
instant. Hence, in the interest of evaluating the impact of both types of interference on the
WFTT performance, individual trials were conducted in each scenario of PNS interference
generation:
• Protective interference on IEEE 802.15.4 channel 11;
• Black-burst interference on IEEE 802.15.4 channel 14.
The contender station is used to simulate the medium contention that “alien” stations
may impose on a WFTT network. Two interferers have been developed to meet this need:
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(a) Wi-Fi (CAOS) (b) IEEE 802.15.4 (ZigFlooder)
Figure 6.2: Single contender “alien” interference examples
one based on the IEEE 802.11 technology, named CAOS, and the other, based on IEEE
802.15.4, named ZigFlooder. The former encompasses one USB Wi-Fi dongle configured to
perform packet transmissions with a period of one millisecond on channel 1. This channel
was selected because its overlaps the IEEE 802.15.4 channel (14) chosen to support the
WFTT network. The Wi-Fi traffic is supported on packets with a length of 50 bytes (24
bytes for the PLCP and 26 bytes for the MPDU), which are transmitted at a rate of 1
and 2 Mbps (PLCP and MPDU, respectively) and at the dongle’s maximum supported
power (20 dBm). This traffic is capable of occupying a maximum of 29.6 % of the available
medium time. The elected transmission period yields a small/moderate level of channel
contention that enables the assessment of the WFTT effectiveness in avoiding Wi-Fi “alien”
contention. Figure 6.2(a) illustrates the noise generated by the CAOS tool using a single
USB Wi-Fi dongle. As it can be seen, the “alien” interference is only detected when both
PNS interference and WFTT data packets are not being transmitted. For more information
regarding the CAOS implementation, please refer to Appendix B.
The ZigFlooder is based on a uMRFs board programmed to transmit IEEE 802.15.4
standard packets on channel 14 with a length of 20 bytes, a power of 0 dBm and a period of
ten milliseconds. These contention transmissions employ the “Energy Above Threshold”
CCA mechanism with limit of -69 dBm. An example of this type of noise is depicted in
Figure 6.2(b). The ZigFlooder channel was selected so that it overlaps the one used by the
WFTT network. The chosen transmission period results in a maximum occupation of the
channel time of 6.4 %, thus resulting in a low level of IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” contention to
the WFTT network.
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Table 6.2: Unoptimized WFTT: EC parameters
Parameter Value
EC length 1100 ms
Slots in the Protected Window 3
Protected Window Length 40 ms
Contention Window Length 100 ms
Inactive Window Length 960 ms
Besides the trial’s general parameters, the WFTT protocol elementary cycle parameters
must also be configured before trials can be performed. The two slave stations are set
up to operate as real-time stations conducting transmissions on their protected window
designated slots. The master station was configured with the parameters documented in
Table 6.2. As illustrated, the elementary cycle encompasses a protected window holding
three reserved slots. The durations of the elementary cycle, protected, contention and
inactive windows are 1100, 40, 100 and 960 milliseconds, respectively. The decision to use
these values is motivated by the following facts:
• The elementary cycle duration is configured according to the requirement of the
target application. Hence, it can be very short (e.g., 40 milliseconds) when the
application merely requires a brief protected window for critical communications and
the remaining (contention and inactive) windows can be suppressed, or it can be
large in scenarios where the application demands a very low sampling frequency;
• The trials conducted for both WFTT implementations (unoptimized and optimized)
require the use of a tool named WITAS, whose operation depends on the provision
of event information by the WFTT network elements. This information is commu-
nicated by these elements to the Event Loggers during the inactive window. Hence,
its length must provide enough time slack to accommodate these transactions. The
value of 960 milliseconds was found suited for this purpose;
• Although the contention window is not used to perform any WFTT transmissions in
the current scenario, a length of 100 milliseconds was reserved for completeness;
• Albeit only two slave stations are used in this unoptimized implementation testbed,
the WFTT protocol was configured to reserve three real-time slots. Hence, the same
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number of slots is used in both unoptimized and optimized WFTT implementations,
which facilitates their comparison.
• As documented in Figure 5.1, the protected window encompasses several delays that
are instrumental in guaranteeing the correct operation of the WFTT protocol. For
example, besides the delay of loading the scheduled real-time (RT) packet into the
transceiver, the overhead interval must account for the delay of reading, processing
and logging the trigger packet (TP). In order to support all the required delays, the
protected window was configured with a duration of 40 milliseconds. This value has
been calculated by approximation, using estimates experimentally obtained.
The two slaves are configured as real-time stations 1 and 2. The use of only two stations
is motivated both by a hardware limitation of the WITAS tool, which cannot support a
high number of Event Loggers simultaneously, and by the fact that only two Event Loggers
are required to ensure the proper timing consistency of the WITAS tool. The latter is a
critical aspect that is assessed in every trial to guarantee that the timestamps used by the
Event Loggers is properly aligned, i.e., that the Event Loggers have a common view of
the time. This is validated by manually checking the timestamp values attributed by the
Event Loggers to the “trigger packet receive” event, which occurs in every elementary cycle
and must be simultaneously triggered and logged at both slave stations. If the timestamps
of this event are synchronized among Event Loggers throughout a trial, then all the trial
timestamps are valid. Otherwise, the trial is discarded. The latter case occurred only
during the development and testing phase of the WITAS tool. However, for the sake of
correctness, the “trigger packet receive” event timestamps were manually verified for all
trials.
The use of two slave stations in a scenario where three real-time slots are reserved in
the protected window has no foreseeable impact on the performed transmissions. This
is supported by the fact that these stations occupy the first two slots of the protected
window and, in theory, no “alien” station will be able to capture the medium before the
end of their transmissions because the medium will not be found idle during that period.
However, because the third slot is not used, an “alien” station may initiate a transmission
that can extend to the contention window. In any case, since this testbed simply aims at
assessing the timeliness of the two slaves operating as real-time stations, the occurrence of
an “alien” transmission in the third slot or beyond is not relevant for the evaluation.
A trial is characterized by the occurrence of 1000 real-time transmissions. Provided
that each EC comprehends two real-time transmissions, 500 ECs are required to complete
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a trial. Hence, a trial is complete when 500 trigger packet transmissions (and the associ-
ated real-time packets) are performed. The evaluation of the WFTT real-time transmission
timeliness is conducted for the three available PNS modes of operation: turned-off (OFF),
transmitting black-burst interference (BB) or transmitting a protective interference (PI).
The first case is used to collect reference information when there is no “alien” contender
disputing the medium and no PNS interference to protect it. The second case is evalu-
ated both under Wi-Fi and IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” noise. The third case is only assessed
regarding Wi-Fi noise, as the PI generated by the PNS has no foreseeable impact on IEEE
802.15.4 “alien” transmissions. In all cases, the trials are conducted for three levels of
transmission power (0 dBm, -10 dBm and -20 dBm), allowing evaluating the impact of
this parameter on the WFTT performance. In order to assess the influence of the PNS
power level on the WFTT ability to avoid “alien” noise, the trials conducted for the sce-
narios and cases mentioned above are assessed for two interference (BB/PI) power levels:
-2 dBm and +18 dBm.
The raw results of each trial include the number of successful (SUCC) and failed (FAIL)
real-time packet transmissions and the set of associated delays, besides the number of re-
ceived trigger packets. Using the WITAS application, the minimum, maximum, average
and standard deviation delay statistical parameters of a given trial are computed. Fur-
thermore, employing an OpenOffice Calc spreadsheet, the real-time and trigger packet
error rate are computed. The former corresponds to the percentage of real-time packets
that were not successfully delivered while the later is the percentage of undelivered trigger
packets.
Figure 6.3 depicts a set of photos of the testbed assembled to assess the performance of
the WFTT unoptimized implementation. As documented, the photos show the master and
slave stations that form the WFTT network, the BeeMon device that is used for monitoring
the WFTT (data and interference) transmissions and, finally, the CAOS and ZigFlooder
tools used to inject contention noise in the medium.
6.1.2 Results
The results of the WFTT unoptimized version assessment are presented in Tables 6.3
and 6.4. These tables document the WFTT timeliness results obtained when the PNS is
configured to transmit interference with a power level of -2 dBm or +18 dBm, respectively.
The first aspect to consider in both tables is the interpretation of the error rate pa-
rameters. According to the proposed operation, for each trigger packet transmission there
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(a) Master, BeeMon and CAOS (b) Slaves (c) CAOS and ZigFlooder
Figure 6.3: Unoptimized implementation testbed photos
will occur two logging events documenting its reception. Furthermore, when a given slave
receives a trigger packet and realizes that it has a scheduled transmission on the protected
window, it proceeds according to the described state machine, performing a real-time trans-
mission in the designated slot. Hence, provided that the WFTT network encompasses two
real-time slaves, there will be two real-time scheduled transmissions per trigger packet.
The trigger packet error rate (TPER) is the percentage of trigger packets that were not
received by any of the real-time stations. In other words, if a trigger packet is received by
at least one station, it is assumed to be successful. The real-time packet error rate corre-
sponds to the number of failed transmissions (FAIL) divided by the sum of the number of
failed transmissions (FAIL) with the number of succeeded transmissions (SUCC).
Reference trials
In order to facilitate a comparative analysis of the results, a copy of the reference results
described in Table 6.3 is also embodied in Table 6.4. As documented in these tables, the
trials for WFTT data transmission power levels of 0 dBm and -10 dBm have very similar
results. It is possible to observe that the real-time and the trigger packet error rates are
null. Also, the transmission delay of the real-time packets is very close both in terms of its
average value and its minimum and maximum values. The experimental real-time delay
minimum and maximum values differ from their estimates, documented in Table 4.6, by
approximately 3.2 % and 2.1 %, respectively, which is a small variation considering the
assumptions used in their computation (e.g., assuming the turbo mode timings). Hence,
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Table 6.3: Unoptimized WFTT timeliness with a PNS power of -2 dBm
PNS Contender
Power SUCC FAIL RPER TPER MIN MAX AVG STDV
(dBm) (#) (#) (%) (%) (µs) (µs) (µs) (µs)
OFF None
0 1000 0 0.0 0.0 1530 1550 1541.9 4.75
-10 1000 0 0.0 0.0 1530 1551 1542.1 4.68
-20 967 22 2.2 0.0 1531 1550 1542.0 4.62
BB
Wi-Fi
0 122 25 17.0 84.8 1533 1550 1542.2 4.48
-10 20 146 88.0 83.4 1535 1548 1543.0 3.94
-20 6 122 95.3 87.0 1534 1548 1538.3 5.85
802.15.4
0 860 41 4.6 6.0 1530 1550 1541.7 4.55
-10 856 2 0.2 14.2 1531 1550 1541.7 4.63
-20 900 4 0.4 9.4 1530 1551 1542.0 4.74
PI Wi-Fi
0 998 1 0.1 0.0 1530 1551 1542.0 4.66
-10 995 5 0.5 0.0 1530 1550 1541.7 4.76
-20 579 208 26.4 0.8 1533 1550 1541.9 4.68
SUCC Succeeded Transmissions MAX Maximum Delay
FAIL Failed Transmissions AVG Average Delay
RPER Real-Time Packet Error Rate STDV Delay Standard Deviation
TPER Trigger Packet Error Rate BB Black-burst Interference
MIN Minimum Delay PI Protective Interference
these results seem to corroborate the timeliness estimates’ validity for the transmission of
real-time packets.
Regarding the transmission power of -20 dBm, it is visible a small increase in the real-
time packet error rate (RPER). Conversely, the trigger packet error rate (TPER) is kept
constant at 0 %. This result suggests that the real-time packet errors are caused by a
degradation of the SNR, motivated by both a reduction of the transmitted power and the
relative position of the slave stations, which further contributes to decrease the received
signal strength. Recall that the slave stations are vertically aligned at heights of 10 and
160 centimeters while the master is at, approximately, nine meters from the slaves at a
height of 82 centimeters.
Trials secured by BB interference
In order to evaluate their immunity, the trials secured by BB interference are exposed
to either Wi-Fi or 802.15.4 “alien” noise. The following subsections discuss the obtained
results.
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Table 6.4: Unoptimized WFTT timeliness with a PNS power of +18 dBm
PNS Contender
Power SUCC FAIL RPER TPER MIN MAX AVG STDV
(dBm) (#) (#) (%) (%) (µs) (µs) (µs) (µs)
OFF None
0 1000 0 0.0 0.0 1530 1550 1541.9 4.75
-10 1000 0 0.0 0.0 1530 1551 1542.1 4.68
-20 967 22 2.2 0.0 1531 1550 1542.0 4.62
BB
Wi-Fi
0 176 25 12.4 77.8 1532 1550 1541.4 4.76
-10 24 112 82.4 86.4 1532 1549 1539.0 4.15
-20 15 115 88.5 86.8 1534 1549 1541.0 4.02
802.15.4
0 874 63 6.7 0.0 1531 1550 1541.9 4.76
-10 871 2 0.2 12.6 1531 1550 1542.2 4.77
-20 854 2 0.2 14.4 1531 1551 1541.9 4.81
PI Wi-Fi
0 997 1 0.1 0.2 1530 1550 1541.9 4.63
-10 993 5 0.5 0.0 1530 1551 1542.0 4.65
-20 770 112 12.7 0.6 1530 1551 1542.1 4.64
SUCC Succeeded Transmissions MAX Maximum Delay
FAIL Failed Transmissions AVG Average Delay
RPER Real-Time Packet Error Rate STDV Delay Standard Deviation
TPER Trigger Packet Error Rate BB Black-burst Interference
MIN Minimum Delay PI Protective Interference
Wi-Fi “alien” noise
Consider the results depicted in Table 6.3 for the scenario where the PNS synthesizes
black-burst interference with a power of -2 dBm. When a Wi-Fi “alien” interferer contends
for the medium, the trigger packet error rate (TPER) significantly increases when compared
to the reference values, reaching an average value of 85.0 % among the three power levels
(0 dBm, -10 dBm and -20 dBm). This trend is closely followed by the real-time packet
error rate (RPER) in the two lower transmission power levels (-10 dBm and -20 dBm).
However, for 0 dBm, the RPER is much smaller than the one experienced by the TPER
for the same transmission power. Also, it is important to notice that the -20 dBm case
also yields a higher RPER, which is consistent with the reference scenario. Regarding
the real-time transmission timeliness in this scenario, the minimum, maximum, average
and standard deviation values have variations of less than 0.25 % when compared to their
reference counterparts.
In the case of securing the WFTT network with +18 dBm interference, Table 6.4 reports
a very high packet error rate for both trigger and real-time packets in the two lower levels
of transmission power (-10 dBm and -20 dBm). However, following the trend observed in
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Table 6.3, the RPER decreases to a moderate value of 12.4 % when the transmission power
employed by the WFTT stations is 0 dBm. The TPER is also smaller in this case, but
the error rate decrease is not so steep. The delay parameters of the real-time packets show
a strong affinity with the results obtained in the reference trials. Indeed, the variation
between the reference values and those obtained in the BB scenario for a Wi-Fi contender
is bounded by a difference of approximately 0.2 %.
The trials presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 are characterized by a very high level of
determinism concerning the delay timing parameters (minimum, maximum, average and
standard deviation). This determinism is justified by the fact that the delay parameters are
only calculated for successful transmissions and because the transmissions are performed
employing a contention-free transmission mechanism. Thus, the transmission delay expe-
rienced by the real-time packets is mainly dependent of the hardware being used, which,
in this case, does not result in significant changes on the delay statistical parameters.
The presented results also indicate that the black-burst interference produced by the
PNS in both levels of transmission power (-2 dBm and +18 dBm) is not capable of avoiding
high trigger and real-time packet error rates in environments affected by Wi-Fi “alien”
noise. Assuming that the transmission power and distance between stations is adequate
for supporting successful packet transmissions in the absence of interference (as noted on
the reference trials), the high TPER/RPER can only stem from the corruption of WFTT
data packets by external noise. This overlapping of data packets and “alien” noise can
occur in two different ways:
1. The WFTT packet transmission is initiated concurrently to an ongoing “alien” trans-
mission;
2. An “alien” transmission is initiated concurrently to an ongoing WFTT packet trans-
mission.
The first case occurs when the medium becomes free for an interval of time that allows
the “alien” station to consider it idle and to initiate a new transmission. Since the WFTT
protocol assumes that the real-time slots are free from “alien” noise, real-time stations do
not check for a busy medium before initiating their packet transmissions. Hence, if an
“alien” transmission is ongoing, a collision will follow. The second case occurs when the
“alien” station perceives the medium as being free, even if a WFTT data transmission is
being propagated. This issue may arise when the WFTT packet signal is not sufficiently
strong to be acknowledged by the “alien” station.
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The justification for a high TPER in this scenario seems to be mainly coupled to the
first case. If the TPER was high as a consequence of Wi-Fi “alien” stations detected the
medium idle when a data transmission was being performed, it would significantly increase
for lower levels of data transmission power, which is not reflected in the results presented in
Tables 6.3 and 6.4. Moreover, the trigger packets employing higher levels of transmission
power are certainly detected by the “alien” stations, provided that the master station
issuing them is geographically separated from the Wi-Fi contender by a distance of only
0.5 meters.
The RPER variation seems to be motivated by both cases of overlapping. Results in
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 document a significant degradation of the RPER when the data trans-
mission power falls from 0 dBm to -10 dBm or -20 dBm. Recall that the physical distance
at which the slaves are from the contender is much higher than the equivalent distance to
the master (9 meters versus 0.5 meters). These facts seem to support the conclusion that
the amount of energy reaching the contender is not high enough for declaring the medium
busy when the real-time packets are transmitted with power levels of -10 dBm and -20
dBm. Furthermore, if the real-time slaves perform transmissions at their maximum power
(0 dBm), a significant RPER (e.g., 17 % in the PNS interference scenario with a power of -2
dBm) is still reported, possibly resulting from collisions with ongoing “alien” transmission
on protected window reserved slots.
In order to better understand the results obtained for the unoptimized version of the
WFTT protocol, a characterization of the transmissions during part of an EC was con-
ducted using the BeeMon device detailed in Appendix D tied to an HP 54602B oscilloscope.
Figure 6.4 shows the oscilloscope captures with overlay information identifying the mea-
sured intervals and specific parts of the signal marked with a number inside a circle (e.g.,
2©) for easier reference. These captures illustrate the trigger packet transmission 1© and
the first 2© and second 3© real-time packet transmissions. The signal depicted between
packet transmissions is the black-burst interference sequence. Although these captures
where obtained using a WFTT network encompassing three slaves, the presented measure-
ments only address the two first real-time transmissions.
Figure 6.4(a) demonstrates that the capture interval occurring between the BB sequence
and the trigger packet transmission 1© lasts 720 microseconds. Recalling that a medium
idle period of more than 10 microseconds (see Table 4.4) may allow a Wi-Fi “alien” con-
tender to declare it free and initiate a transmission, multiple “alien” transmissions can be
triggered during the capture interval, which justifies the high TPER documented in both
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(a) TP pre-delay (720 µs) (b) TP post-delay (80 µs) (c) RTP #1 pre-delay (400 µs)
(d) RTP #1 post-delay (400 µs) (e) RTP #2 pre-delay (400 µs) (f) RTP #2 post-delay (480 µs)
Figure 6.4: Unoptimized WFTT packet (measured) timings
Tables 6.3 and 6.4.
Results document a significant RPER of 17 % and 12.4 % for PNS transmission power
levels of -2 dBm and +18 dBm, respectively. Although these values are notably smaller
than those of the associated TPER, they still need to be addressed. The origin of these
real-time packet errors can be traced to the impairment of the WFTT protocol timeline.
This impairment occurs as the result of an “alien” transmission that is performed on a
reserved interval, in one or more slots of the protected window, for example. Recalling
that a contending “alien” station may initiate a transmission if the medium is sensed free
for a given time interval, the packet errors are a result of the existence of relatively long
idle periods between real-time transmissions in the protected window. This is illustrated
in Figures 6.4(b), 6.4(c), 6.4(d), 6.4(e) and 6.4(f), which report the effective duration of
time intervals between real-time transmissions. As depicted, the idle intervals range from
80 to 480 microseconds and were introduced in the (unoptimized) WFTT protocol imple-
mentation to provide a time margin for the PNS and MRF24J40 transceiver limitations
identified in Section 3.4.2. As in the TPER case, these intervals are much longer than
the identified 10 microseconds bound (Wi-Fi technology), which justifies the occurrence
of “alien” transmissions in this period and the subsequent packet errors. However, one
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observation arising from these results is that the time margin shortening is followed by a
reduction on the packet error rate. In this sense, the optimization of the WFTT protocol
implementation must account for a significant reduction of the time margins in order to
reduce the probability of Wi-Fi “alien” stations being able to find the medium idle during
that period.
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 allow a comparative analysis of the WFTT protocol timeliness for
two levels of PNS interference power. Although results show a general trend of TPER and
RPER reduction as a consequence of increasing the interference power from -2 dBm to
+18 dBm, the variation does not seem very significant. An exception to this trend occurs
for the value of the TPER when the employed data transmission power is -10 dBm.
IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” immunity
Consider the scenario where the WFTT network is protected by black-burst interfer-
ence propagated with a power level of -2 dBm and is exposed to IEEE 802.15.4 noise.
Compared to the reference trials, a moderate increase in the TPER is visible for all levels
of transmission power. A TPER of 14.2 % is documented for the -10 dBm transmission
power, followed by a 9.4 % for -20 dBm and 6.0 % for 0 dBm. Regarding the RPER,
the highest value (4.6 %) occurs for a data transmission power of 0 dBm and decreases to
almost zero for -10 and -20 dBm. The real-time transmission delay (minimum, maximum,
average and standard deviation) suffers a maximum variation of 0.026 % when compared
to the reference values. As documented in Table 6.3, the PNS BB interference is more
effective in dealing with IEEE 802.15.4 noise than with Wi-Fi noise. This is mainly a
consequence of the IEEE 802.15.4 longer idle interval required to declare the medium free
(128 microseconds according to Table 4.5) and of the technology’s CSMA/CA mechanism,
which is more sensible to lower levels of energy.
Assume the scenario where the PNS synthesizes interference with a power level of +18
dBm. Compared to the reference trials, the value of the RPER experiences a small increase
when the WFTT network is exposed to IEEE 802.15.4 noise. The exception occurs for the
-20 dBm data transmission case, where it is actually reduced from 2.2 % (reference) to 0.2
%. However, for a data transmission power of 0 dBm, the RPER can reach the moderate
value of 6.7 %. Regarding the TPER, it is null when the WFTT network employs data
transmissions with a 0 dBm power level. Nonetheless, it increases to an average of 13.5
% in the two lower levels of data power (-10 and -20 dBm). Compared to case where the
PNS interference is generated with a -2 dBm power level, the results show a small and
inconsistent variation of the TPER and RPER. As in the Wi-Fi contender case, the real-
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time packet timeliness does not suffer a significant variation (< 0.07 %) when the WFTT
network is exposed to the IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” noise.
Although the WFTT immunity to IEEE 802.15.4 noise is higher than to Wi-Fi noise,
the PER of trigger packets and real-time packets is not negligible. Regarding the TPER,
as presented above, the time slack existing between the end of the WFTT black-burst
sequence and the beginning of trigger packet transmission allows IEEE 802.15.4 based
“alien” stations to find the medium idle and initiate new transmissions, thus overlapping
the trigger packet and causing its corruption. However, because the clear channel assess-
ment procedure of the IEEE 802.15.4 technology lasts 128 microseconds (refer to Table 4.5
for more information), which is significantly higher than its Wi-Fi counterpart, the TPER
is lower. This results of a reduced probability of “alien” stations being able to find the
medium free. Likewise, the existing slack intervals between the real-time transmissions
in the protected window are long enough (see Figure 6.4) to allow IEEE 802.15.4 based
“alien” stations to initiate transmissions during this period. However, as discussed above,
the longer CCA and increased sensibility to noise contribute to a significantly reduced
RPER, when compared to the Wi-Fi “alien” interferer case.
Trials secured by PI interference
The protective interference (PI) results presented in Table 6.3 (PNS power of -2 dBm)
address the performance of trigger and real-time packet transmissions under contention
from Wi-Fi “alien” stations. These results document a null TPER for WFTT data trans-
missions performed with 0 dBm and -10 dBm and a small TPER of 0.8 % for transmissions
with a -20 dBm power level. The RPER is small for 0 dBm and -10 dBm, but increases to
a significant value of 26.4 % when WFTT packets are propagated with a power level of -20
dBm. When compared to the reference values, the results collected in this scenario evidence
a maximum deviation of 0.13 % regarding the delay timeliness parameters. Hence, there
is a global indication that, by securing the trigger packet and the protected window with
protective interference, it is possible to significantly improve the WFTT network immunity
to Wi-Fi “alien” noise.
A similar trend is reported in Table 6.4 for the scenario where the PNS synthesizes
protective interference with a power level of +18 dBm. In this case, the major difference
is an accentuated drop in the RPER (from 26.4 % to 12.7 %) when the WFTT network
operates with a power of -20 dBm. This variation seems to be a result of the increased
protection provided by the higher power interference synthesized by the PNS. Otherwise,
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the results are very close to those presented in Table 6.3.
Overall, Tables 6.3 and 6.4 provide evidence supporting the conclusion that the WFTT
real-time packet transmission immunity to contention noise varies with the level of power
being used in its propagation. For lower levels (e.g., -20 dBm), the RPER significantly
increases. Although this trend is followed by the TPER, it is more severe for the RPER.
Assuming that the “alien” transmissions can be effectively hindered by the protective
interference, the justification for this effect is a reduction of the SNR, as a consequence
of the lower signal levels. The reason why the RPER reduction is much steeper than the
TPER is tied to the (relative) physical positioning of the stations, i.e, the slaves are placed
perpendicularly at heights of 10 and 160 centimeters, while the master is located at a
distance of 9 meters and at a height of 82 centimeters. The physical placement of the
slaves is coincident with the physical region where each one’s transceiver antenna exhibits
the lowest gain, as illustrated by the radiation pattern of the MRF24J40MA datasheet
[167].
Conclusions
The assessment of the WFTT protocol unoptimized implementation has disclosed sev-
eral conclusions that must be accounted in the implementation of an optimized version.
The first conclusion is that the time slack introduced in this implementation to cope with
the timing limitations of both PNS and MRF24J40MA transceiver devices creates an op-
portunity for “alien” stations to perform transmissions in intervals reserved by the WFTT
protocol for critical communications (trigger and real-time packets). This conclusion was
based on the results obtained for the scenario where the WFTT network is protected by
black-burst interference and exposed to IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” noise. In this case, the time
slack is reduced by approximately half, when compared to the time slack reserved for the
trigger packet (see Figure 6.4) and the IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” technology requires a longer
idle period before initiating a transmission. The combination of both facts is determinant
in significantly reducing the probability of IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” stations being able to
find the medium free on the protected window.
Another conclusion is that the protective interference is highly effective in blocking
Wi-Fi “alien” stations from accessing the medium and being able to initiate transmissions
that jeopardize the WFTT protocol timeliness. This conclusion arises from the evidence
that the RPER and TPER are very low in the presence of Wi-Fi noise, as long as the
WFTT network is secured with protective interference.
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The levels of transmission power employed by the WFTT network elements are ad-
dressed in the third conclusion. Results indicate a timeliness improvement trend when the
levels of power used for both interference and data transmissions are higher. In this sense,
regarding the implementation of an optimized version of the WFTT protocol, the PNS
and the WFTT data transceivers should be configured with +18 dBm and 0 dBm levels
of transmission power, respectively.
Finally, the delay statistics are highly consistent across all trials and all noise/protec-
tion/power scenarios. In fact, results report variations of less than 0.2 % for such scenarios
when compared to the reference values collected in a noise-free environment.
Globally, the aforementioned conclusions allow stating that, if the two different types
of interference (BB and PI) can be synthesized simultaneously, an optimized implemen-
tation of the WFTT protocol can support dependable real-time communications in open
environments, where technologies such as Wi-Fi and IEEE 802.15.4 may contend for the
medium.
6.2 Optimized WFTT - Trigger Packet Timeliness
Following the results obtained for the unoptimized implementation of the WFTT proto-
col, this section analyzes a new version, herein named optimized WFTT implementation,
which builds on the conclusions presented for the unoptimized version. This section is
focused on the trigger packet timeliness and resilience to external interference, given its
contribution to ensure the correct behavior of the WFTT protocol.
6.2.1 Methodology
The WFTT optimized version was created after realizing that the original implementa-
tion had issues related to the adopted safety timing margins. Hence, an effort was made to
shorten these margins without compromising the overall WFTT behavior and timeliness.
As it will be discussed, one of the key identified problems was the long timing margin
reserved between the end of the black-burst transmission and the beginning of the trigger
packet. This slack interval made it possible for “alien” stations to perceive the medium as
idle, resulting in a high percentage of lost trigger packets and, consequently, in a significant
number of elementary cycles without any transmissions.
The first step in optimizing the WFTT protocol was reducing the idle time between
the black-burst and the trigger packet to a minimum, coping with both the jitter of the
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(a) Minimum delay (b) Maximum delay
Figure 6.5: Optimized WFTT capture interval length
Microchip’s MRF24J40 transceiver and the jitter of the PNS. Hence, the optimized trigger
packet timeliness was the first data flow to be assessed. Figure 6.5 illustrates two snapshots
representing the minimum and maximum time margins of the implemented capture interval
(between the black-burst sequence and the trigger packet). These captures were obtained
using an HP 54602B oscilloscope fed with the output signal of a BeeMon device that was
configured to operate on channel 14. As documented, the capture interval has a minimum
of 80 microseconds and a maximum of 200 microseconds. Although these values are still
significantly higher than the minimum SIFS (Wi-Fi) and CCA (IEEE 802.15.4), they
are much smaller than those obtained in the unoptimized WFTT implementation (720
microseconds). Hence, a substantial improvement in the TPER is to be expected in both
scenarios of Wi-Fi and IEEE 802.15.4 noise contention.
Figure 6.6(a) illustrates the physical arrangement of the setup used to perform this
evaluation. As documented, the testbed encompasses one master (M) placed at the origin;
two slaves (S1 and S2) placed in a perpendicular line at two meters from the master and
two meters from each other; and the Contender (C) fixed at 1.5 meters away from the
slave in the opposite direction of the slaves. The specific device arrangement shown in
Figure 6.6(a) was motivated by several factors, namely the WITAS limitation of coping
with large distances between Event Loggers and the Event Processor (see Appendix A),
the need of evaluating the impact of an interference source close to all the elements of
a WFTT network and the requirement of including the master station in the timeliness
assessment. The latter is justified by the fact that, to compute the trigger packet delays,
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(a) Physical arrangement (b) WITAS setup
Figure 6.6: Optimized WFTT: trigger packet timeliness setup
information about their reception and transmission instants is required. Since the master
is responsible for performing the trigger packet transmissions, it needs to be connected to
an Event Logger in order to register the corresponding instants.
Figure 6.6(b) depicts the connection of the WITAS evaluation tool to the elements
that participate in the WFTT network. As illustrated, slaves S1 and S2 were connected
to the Event Loggers EL 1 and EL 2, while the master (M) was tied to the Event Logger
EL 65. All Event Loggers were configured with the same identification of their attached
WFTT stations, as presented in Appendix A. Hence, the master was configured with the
identification 65. The three Event Loggers were connected to the Event Processor, which
was also tied to the PC running the WITAS application via a serial link. Although real-
time packets were also transmitted/received by the WFTT stations in these trials, their
information is filtered by the application so that the results only referred the trigger packet
timeliness.
Table 6.5 depicts the general parameters of the setup used in this WFTT implementa-
tion assessment. As before, the contender was placed on a MDF stand with a height of 64
centimeters, the master on a MDF table at a height of 82 centimeters and the slaves over a
large PVC table at a height of 74 centimeters, aligned as represented in Figure 6.6(a). The
master and the slaves transmitted their data packets on channel 14 with a power of 0 dBm.
217
CHAPTER 6. PROTOCOL ASSESSMENT
The PNS synthesized protective interference in channel 11 and black-burst interference in
channel 14 employing, in both cases, transmissions with a power level of +18 dBm. The
CAOS and ZigFlooder devices were used as “alien” medium contenders and were placed at
a distance of 1.5 meters from the master. This position is herein designated as “@-1.5m”.
In the CAOS, five Wi-Fi USB dongles were set to perform packet transmission in channel
(1) at the dongle’s maximum supported power. The packets had an overall length of 50
bytes, 24 bytes for the PLCP and 26 bytes for the MPDU. The packets were transmitted
at a rate of 1 (PLCP) and 2 Mbps (MPDU) with a period of one millisecond, resulting in a
duty cycle of 29.6 %. The “alien” traffic produced by this CAOS setup provided a harsher
contention environment when compared to the one used in the unoptimized WFTT imple-
mentation assessment, since five Wi-Fi dongles were setup in parallel to produce contention
noise instead of only one. The option to increase the number of Wi-Fi stations emerged
from the conclusion that the performance of an IEEE 802.15.4 network worsens with an
increasing number of contending IEEE 802.11b stations [127].
Figure 6.7 shows two illustrative signals representing examples of the medium occupa-
tion of a WFTT network when the master’s PNS synthesizes either protective or black-burst
interference. These signals were obtained using the BeeMon device (see Appendix D) con-
figured to operate on channel 14 and attached to an HP 54602B oscilloscope. The WFTT
network used to obtain these signals was arbitrarily setup with one master and three slaves
configured as real-time stations for demonstration purposes. Figure 6.7(a) depicts part of
an EC where the WFTT transmissions are secured by protective interference. As doc-
umented, the Wi-Fi noise generated by the CAOS tool was only visible in the medium
outside the bounds of the protective interference, which suggests that it is effective in
hindering the Wi-Fi “alien” transmissions, even in environments with a very high level
of contention. Figure 6.7(b) presents the part of an EC where the WFTT transmissions
are guarded by black-burst interference. In this case, it is possible to observe that the
Wi-Fi noise only occurred when either there were no ongoing WFTT data transmissions
or black-burst interference, thus indicating that this type of interference is also suited to
protect WFTT transmissions against Wi-Fi noise.
As in the unoptimized WFTT assessment, the interference produced by the ZigFlooder
is based on the transmission of IEEE 802.15.4 standard packets on channel 14 with a length
of 20 bytes, a power of 0 dBm and a period of ten milliseconds, resulting in a maximum
occupation of the channel of 6.4 %.
The elementary cycle parameters used in this assessment are documented in Table 6.2,
218
6.2. OPTIMIZED WFTT - TRIGGER PACKET TIMELINESS
(a) WFTT employing “protective” interference (b) WFTT employing “black-burst” interference
Figure 6.7: Wi-Fi multi-contender interference examples
Table 6.5: Optimized WFTT - trigger packet timeliness: general parameters
Parameter Unit/Type
Contender Master
Slaves
CAOS ZigFlooder Data PNS
Height cm 64 82 74
Channel
IEEE 802.15.4 — 14 14 11, 14 14
IEEE 802.11 1 — — — —
Power dBm 20, 15, 16, 14, 20 0 0 18 0
i.e., the parameters employed in the unoptimized WFTT implementation were also used in
this scenario. A trial was characterized by the occurrence of 1000 trigger packet transmis-
sions. Provided that two slave stations were able to listen/log the trigger packet receptions,
the execution of 500 ECs was required to to complete a trial, since each trigger packet orig-
inated two transmission logs. Similarly to the unoptimized scenario, the evaluation of the
WFTT trigger packet transmission timeliness was performed in two PNS modes of oper-
ation: transmitting black-burst interference (BB) or transmitting a protective interference
(PI). Both cases were evaluated in three perspectives: no “alien” noise, Wi-Fi “alien” noise
and IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” noise. In all cases, the trials were conducted using a power level
of 0 dBm in the WFTT data packet transmissions and +18 dBm for the PNS synthesized
interference.
The raw results obtained in each trial encompass the number of successful (SUCC) and
failed (FAIL) trigger packet transmissions/communications, besides the set of associated
delays. A transmission delay is the time elapsing between the instant when the packet
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(a) Master, BeeMon and CAOS (b) Slaves (c) CAOS and ZigFlooder
Figure 6.8: Optimized implementation: trigger packet testbed assessment photos
transmission is triggered and the instant when the packet reception event occurs at a
slave. When a trigger packet is transmitted by the master, but it is not received by a given
slave station, a transmission failure is said to have occurred.
Using the WITAS application, the minimum, maximum, average and standard devia-
tion (delay) statistical parameters of a given trial were computed. Furthermore, using this
application, it was possible to compute the number of (trigger packet) transmissions that
were not received in all slave stations. This number was designated as “Zero Reception”
failures because they correspond to the cases where the trigger packet is transmitted but
not received by any of the slave stations participating in the WFTT network. To clarify
this definition an example is provided. Consider a network composed by one master trans-
mitting trigger packets and two slaves listening to them. Assume that two trigger packets
are transmitted by the master in a trial. The first trigger packet is only received by one
of the slaves, while the second trigger packet is not received by any slave. In this case,
there is a total of three trigger packet transmission failures in which two of them are “Zero
Receptions”. The requirement of obtaining information about “Zero Reception” failures
was motivated by the need of tracing their origin.
Figure 6.8 presents several photos of the experimental setup. As depicted, in addition
to the stations composing the WFTT network (master and slaves), these photos illustrate
the WITAS elements (Event Loggers and Processor) and the sources of “alien” noise that
contend for the medium (CAOS and ZigFlooder).
220
6.2. OPTIMIZED WFTT - TRIGGER PACKET TIMELINESS
Table 6.6: Trigger packet transmission timeliness (CAOS@-1.5m)
PNS
Contender SUCC FAIL TPER MIN MAX AVG STDV
Type (#) T(#) ≀ Z(#) (%) (µs) (µs) (µs) (µs)
BB
None 1000 0 ≀ 0 0.0 2109 2128 2116.0 2.74
Wi-Fi 669 331 ≀ 6 33.1 2108 2127 2115.9 2.71
802.15.4 1000 0 ≀ 0 0.0 2108 2127 2116.0 2.82
PI
None 1000 0 ≀ 0 0.0 2108 2128 2116.1 2.71
Wi-Fi 970 30 ≀ 18 3.0 2110 2127 2115.9 2.92
802.15.4 906 94 ≀ 94 9.4 2107 2127 2116.0 2.66
SUCC Succeeded Transmissions AVG Average Delay
FAIL Failed Transmissions STDV Delay Standard Deviation
TPER Trigger Packet Error Rate T ≀ Z [T]otal ≀ [Z]ero Receptions
MIN Minimum Delay BB Black-burst Interference
MAX Maximum Delay PI Protective Interference
6.2.2 Results
Table 6.6 documents the trigger packet transmission timeliness results. In this evalua-
tion setup, for each trigger packet transmission there will occur two logging events docu-
menting its reception, provided that two slave stations participate in the WFTT network.
Although these slaves will perform real-time packet transmissions according to the schedule
defined by trigger packet, this information is filtered from the results, since this section fo-
cuses only on the trigger packet timeliness. The trigger packet error rate (TPER) presented
in Table 6.6 corresponds to the percentage of unsuccessful (trigger) packet transmissions.
If a reception event resulting from a trigger packet is generated, that transmission is said to
be successful. The trigger packet error rate (TPER) corresponds to the total (T) number
of failed transmissions (FAIL) divided by the total number of possible logged transmis-
sions. In this case, since there are two slave stations, a total of 1000 transmissions should
occur in an ideal scenario. As aforementioned, Table 6.6 depicts the total number of failed
transmissions resulting from the simultaneous absence of trigger packet receptions in both
slaves (Z).
Trials secured by BB interference
The trials secured using black-burst (BB) interference encompass the evaluation of the
WFTT protocol timeliness in three different scenarios of “alien” noise contention: no noise,
Wi-Fi noise and IEEE 802.15.4 noise. The following subsections discuss the obtained results
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for each of these scenarios.
Noise-free scenario
As expected, there are no packet failures in the noise-free results documented in Table
6.6. Furthermore, when compared to the trigger packet delay estimated values presented
in Table 4.6 (Section 4.4), the percentage variation is very small, of 0.86 % and 0.047 %
for the minimum and maximum delays, respectively. These results confirm the validity of
the corresponding estimates.
Wi-Fi “alien” immunity
The TPER experienced when the WFTT network is exposed to Wi-Fi noise is 33.1
% (see Table 6.6), which arises from a high number of lost trigger packets. However, the
delay parameters show no significant variation as a consequence of the polluted environment
where the WFTT transmissions are being carried out. In order to better understand the
cause of this high TPER, the values of the total number of packets lost (T) and of the “Zero
Reception” (Z) coupled lost packets are analyzed. As documented, for the possible 1000
successful transmissions, 331 where not properly performed and, from these, 6 were due to
“zero reception” failures. This means that 325 transmissions failed because one of the two
(packet reception) logging events associated to the transmission did not occur. Hence, for
the majority of the transmissions, one of the slaves was able to receive the packet. This
has not occurred only for three trigger packets, thus resulting in 6 packet failures reported.
Assume that the trigger packet transmission by the master experiences a similar at-
tenuation in the path to both slaves, since they are geographically close and are placed at
approximately the same distance from the master and from the CAOS contender. From
the presented TPER results, it is possible to conclude that the high TPER is not mainly
caused by the trigger packet corruption, since only three packets were effectively lost si-
multaneously by both slave stations. The high TPER suggests that the trigger packet
failures are a result of “alien” transmissions within the capture interval. Such external
transmissions are documented to have a much higher impact on one of the slaves, which
indicates that the lack of packet errors in the other slave may result from a minimal noise
power radiation in its direction. Because the WITAS tool does not offer information about
the slave stations that logged the events, it is not possible to check which slave benefits
from this CAOS transmission artifact.
IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” immunity
The trial where the WFTT network is exposed to IEEE 802.15.4 noise exhibits a null
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TPER, which confirms that an “alien” contender is not able to access the medium when
the capture interval is smaller than its required idle time for declaring the medium free.
Furthermore, it also endorses the argument that the probability of finding the medium
free when the capture interval is slightly higher than the “alien” minimum CSMA/CA
is also small. In this case, the capture interval can reach the limit of 200 microseconds
while the minimum CCA is only of 128 microseconds. Nevertheless, because an “alien”
station response is highly dependent of the employed hardware, which defines its ability to
transmit a packet immediately after the CCA period, the observed behavior may not be
replicated by “alien” IEEE 802.15.4 stations employing a different transceiver.
Regarding the delay parameters, results also corroborate that the “alien” IEEE 802.15.4
interference has no meaningful impact on the trigger packet timeliness when the WFTT
network is secured by black-burst interference.
Trials secured by PI interference
As in the previous case, trials secured by protective interference (PI) are conducted in
three distinct scenarios of “alien” noise contention: no noise, Wi-Fi noise and IEEE 802.15.4
noise. The obtained results in each scenario are analyzed in the following subsections.
Noise-free scenario
On par to what occurred in the trials secured by BB interference, Table 6.6 demonstrates
that no packet failures were detected in the noise-free trial. Compared to the trigger packet
delay estimated values presented of Table 4.6, the variation in percentage is still very small,
i.e, of 0.81 % and 0.047 % for the minimum and maximum delays, respectively.
Wi-Fi “alien” immunity
In the scenario where the WFTT network is secured by protective interference against
Wi-Fi “alien” contention the TPER rises to 3.0 % when compared to the reference value.
This value results from the overall occurrence of 30 trigger packet failures, in which 18
are caused by a failure to receive the trigger packet in both slave stations. This means
that 1.8 % of the failures where due to the trigger packet not being received by any of
the slaves and the other 1.2 % were originated by a reception failure in only one of them.
This seems to be caused by the occurrence of “alien” transmissions within the capture
interval. Recalling that the CAOS tool employs five USB Wi-Fi network adapters that
attempt to perform transmissions at every millisecond and that each adapter has a specific
radiation and sensitivity pattern, it is possible that the protective interference has different
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hindering impacts on each CAOS Wi-Fi adapter. Hence, it is feasible that in most trigger
packet transmissions, the master’s PNS protective interference is highly effective in blocking
the transmissions from a given CAOS Wi-Fi adapter while in a few there is an “alien”
Wi-Fi adapter whose sensitivity to the protective interference is reduced and an “alien”
packet transmission is initiated during the capture interval. This explains the occurrence
of trigger packet reception failures at both slaves. A possible solution for this issue can
be the use of new WFTT devices, which are able to transmit interference synchronized
with the master station. If such devices were deployed around the physical area of the
WFTT network, as suggested for mitigating the hidden node problem in Section 4.2.3,
the synthesized interference visibility by “alien” stations would increase, thus reducing the
issue’s probability of occurrence.
Likewise, as observed above, the occurrence of reception failures on a single slave can
arise when the radiation pattern of the Wi-Fi adapter has a minimum in the direction of
a slave. In this case, although the “alien” transmission is performed, the level of energy
reaching the slave is not high enough to lower its SNR to a level where the packet reception
fails. Regarding the delay parameters, no significant variation is shown. Overall, consid-
ering the harsh contention environment created by the CAOS tool in this trial, the TPER
values are very small.
IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” immunity
In this scenario, the protective interference has no meaningful impact on blocking the
“alien” noise since the PNS interference is not sensed by the IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” sta-
tion. Hence, the TPER rises to a value of 9.4 %, where all packet failures are caused by
a corruption of the trigger packet due to the overlapping with an ongoing “alien” trans-
mission. This observation is supported on the fact that all trigger packet failures occurred
simultaneously in both receivers. Hence, the packet decoding failed during the reception
process, which is a strong indication that it was corrupted. Despite the protective interfer-
ence inability to avoid “alien” transmissions, the TPER is not very high when the WFTT
network is exposed to “alien” IEEE 802.15.4 noise. This is the result of using a small duty
cycle for the transmission IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” noise. If this duty cycle increases, the
medium contention will be higher and the probability of collisions will also increase. As in
the previous cases, the delay parameters show no significant variation when compared to
the reference values (noise clear environment).
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Conclusions
The analysis of the trigger packet timeliness has allowed an experimental verification
of the improvements resulting from optimizing the WFTT protocol implementation. The
major conclusion is that a combination of black-burst and protective interference is ca-
pable of ensuring a very high level of protection against both Wi-Fi and IEEE 802.15.4
“alien” noise. Results demonstrate that the TPER is very small (3.0 %) when protective
interference is used to secure the WFTT network. Also, there is evidence that the use of
black-burst interference is effective in avoiding contention noise from IEEE 802.15.4 “alien”
sources. Although these results are not optimal in the sense that a 3.0 % TPER is not
negligible and that the null TPER for the IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” noise was obtained in a
contention environment with a low duty cycle, the time margins can be further reduced,
thus potentially enhancing the overall WFTT network response to “alien” noise.
Another conclusion arises from the consistent values of the delay parameters obtained in
all trials. As documented, the minimum, maximum, average and standard deviation delays
show no significant variation throughout the trials, regardless of the existence of noise and
the type of noise used. This is an expected result emerging directly from the adopted
contention-free transmission scheme and from the medium protection against “alien” noise
of the WFTT protocol. In summary, by performing transmissions and employing black-
burst and protective interference according to the WFTT protocol definition, it is possible
to ensure the transmission of trigger packets with a high level of determinism for both
delay and error rate, even in challenging contention environments.
6.3 Optimized WFTT - Slave Timeliness
After experimentally validating the improvements on the trigger packet timeliness aris-
ing from optimizing the WFTT protocol implementation, it is necessary to assess the
performance of the different types of traffic that can be supported on an elementary cycle.
The methodology employed to evaluate the different types of traffic and the associated
experimental results are presented and analyzed in the following subsections.
6.3.1 Methodology
In the previous section, the WFTT protocol assessment setup was focused on the trigger
packet timeliness. This section also addresses the optimized WFTT implementation, but
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targets the slave station timeliness, i.e., the timeliness of the real-time packets, transmitted
on the protected window, and of the contention packets, transmitted on the contention
window. Slave stations were configured to perform only one type of transmission per
elementary cycle. Real-time transmissions were performed on the reserved slots of the
protected window while contention transmissions were conducted at one random instant
within the contention window. Due to the PNS limitations described in Section 3.4.2, real-
time transmissions were secured by either protective or black-burst interference in a given
elementary cycle, as in the previous assessment. Transmissions in the contention window
were secured only by protective interference.
The setup used to evaluate the timeliness of the slave transmissions is pictured in Figure
6.9(a). As documented, it is composed by one master (M) placed in a MDF stand at the
origin; three slaves (S1, S2 and S3) placed on a PVC table, in a perpendicular line to
the master (1.5 meters apart of each other) and at a fixed distance of approximately 7
meters from it; and the Contender (C) placed on a MDF mobile stand that can be moved
into two different locations: one at 3 meters form the master (herein designated as the
position “@-3m”) and the other at a distance of 6 meters from the master in the opposite
direction (herein designated as the position “@+6m”). The spacial arrangement devised
for this assessment was driven by the results obtained in the two previous evaluations,
having the contender close to the master. In this case, we chose to put the contender at
more reasonable distances both from the master and from the slaves to draw conclusions
regarding its impact on the trigger packet error rate and on the error rate associated
to packets transmitted by the slaves. The distance of 1.5 meters between slave stations
was motivated both by the WITAS distance limitation between Event Loggers and the
possibility of evaluating a deployment scenario where the WFTT network covers a small
geographical area.
The use of a three slave station setup provides a more realistic network setup to com-
pare the transmissions timeliness of the WFTT protocol in its protected and contention
windows. As explained before, a packet transmission delay corresponds to the time elaps-
ing between the instant of the packet transmission trigger command and the instant of the
packet reception event at a given slave.
Figure 6.9(b) illustrates the WITAS connection to the WFTT elements used in the
testbed. Since the assessment targets the evaluation of the slave station performance,
only the slaves were connected to the Event Loggers and registered their events for the
subsequent timing analysis. The WITAS application was used to configure the testbed
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(a) Physical arrangement (b) WITAS setup
Figure 6.9: Optimized WFTT: slave packet timeliness setup
parameters, store the collected data and process it to obtain the statistical timeliness results
of the transmissions performed by the WFTT slave stations. The parameters employed in
this evaluation were common to the trigger packet timeliness evaluation scenario. Hence,
they are also expressed by Table 6.5.
The EC parameters adopted for each one of the (protected and contention window)
transmission scenarios is documented in Table 6.7. As depicted, the EC reserved three slots
in the protected window in all scenarios. However, these slots were only effectively used in
the scenario where slave stations were configured to perform real-time transmissions, i.e.,
in the “Protected Window Transmission Scenario”. The length of the protected window
was 40 milliseconds, providing enough time to cope with the delays that ensured a correct
operation of the WFTT protocol, as represented in Figure 5.1. In this scenario, the events
occurring in the protected window were uploaded to the attached Event Logger during
the inactive window, which provided an interval of 860 milliseconds for this purpose. The
length of the contention window was arbitrarily selected to be of 100 milliseconds and could
be reduced if required.
The duration of the contention and inactive windows is dependent of the type of packets
whose timeliness is being assessed. In the “Contention Window Transmission Scenario”,
slave stations were configured to exclusively perform transmissions on the contention win-
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Table 6.7: Optimized WFTT: EC parameters
Parameter PWTS CWTS
EC length 1000 ms 1400 ms
Slots in the Protected Window 3 3
Protected Window Length 40 ms 40 ms
Contention Window Length 100 ms 800 ms
Inactive Window Length 860 ms 560 ms
PWTS - Protected Window Transmission Scenario
CWTS - Contention Window Transmission Scenario
dow. In this case, the contention and inactive windows were configured to have a duration
of 800 and 560 milliseconds, respectively. These intervals provided enough room to ran-
domize the transmission triggering instant on the contention window and to upload all
event information to the attached Event Logger during the inactive window.
A trial is characterized by the occurrence of 1000 packet transmissions. Provided that
three slave stations were able to listen/log the corresponding packet receptions, the exe-
cution of 167 ECs is required per trial, as each trigger packet originates six transmission
logs (one packet transmission originates two receptions, hence two transmission logs). As
previously stated, the timeliness of the WFTT protocol was evaluated using two different
types of packets:
Real-time: packets transmitted on the protected window in designated slots. This type of
traffic was used to assess the WFTT protocol ability to support dependable real-time
communications;
Contention: packets transmitted at a random instant within the contention window. The
WFTT protocol ability to support best-effort communications was tested using this
type of traffic;
The “Energy Above Threshold” CCA mechanism (CCA1 mode) was adopted with a -69
dBm medium busy threshold for all best-effort transmissions, since, according to Bertocco
et al. [108], it is the worse selectable CCA mechanism to avoid Wi-Fi noise. As before,
the assessment was conducted using either black-burst (BB) or protective interference (PI)
with a power level of +18 dBm and WFTT data packets with a 0 dBm transmission power.
The tested “alien” contention behaviors and the parameters that represent the results are
common to the trigger packet assessment.
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(a) Master, BeeMon and CAOS (b) Slaves, Event Loggers
and Processor
(c) Slave, Event Logger
and Processor
Figure 6.10: Optimized implementation: WFTT testbed assessment photos
Figure 6.10 presents multiple photos of the experimental setup used to assess the WFTT
slave transmission timeliness. Figure 6.10(a) illustrates the master station, the BeeMon
device and the CAOS tool. The WFTT slave setup and the corresponding WITAS elements
(Event Loggers and Processor) are pictured over a PVC table in Figure 6.10(b). Figure
6.10(c) provides close-up photos of the two WITAS elements used in the WFTT timeliness
assessment. At the top, a photo of the Event Logger (EL2) attached to its designated slave
station (S2) is shown. At the bottom, a lateral photo of the Event Processor is presented,
illustrating a uMRF board attached to the specific Event Processor interfacing board.
6.3.2 Results
This section presents and discusses the results obtained using the aforementioned
testbed. In the following subsections, a comparative analysis between the timeliness of
the different types of traffic supported by the WFTT protocol is provided.
Real-Time Transmissions
The results of the real-time transmissions are presented in Table 6.8. As introduced
in the methodology section, a total of 1000 real-time transmissions were expected to be
logged per trial in response to the broadcast of 167 trigger packets. This meant that, for
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Table 6.8: Optimized WFTT real-time transmission timeliness
PNS
Contender SUCC FAIL RPER TPER MIN MAX AVG STDV
Type Position (#) T ≀ Z (#) (%) (%) (µs) (µs) (µs) (µs)
BB
None — 1000 0 ≀ 0 0.0 0.0 1531 1550 1541.7 4.55
Wi-Fi
@-3m 160 164 ≀ 106 50.6 40.7 1534 1550 1541.7 4.58
@+6m 41 7 ≀ 0 14.6 95.2 1533 1550 1540.1 5.17
802.15.4
@-3m 1000 0 ≀ 0 0.0 0.0 1530 1550 1541.9 4.59
@+6m 999 1 ≀ 0 0.1 0.0 1531 1550 1542.0 4.80
PI
None — 999 1 ≀ 0 0.1 0.0 1531 1550 1541.6 4.80
Wi-Fi
@-3m 1000 0 ≀ 0 0.0 0.0 1534 1550 1541.7 4.52
@+6m 887 41 ≀ 0 4.4 7.2 1530 1550 1542.2 4.60
802.15.4
@-3m 624 28 ≀ 28 4.3 34.7 1534 1550 1541.6 4.60
@+6m 669 37 ≀ 28 5.2 29.3 1534 1550 1542.3 4.71
SUCC Succeeded Transmissions AVG Average Delay
FAIL Failed Transmissions STDV Delay Standard Deviation
RPER Real-Time Packet Error Rate T ≀ Z [T]otal ≀ [Z]ero Receptions
TPER Trigger Packet Error Rate BB Black-burst Interference
MIN Minimum Delay PI Protective Interference
MAX Maximum Delay
each trigger packet, a total of six real-time transmissions were due to be logged. Provided
that there were three slave stations, that each station performed a real-time transmission
in its designated slot and that this transmission was logged by the two remaining slave
stations, a total of six reception events should be recorded per elementary cycle.
Regarding Table 6.8 parameters, the real-time packet error rate (RPER) corresponds
to the percentage of unsuccessful real-time packet transmissions. As before, if a reception
event resulting from a real-time packet was generated, that transmission was said to be
successful. The real-time packet error rate (RPER) matches the total (T) number of
failed transmissions (FAIL) divided by the total number of possible logged transmissions
(1000). The total number of failed transmissions resulting from the simultaneous absence
of real-time packet receptions in both listening slave stations is represented in the table’s Z
column. The TPER stands for the trigger packet error rate and it reports the percentage
of trigger packets that were not received by any of the slave stations. Hence, if a given
trigger packet was received by at least one slave station, its transmission was considered
successful.
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Trials secured by BB interference
The trials secured using black-burst (BB) interference encompassed the evaluation of
the WFTT protocol timeliness in three different scenarios of “alien” noise contention: no
noise, Wi-Fi noise and IEEE 802.15.4 noise. The following subsections discuss the obtained
results for each one of these scenarios.
Noise-free scenario
As depicted in Table 6.6, there were no packet failures in the noise-free case, as expected.
When compared to the real-time packet delay values estimated in Table 4.6 (Section 4.4),
the variation in percentage is small, of 3.1 % and 2.0 % for the minimum and maximum
delays, respectively. Since the referred real-time packet delay estimates were determined
using approximate values obtained in the turbo mode operation, the observed difference
may result from that option.
Figure 6.11 depicts the delay histograms of three key trials. The first one (no contender)
corresponds to the case where the WFTT network was secured by black-burst interference,
but operated without contention from “alien” technologies. The second and third trials
coincide with those having the highest RPER/TPER combination while employing either
black-burst or protective interference to guard the WFTT network. As it will be seen
further ahead, these delay histograms allow establishing a direct comparison between the
different trials in terms of delay dispersion. From Figure 6.11, it is possible to observe that
the delay value scattering for the “no contender” trial does not seem to follow a specific
distribution.
Wi-Fi “alien” immunity
As introduced, the WFTT network was exposed to Wi-Fi noise generated by a contender
placed at either at -3 or at +6 meters from the master. In the first case, the measured
RPER was of 50.6 % with a TPER of 40.7 %. The lost packets resulting from zero
receptions represented 64.6 % of the total number of lost packets. When compared to the
noise-free case, the associated delay parameters exhibited a maximum variation of only
0.66 % (standard deviation). In the second case, the experienced RPER was of 14.6 %
and the TPER was of 92.5 %. In this case the delay parameters suffered a maximum
aggravation of 13.6 % (standard deviation).
These results indicate a significant aggravation of the TPER when the contender is
moved from the -3 to the +6 meter position, following a similar trend evidenced in the
trigger packet assessment. This trend indicates that the TPER increases with the distance
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Figure 6.11: WFTT real-time packet transmission histograms
from the contender to the master station. With regards to trigger packet assessment,
although this behavior is mainly caused by the existence of idle intervals that allow “alien”
stations to perceive the medium free and initiate transmissions that ultimately corrupt the
trigger packet, it is aggravated by the reduction of power perceived by the contender, as a
result of increasing the distance to the master’s PNS.
Regarding the RPER, a noticeable decrease is documented when the contender is moved
from the -3 meters to the + 6 meters position. The overall number of packets used to cal-
culate the RPER, however, decreases drastically, which limits the analysis and justification
of this change. The RPER obtained in the -3 meter position was very high and results
from a significant number of successful trigger packet transmissions. The optimized im-
plementation of the WFTT protocol encompassed a 100 microsecond time slack between
transmissions on the protected window. As argued, this interval was included to cope with
the response time limitations of both the MRF24J40 transceiver and of the PNS. However,
despite being significantly smaller than the one used in the unoptimized version (400 mi-
croseconds), it was still much larger than the Wi-Fi’s minimum SIFS (10 microseconds),
thus still resulting in a very high number of lost real-time packets.
The recorded delay parameters show a small variation for both contender positions when
compared to the noise-free case. The exception occurs for the standard deviation delay in
the +6 meter position. In this case, there was a higher dispersion around the average delay
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value, possibly caused by the reduced number of samples. This dispersion can be observed
in Figure 6.11, where the delays seem to exhibit a more randomized frequency distribution
in comparison to the noise-free case.
IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” immunity
The WFTT network was subjected to IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” noise from a contender
placed in two distinct positions: at -3 meters or at +6 meters from the master. As docu-
mented in Table 6.8, both cases depict a negligible TPER and RPER, in addition to the
non significant variations in the delay parameters, when compared to the reference trial
(noise-free case). The exception is the standard deviation, which shows a maximum varia-
tion of 5.5 %. However, because it is a measure of dispersion, this variation only indicates
a slightly higher scattering of delays around the average value.
The negligible TPER and RPER results are a strong indicator of the effectiveness
of the WFTT protocol in supporting the reliable transmission of trigger and real-time
packets in environments affected by IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” noise. However, as noticed
in the trigger packet timeliness assessment, the contender offers a low contention duty
cycle, which possibility contributes to the almost inexistent loss of packet. In order to
better characterize the WFTT protocol immunity to IEEE 802.15.4 based noise, a harsher
environment should be used.
Overall, it is reasonable to conclude that the optimized implementation of the WFTT
protocol is capable of ensuring a high level of reliability and timeliness for real-time trans-
missions in the presence of IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” noise when such transmissions are secured
by black-burst interference.
Trials secured by PI interference
The obtained results for each one of the three distinct protective interference (PI)
secured trials of “alien” noise contention are presented and discussed in the following
subsections.
Noise-free scenario
As aforementioned, the noise-free scenario sets the reference performance for the re-
maining trials. The option to conduct different reference assessments for the black-burst
and protective interference scenarios was motivated by the need of checking if the WFTT
protocol optimization was responsible for some variation in the result’s timeliness. Con-
sider, for example, the black-burst protected scenario. If the RPER increased in the noise-
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free case when compared to the unoptimized implementation, it would indicate an over-
lapping between PNS interference and WFTT data transmissions, which could be caused
by the use of a time slack not long enough to cope with the timing limitations of the PNS
and of the MRF24J40 transceiver.
Table 6.8 reports a null TPER and a 0.1 % RPER resulting from one real-time packet
failure. These results confirm that the optimized WFTT protocol implementation using
protective interference is working correctly. This is further corroborated by the delay
results, which are similar to those of the previous reference trial.
Wi-Fi “alien” immunity
The RPER and TPER for the scenario where the contender is placed at -3 meters from
the master were null, while the delay parameters suffered a maximum variation of 5.8 %
(standard deviation). A degradation of these results is observed when the contender is at
the +6 meter position. In this case, the RPER and TPER increase to 4.4 % and 7.2 %,
respectively. In the first case, it is possible to observe that the protective interference is
capable of totally hindering the Wi-Fi “alien” stations from initiating transmissions. In the
second case, a small percentage of trigger and real-time packets fail their correct transmis-
sion. The real-time packet failures never occur simultaneously in both receiving slaves, i.e.,
at least one of the slaves is able to successfully receive the real-time packet. These small
packet error rates can be justified by the occurrence of “alien” transmissions during the
capture interval (trigger packet errors) or during the idle intervals in the protected window
slots (real-time packet errors). In both cases, the “alien” transmissions are initiated when
a Wi-Fi network adapter has a request and finds the medium free for a given minimum
amount of time. This scenario should never occur since the PNS synthesizes protective
interference specifically to avoid such occurrences. However, because the CAOS employs
multiple USB Wi-Fi network adapters with specific radiation and sensitivity patterns, it is
possible that one of them has a sensitivity minimum in the direction of the master station.
As a consequence, it can sporadically sense the medium with less energy than it actually
has and, therefore, initiate the requested “alien” transmission, resulting in the corruption
of a trigger packet.
The justification for the low RPER results is slightly different. Should it be the same,
the real-time packet failures would be mainly due to “Zero Reception” occurrences, i.e.,
most of the packets would not be received by any of the slave stations. This is not the case,
however. Results indicate that the experienced RPER is originated by packet failures in
only one of the slave stations. Although the WITAS provides no information allowing to
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check if these packet failures are systematically occurring at the same slave, it is reasonable
to assume so. Hence, a possible justification for this occurrence is that, although an “alien”
station finds sporadically the medium idle as a result of a sensitivity minimum in the
master’s direction, the subsequent “alien” transmission has a different impact on the slave
stations, which are possibly receiving an ongoing real-time transmission. On one of them
the ongoing transmission is corrupted and the slave is not able to successfully decode the
packet. On the other, due to a favorable SNR, the packet is successfully decoded.
IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” immunity
The WFTT protocol “alien” immunity results show a significant TPER of 34.7 % and
29.3 % for both contender locations (-3 and +6 meters). The associated RPER is notably
smaller, but still not negligible, reaching values of 4.3 % (-3 meter position) and 5.2 % (+6
meter position). In both cases, given the high percentage of “zero reception” errors, the
majority of the packet failures occurred simultaneously in both receiver slave stations. As
in the previous scenarios, the delay parameters remain almost unchanged when compared
to the reference trial.
The high TPER can be attributed to the overlapping of the trigger packets with IEEE
802.15.4 “alien” transmissions. On account that the protective interference has no impact
on blocking IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” stations from performing transmissions, since it is prop-
agated on a different channel, it is possible that an “alien” packet may collide with an
ongoing trigger packet transmission. Provided that the TPER specifically accounts trigger
packet failures occurring at all receivers simultaneously, it is reasonable to assume that
its high value is a consequence of packet corruption due to transmission overlapping. The
low/ moderate RPER seems to have the same cause. However, because real-time packets
are significantly shorter than the trigger packet, the collision probability is notably lower.
The position of the contender seems not to have a high impact on the packet error rate
and on the delay statistical values.
The delay histogram for the overall performance worst-case scenario is reported in
Figure 6.11. The selected scenario corresponds to the contender placed at the +6 meter
position. As it can be observed, the delay distribution has an arbitrarily form whose
bounds are within the maximum delay variation of the reference trial. This indicates a
high consistency of the delays among different contention environments.
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Table 6.9: Optimized WFTT contention transmission timeliness
PNS
Contender SUCC FAIL CPER TPER MIN MAX AVG STDV
Type Position (#) T ≀ Z (#) (%) (%) (µs) (µs) (µs) (µs)
PI
None — 994 0 ≀ 0 0.0 0.6 1406 3662 2552.6 724.88
Wi-Fi
@-3m 978 4 ≀ 2 0.4 1.2 1406 3662 2493.0 748.05
@+6m 889 63 ≀ 4 6.6 4.8 1406 3662 2535.9 729.78
802.15.4
@-3m 623 131 ≀ 130 17.4 24.6 1406 3662 2543.5 716.63
@+6m 646 158 ≀ 112 19.7 19.8 1408 3662 2463.3 695.03
SUCC Succeeded Transmissions AVG Average Delay
FAIL Failed Transmissions STDV Delay Standard Deviation
CPER Contention Packet Error Rate T ≀ Z [T]otal ≀ [Z]ero Receptions
TPER Trigger Packet Error Rate PI Protective Interference
MIN Minimum Delay MAX Maximum Delay
Contention Window Transmissions
Table 6.9 presents the contention window transmission timeliness results. In this eval-
uation scenario, the contention packet transmissions are only assessed for protective in-
terference (PI). However, as before, the associated trials are conducted on three different
“alien” contention environments: noise-free, Wi-Fi noise and IEEE 802.15.4 noise.
With the exception of the CPER, which accounts for the contention packet error rate,
the parameters reported on Table 6.9 are similar to those presented in Table 6.8 and
discussed in the corresponding section. The trial definitions (duration, number of trigger
packets transmitted, etc.) are also identical. However, in this case, trials address the
transmission of contention packets on the contention window instead of real-time packets
on the protected window.
Noise-free scenario
The noise-free scenario refers to the case where there is no medium contention by
“alien” stations. In this case, Table 6.9 shows that the TPER is extremely small (0.6
%) and the CPER is null. From the delay perspective, the variation in percentage when
compared to the estimated minimum and maximum delays of Table 4.6 (Section 4.4) is
3.7 % and 0.9 %, respectively. Provided that the contention packet delay estimates are an
approximation that employ timings obtained using the turbo mode operation, the variation
seems acceptable.
Two delay histograms are provided in Figure 6.12. These histograms refer to the
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Figure 6.12: WFTT contention packet transmission histograms
best and worst transmission performance cases, as documented by Table 6.9. Hence, one
corresponds to the case in which the WFTT network operates without contention from
“alien” technologies and the other to the case in which the medium dispute is performed by
an IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” contender. These two delay histograms allow a direct comparison
between the best and worst case scenarios in terms of delay dispersion. Regarding the
noise-free case, Figure 6.12 demonstrates that the delays concentrate in specific values,
i.e., around 1414, 1734, 2056, 2373, 2692, 3013, 3333 and 3654 microseconds. These values
were obtained from the histogram’s raw data by selecting the central delay in each delay
group. The average difference between these values is 320 microseconds with a standard
deviation of 1.63 microseconds, which is consistent with the backoff period duration (320
microseconds) used as the time basis for the IEEE 802.15.4 CSMA/CA medium access
algorithm. As detailed in Section 2.1.2, before initiating a CCA procedure, a random
number of backoff periods ranging from 0 to 2BE − 1 must be enforced. Provided that the
selected backoff exponent (BE) is 3, the random number of backoff periods to wait will
range from 0 to 7, each one with a duration of 320 microseconds, which corroborates the
results of Figure 6.12.
Wi-Fi “alien” immunity
The results reported in Table 6.9 document a TPER and CPER of 1.2 % and 0.4 %,
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respectively, when the contender is at the -3 meters position. The TPER and CPER results
are aggravated to values of 4.8 % and 6.6 %, if the contender is moved to the +6 meter
position. In both cases, the minimum and maximum delays show no variation in compar-
ison to the noise-free case. Conversely, the average delay and standard deviation suffer a
maximum change of 2.3 %, thus indicating a slight difference in the delay distribution in
the presence of Wi-Fi “alien” noise.
The TPER and CPER at the first position (-3 meters) are consistent with the Wi-Fi
“alien” immunity results presented in the real-time packet timeliness evaluation scenario,
i.e., the TPER and RPER values are very small when the medium is secured using protec-
tive interference. The results obtained at the +6 meter position also follow the observed
increase trend in both packet error rates. It is worth noting that, as in the real-time
packet evaluation scenario, the majority of the contention packet failures (93.6 %) are not
originated by “zero reception” errors, which indicates that, at least, one of the slave sta-
tions is capable of successfully decoding the contention packet. As discussed above, the
justification for these packet error rates is the occurrence of “alien” transmissions during
the contention window (contention packet errors) or during the capture interval (trigger
packet errors), which overlap with packets transmitted by the WFTT network. Since the
contender (CAOS) employs several USB Wi-Fi network adapters characterized by differ-
ent sensitivity patterns, it is possible that one of them has a sensitivity minimum in the
direction of the master’s PNS, thus causing it to sense the medium with less energy than
it actually has. As a consequence, it will initiate the requested “alien” transmission, thus
resulting in the corruption of an ongoing WFTT packet transmission.
In summary, the timeliness results of Table 6.9 indicate that the WFTT data trans-
missions performed within the contention window are highly secured against Wi-Fi “alien”
interference.
IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” immunity
The IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” immunity results of Table 6.9 document a CPER of 17.4 %
and 19.7 % when the contender is placed at either -3 or +6 meters from the master. In both
cases, the percentage of packets lost due to “Zero Reception” errors is highly significant
(99.2 % and 70.8%), which indicates that the packet transmission was logged, whereas the
associated reception events were not. This is a consequence of the type of communications
being performed. As explained, in contention-based IEEE 802.15.4 communications, a
packet is only transmitted if the corresponding CCA procedure finds the medium idle.
Otherwise, the access to the medium is postponed to a later instant and the process
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repeats itself, up to a given maximum number of backoffs. If this number (typically four)
is exhausted, then the CSMA/CA algorithm declares a channel access failure and no packet
is transmitted. Since a packet is logged by the WITAS when its transmission is requested,
a channel access failure will result in three “Zero Reception” errors. Hence, the significant
CPER observed at both locations seems consistent with the occurrence of a high number
of channel access failures. The increase of the CPER between positions also corroborates
this conclusion, since the contender is closer to the WFTT slaves, thus exhibiting a higher
level of energy and further aggravating the blocking effect.
Compared to the RPER results obtained in the analogous scenario, there is a notable
increase in the packet error rate: 304.6 % and 278.8 % for the -3 and +6 meter positions,
respectively. This accentuated increase can also be explained by the nature of the packets
being transmitted. On the RPER case, the real-time packet was transmitted without
sensing the medium. Therefore, if the SNR was favorable, the packet could be effectively
received by one or more slave stations. On the CPER, the packet was only transmitted if
the medium was found idle during the CCA procedure. This mechanism yields a higher
packet error rate since, possibly, the packets that could benefit from a temporarily favorable
SNR are potentially blocked by the transmitter itself and never get to be propagated in
the medium.
Regarding the TPER documented in Table 6.9, a small reduction from 24.6 % to 19.8 %
is visible when the contender is moved from the -3 to the +6 meter position. This relative
error rate reduction (19.5 %) is similar to the one found in the analogous real-time packet
assessment presented above (15.5 %). As concluded there, the observed errors seem to
result from the overlapping of “alien” transmissions and trigger packets, which cause their
corruption.
It is important to notice that the results presented above were obtained with an IEEE
802.15.4 “alien” contender characterized by a low transmission duty cycle. In this sense,
in a more challenging contenting scenario, possibly including more than one contender, a
degradation of the CPER should be expected.
Figure 6.12 demonstrates that the contention packet delays also concentrate around the
specific values presented in the noise-free trial subsection. Furthermore, there is a visible
difference in the delay dispersion pattern, which is consistent with the results presented in
Table 6.9. Globally, the IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” contender noise has a small impact on the
WFTT contention packet transmission delays.
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Conclusions
The evaluation of the WFTT protocol slave transmission timeliness was conducted for
two types of traffic. In the following subsections, the key conclusions for each one are
summarized.
Real-time transmissions in the protected window
The Wi-Fi “alien” immunity results obtained for a WFTT network secured with black-
burst interference indicated a high vulnerability to this type of interference. For example,
the observed RPER was of 14.6 % for the +6 meter position and of 50.6 % in the -3
meter position. On the other hand, the resilience to IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” transmissions
was found to be very high, thus supporting the conclusion that an optimized WFTT
implementation, secured with black-burst interference, is capable of ensuring a high level
of reliability for real-time transmissions in the presence of IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” noise.
It was observed that the optimized WFTT implementation was highly resilient to Wi-Fi
noise when the master’s PNS was configured to synthesize protective interference to secure
the network. For example, even in a very harsh contention environment, encompassing
multiple Wi-Fi adapters continuously disputing the medium, the RPER and TPER are
bounded by values of 4.4 % and 7.2 %, respectively. Conversely, the results demonstrate
that a WFTT network secured with protective interference has a significant vulnerability
to IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” noise. These observations allow concluding that an optimized
WFTT implementation employing protective interference is capable of supporting real-time
transmissions with high reliability requirements in the presence of Wi-Fi noise.
According to the presented results, the delays are consistently bounded by a minimum
and maximum values in the different reported scenarios of shielding interference and con-
tending noise. This information establishes that, by combining both types of interference
in the master’s PNS, it is possible not only to support a high level of reliability against
IEEE 802.15.4 and Wi-Fi “alien” noise, but also to guarantee a high level of determinism
concerning the transmission delay.
Contention transmissions in the contention window
The timeliness results indicate that the WFTT contention data transmissions performed
within the contention window are highly secured against Wi-Fi “alien” interference. For
example, the TPER and CPER results are bounded by the 4.8 % and 6.6 % values, which
240
6.4. SUMMARY
where obtained in the +6 meters position. Conversely, when the “alien” contender employs
the IEEE 802.15.4 technology, the error rate is significantly aggravated. Therefore, the
contention window protective interference is only capable of improving the reliability of
contention packets when the “alien” source employs the Wi-Fi technology.
Regarding the timing behavior of the contention packets, it was found that the delays
are concentrated around multiples of the backoff period duration (320 microseconds), which
is the time basis for the IEEE 802.15.4 CSMA/CA medium access algorithm. In this
sense, because the transceiver was configured with a backoff exponent of 3, the delays are
concentrated around eight groups of delays in the range of 1406 to 3662 microseconds.
This timing behavior supports the conclusion that the WFTT contention window is only
capable of supporting best-effort traffic.
6.4 Summary
This chapter focused on providing an holistic experimental assessment of the WFTT
protocol. This endeavor was segmented in three main evaluations. The first addressed an
unoptimized version of the WFTT protocol where trials were conducted over a wide range
of transmission power levels and “alien” noise contenders to collect information about
the real-time/trigger packet error rate and the delay affecting these transmissions. This
assessment allowed concluding that the time slack introduced to cope with the timing
limitations of both the PNS and the MRF24J40MA transceiver devices was responsible
for allowing “alien” stations to transmit in intervals reserved by the WFTT protocol for
critical communications. Consequently, a reduction of the slack interval was proposed to
minimize the error rates of both real-time and trigger packets.
Another conclusion from the first evaluation corresponded to the experimental vali-
dation that protective interference is highly effective in blocking Wi-Fi “alien” stations
from accessing the medium and being able to initiate transmissions. Moreover, it was also
concluded that a significant improvement in the timeliness of the WFTT protocol can be
achieved when the interference and the data transmissions are propagated at their maxi-
mum power levels. Regarding the delay statistics for the real-time transmissions, results
confirm highly consistent values across all trials and all noise/protection/power scenarios,
thus suggesting that the WFTT protocol is suitable for supporting real-time communica-
tions.
The second evaluation scenario was built upon the conclusions of the first assessment.
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In this (optimized) scenario, the scope of the evaluation was narrowed and focused on
the trigger packet timeliness, considering the recommended transmission power levels of
the previous evaluation. Therefore, the assessment was conducted using the maximum
transmission power for both PNS interference and WFTT data. The two available types
of PNS interference were tested against the two main technologies possibly contenting for
the medium: Wi-Fi and IEEE 802.15.4. The goal of this assessment was to provide a first
verification of the WFTT protocol optimized implementation.
The key conclusion arising from this study was that a combination of black-burst and
protective interference is capable of ensuring a very high level of protection against bothWi-
Fi and IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” noise in open environments. Furthermore, it was concluded
that the minimum, maximum, average and standard deviation delays show no significant
variation throughout the trials, regardless of the existence of noise and the type of noise
used, which indicates that it is possible to ensure the transmission of trigger packets with
a high level of determinism for both delay and error rate, even in challenging contention
environments.
The third evaluation scenario was focused on the WFTT slave data transmission timeli-
ness. This analysis has allowed to characterize the behavior of real-time packets, transmit-
ted on the protected window, and of the contention packets sent on the contention window.
Regarding the WFTT real-time packet timeliness, it was concluded that the black-burst
interference is mostly effective in avoiding contention from IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” stations.
Furthermore, it was found that the protective interference is highly effective in blocking
Wi-Fi “alien” interference through evidence of highly reliable and timely communications.
By combining both characteristics, it was concluded that reliable real-time communications
can be supported by the WFTT protocol, as long as the PNS is capable of simultaneously
synthesizing both black-burst and protective interference patterns.
According to the contention window packet transmission timeliness results, the pro-
tective interference propagated during this period offers a layer of shielding against noise
cause by Wi-Fi “alien” stations. Hence, the transmission’s delay characteristics are similar
to the noise-free case in this scenario. However, the same does not occur for IEEE 802.15.4
“alien” stations because the protective interference has no influence on them.
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“It is much better to do a little with cer-
tainty, and leave the rest for others that
come after you, than to explain all things
by conjecture without making sure of any
thing.”
Sir Isaac Newton (1643 - 1727)
7
Conclusions and Future Work
In the previous chapters, the Wireless Flexible Time-Triggered protocol was designed,
implemented and experimentally validated. In the following sections, a short summary
and discussion of the contributions of this dissertation are presented. Furthermore, some
lines of interesting future research are also suggested.
7.1 Summary
The requirements of a communication protocol are the cornerstone of its design and
development. In this sense, this dissertation began by addressing three representative ap-
plication categories with emphasis on their communication requirements. The selection
was driven by their adoption of personal area network technologies and operation in open
spaces, where other technologies may contend for the medium. The study of these ap-
plications resulted in the conclusion that there is a broad heterogeneity of requirements,
even within the same application domain, which poses demanding challenges regarding the
flexibility of the core communication technologies and protocols. The key requirements of
localization, monitoring and synchronization dependent applications can be resumed to a
high dependability, resilience to (un)intended interference, security and flexibility in meet-
ing different levels of timeliness, depending on the specific application being addressed.
Hence, the design of an effective communication protocol must account for these require-
ments.
This dissertation argued that the use of a specific traffic separation mechanism, at the
Medium Access Control (MAC) level, is the underlying foundation for designing a real-time
communication protocol able to operate in “open communication environments”. In order
to validate this claim, research was conducted in several fields. A study of the background
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subjects was focused on the most widespread wireless low-power technologies operating
on the 2.4 GHz ISM band; on the main (low-power) wireless real-time protocols targeting
factory automation applications for this band; and on the coexistence of the associated
communication technologies.
Provided their widespread adoption for supporting communications on the 2.4 GHz ISM
band, the Bluetooth and the IEEE 802.15.4 technologies were selected as the main candi-
dates to enable the development of a wireless real-time communication solution. However,
due to the emergent nature of the ANT and nanoNET technologies, these were also ana-
lyzed, although with less detail. The main conclusion is that, when compared to Bluetooth,
the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol provides a much higher degree of flexibility, both in terms of
its network architecture and timeliness support. The adoption of the IEEE 802.15.4 tech-
nology was also motivated by its use of the DSSS spread spectrum technique that can be
combined with frequency agility mechanisms to avoid interference and provide reliable wire-
less communications in the 2.4 GHz ISM band. Despite these differentiating features, the
IEEE 802.15.4 transceivers are amongst the most cost effective communication solutions
in the market.
On account of its more demanding timeliness and reliability requirements, the study of
the existing communication protocols for the 2.4 GHz ISM band was mainly focused on
factory automation applications. The conducted analysis revealed that several standard
wireless protocols (e.g., ISA SP100.11a, WirelessHART or WIA-PA) rely on the physical
layer of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard for enabling communications. However, given their
high complexity, multi-hop operation or particular configuration, significant end-to-end
delays can potentially occur. Furthermore, there are protocols devised for specific pur-
poses (e.g., the “Wireless Fieldbus for Plastic Machineries”) which are also based on the
IEEE 802.15.4 technology, but are able to meet more stringent timeliness requirements.
This observation further validated the selection of the IEEE 802.15.4 technology as the
underlying foundation of a new protocol. One aspect that emerged from this study was
the common assumption that enough bandwidth is always available to support the proto-
col’s operation. Despite the fact that some protocols employ frequency agility mechanisms,
these are not effective when the available bandwidth is exhausted. In such scenarios, the
studied technologies face a significant performance degradation, which may render them
unusable. Therefore, to support applications with stringent reliability requirements, new
communication methods were needed.
The study of the coexistence among communication technologies operating in the 2.4
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GHz ISM band was focused on the IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15.4 and Bluetooth standards,
given their massive widespread adoption. This study concluded that there is a significant
degradation of the IEEE 802.15.4 packet reliability when its transmissions are exposed
to noise from other co-located IEEE 802.15.4 stations. Likewise, it was found that the
IEEE 802.11 networks are responsible for causing a dramatic reliability reduction in IEEE
802.15.4 networks. Conversely, the Bluetooth impact on IEEE 802.15.4 communications
was considered negligible. This conclusion is supported by the Bluetooth use of a frequency-
hopping scheme that, combined with a blacklisting mechanism, reduces the probability of
collisions with neighbor technologies.
The channel access mechanisms reported in the literature are not suitable to meet the
dependability and timeliness requirements of demanding real-time applications. Since all
real-time protocols are highly dependent of the channel access timeliness, a novel tech-
nique named bandjacking was devised to provide deterministic wireless channel access in
contention-based open environments, in particular, in the 2.4 GHz ISM band. This dis-
sertation described, in detail, the architecture and operation of the stations developed to
support this technique, besides reporting its implementation feasibility and discussing the
results of its performance assessment. These results demonstrated that, although a com-
mercial PNS can be developed using COTS components, two aspects must be accounted
in any implementation. The first is the transceiver’s latency to initiate/stop transmissions.
The second is the PNS’s delay to switch on/off the interference using SPI commands. In
both cases, the delays were found to be significantly long and affected by a non-negligible
jitter, which limited the determinism of the associated operations. Nevertheless, the band-
jacking technique effectiveness was experimentally demonstrated with an implementation
employing a COTS-based PNS.
Although the bandjacking technique was shown to support reliable wireless channel
access in open environments, it was limited to transmissions from a real-time station to
one (or more) standard station(s). In order to extend this determinism to a network
of stations, requiring the support of multiple real-time data streams, a protocol named
Wireless Flexible Time-Triggered (WFTT) was devised, building on the medium capture
and maintenance conveyed by the bandjacking technique and inspired on the Flexible
Time-Triggered paradigm. This dissertation reported its development in both architectural
and operational perspectives. Moreover, two analytical studies focused on the protocol’s
implementation feasibility and timeliness were presented. The implementation feasibility
was addressed considering the two identified problematic scenarios of “alien” contention:
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Wi-Fi and IEEE 802.15.4 noise. In this sense, the timing bounds that the WFTT protocol
must meet in both cases was calculated and justified. Regarding the protocol timeliness,
the study was focused on both the synchronous and asynchronous traffic. In the first
case, the delay and jitter associated to both trigger and real-time packet transmissions was
studied. In the second case, the delay and jitter of a contention based transmission using
the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol was presented.
The WFTT protocol instantiation in practical prototypes was also reported. The en-
visioned operation of the devices participating in a WFTT network was presented with an
emphasis on their interaction and timing behavior. Furthermore, the architecture and inner
operation of the master and slave stations was described. In this scope, their hardware/-
software architectures and the state machines that rule their operation were documented.
An aspect that was not considered in the implementation was the avoidance of idle peri-
ods in the protected window, which may occur when a slave station fails to transmit its
scheduled packet. Nevertheless, one possible solution to mitigate this issue was proposed.
Finally, a setup for the WFTT protocol assessment was defined. Because open envi-
ronments were characterized by encompassing a broad set of technologies; and since Wi-Fi
was identified as one of the most pervasive wireless contention-based technologies, a tool
allowing polluting the 2.4 GHz ISM band with Wi-Fi transmissions (CAOS) was devised.
This tool is throughly used in the evaluation testbeds to mimic crowded environments.
Furthermore, in order to evaluate the WFTT performance, a Wireless Timeliness Assess-
ment System (WITAS) tool was also developed. This tool allows to individually measure
the delay and jitter of multiple data flows. Besides the setup architecture, the protocol
assessment described the methodology used to conduct the experimental trials, the ob-
tained results and their analysis. The assessment was focused on providing an holistic
evaluation of the WFTT protocol by isolating its behavior in three key evaluations sce-
narios. The first addressed an unoptimized protocol implementation, where trials were
conducted over a wide range of transmission power levels and “alien” noise contenders to
collect information about the real-time/trigger packet error rate and the delay affecting
these transmissions. The second evaluation scenario inherited the improvement proposals
emerging from the first scenario’s analysis and narrowed the evaluation scope by focusing
on the trigger packet timeliness of the WFTT optimized implementation. The third eval-
uation scenario was exclusively focused on the slave data transmission timeliness of this
optimized implementation.
The collected results support the thesis that a specific traffic separation mechanism
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(bandjacking) working at the MAC level is the design cornerstone of a communication pro-
tocol (WFTT) capable of supporting the requirements of real-time applications in open
environments. Additionally, results demonstrate that it is feasible to (simultaneously)
support flexibility and timeliness in environments encompassing multiple contention-based
technologies. These conclusions are based on the observations that a combination of black-
burst and protective interference is capable of ensuring a very high level of protection
against both Wi-Fi and IEEE 802.15.4 “alien” noise transmissions in open environments;
and that both WFTT trigger and real-time packets experience a high level of determinism
regarding their delay and error rate, even in challenging contention environments. Fur-
thermore, the existence of a contention window secured by protective interference offers an
additional layer of shielding against noise cause by Wi-Fi “alien” stations, which enables
the support of reliable best-effort low-power contention communications in environments
encompassing Wi-Fi “alien” stations.
7.2 Future Research
This dissertation has focused on devising a wireless real-time medium access protocol
that provides timeliness guarantees in open environments. Higher layer services such as, for
example, admission control and message scheduling have been left out of the scope of this
dissertation. Hence, one logical line of future research is the adaptation of existing FTT
higher level mechanisms to the WFTT protocol. In addition, some extensions for improving
the timeliness and dependability of the WFTT protocol, which seem promising, are the
message/station redundancy support, and the multi-domain coordination and routing.
Scheduling and Admission Control Implementation
This dissertation proposed and validated a medium access protocol inspired by the
FTT protocol for wireless communications. The assessment of the protocol was conducted
using a set of messages with constant requirements and fixed scheduling. The flexibility
potential provided by the WFTT protocol can only be fully exploited if an admission control
mechanism and a scheduler are available, allowing modifying data flow requirements and
adding/removing data streams on-line. Although the WFTT protocol is slightly different
from the FTT, the implementation of the scheduling and admission control mechanisms
should not be a difficult endeavor, since the WFTT master has more resources than the
FTT-CAN master, for example, and their timing windows have a similar structure and
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operational requirements.
Message/Station Redundancy Support
The WFTT protocol was proven to be an effective solution for supporting wireless
real-time communications in contention-based environments. Although the most pervasive
technologies operating on the 2.4 GHz ISM band rely on contention to access the medium,
there are a few others (e.g., Bluetooth) which employ a TDMA MAC and could, eventually,
compromise the WFTT timeliness. The same occurs for RF jammers. Therefore, the de-
velopment of a redundancy mechanism that could replicate the WFTT protocol operation
in more than one frequency band would improve the reliability of the protocol. Because
the WFTT protocol relies on a single master to transmit a trigger message that triggers
the operation of the slaves, if the master fails, the network becomes compromised. One
interesting line of research is the implementation of a WFTT master replication mechanism
that would improve the overall WFTT dependability.
Multi-domain Coordination and Routing
As presented in this dissertation, the support of large wireless networks is an important
requirement in many application scenarios. Therefore, extending the WFTT master/multi-
slave architecture to cope with this requirement is a compelling arena of future research.
Two aspects must be addressed. First, different domains should be able to communicate
with each other in a timely fashion. This involves devising mechanisms to ensure the
routing of packets between WFTT networks (clusters) and, also, the phase coordination
between them to guarantee that whenever a given WFTT master sends a packet to another
neighbor master, the later is ready to receive it. Second, as each WFTT cluster operation
is ruled by its master, a global scheduling paradigm could be devised to allow the reuse
of the spectrum (frequency bands) and guarantee collision-free communications between
clusters. One possible solution can be the adoption of a coloring mechanism similar to
those employed in cellular radio communications.
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WITAS: A WIreless Timeliness Assessment
System
This appendix describes the WITAS architecture, operation and supporting applica-
tions. This document is divided in four sections. The first corresponds to an overview
of the system’s architecture. Afterwards, an in-depth review of the protocol operation is
presented with focus on both log and command activities. In this section, protocol ex-
amples are shown for clearness. The following section addresses the applications used to
manage the WITAS system and to process the raw data collected in the trials. Finally, the
implementation feasibility is studied and some lines of future improvement are analyzed.
A.1 Architecture
The WITAS architecture can be analyzed in two main perspectives: system and de-
vices. The following subsections provide an architecture overview of the system and of the
associated devices, with emphasis on their hardware.
A.1.1 System
The WITAS measurement system encompasses two types of devices: Event Loggers
(ELs) and Event Processors (EPs), as shown in Figure A.1. The first ones are designed
to be connected to the wireless stations (S1 ... Sj) being assessed for their timeliness.
Event Loggers register the transmission/reception instant of any packet sent/received by
the associated wireless station. Additionally, ELs are designed to monitor the power con-
sumption of the associated stations. All information registered by ELs is communicated
A1
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Figure A.1: WITAS global architecture
to the Event Processor, which is responsible for its forwarding to an application running
in a PC.
The overall system behavior is driven by a central clock, which is supplied by one of
the EPs to the remaining EPs and ELs. This shared clock allows that all time-stamping
devices (Event Loggers) register the event instants in a coherent way, since the same clock
is used by all Event Loggers.
Because all ELs are tied to a single serial reception port at the EP, the later needs to
poll each of the associated Event Loggers individually to obtain the registered information.
This is done in a round robin fashion by means of a specific serial command, which, despite
being received by all ELs is only executed by the addressed EL. The ELs use a specific signal
to notify the EP that event data sets are waiting to be collected. This allows speeding up
the polling process and avoiding wasting bandwidth in queries that will have no response.
In a similar fashion, EPs use a specific signal to drive ELs to a configuration mode.
A.1.2 Devices
As introduced, the WITAS system encompasses both ELs and EPs. The first are
responsible for the event time-stamping while the second collect the event records from
the ELs. The EL hardware architecture was specifically tailored to enable fast serial
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(a) Connected view (b) Unconnected view
Figure A.2: Event Logger pictures
communications with both the EP and the communication node being monitored. In
this sense, the main attributes of the microcontroller selected to power the EL were the
integration of two fast serial ports and a moderate/high processing capability. The selected
microcontroller for this purpose was the Microchip PIC18F46K22 MCU, which can operate
up to 16 MIPS (@64 MHz). Besides these features, the PIC18F46K22 provides a generous
amount of memory (64 kilobytes of Flash, 3896 byte of RAM and 1024 bytes of EEPROM),
four 16-bit hardware timers and 36 input/output pins.
Besides the PIC18F46K22 MCU, the Event Logger board encompasses an electronic
circuit that powers-up the node being monitored. Jointly with the MCU’s ADC, this
circuit allows measuring the energy being supplied to the node. The board also includes
several connectors, which allow feeding/receiving signals to/from external elements such
as the EP or the communication node being monitored. Figure A.2 depicts two photos of
an Event Logger. As documented, the board integrates several through-hole components.
For example, the two LEDs allow checking the board’s state while the two push buttons
can be used to drive the EL operation.
The event processor is built using a uMRF and a mezzanine board. The uMRF board
hardware architecture and features is detailed in Appendix C. The mezzanine board is
simply an electrical interface that routes signals to/from the ELs from/to the uMRF board.
The main signals being interfaced are the serial data (transmitted commands/received
events), clock and data ready signal. An important design option of the mezzanine board
was the direct connection of all the EL’s transmit serial lines to the EP’s receive pin. The
EL’s transmit pin is kept in a high impedance state, except for the intervals in which the EL
performs a transmission. Moreover, another relevant EP design option was the connection
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(a) Top view (b) Lateral view
Figure A.3: Event Processor pictures
of its transmit serial line to all the EL’s receive pins. Therefore, the data transmitted
by the EP is received simultaneously by all connected ELs. Provided that an EL only
performs a data transmission to the EP when it is specifically addressed for this purpose,
there is no risk of having overlapping transmissions from multiple ELs.
Figure A.3 illustrates two views of the Event Processor board. Figure A.3(a) shows
a top view, where eight EL connectors are visible. Figure A.3(b) depicts a lateral photo
registering the coupling between the mezzanine and the uMRF boards.
A.2 Operation
The operation of the WITAS measurement system is dependent of the behavior of three
elements: wireless stations, Event Loggers and Event Processors. When the transmission
of a packet is initiated, the corresponding wireless station switches the state of a digital line
that is connected to an interrupt input of the Event Logger. As result, the EL records the
instant at which the event occurred together with complementary information about the
sender and message sequence number. This information is communicated by the wireless
station (using the serial connection) immediately after signaling the digital line. An EL is
capable of storing several event records before being queried by the EP to perform their
transmission. When an EL has (at least) one event record to communicate, it raises a
signal to the associated EP notifying this condition. Consequently, the EP will include
this EL in the following event polling cycle, allowing the collection of the event records
received so far. Hence, in the following polling cycle, the EL will be polled by means of
a specific command to which it will reply with all the existing buffered event records (up
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to a given configurable maximum). These records are then forwarded by the EP to an
application running in a PC. Besides recording the serial stream of event records coming
from the EP, the PC application allows configuring the WITAS operation (EPs and ELs)
during the multiple phases of a trial. The features supported by this application are the
following:
• Configure the trial parameters;
• Current sampling period by the EL1;
• List of device IDs participating on the trial;
• Polling period of the EPs to the ELs;
• Stop, Set and Begin a trial;
• Record raw data file;
• Generate histogram CSV files;
• Store/load default settings.
The WITAS application is able to compute the following parameters based on the event
records received from the EP:
• Latency (minimum, maximum, average, standard deviation);
• Latency histogram CSV file;
• Energy consumption (minimum, maximum, average, standard deviation)1;
• Number of packets successfully transmitted;
A.2.1 Event Logging
The devised logging protocol was built to cope with the requirements of the WITAS
monitoring system. Figure A.4 shows the structure of an event record frame. As doc-
umented, the frame start character ‘$’ is followed by another character (‘E’, ‘T’ or ‘R’)
defining the event’s operation being logged. Afterwards, a character indicates the type of
1Although the EL hardware was designed to support current consumption, this feature is not yet
supported by the EL’s firmware.
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Figure A.4: Event logging frame format
packet registered (or ‘E’ if it corresponds to an energy measurement). Following, comes the
identification of the station and the packet sequence number (or energy value). All of these
fields are embedded in the frames sent by the wireless station to the EL. When the EL
forwards the frame to the EP, it appends the timestamp field, whose value is represented in
multiples of 1 microsecond. The baudrate employed in both serial communications is 500
kbps. Hence, the duration of the packet sent by the wireless station is 200 microseconds
while its forwarding to the EP is twice as longer.
The sequence number together with the identification of the station allows tracking if
any packets have been transmitted but not received by their intended recipients. Besides,
because every event is time-stamped in a coherent manner, it is possible to compute the
communication delays and other statistical parameters associated to the performance of
the communication system being assessed.
Figure A.5 depicts two event logging examples. In the first, station “S00” indicates that
it transmitted a trigger packet with the sequence number “00001”. In the second, station
“S01” informs that it received a real-time packet with the sequence number “00023” from
station S04. When these packets are forwarded to the EP, the associated time-stamp is
appended to the frame, as shown in Figure A.5. Afterwards, these packets are sent to the
PC application, responsible for saving and processing the trial data.
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Figure A.5: Event logging example
A.2.2 Command and Control
Figure A.6 shows the WITAS control frame format used to configure and control the
execution of measurement trials. As before, the frame started by the ‘$’ initiator character,
followed by the operation character and the identification of the device to be commanded.
The frame length is typically constant with a size of 5 bytes. The exception is the configure
command frame, whose size is variable and depends of the configuration payload. Except
for the “get records” command, which is issued by the EP to the connected ELs, all
commands are triggered by the PC application. The target device is specified in the “Dev”
field of the frame together with its “ID”. Regarding the identification of WITAS devices,
the ELs are always configured with the ID of the associated wireless station. As for the
EPs, the one with the zero ID is the “source”, meaning that it is the one responsible to
supply the clock for the timestamps.
Figure A.7 shows the PC application issuing two commands. In the first case, it re-
quests that the Event Logger associated with the wireless station “S01” begins the logging
procedure for upcoming events. In the second case, it instructs the wireless station “S00”
to initiate its operation.
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Figure A.6: WITAS control frame format
A.3 WITAS Applications
During a trial, the use of a PC application in combination with the WITAS system
occurs in two phases. In the first, the application is required to configure/setup the target
trial so that it carries on as expected. In the second, an application is needed to process
the collected data and to obtain meaningful information from it. As introduced, all data
exchanges in the WITAS system are conducted by means of serial messages. Hence, the
selected applications must be able to perform serial data transmissions/receptions and
analyze the information conveyed using this type of communication.
Docklight (www.docklight.de) is a popular tool for developing serial communication
protocols, which, among other features, allows recording predefined sequences of symbols
that can be sent via a serial port by simply pressing a button. In this scope, the Docklight
PC application was used in combination with the WITAS system to setup the experimental
trials described in this dissertation. The adopted approach was built upon the elaboration
of a “command library” encompassing all the message sequences that should be transmitted
to the WITAS system in order to properly configure the trials. After building this “library”,
the process of setting up a trial became very fast because the transmission of a given
command only requires pressing the corresponding button in the Docklight application.
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Figure A.7: WITAS control example
Listing A.1: Example of the results obtained by processing a trial’s raw data
1 --> Transmission DELAY
2 Minimum : 1406 us
3 Maximum : 3662 us
4 Average : 2598.8 us
5 Std.Dev: 736.25 us
6
7 --> Transmitted PACKETS
8 Success : 687
9 Errors : 295
10 ZR Errors : 4
11 PER: 30.0
12
13 --> Received PACKETS
14 Errors Total: 1
15 Error Non -Repetitive : 1
A second PC application was required to process the trial’s collected raw data. During a
trial, the Docklight application receives all the messages forwarded by the EP. As described,
these messages contain the EL event records plus their associated timestamps. Whenever
a message is received, it is displayed in the Docklight’s user interface. At the end of a
trial, the received frames (plus timestamps) are manually copied to a text file, which can
be used to obtain several statistical parameters. In this scope, a command-line application
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was developed using the Ruby programming language. This application accepts the name
of the text file where the messages are stored as an input parameter and reproduces the
associated statistical results, as documented in Listing A.1. Optionally, the application
can output a latency histogram using the comma separated value file format.
A.4 Implementation
This section is dedicated to the WITAS system feasibility analysis and to the discussion
of the main limitations and improvements that can be performed in the future.
A.4.1 Feasibility Analysis
For the purpose of analyzing the feasibility of using the WITAS system to assess the
WFTT protocol performance a typical elementary cycle (EC) of 200 milliseconds is as-
sumed. An EC encompasses the transmission of a trigger packet (TP) followed by real-
time (RT) and contention (CT) packets, if any. Considering a scenario encompassing one
master, four RT stations and three contention-based stations performing one transmission
each per elementary cycle, the events generated and sent to the Event Loggers will be:
• Master: 1 x TP transmission, 4 x RT reception, 3 x CT reception
• Slave RT: 1 x TP Reception, 1 x RT Transmission, 3 x RT Reception, 3 x CT
reception
• Slave CT: 1 x TP Reception, 4 x RT Reception, 1 x CT Transmission, 2 x CT
reception
Hence, the number of events reported in each EC by a wireless station to the associated
Event Logger is given by:
#EventsEC = #RTPackets +#CTPackets+ 1
☛
✡
✟
✠A.1
Since each event takes 200 microseconds to be transmitted from the WFTT station to
the Event Logger, the maximum number of packets that can be transmitted in an EC is
given by:
#EventsEC2EL = ECPeriod/200us
☛
✡
✟
✠A.2
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Regarding the forwarding of these events from the event logger to the Event Processor,
the maximum number of packets that can be transmitted in an EC is given by:
#EventsEC2EP = ECPeriod/400us
☛
✡
✟
✠A.3
For a scenario where the EC period is 200 milliseconds, the #EventsEC2EL and
#EventsEC2EP are characterized by values of 1000 and 500, respectively.
Considering the specified scenario, the transmission time of the events from the wireless
stations to the Event Loggers is of 1.6 milliseconds, which corresponds to 0.8 % of the EC
period. Furthermore, the transmission time of the event records stored at the Event Loggers
during an EC is of 25.6 milliseconds, corresponding to 12.8 % of the available time in an
EC. This interval corresponds to the delay of polling 64 event records, which are a result
of the communications that occurred during the EC.
The scenario mentioned above defines a network encompassing eight WFTT wireless
stations. This number is aligned with the limitation of an EP to collect event records from
eight different Event Loggers. However, this number can be extended by using more EPs
with additional Event Loggers. In this case, EPs can be connected in different serial ports
at the PC or in different PCs running the logging application. In the first case, the event
record stream is stored in a single file, which will be used to compute the communications’
timeliness. In the second case, the event record stream is saved in multiple files. In this
scenario, the partial record streams must be merged to obtain a complete view of the event
history and allow computing the timeliness of the communications.
A.4.2 Limitations and future work
During the testing of the WITAS system and throughout the execution of the WFTT
performance trials presented in this dissertation, several limitations were identified. Pro-
vided the system’s support of the basic functionality, the correctness of the obtained results
and the scarcity of time to redesign the hardware, the WFTT trials were conducted with the
WITAS system in its current version. This version is characterized by some impairments,
which, in most cases, result of early sub-optimal hardware design options that imposed
constraints to the way the WITAS system can be effectively used. One of such limitations
is the direct connection between UART interfaces, without employing appropriate drivers
(e.g., EIA232 physical interfaces). Because of this, the distance between transmitter and
receiver is severely shortened due to the signal attenuation and addition of noise. Hence,
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the use of the WITAS system to assess networks extending over large physical areas is
not currently possible. This effect is also experienced for other signals, namely the clock
signal provided by the EP to the ELs. One possible solution for these problems can be the
redesign of the EL and of the EP mezzanine boards in order to employ differential signals.
The serial communications could employ a RS485 physical interface, for example.
One aspect that revealed to be a design drawback was the use of different architectures
for the EL and for the EP. This option made the firmware development more complex
and segmented. Another issue arising from this option was the EL UART’s lack of flow
control hardware support, which increased the difficulty of obtaining a consistent com-
munication coordination between the EL and the EP. A possible solution for such prob-
lems could be the adoption of a common hardware architecture, employing the Microchip
dsPIC33FJ256MC710 MCU. Besides being faster than the PIC18F46K22 used in the EL,
it provides more memory (allowing buffering more event records) and integrates UARTs
with flow control.
Although the trial setup process with the Docklight application is relatively fast, it
forces the user to press a set of buttons in a (possibly) repetitive way. Furthermore,
the processing and configure applications are decoupled from each other, which causes
the user to individually setup each one. In order to overcome these drawbacks, a single
configure and process GUI application could be built. This application should allow setting
up a trial with a single click, record the raw data into a file and process it to obtain
the designated statistical information. One important feature to include would be the
possibility of saving/loading configuration files containing information about the different
trial parameters (e.g., IDs of the stations, types of packets being considered, etc.). An
alpha version of one such application was already implemented using the Java language.
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CAOS: Contention-bAsed nOise Sequencer
CAOS stands for “Contention-bAsed Noise Sequencer” and, as suggested, it is a tool
aimed at producing contention-based noise. The motivation for developing a device with
this nature arose from the requirement of mimicking communication environments popu-
lated with Wi-Fi transmissions in the 2.4 GHz ISM band. Because the WFTT protocol
was developed to operate over this band, its assessment in the presence of Wi-Fi contention
noise was considered essential.
This appendix is divided in two main sections: the CAOS architecture and its evalu-
ation. The first is focused on the employed hardware and on the software developed to
support its functionality. The evaluation section addresses the CAOS effectiveness and is
conducted using two different approaches. One in which its ability to “pollute” the 2.4
GHz ISM band is studied using a spectrum analyzer and the other where its effect on IEEE
802.15.4 broadcast transmissions is assessed.
B.1 Architecture
The CAOS architecture is very simple, thus indicating that a system with similar
properties can be easily assembled. The following subsections describe the key elements of
the CAOS hardware and software architectures.
B.1.1 Hardware
The hardware architecture of the CAOS encompasses a personal computer (PC) and a
set of five USB Wi-Fi network adapters. The PC has no stringent requirements regarding
processing power and memory. In this sense, a midrange PC setup was assembled using a
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(a) Front (b) Back
Figure B.1: CAOS physical appearance
specific set of components, namely:
• Zotac H55-ITX motherboard;
• Intel Core i3-540 processor running at 3.06 GHz;
• 2GB RAM DIMM operating at 1333 MHz;
• Fujitsu 60 GB SATA 2.5 in HDD;
• Compucase 8K07 120 W Mini-ITX Case.
The PC was setup with a Mint Linux 10 operating system (“Julia” distribution, kernel
2.6.35) . Besides the PC components, a set of five BELKIN F5D7050 USB Wi-Fi network
adapters were also employed in the construction of the CAOS. Figure B.1 depicts two
photos of the CAOS: one from the front panel and the other from the back panel. As
illustrated, provided that the Mini-ITX Case only has two front-facing USB ports, three
USB extension cables were used to allow placing the Wi-Fi network adapters close to each
other and with a consistent physical orientation.
B.1.2 Software
From the perspective of the user, the CAOS operation is managed through a web page,
which is accessible by default at the (static) IP address 192.168.0.101. In this sense, if the
user requires that Wi-Fi noise is generated, it must access the designated address using a
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Figure B.2: CAOS software organization
Figure B.3: CAOS on-line setup (browser snapshot)
browser and request the noise transmission to be initiated. In order to simplify the analysis
of the software developed for the CAOS, a visual scheme was devised, showing its software
organisation main elements. This scheme is represented in Figure B.2.
As documented, when the user accesses the 192.168.0.101 IP address using the browser,
the server supplies the “index.html” file 1©, which, in turn, redirects the browser to
the “192.168.0.101/cgi-bin/caos.py” address 2©. This path corresponds to the “caos.py”
Python script, which is executed by the server (CAOS) and returns an HTML file with
several forms that the user can fill. An example of the HTML file rendered at the user’s
browser is illustrated in Figure B.3. This HTML file is dynamically constructed using a
HTML template file 4© and the default parameters of the CAOS, which are stored in a
text file named “config.caos” 3©.
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The configurable parameters depicted in Figure B.3 are:
• # of packets: number of packets to be transmitted;
• Channel: Wi-Fi channel where the packets shall be transmitted;
• Sleep time: Interval in microseconds between packet transmission attempts;
• Length: size of the packet’s payload.
The “noisify!” button initiates the transmission of a noise sequence employing the
configured parameters. When this button pressed, the Python script invokes the “btx”
command line application 5© with the parameters selected in the HTML forms. This file
results from compiling the “tx.c” C source code file B© using the “maketest.sh” script
A©. The “tx.c” B© source file holds the command line application that enables the
transmission of IEEE 802.11 packets. This application was developed using the Loss Of
Radio CONnectivity (LORCON) library version 2 [168]. The LORCON is an open source
library that provides driver abstraction and allows injecting IEEE 802.11 packets into the
medium using standard wireless network adapters.
The LORCON library supports the Pedro Larbig’s RT73 driver [169], which is com-
patible with the BELKIN F5D7050 Wi-Fi adapter and exhibits a small access latency,
making it an ideal choice for supporting the CAOS tool. In this sense, besides installing
the LORCON library, the RT73 driver was also added to the Mint Linux 10 operating
system.
B.2 Evaluation
This section aims at studying to which extend is the CAOS tool able to fulfill the
requirement of fully occupying the 2.4GHz ISM band. Provided the requirement of flooding
the entire 2.4 GHz ISM band with IEEE 802.11 traffic, the CAOS packet transmissions were
configured to be performed in multiple IEEE 802.11 channels covering the full range of the
2.4 GHz ISM band according to the settings defined in Table B.1. As documented, packet
transmissions are performed with a period of 1 milliseconds in channels 1, 4, 7, 10 and
14, identified as the best compromise between reducing cross-interference and maximizing
bandwidth coverage. Since each USB Wi-Fi adapter is factory set with a specific maximum
transmission power, the spectral occupation of the 2.4 GHz band will not be uniform across
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Table B.1: CAOS settings
Traffic
Packet size 50 octets = PLCP (24) + MPDU (26)
Packet period 1 ms
Data rate PLCP @ 1 Mbps / MPDU @ 2 Mbps
Power
Channel 1 4 7 10 14
Value (dBm) 20 15 16 14 20
the full spectrum. This is observed in Table B.1, where different levels of transmission
power are setup for the different network adapters, despite of their common configuration
to use a +20 dBm transmission power. The illustrated transmission power values were
obtained using the Linux command line “iwconfig” application.
The remaining of this section focuses on assessing the CAOS tool ability to occupy the
overall 2.4 GHz ISM band with Wi-Fi noise. As introduced, two approaches are studied.
One were a spectrum analyzer is used to verify the band occupation and the other to assess
the CAOS electiveness in blocking IEEE 802.15.4 traffic.
B.2.1 Bandwidth occupation on the 2.4 GHz ISM band
The evaluation of the CAOS tool bandwidth occupation in the 2.4 GHz ISM band was
conducted using the Aaronia Lcs Analyzer v1.9.9 application together with a SPECTRAN
HF2025E v2.2 spectrum analyzer, including the 201 option (Real-Time Broadband Peak
Power Meter). The spectrum analyzer was configured with the settings documented in
Table B.2. The evaluation was realized for a period of 225 seconds with the CAOS tool
performing the transmission of a periodic packet stream in the five channels according to
the settings of Table B.1.
The results obtained with the Aaronia Lcs Analyzer application were segmented in two
parts. The first corresponds to the (RMS) power measurement during a full sweep of the 2.4
GHz ISM band. In this case, two traces are shown, as depicted in Figure B.4. The darker
trace represents last power level sweep, while the lighter registers the maximum power
during a trial (225 seconds). Besides the traces, Figure B.4 includes overlay information
that helps to read its contents, namely the regions occupied by each Wi-Fi channel and
the parameters configured for the spectrum analyzer.
The second part of the CAOS band occupation analysis focuses on the waterfall fre-
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Table B.2: Aaronia Lcs analyzer settings
Range (MHz)
Start Stop Span Center
2400 2490 90 2445
Sweep
Sampletime Pulsemode
1 s yes
Bandwidth
Resolution Video Attenuator
3 MHz 3 MHz AUTO
quency graphic illustrated in Figure B.5. As shown, it encompasses a timestamped rolling
window, where each line corresponds to a full sweep of the 2.4 GHz ISM band. In this
case, the high power levels are represented in a darker tone. The white gaps indicate that
no energy was detected on the sampled frequency.
The maximum power measured in channels 1, 4, 7, 10 and 14 (Figures B.4 and B.5)
seems to be aligned with the power supported by the USB Wi-Fi network adapters of
Table B.1. However, as shown in Figure B.5, there are visible “holes” in the spectrum,
which indicates that the corresponding frequencies had no significant level of energy when
the spectrum analyzer performed the sweep. One possible cause for this problem is the
occurrence of cross-interference between transmissions. Provided that the selected channels
experience some frequency overlapping, the packet transmission rate in “neighbor” channels
can be decreased. Furthermore, since the Wi-Fi network adapter’s maximum power is
hardware dependent, the CAOS tool spectral occupation profile will only be uniform if the
selected Wi-Fi USB cards are able to support a similar level of maximum transmission
power.
B.2.2 Impact on IEEE 802.15.4 broadcast transmissions
The assessment of the CAOS noise impact on IEEE 802.15.4 broadcast transmissions
is an alternative way of testing its effectiveness in mimicking heavily “polluted” Wi-Fi
environments. In this sense, a simple testbed encompassing one IEEE 802.15.4 transmitter
(T) station (height ≈ 78 centimeters), one IEEE 802.15.4 receiver (R) station (height ≈ 82
centimeters) and one CAOS (C) tool (height ≈ 64 centimeters) was built. The transmitter
and receiver were separated by a distance of 3 meters. The CAOS tool was placed at 3.9
meters from the central point between transmitter and receiver. Figure B.6(a) shows an
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Figure B.4: CAOS frequency sweep
illustrative diagram of the testbed’s physical arrangement and Figure B.6(b) provides a
photography of its realization.
The CAOS assessment was based on trials, each one comprehending the transmission
of 1000 IEEE 802.15.4 broadcast packets with a payload of one byte. Both transmitter
and receiver stations were programmed with a firmware application allowing their con-
figuration/control through a terminal emulator. Using this approach, the IEEE 802.15.4
transmitter station was configured to employ a power of -10 dBm and to conduct trans-
mission attempts at every 100 milliseconds. Each transmitted packet carried one distinct
character symbol that was also sent to the attached terminal emulator. Since the sequence
of characters was known a priori, the receiver station could determine when a packet was
lost. The successfully received symbols and the ‘ ’ character, representing the failed re-
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Figure B.5: CAOS frequency occupation waterfall
ceptions, were printed to the terminal emulator. By counting the number of existing ‘ ’
characters at the receiver, it was possible to determine the transmission’s packet error rate
(PER).
In order to measure the impact of the CAOS noise over the full length of the 2.4 GHz
ISM band, 10 trials were conducted for each one of the 16 IEEE 802.15.4 channels. As
documented in Figure B.6(c), the obtained results were combined to create a 3D graph-
ical representation, illustrating the experienced IEEE 802.15.4 PER as a function of the
channel and of the trial number. These results show that the noise produced by the CAOS
tool forces a high PER (typically more than 70 %) on the IEEE 802.15.4 broadcast trans-
missions, independently of the channel being used to perform them. Although the PER
is not uniform across all IEEE 802.15.4 channels, a consistent behavior between different
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(a) Physical arrangement (b) Setup photo
(c) Results
Figure B.6: CAOS noise impact evaluation setup and results
trials can be observed. This effect is possibly caused by the different levels of transmission
power employed by the Wi-Fi network adapters embedded in the CAOS tool.
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The uMRF Wireless Platform
This appendix describes the uMRF wireless platform whose elements were employed
in the development of the testbeds created to assess the bandjacking technique and the
WFTT protocol performance. The platform explanation is divided in two sections, one
dedicated to the wireless device used in the implementation of the WFTT slave (uMRFs)
and the other addressing the device employed by the master station (uMRF).
C.1 uMRFs: A Tiny Wireless Node
This section presents the uMRFs wireless device fact sheet, whose development specifi-
cally targets the support of low-power wireless networks based on the IEEE 802.15.4 stan-
dard. The design of this device was driven by the functionality required for implementing
a WFTT slave station.
C.1.1 Overview
The uMRFs board is an integrated solution for developing wireless applications based
on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. Besides the obvious communication functionality, the
uMRFs board encompasses several hardware components, allowing extending its usage to
monitor temperature and acceleration, for example. Given its low energy consumption and
small size, the uMRFs board can enable mobile applications when used together with a
Li-IoN battery. The circuitry for charging the battery from a USB power source is also
included in the board.
The uMRFs board encompasses several components packed in a tiny board to provide
the following set of features:
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• Micro-controller operating at up to 16MIPS (Microchip PIC18 family);
• IEEE 802.15.4 standard low-power wireless radio module;
• Low-power digital accelerometer;
• USB or battery powered, with on-board battery charger;
• USB serial port;
• General buttons and LEDs for debug;
• Low power consumption;
• Compact and small profile: 44 mm x 44 mm x 9 mm;
• Broad range of development tools;
• Free software tool-chain for academic use.
C.1.2 Hardware
Figure C.1 shows an enlarged picture of the uMRFs board decorated with information
identifying the included components. Tables C.1, C.2 and C.3 document the main char-
acteristics of the microcontroller, wireless module and peripherals, respectively. As docu-
mented, the uMRFs board encompasses a 8-bit nano Watt XLP Microchip PIC18F26K20
microcontroller, capable of operating with a frequency of up to 64 MHz (16 MIPS). Be-
sides its low-power operation and flexible frequency setup, the PIC18F26K20 microcon-
troller boasts 64 kilobytes of program memory, 3936 bytes of data memory and 1024 bytes
of EEPROM memory. As documented in Table C.1, the microcontroller supports a wide
range communication peripherals, timers and input/output pins for both analog and digital
operation.
The Microchip’s MRF24J40MA wireless module (Table C.2) integrated on the uMRFs
board is responsible for its enabling with IEEE 802.15.4 wireless communications. Besides
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard conformance, the module supports the low-power operation
sleep mode; the development of applications with ZigBee, MiWi (+P2P) and proprietary
communication stacks; and features several distinctive functionalities such as a security
engine (AES-128) supporting the CTR, CCM and CBC-MAC modes.
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Figure C.1: The uMRFs development board
Table C.1: PIC18F26K20 characteristics
Microcontroller
Type 8-bit nano Watt XLP
Frequency Up to 64 MHz (internal oscillator)
Operations per second Up to 16 MIPS
Program memory size 64 kB
Data memory size 3936 B
EEPROM memory size 1024 B
Analog-To-Digital converter 11 channels of 10-bit
I/O pins 25 I/O + 1 input
Communications EUSART, SPI, I2C
Timers 1 x 8-bit, 3 x 16-bit
Others 1 x CCP, 1 x ECCP (PWM)
Table C.2: MRF24J40MA characteristics
Wireless Module
Type IEEE Std. 802.15.4
Frequency 2.4 GHz
Antenna On-board, +0 dBm
Data rate 250 kbps
Range Up to 400 m outdoor / 10 m indoor
Power consumption Reception: 19 mA, Transmission: 23 mA, Sleep: 2 nA
Supported protocols ZigBee, MiWi (+P2P), proprietary
Features
Hardware CSMA-CA mechanism; auto ACK; hardware
security engine (AES-128) with CTR, CCM and CBC-MAC
modes; support all CCA modes and RSS/LQI
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Table C.3: uMRFs peripherals’ characteristics
Peripherals
Accelerometer Freescale MMA7455L (SPI)
Precision 8/10-bit x 3 axis
Scale +/- 2/4/8g
Power consumption 400 µA
Temperature sensor Microchip MCP9700
Type Analog output
Accuracy 4 ◦C
Battery charger Microchip MCP73833
USB to serial converter FTDI FT232RL
Programming interface 5 or 6-wire ICSP
Hardware debug LEDs 2 (orange + green)
Hardware debug buttons 2 (general purpose + reset)
As shown in Table C.3, the uMRFs board offers support for mounting several periph-
erals, namely: accelerometer, battery charger controller, USB to serial converter, pro-
gramming interface and several hardware input/outputs. The accelerometer was included
to enable shock/fall detection applications, for example. The serial converter allows the
uMRFs boards to dialogue with PC applications using serial communications. The support
for mobile applications was included by powering the board with a battery and enabling
its recharge through a standard USB connection. Finally, the board’s hardware inputs and
outputs provide a simple mechanism to externally control and monitor its operation.
C.2 uMRF: An Extensible Wireless Board
The uMRF board is an embedded solution for developing IEEE 802.15.4 wireless com-
munication applications. The key design aspect of this board is its flexibility to bridge
a low-power IEEE 802.15.4 network to a higher level communication tier implemented in
compliance to the IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) or IEEE 802.3 (Ethernet) standards. The original
design of this device was driven by the functionality required for implementing a WFTT
master station. This section describes the main characteristics and features of the uMRF
board.
C.2.1 Overview
The uMRF (read as “micro MRF”) board is an integrated solution for developing
IEEE 802.15.4 wireless applications. Besides the IEEE 802.15.4 communication function-
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ality, which is enabled with either the MRF24J40MA (400 meters range outdoor / 10
meters range indoor) or MRF24J40MB (1200 meters range outdoor / 10 meters range
indoor) modules, the uMRF board encompasses two connectors, which allow extending
its functionality using mezzanine boards (add-ons) with support for Wi-Fi and Ethernet
communications. The small size (less than a credit card), moderate energy consumption
and high processing power make the uMRF board a good solution for resource demanding
applications where multiple communication technologies are required. A Li-IoN battery
can be used to power up the board, which includes the circuitry for charging the battery
from a USB power source.
The uMRF embeds several components packed in a credit card sized board to provide
the following set of features:
• High performance microcontroller operating at up to 40MIPS (Microchip dsPIC fam-
ily);
• On-board IEEE 802.15.4 standard low/moderate power radio module;
• USB or battery powered, with on-board battery charger;
• USB serial port;
• General purpose buttons and LEDs for debugging;
• Low power consumption;
• Small size: 69 mm x 49 mm x 9 mm.
C.2.2 Hardware
Figure C.2 shows an enlarged picture of the uMRF board decorated with information
identifying the included components. As documented, the board provides soldering points
for mounting two IEEE 802.15.4 modules of different sizes. Furthermore, the mounting of
some external peripherals such as the temperature sensor and the serial-USB converter is
optional, allowing to reduce the board’s overall cost.
Tables C.4, C.5 and C.6 document the main characteristics of the microcontroller, wire-
less module and peripherals, respectively. The uMRF board integrates a 16-bit Microchip
dsPIC33FJ256MC710 microcontroller capable of operating with frequencies of up to 80
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Figure C.2: The uMRF development board
MHz (40 MIPS). In addition to the broad frequency support, this microcontroller com-
prises a Program memory of 256 kilobytes, a data memory of 30 kilobytes and support for
Direct Memory Access (DMA). Table C.4 shows that, when compared to the PIC18F26K20
microcontroller adopted for the uMRFs board, the dsPIC33FJ256MC710 MCU is enabled
with a much wider range of communication peripherals, timers and input/output pins for
both analog and digital operation.
Table C.4: dsPIC33FJ256MC710 characteristics
Microcontroller
Type 16-bit
Frequency Up to 80 MHz
Operations per second Up to 40 MIPS
Program memory size 256 kB
Data memory size 30 kB
Memory features Direct Memory Access (DMA)
Analog-To-Digital converter 24 channels x 2
I/O pins 85
Communications 2 x UART, 2 x SPI, 2 x I2C, 2 x CAN
Timers 9 x 16-bit, with pairing: 4 x 32-bit
Others 8 x PWM
As shown in Table C.5 the IEEE 802.15.4 MRF24J40MB module presents similar char-
acteristics to the MRF24J40MA module, except for the higher range and increased current
consumption. The range extension is achieved through the inclusion of both a power am-
plifier, increasing the propagated energy level, and and low noise amplifier, augmenting
the reception sensitivity.
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Table C.5: MRF24J40MB characteristics
Wireless Module
Type IEEE Std. 802.15.4
Frequency 2.4 GHz
Antenna On-board, +20 dBm
Data rate 250 kbps
Range Up to 1200 m outdoor / 100 m indoor
Power consumption Reception: 25 mA, Transmission: 130 mA, Sleep: 5 µA
Supported protocols ZigBee, MiWi (+P2P), proprietary
Features
Hardware CSMA-CA mechanism; auto ACK; hardware
security engine (AES-128) with CTR, CCM and CBC-MAC
modes; support all CCA modes and RSS/LQI
The uMRF board includes peripherals such as a temperature sensor, a USB to serial
converter, a battery charger controller and some hardware inputs and outputs. However, its
distinctive functionality arises from the possibility of mounting mezzanine boards holding
other types of communication interfaces. The support of the IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) and the
IEEE 802.3 (Ethernet) standard communication technologies was achieved through the
development of specific mezzanine boards. Another example of the functionality extension
conveyed by the use of mezzanine boards is the PNS connection to the WFTT master
station. In this case, a mezzanine board is used to bridge the driving signals of the master
to the PNS board.
Table C.6: uMRF peripherals’ characteristics
Peripherals
Temperature sensor Microchip MCP9700
Type Analog output
Accuracy 4 ◦C
Battery charger Microchip MCP73833
USB to serial converter FTDI FT232RL
Programming interface 5 or 6-wire ICSP
Hardware debug LEDs 2 (orange + green)
Hardware debug buttons 3 (2 x general purpose + reset)
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BeeMon: A IEEE 802.15.4 2.4 GHz energy
monitor
The motivation for developing an IEEE 802.15.4 channel energy monitor is the require-
ment of evaluating the periods of time in which IEEE 802.15.4 transmissions occupy the
medium. This can be an important tool to assess the timeliness of any wireless protocol
using the IEEE 802.15.4 technology to perform transmissions. This appendix describes
the hardware of the BeeMon, an IEEE 802.15.4 2.4 GHz channel energy monitor, with
emphasis on its hardware and software. Its operation is also described in detail.
D.1 Architecture
The architecture of the BeeMon monitor builds on the features provided by the uMRFs
board presented in Appendix C.1. The availability of a platform including a suitable MCU
and an IEEE 802.15.4 transceiver that is capable of performing fast energy measurements
was essential in the development of a low cost monitoring solution for the 2.4 GHz ISM
band.
D.1.1 Hardware
As depicted in Figure D.1, the BeeMon monitor operates with the help of an oscillo-
scope, which allows visualizing a signal proportional to the energy levels detected in the
medium. In this sense, the BeeMon monitor produces an analog signal matching the energy
sampled on a given channel or on a set of channels, as it will be explained further ahead.
The hardware of the BeeMon monitor encompasses a uMRFs board and a low pass filter.
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Figure D.1: Architecture of the BeeMon IEEE 802.15.4 channel monitor
As detailed in Appendix C.1, the uMRFs board uses a Microchip PIC18F26K20 to run
the application firmware that, among other functions, drives the board’s MRF24J40MA
transceiver. Provided that this MCU does not have an integrated DAC, a PWM output
was used to generate an energy proportional digital signal, which can be converted into an
analog signal that can be visualized in an oscilloscope.
The low-pass filter allows converting the PWM signal from the MCU into a proportional
analog counterpart. The filter is a simple RC circuit designed with a cutoff frequency of
3183 Hz and a time constant of 50 microseconds. Therefore, the response to a step input
signal takes around 5.3 microseconds to reach 10 % of its amplitude, which is the minimum
perceivable change in the output signal using an oscilloscope. Hence, a perceivable change
on the BeeMon output analog signal will be affected by a constant delay of approximately
5.3 microseconds introduced by the low-pass filter. This delay must be accounted on the
overall BeeMon monitor response time.
The physical implementation of the BeeMon monitor is shown in Figure D.2. The
uMRFs board is powered by a USB connection that, additionally, allows sending serial
commands to change the mode of operation or channel of the BeeMon monitor. The RC
low-pass filter was constructed and embedded in the wire that is connected to the MCU’s
PWM output. Figure D.2(b) shows a separate wire that carries the PWM signal to the
low-pass filter.
D.1.2 Software
The design of the BeeMon monitor relies heavily on the features provided by the
MRF24J40 transceiver to sample the energy levels of a IEEE 802.15.4 channel. All in-
teractions with the MRF24J40 transceiver via the SPI bus were optimized in the firmware
by reducing to a minimum the number of function callings, i.e., by sending commands to
the MRF24J40 transceiver in the most low level possible way, thus avoiding the latency of
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(a) Overview (b) Detail
Figure D.2: Physical implementation of the BeeMon monitor
context save and restore operations associated to the cascade invocation of functions.
The key operations of the firmware developed for the BeeMon monitor are the energy
sampling using the MRF24J40 transceiver [153] and the conversion of the samples into
an analog signal that can be visualized in an oscilloscope. In this sense, the first step is
then the collection of digital values proportional to the energy in the medium. This task
was realized using the energy detection feature of the MRF24J40 transceiver. According
to its datasheet, the period of time used to sample the energy in any channel can be
configured to last for 1, 2 , 4 or 8 symbols, the later being the default value. This means
that the energy detection algorithm will provide an energy value in the MRF24J40 RSSI
register containing the averaged RSSI received power levels over this period of time. In
this BeeMon implementation, a two symbol configuration was chosen, making the channel
sample period last for 32 microseconds.
The second key operation of BeeMon’s firmware is the digital to analog conversion of the
sampled levels of energy. As introduced, the MCU’s PWM module is used together with a
low-pass filter for this purpose. Hence, the PWM register that controls the signal’s duty-
cycle is loaded with the 8-bit value (0 to 255) of sampled energy stored in the MRF24J40’s
RSSI register. The PWM signal was configured with a 16.125 microseconds period. An
important aspect regarding the PWM generation timeliness is the fact that any value loaded
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into the duty cycle register is only latched after the current PWM period completes. This
means that there can be a delay of a maximum of two PWM periods between the loading
of the sampled energy level into the duty cycle register and its effectiveness (one complete
PWM period) in the output PWM signal. As mentioned above, after being generated, the
PWM signal is fed to a low-pass filter that outputs a proportional analog signal to visualize
in a oscilloscope.
The latency associated to the process of sampling the medium energy and converting
it to an analog signal whose variations are visible on an oscilloscope is not negligible. This
latency corresponds to the sum of the following delays:
1. Sample time at the MRF24J40 transceiver;
2. Communication time of the averaged RSSI power from the transceiver to the MCU;
3. Update time of the PWM duty cycle register;
4. Latch time of the PWM duty cycle value;
5. PWM period with the updated duty cycle value;
6. Low-pass filter time to produce a visible a variation on the output analog signal.
In order to have a more experimental estimate of the BeeMon monitor response time,
an evaluation of its firmware implementation was performed. In this evaluation, a digital
output pin is set between the instants where the energy sampling is triggered and the
instant where the corresponding value is updated in the PWM duty cycle register. The
digital pin signal is tied to a Rigol DS1052E oscilloscope for its characterization. As shown
in Figure D.3(a), the experimental sum of the delays 1, 2 and 3 is, approximately, 43.6
microseconds. Provided that the delays 4,5 and 6 have been already presented, the overall
response time of the BeeMon monitor is 64.725 microseconds with a maximum jitter of
16.125 microseconds, due to the phase difference of the duty cycle register latching. In
order to simplify the analysis of the timings collected with the BeeMon, its response time
is assumed to encompass a delay of 65 microseconds and a jitter of 16 microseconds.
Due to the fact that some of the referred operations can be parallelized, e.g., the energy
sampling on the MRF24J40 transceiver can be simultaneously conducted with the latching
of a PWM duty cycle value of a former energy sample, the sampling period of the BeeMon
monitor can be highly reduced. In this sense, in order to have a fixed sampling period
and provide enough time to the MCU to perform other tasks, a 50 microsecond sampling
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(a) Sample period (b) Channel change slack
Figure D.3: BeeMon timing constraints
interval was defined, thus allowing an energy sampling frequency of 20 KHz. The sampling
period can be seen in Figure D.3(a).
The BeeMon supports two types of monitoring operations: single channel and channel
sweep. The first was already discussed and corresponds to the continuous energy moni-
toring on an IEEE 802.15.4 channel. The second performs a cyclical energy monitoring
in all IEEE 802.15.4 channels of the 2.4 GHz ISM band. One of the main limitations of
implementing such a feature is the requirement of guaranteeing that the internal oscillator
is stable before initiating any interactions with the transceiver. According to the datasheet
of the MRF24J40 transceiver [153], a wait period of 192 microseconds should be enforced
after changing channel. A delay of approximately 268 microseconds is used in this imple-
mentation, as it can be seen in Figure D.3(b). The sweep speed of the BeeMon monitor is
set in the firmware by means of define instructions. Currently, provided that the sampling
period of a channel is 50 microseconds and that there is a significant delay for exchanging
the sampling channel, eight samples per channel are collected. The maximum value of
each set of samples is then stored into a data array with 16 positions, one for each channel.
Then after each complete channel sweep, the values stored in the data array are fed to
the PWM module, which then, together with the low-pass filter generates an analog sig-
nal representing the energy levels observed in the IEEE 802.15.4 channels. The switching
between the two modes of operation is performed by serial commands sent to the BeeMon
monitor according to the predefined format presented in the following section.
D5
APPENDIX D. BEEMON: A IEEE 802.15.4 2.4 GHZ ENERGY MONITOR
(a) Energy over time on a given channel (b) Energy over the 16 IEEE 802.15.4 channels
Figure D.4: BeeMon visualization modes
D.2 Operation
The visualization of the signals representing the energy levels on the medium requires
some adjustments in the oscilloscope. In this sense, in the single channel mode of operation,
the oscilloscope should be set to the Y-T mode (or Roll mode in case it is available) with
a scale of between 200 mVdiv e 1 Vdiv. Figure D.4(a) shows the channel energy analysis
using the BeeMon monitor of a IEEE 802.15.4 communication protocol. As illustrated,
three transmissions are visible over a period of 60 milliseconds.
In the channel sweep mode, all IEEE 802.15.4 channels are sampled sequentially. In
order to synchronize the oscilloscope with the BeeMon channel sweep, the external trigger
of the oscilloscope should be connected to the trigger signal of the BeeMon monitor. This
trigger signal generates an impulse (3.3 V amplitude) that marks the beginning of the
channel sweep operation. Afterwards, the output of the BeeMon monitor represents the
energy sampled in the IEEE channels, starting in channel 11 and ending in channel 26.
All channel sweeps are preceded by this trigger impulse to allow the synchronization of the
attached oscilloscope. The duration of each energy slot corresponding to a given channel
is similar to the duration of the synchronization impulse. Figure D.4(b) depicts the trigger
signal in blue and the energy per channel in yellow. As shown, energy was detected in
channels 22, 23, 25 and 26, the latter with the highest level. Using the oscilloscope’s display
persistence feature, the energy levels of the previous channel sweeps can be visualized.
The BeeMon monitor can be configured using simple commands, which are sent via a
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serial connection configured with a baud-rate of 115200 bps, eight data bits, no parity and
one stop bit (8N1). The supported commands are listed in Table D.1. As shown, the user
can initiate or pause the BeeMon’s operation by sending the characters ‘i’ or ‘p’ through
the serial connection, respectively. Furthermore, the BeeMon monitor supports commands
to reset its operation, switch between (single channel/multi channel) operation modes and
set the operation channel (only in the single channel mode).
Table D.1: BeeMon serial commands
Command Description
i (i)nitiate operation
p (p)ause operation
t (t)oggle (start/stop) operation
r (r)eset BeeMon hardware
s (s)ingle channel mode
m (m)ultiple channel sweep mode
0-f Set operating channel from 11 to 26 (single channel mode)
Although the BeeMon monitor has known timeliness limitations, it can be a helpful
tool to analyze and debug time sensitive communication protocols that make use of the
IEEE 802.15.4 technology.
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